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SURVEY

a journal of East & West studies

Post-Industrial Society—A Symposium

Daniel Bell François Bourricaud Jean Floud
Giovanni Sartori Peter Wiles Ken'ichi Tominaga

Soviet Union Yesterday & Today

Robert Conquest Joseph Berger David E. Powell
Jonathan Harris Michael Scammell

Marxism & Intellectuals

Milovan Djilas Neil McInnes Lewis S. Feuer

International Scene

Harish Kapur Robert C. Horn

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Announcement

Beginning with the Winter 1971 issue, SURVEY will be published by OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS with the continuing support of the International Association for Cultural Freedom and the co-sponsorship of Stanford University. The journal will retain its focus of interest, but will be expanding its scope. As before, but rather more comprehensively, it will deal with general ideas and international affairs in the over-all framework of East-West relations. It will co-operate with Stanford University's Center for Russian and East European Studies and its Center for Research in International Studies. A new international Advisory Board consisting of eminent scholars and writers will be assisting in the formulation of long-term editorial plans. These will also include a series of regular seminars and international conferences to be held at Stanford. We welcome our new publishing and intellectual partners whose collaboration with SURVEY will enable our journal to extend its horizons and to support its growth in general readership and influence.

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Post-Industrial Society—A Symposium

In June, 1970, an international seminar in Zurich (convened by Professor Daniel Bell and Professor Ralf Dahrendorf and sponsored by the International Association for Cultural Freedom) discussed the implications of Professor Bell's thesis on 'Post-Industrial Society.' The construct itself is not a projection of complete social transformation; it does not deal with the political and cultural dimensions of society. It stresses three important points of change in the development of advanced industrial societies:*

1. A change from manufacturing to services in the economy indicated by the increased weight of the latter in the G.N.P., in the total labour force, etc.

2. The rise to predominance of a professional and technical class and the spread of technocratic forms of decision-making.

3. The codification of theoretical knowledge as the basis of innovation and policy-making in society, particularly in the relation of science to technology and of technical questions—economic or strategic—to public policy.

We publish below some of the papers presented at the seminar and some others written afterwards for SURVEY *by the participants. The symposium has an important bearing on the theoretical questions of sociology (whether of class or of elite) and on the practical questions of politics (the prospects for democratic participation, the significance of political and cultural differences between technologically advanced societies, the meaning of 'convergence'). It will continue in the next issue of* SURVEY *in which Professor Bell will also sum up his conclusions.*

Technocracy and Politics

Daniel Bell

'THE rational is real and the real is rational' is a famous phrase of Hegel's. By this he did not mean that the existent was real. As a post-Kantian philospher, he accepted the proposition that the empirical

* Professor Bell developed his thesis at length in a monograph 'The Measurement of Knowledge and Technology' in *Indicators of Social Change*, edited by Eleanor Sheldon and Wilbert Moore (published by the Russell Sage Foundation, New York 1969).

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reality was a flux, and that knowledge is gained only through the application of the *a priori* categories necessary to organize it. Thus, the 'real' is the underlying structure of concepts which make sense of the confusing froth of the present. For Hegel, the 'real' was the unfolding of rationality as the self-conscious reflective activity of mind, which gave men increasing power over nature, history, and self.

In a fundamental sense, the theme of rationality is also the major underpinning of sociological theory. For Durkheim, as he argued in his *Division of Labour*, the tendency of civilization is to become more rational, and this was a product of the greater degree of interdependence in the world and the syncretism of culture or secularization, which broke down parochial forms. In the writings of Max Weber, the concept of the rational, indeed, moves to the very centre of his sociology. In his last lectures, given in the winter of 1919–20, he points out that modern life is made up of 'rational accounting, rational technology, rational law, and with these a rationalistic economic ethic, the rational spirit and the rationalization of the conduct of life'.[1] Indeed, as Professor Talcott Parsons points out, 'the conception of a law of increasing rationality as a fundamental generalization about systems of action . . . is the most fundamental generalization that emerges from Weber's work'. And, drawing a curious parallel—or is it a prophecy?—Professor Parsons concludes: 'Rationality occupies a logical position in respect to action systems analogous to that of entropy in physical systems.'[2]

These conceptions of rationality are rooted in nineteenth-century ideas of man's relation to nature and society, and they are extensions, in one sense, of the conceptions of progress which had emerged at the end of the eighteenth century. Whatever their philosophical overtones, the concepts of rationality received a practical embodiment in industry—and in war. The development of every advanced industrial society, and the emergence of what I have called the post-industrial society, depends on the extension of a particular dimension of rationality. But it is precisely that definition of rationality which is being called into question today, and what I seek to do here is to trace the vicissitudes of that conception—the technocratic—as it relates to politics.[3]

LET me begin first with an extraordinary vision from the past. More than 150 years ago, the wildly brilliant, almost monomaniacal technocrat, Claude Henri de Rouvroy, Comte de Saint-Simon ('the last gentleman and the first socialist' of France), popularized the word industrialism to designate the emergent society, wherein wealth would be created by production and machinery rather than be seized through plunder and war. Past society, Saint-Simon said, had been military

[1] Max Weber, *General Economic History* (London, n.d.), p. 354.
[2] Talcott Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action* (New York, 1937), p. 752.
[3] The other tension, between the technocratic and the cultural, is discussed elsewhere in a work in progress, *The Disjunction of Culture and Social Structure.*

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society, in which the dominant figures were noblemen, soldiers, and priests, and the leading positions in the society were based either on control of the means of violence or on the manipulation of religious myth. In the new society, the 'natural elite' that would organize society in a rational, positivist fashion would be the industrialists (actually the engineers or technocrats), for the methods of industry were methods of order, precision, and certainty, rather than of metaphysical thought. In this society, ordered by function and capacity, 'the real noblemen would be industrial chiefs and the real priests would be scientists'.

The revolution which ended feudal society—the French Revolution—could have ushered in the industrial society, said Saint-Simon, but it did not do so because it had been captured by metaphysicians, lawyers, and sophists, men with a predilection for abstract slogans. What was needed, Saint-Simon added, was a breed of 'new men'—engineers, builders, planners—who would provide the necessary leadership. And since such leaders require some concrete inspiration, Saint-Simon, shortly before his death, commissioned Rouget de l'Isle, the composer of 'The Marseillaise', to write a new 'Industrial Marseillaise'. This 'Chant des Industriels', as it was called, had its première in 1821 before Saint-Simon and his friend Ternaus, the textile manufacturer, at the opening of a new textile factory in Saint-Ouen.

The episode takes on a somewhat comic air, especially when we read that a number of the count's followers established a new religious cult of Saint-Simonianism to canonize his teachings. (In the monastic castle to which the followers of Saint-Simon retreated, garments were buttoned down the back so that, in socialist fashion, each man would require the help of another in dressing. Thus was pedagogy reinforced by ritual.) And yet many of these very followers of Saint-Simon were also the men who, in the middle of the nineteenth century, redrew the industrial map of Europe.[4]

We may at this point leave the story of Saint-Simon and his followers to the curiosa of the history of ideas; but if, with the spirit rather than the method of Saint-Simon, one speculates on the shape of society 40 or 50 years from now, it becomes clear that the 'old' industrial order is passing and a 'new' society is indeed in the making. To speak rashly: if the dominant figures of the past 100 years have been the entrepreneur, the businessman, and the industrial executive, the new

[4] It is not too much to say, Professor F. H. Markham has written, 'that the Saint-Simonians were the most important single force behind the great economic expansion of the Second Empire, particularly in the development of banks and railways'. Enfantin, the most bizarre of the Saint-Simonians, formed the society for planning the Suez Canal. Former Saint-Simonians constructed many of the European railways—in Austria, Russia, and Spain. The brothers Emile and Isaac Pereire, who promoted the first French railway from Paris to Saint-Germain, also founded the Crédit Mobilier, the first industrial investment bank in France, as well as the great shipping company, the Compagnie Générale Transatlantique (the C.G.T. today sails the *Flandre* and the *France*), which gave its first ships the names of Saint-Simonian followers, including the *Saint-Simon* (1,987 tons). See F. H. Markham, *Henri Comte de Saint-Simon: Selected Writings* (Oxford, 1952).

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men are the scientists, the mathematicians, the economists, and the engineers of the new computer technology. And the dominant institutions of the new society—in the sense that they will provide the most creative challenges and enlist the richest talents—will be the intellectual institutions. The leadership of the new society will rest not with businessmen, or corporations as we know them (for a good deal of production will have been routinized), but with research corporations, industrial laboratories, experimental stations, and universities. In fact, the skeletal structure of the new society is already visible.

WE are now, in the USA, in the first stages of a post-industrial society. A post-industrial society can be characterized in several ways. We can begin with the fact that ours is no longer primarily a manufacturing economy. The service sector (comprising trade, finance, insurance and real estate; personal, professional, business and repair services; and general government) now accounts for more than half of the total employment and more than half of the gross national product. We are now a 'service economy'—i.e. the first nation in the history of the world in which more than half of the employed population is not involved in the production of food, clothing, houses, automobiles, and other tangible goods.

One can also look at a society not in terms of where people work but what kind of work they do, the occupational divisions. In a paper read to the Cambridge Reform Club in 1873, Alfred Marshall, the great neo-classical economist, posed a question that was implicit in the title of his paper, 'The Future of the Working Classes'. 'The question', he said, 'is not whether all men will ultimately be equal—that they certainly will not be—but whether progress may not go on steadily, if slowly, till, by occupation at least, every man is a gentleman.' And he answered his question: 'I hold that it may, and that it will.'

Marshall's criterion for a gentleman—in the broad, rather than the traditional genteel, sense—meant that heavy, excessive, and soul-destroying labour would vanish, and the worker would then begin to value education and leisure. Apart from any qualitative assessment of contemporary culture, it is clear, if the first part of his definition still holds, that Marshall's question is well on the way to being answered. The manual and unskilled worker class is shrinking in the society, while at the other end of the continuum the class of knowledge workers is becoming predominant in the new society.

IN identifying a new and emerging social system, it is not only in the portents and social trends, such as the move away from manufacturing or the rise of new social relationships, that one seeks to understand fundamental social change. Rather it is in the defining characteristic of a new system. In the post-industrial society, what is crucial is not just a shift from property or political criteria to knowledge as the base of new power, but a change in the *character* of knowledge itself. What

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has now become decisive for society is the new centrality of *theoretical* knowledge, the primacy of theory over empiricism, and the codification of knowledge into abstract systems of symbols that can be translated into many different and varied circumstances. Every society now lives by innovation and growth, and it is theoretical knowledge that has become the matrix of innovation. With the growing sophistication of simulation procedures, through the use of computers—simulations of economic systems, of social behaviour, of decision problems—we have the possibility, for the first time, of large-scale 'controlled experiments' in the social sciences. These, in turn, will allow us to plot alternative futures in different courses, thus greatly increasing the extent to which we can choose and control matters that affect our life.

In all this, the university, the place where theoretical knowledge is sought, tested, and codified in a disinterested way, becomes the primary institution of the new society. Perhaps it is not too much to say that if the business firm was the key institution of the past 100 years, because of its role in organizing production for the mass creation of products, the university will become the central institution of the next 100 years because of its role as the new source of innovation and knowledge.

To say that the primary institutions of the new age will be intellectual is not to say that the majority of persons will be scientists, engineers, technicians, or intellectuals. The majority of individuals in contemporary society are not businessmen, yet one can say that this has been a 'business civilization'. The basic values of society have been focused on business institutions, the largest rewards have been found in business, and the strongest power has been held by the business community, although today that power is to some extent shared within the factory by the trade union, and regulated within the society by the political order. In the most general ways, however, the major decisions affecting the day-to-day life of the citizen—the kinds of work available, the location of plants, investment decisions on new products, the distribution of tax burdens, occupational mobility—have been made by business, and more recently by government, which gives major priority to the welfare of business.

To say that the major institutions of the new society will be intellectual is to say that production and business decisions will be subordinated to, or will derive from, other forces in society; that the crucial decisions regarding the growth of the economy and its balance will come from government, but they will be based on the government's sponsorship of research and development, of cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit analysis; that the making of decisions, because of the intricately linked nature of their consequences, will have an increasingly technical character. The husbanding of talent and the spread of educational and intellectual institutions will become a prime concern for the society; not only the best talents but eventually the entire complex of prestige and status will be rooted in the intellectual and scientific communities.

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IT is foolhardy to give dates to social processes (when, and by what criteria, can one say that capitalism eclipsed feudalism, at least in the economic sphere?), but our self-consciousness about time, which is itself an aspect of modernity, urges us to seek some symbolic points that mark the emergence of a new social understanding. Alfred Whitehead once remarked that the nineteenth century was dead by the 1880s, and the 1870s was its last lush decade. One could also say that the period from 1880 to 1945 was the period in which the old Western ideologies exploded, culminating in the dreadful travails of fascism and communism as they rode the new Leviathan.

The new period since the end of the Second World War has produced a new consciousness about time and social change. One might well say that 1945 to 1950 were the 'birth-years', symbolically, of the post-industrial society.

To begin with, the transformation of matter into explosive energy at Hiroshima made the world dramatically aware of the power of science. (It was a demonstration, Gerald Holton has written, 'that a chain of operations, starting in a scientific laboratory, can result in an event of the scale and suddenness of a mythological occurrence'.)[5] In 1946, the first digital computer, the ENIAC, was completed at the Government proving grounds in Aberdeen, Maryland, and it was soon followed by the MANIAC, the JOHNIAC, and, within a decade, ten thousand more. Never in the history of invention has a new discovery taken hold so quickly, and spread into so many areas of use, as the computer. In 1947, Norbert Wiener published his *Cybernetics*, which spelled out the principles of self-regulating mechanisms and self-adjusting systems. If the atom bomb proved the power of pure physics, the combination of the computer and cybernetics has opened the way to a new 'social physics'—a set of techniques, through control and communications theory, to construct a *tableau entier* for the arrangement of decisions and choices. In fact, it is not altogether fanciful to suggest that just as the 100 years before 1945 were dominated by machine technology, so the next 100 years may be shaped by a new 'intellectual technology',

[5] Contrast the role of science in the Second World War with the First World War. In *Modern Science and Modern Man*, James Bryant Conant, who before becoming a distinguished educator was a prominent chemist, tells the story that when the United States entered the First World War, a representative of the American Chemical Society called on Newton D. Baker, then Secretary of War, and offered the services of the chemists to the government. He was thanked and asked to come back the next day, when he was told that the offer was unnecessary since the War Department already had a chemist.

When President Wilson appointed a consulting board to assist the Navy, it was chaired by Thomas Edison, and this appointment was widely hailed for bringing the best brains of science to the solution of naval problems. The solitary physicist on the board owed his appointment to the fact that Edison, in choosing his fellow members, had said to President Wilson: 'We might have one mathematical fellow in case we have to calculate something out'. In fact, as R. T. Birge reports (in his study 'Physics and Physicists of the Past Fifty Years', in *Physics Today*, 1956), during the First World War there was no classification of physicist; when the armed forces felt the need for one, which was only occasionally, he was hired as a chemist.

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which, by systems analysis, simulation, game theory, decision theory, programming, and other methods hitched to a computer, will lay out a new compass of the rationality of means.

In those years, the basic relationships between science and government were laid out with the creation of the Atomic Energy Commission and the National Science Foundation. Through these agencies, commitments have led to enormous government spending in research and development, and to the underwriting of large laboratories and research stations through a variety of creative new social forms—university facilities, non-profit corporations, university consortiums, and the like.

If we turn from the dramatic change in science to the prosaic realm of political economy, new techniques and new commitments were forged during those crucial years from 1945 to 1950. The concept of Gross National Product (G.N.P.), the basic tool for all macroscopic economic analysis, was first used in 1945, although the term had been announced in President Roosevelt's budget message to Congress the previous year. In 1946, Congress passed a Full Employment Act, which established a Council of Economic Advisors and stated, as a matter of national policy, that each man had a right to a job, and that society had the responsibility of maintaining full employment. By 1950 Wassily Leontief had outlined his input-output tables, which provide a planning grid for the entire economy. Mathematicians and economists at RAND had worked out the techniques of linear and dynamic programming to give us queuing techniques in production decisions. Technical economics had become inextricably intertwined with public policy, especially through the Council of Economic Advisors.

If one looks beyond the provincial horizon of one's own country, one also sees in these years the emergence of an entirely new world system, with the creation of the *tiers monde* and the fateful relationship of former colonial countries to once imperial powers; the self-conscious recognition of the idea of development—economic, political, and social; the beginning awareness that such social-system terms as capitalism and socialism may be part of a more inclusive social process within the rubrics of industrialization and bureaucratization, and even that these societies, as variants of industrial systems, may be converging in the pattern of their economies into some new kind of centralized-decentralized market-planning system.

Finally, there has occurred what is perhaps the most pervasive change in moral temper—a new 'future-orientation' on the part of all nations and social systems. Some observers have seen the dawn of a new universal history in the fact that all societies, for the first time, are creating common technological foundations. Of course, economic, political, and cultural diversities among nations are still far too great for us to be able to see a single world society, at least within this next century. And yet common foundations are being laid, particularly in the establishing of international scientific communities, and common aspirations are being voiced. The common thread is the orientation to

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the future and the recognition that men have the technological and scientific possibility of controlling the changes in their lives consciously, and by social decision. But such conscious control does not mean the 'end of history', the escape, so to speak, from necessity, which Hegel and Marx emphasized in man's relation to nature, but the beginning of vastly more complicated problems than men have ever faced before.

IT was once exceedingly rare to be able to observe the formation of institutions *de novo*. Social change was crescive and slow-moving. Adaptations were piecemeal and contradictory, the process of diffusion halting, the spread of rationalization difficult and cumbersome. In his reflections on history 35 years ago, Paul Valéry, the quintessential Frenchman of letters, remarked:

> There is nothing easier than to point out the absence from history books, of major phenomena which were imperceptible owing to the slowness of their evolution. They escape the historian's notice because no document expressly mentions them . . .
>
> An event which takes shape over a century will not be found in any document or collection of memoirs . . .
>
> Such was the discovery of electricity and the conquest of the world by its applications. Events of this nature, unparalleled in human history, appear in it—only as something less noticeable than some more spectacular happening, some happening, above all, more in conformity with what traditional history usually reports. Electricity in Napoleon's day had about the same importance as, in the days of Tiberius, could have been ascribed to Christianity. It is gradually becoming apparent that the general innervation of the world by electricity is more fraught with consequences, more capable of modifying life in the near future, than all of the so-called 'political' events which have happened from Ampere's day to the present time.[6]

Today, not only are we aware of trying to identify processes of change, even when they cannot be dated, but there has been a speeding up of the 'time-machine', so that the intervals between the initial forces of change and their application have been radically reduced. A study of 20 major technological innovations that have had a substantial economic and/or social impact during the last 60 to 70 years indicates that every step in the process of technological development and diffusion has accelerated during this period. Specifically:

> The average time span between the initial discovery of a new technological innovation and the recognition of its commercial potential decreased from 30 years (for technological innovations introduced during the early part of this century, 1880–1919) to 16 years (for innovations introduced during the post-First World War period) to nine years (for the post-Second World War period).

[6] Paul Valéry, *Reflections on the World Today* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1948), p. 16.

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> The time required to translate a basic technical discovery into a commercial product or process decreased from seven to five years during the 60–70 year time period investigated.
>
> The rate of diffusion (measured by economic growth) for technological innovations introduced during the post-Second World War period was approximately twice the rate for post-First World War innovations and four times the rate for innovations introduced during the early part of this century.[7]

Perhaps the most important social change of our time is a process of direct and deliberate contrivance. Men now seek to anticipate change, measure the course of its direction and its impact, control it, and even shape it for predetermined ends. 'The transformation of society' is no longer an abstract phrase but a process in which governments are actively engaged on a highly conscious basis. The industrialization of Japan by the old Samurai class was an action aimed at transforming an agrarian economy from the top, and it succeeded remarkably because of the disciplined nature of social relationships that had existed in post-Meiji restoration society. The extraordinary upheavals in the Soviet Union, more ruthless and more concentrated in time than the changes in any other society in history, were carried out on the basis of specific plans, in which the movements of the population, as well as industrial targets, were plotted on social charts. The breakdown of the old colonial system has brought about, since the end of the Second World War, the creation of almost 50 new countries, many of them committed abstractly to the idea of 'socialism', in which the creation of new industrial and urban economies is the fundamental agenda of the new elites. And in the older Western societies we have seen the emergence of planning in more differentiated forms, whether it be target plans, indicative planning, induced investment, or simply economic growth and full employment.

In all these diverse activities, the fundamental themes are rationality, planning, and foresight—the hallmarks, in short, of the technocratic age. In all this, the vision of Saint-Simon seemingly has begun to bear fruit.

IN France, where the idea of technocracy has been more widely talked about than in any other country, it has been defined as 'a political system in which the determining influence belongs to technicians of the administration and of the economy', and a technocrat, in turn, is 'a man who exercises authority by virtue of his technical competence'.[8]

[7] 'The Rate of Development and Diffusion of Technology', by Frank Lynn, Appendix, Volume II, Studies prepared for the National Commission on Technology, Automation and Economic Progress, U.S. Government Printing Office, February, 1966, p. 33.

[8] *Dictionnaire alphabetique et analogique de la Langue Française* (Paris: Société du Nouveau Littré, 1964); and *Grand Larousse Encyclopédique* (Paris, 1964).

The word *technocracy* itself was first coined in 1919 by William Henry Smyth, an inventor and engineer in Berkeley, California, in three articles published in the *Industrial Management*. These were reprinted in a pamphlet, and later included with nine more articles, written for the *Berkeley Gazette* in a larger reprint. The word

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But a technocratic mind-view, one can say with some sense of paradox, is more than just a matter of technique. In its emphasis on the logical, practical, problem-solving, instrumental, orderly, and disciplined approach to objectives, in its reliance on a calculus, on precision and measurement and a concept of a system, it is a world-view quite opposed to the traditional and customary religious, aesthetic, and intuitive modes. It draws deeply from the Newtonian world-view, and the eighteenth-century writers who inherited Newton's thought did indeed believe, as Hume has Cleanthes say in his *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, that the author of Nature must be something of an engineer, since Nature is a machine; and they believed, further, that within a short time the rational method would make all thought amenable to its laws.[9] Bernard de Fontenelle, the popularizer of Cartesianism, precipitated a gory conflict with the humanists (reflected in Jonathan Swift's *Battle of the Books*) when he declared: 'The geometric spirit is not so bound up with geometry that it cannot be disentangled and carried into other fields. A work of morals, of politics, of criticism, perhaps even of eloquence, will be the finer, other things being equal, if it is written by the hands of a geometer.'[10]

The most comprehensive statement of this world-view was made by an unexpected precursor of the technocratic ideology, the nineteenth-century mathematician Augustin Cournot, who is better known for his applications of mathematics to economics than for his writings on history. But as he interpreted the rise of technological civilization, Cournot saw a general movement in history from the vital to the rational. He foresaw an era of mechanization which would be 'post-historic', since universal rationalization would provide a stability to

was taken over by Howard Scott, a one-time research director for the Industrial Workers of the World, and was popularized in 1933–34, when Technocracy flashed briefly as a social movement and a panacea for the depression. The word became associated with Scott, and through him retrospectively with Thorstein Veblen, who, after writing of *The Engineers and the Price System*, was briefly associated with Scott in an educational venture at the New School for Social Research in 1919–20. Interestingly, when the word became nationally popular through Scott, it was repudiated by Smyth, who claimed that Scott's use of the word fused *technology* and *autocrat*, 'rule by technicians responsible to no one', whereas his original word implied 'the rule of the people made effective through the agency of their servants, the scientists and technicians'.

For the origin of the term, see William H. Smyth, *Technocracy Explained by its Originator*, San Francisco Chronicle, 1933, and J. George Frederick, ed., *For and Against Technocracy: A Symposium* (New York, 1933). For a discussion of the relations between Veblen and Scott, see my introduction, "Veblen and the New Class," to the Harbinger edition of *The Engineers and the Price System* (New York, 1965).

[9] It should be pointed out, however, that de la Mettrie, the author of the famous book *Man the Machine*, died of overeating and gout; he stoked the machine too well.

[10] Mindful, perhaps, of some of the hubris of the past, Norbert Wiener, 13 years after the publication of his *Cybernetics*, warned his readers not against the inadequacies of the machine but against its possible success. 'We have already made very successful machines of the lowest logical type with a rigid policy', he wrote. 'We are beginning to make machines of the second logical type, where the policy itself improves with learning. In the construction of operative machines,

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society that resulted from the erosion of instincts and passions and the perfection of administration. In this post-historic era, statistics would more and more be substituted for history as a means of studying human events.[11]

Man's progress towards greater rationality was, of course, the theme of Max Weber, who in his great sociological canvas of Western history saw in the rationalization of law, of economics, of violence, of administration—a law of increasing rationality was his fundamental generalization about the convergence of all systems of action—a parallel with the second law of thermodynamics. Societies, Weber said, are changed when there is an infusion of charismatic energy which breaks the bounds of old traditional constraints, but in the 'routinization of charisma', the stock of energy is consumed until, at the end, there is only a dead mechanism, and the administrators of the system become 'sensualists without spirit, specialists without heart, a nullity . . .'.[12]

But it is in this conception of rationality as functional, as rationalization rather than 'reason', that one confronts the overriding crisis of the technocratic mode. The virtue of a belief in History was that some law of reason was operative: history had either a teleology as defined by Revelation, or some powers of emergence or transcendence that were implicit in man's creativity. In Hegel, the 'cunning of reason' was the evolution of man's self-consciousness—the end of the mystery of 'objectification' wherein men made things, idols, gods, societies 'outside' of themselves, and often worshipped them as fetishes—so that, finally, he could 'recognize himself in a world he has himself made'. Thus the end of history—the overcoming of nature, and the overcoming of the duality of subject and object which divided the 'self'—was the beginning of freedom, of courses of individual and social action that would no longer be subject to any determinism. However metaphorical these sentiments were—though

there is no foreseeable limit with respect to logical type, nor is it safe to make a pronouncement about the exact level at which the brain is superior to the machine'. But even though a completely 'intelligent' machine is still far off in the future, the immediate problem, Wiener said, is that while machines do not transcend man's intelligence, they do transcend men in the performance of tasks. 'We have seen', he pointed out, 'that one of the chief causes of the disastrous consequences in the use of the learning machine is that man and machine operate on two distinct time scales, so that the machine is much faster than man and the two do not gear together without some serious difficulties. Problems of the same sort arise whenever two control operators on very different time scales act together, irrespective of which system is faster and which system is slower.' (See Norbert Wiener, "Some Moral and Technical Consequences of Automation," *Science*, May, 1960).

The point would seem to be that when a machine is constructed to absorb its incoming data at a pace faster than it can be fed, we may not, like the sorcerer's apprentice, think of turning it off until it is too late.

11 On Cournot, see George Friedman, 'Les Technocrates et la civilisation technicienne', in *Industrialisation et Technocratie*, edited by Georges Gurvitch (Paris: A. Colin).

12 The most comprehensive discussion of Weber's 'increasing law of rationality' can be found in Talcott Parsons, *Structure of Social Action*. The phrase at the end of the paragraph is from Weber's conclusion to *The Protestant Ethic*.

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they were quite realistic in their picture of man's slavish dependencies in the past—they did posit some ends to the march of rationality.

SAINT-SIMON, the 'father' of technocracy, had a vision of the future society that made him a Utopian in the eyes of Marx. Society would be a scientific-industrial association whose goal would be the highest productive effort to conquer nature and to achieve the greatest possible benefits for all. Men would become happy in their natural abilities. The ideal industrial society would by no means be classless, for individuals were unequal in ability and in capacity. But social divisions would follow actual abilities, as opposed to the artificial divisions of previous societies, and individuals would find happiness and liberty in working at the job to which they were best suited. With every man in his natural place, each would obey his superior spontaneously, as one obeyed one's doctor, for a superior was defined by a higher technical capacity. In the industrial society, there would be three major divisions of work, corresponding, in the naïve yet almost persuasive psychology of Saint-Simon, to three major psychological types. The majority of men were of the motor-capacity type, and they would become the labourers of the industrial society; within this class, the best would become the production leaders and administrators of society. The second type was the rational one, and men of this capacity would become the scientists, discovering new knowledge and writing the laws that were to guide men. The third type was the sensory, and these men would be the artists and religious leaders. This last class, Saint-Simon believed, would bring a new religion of collective worship to the people and overcome individual egoism. It was in work and in carnival that men would find satisfaction, and in this positivist Utopia, society, in the famous vision of Saint-Simon, would move from the governing of men to the administration of things.

But in the evolution of technocratic thinking, things began to ride men. For Frederick W. Taylor, the founder of scientific management, who was perhaps most responsible for the translation of technocratic modes into the actual practices of industry, any notion of ends other than production and efficiency of output was almost non-existent. Taylor believed strongly that 'status must be based upon superior knowledge rather than nepotism and superior financial power', and in his idea of functional foremanship he asserted that influence and leadership should be based on technical competence rather than on any other criteria.

Out of Taylor's reflections (and his own compulsive character) came the idea of scientific time-study and, more broadly, the measurement of work—for it is with the measurement of work and the idea of unit cost, rather than with the introduction of the factory as such, that modern industry gained distinctive meaning as a new way of life.

Taylor's principles were based upon the following: the time it takes to do a specific job; incentives and bonus systems for exceeding norms;

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differential rates of pay based on job evaluation; the standardization of tools and equipment; the fitting of men to jobs on the basis of physical and mental tests; and the removal of all planning and scheduling from the work floor itself into a new planning and scheduling department, a new superstructure, the responsibility for which was in the hands of the engineer.

By setting 'scientific' standards, Taylor felt that he could specify the 'one best way' or the 'natural laws' of work, and so remove the basic source of antagonism between worker and employer—the question of what is 'fair' or 'unfair'.[13] But in his view of work, man disappeared, and all that remained was 'hands' and 'things' arranged on the basis of minute scientific examination along a detailed division of labour wherein the smallest unit of motion and the smallest unit of time became the measure of a man's contribution to work.

IN Marxism, another great source of technocratic thought, the same dissolution of ends, and concentration on means alone, also appears. Hegel had seen man's growth as an ideational process in which self-consciousness triumphed over limited dependencies of subjectivity and objectification. Marx naturalized this historic process by seeing man's growth in material and technical powers, in the growth of his means over nature. But what would this lead to? In his earlier works Marx had envisioned socialism as a state where a man would be a hunter in the morning, a fisherman in the afternoon—and perhaps a superior lover at night; in which there would be no distinction between mental and physical work or between town and country. The single image of socialism for Marx, by and large, was the end of the division of labour, which he saw as one of the sources, along with private property, of the alienation of men from society. But in his later writings these naive ideas had vanished, and Marx, in his conception of man as 'emergent', assumed that new powers would be created and new visions of life would be achieved which his own generation, limited by nature and human frailty, could not yet envisage. And so, the ends of history were left ambiguous.

In Lenin, who bears the same relation to Marx that Taylor does to Saint-Simon, the conception of ends disappears almost completely. For Lenin was the superb technician of power. The creator of the disciplined party and the cadre, Lenin was able to create a flexible instrument of revolution and subversion which could lash hundreds of thousands, even millions, of persons into action. But once the power had been won, only a fumbling and incoherent vision of the future

[13] See *The Principles of Scientific Management*, by Frederick W. Taylor, p. 10, reprinted in the compendium *Scientific Management* (Harper & Bros.: New York, 1947).

Interestingly enough, Taylor's condemnation of 'waste and confusion' made him seem progressive to many young engineers, and one of Taylor's chief disciples, Morris T. Cooke, became a link with Veblen. See my essay, 'Veblen and the New Class', op. cit.

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could be detected. In *State and Revolution*, written as the first manual of socialism, Lenin assumed that running a society would be as simple as running the post office, and administration would become so simple that any shoemaker could be an executive.

When the power had finally been secured in a war-torn, broken-down country, Lenin's formula for socialism turned out to be only Soviet power plus electrification.[14] The irony of it is that today in the Soviet Union, as in the other communist countries, the chief demand of individuals is for private cars, individual homes, and other personal possessions. But the nature and condition of work represent no flowering of socialist humanism as it was envisaged in the past. Work, like all production, has become geared to a consumption society and to turning out larger and greater quantities of goods.

In the technocratic mode, the ends have become simply efficiency and output. The ends have become means and they exist in themselves. The technocratic mode has become established because it is the mode of efficiency—of production, of programme, of 'getting things done'. For these reasons, the technocratic mode is bound to spread in our society. But whether the technocrats themselves will become a dominant class, and how the technocratic mode might be challenged, are different questions, which we must now consider.

IT was the root idea of Saint-Simon, Auguste Comte, and Herbert Spencer, the theorists of industrial society, that there was a radical opposition between the industrial spirit and the military spirit. The one emphasized work, production, rationality, the other display, waste, and heroics. Out of technology, economizing, and investment would come productivity as the basis of increasing wealth for all, rather

[14] Lenin, as is well known, was strongly attracted to the ideas of Frederick W. Taylor. In an address in June 1919 on 'Scientific Management and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat', he stated: 'The possibility of socialism will be determined by our success in combining Soviet rule and Soviet organization or management with the latest progressive measures of capitalism. We must introduce in Russia the study and teaching of the Taylor system and its systematic trial and adoption.' (See the discussion in *The End of Ideology*, Glencoe, Illinois: 1960, p. 253. More of this can be gleaned from some newly discovered materials from Lenin's archives.

During 1969, in preparation for the 1970 centenary of Lenin's birth, the Soviet press devoted considerable space to this material from Lenin's archive on the first few months of the new Soviet government. In an article in *Komsomolskaya Pravda* for January 11, 1969, V. Chikin takes off from a 'unique Lenin album', which is being completed by scholars from the central Party archives, on Lenin's efforts to work out 'just principles and a judicious system of government management', and the author draws on some 'rough notes and instructions, newspaper articles and detailed reports' to make the following observation: 'Ilyich [Lenin] sets himself the special goal of teaching practicality to the Bolshevik leaders who had not yet broken out of the sweet captivity of revolutionary romanticism. He notes to himself: "Practicality and efficiency as a slogan." And knocking the "romantics" right out, he advances a completely unexpected formula for socialism: "To scoop up with both hands the best from abroad: Soviet power + the Prussian railway system plus American technique and the organization of trusts + American education, etc., etc. + + = Σ = socialism." True, to judge from the evidence of eyewitnesses, the first efforts to "Americanize" the office work in the CPC [Council

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than exploitation and plunder as the means of seizing wealth from others. In ancient society, work was subordinated to war and the warrior ruled; in industrial society, life would become pacific and the producer would rule.

The irony is that although the economizing spirit—the deployment of limited resources to attain maximum results—has indeed spread throughout society as Schumpeter and others have argued, war rather than peace has been in large part responsible for the acceptance of planning and technocratic modes in government. The rise of the mass army, beginning with the Conscription Act passed in 1789 by the French revolutionary government—a system followed by every major power in the nineteenth century except Great Britain and the United States—set forth new modes of organization and supply. War and the mass army have supplied the model, too, for the most curious of social schemes. In 1795, for example, Gracchus Babeuf, the fiery conspiratorial leader of the extreme left-wing of the Jacobin movement, outlined his picture of collective economic planning as follows: All workers would be classified according to the type of work. Society would have exact information on what everyone was doing so that there would be neither underproduction nor overproduction. Society would determine the number of persons to be employed in any particular branch of industry. All would be apportioned to the needs of the present, and to the requirements of the future in the light of

of Peoples Commissars] had no success.' (I am indebted to Paul Zinner for the citation and to Colette Shulman for the translation.)

A technocratic mind-view, one might say, is not only a doctrine but also a temperament. Just as one can observe the awesome obsessiveness in Taylor, so one sees the compulsive orderliness in Lenin. A recently published memoir by Nikolay Valentinov, who spent several months with Lenin in Geneva in 1904, provides a vivid picture of his personality: 'In his "normal" condition, Lenin tended towards an orderly life, free from all excesses. He wanted it to be regular, with precisely fixed hours for meals, sleep, work, and leisure. He did not smoke or drink, and looked after his health doing physical exercises every day. He was order and neatness incarnate. Every morning, before he settled down to read the newspapers, write, and work, Lenin, duster in hand, would put his desk and his books in order. He sewed any loose buttons on his coat or trousers himself, without bothering Krupskaya (his wife). If he found a stain on his suit, he immediately tried to remove it with petrol. He kept his bicycle as clean as a surgical instrument. In this "normal" condition Lenin would have appeared to any observer as the most sober, balanced, and well-disciplined of men, without passions, repelled by slovenliness, and in particular by Bohemian ways. "I have already got used to the way of life in Cracow: it is limited, quiet and sleepy," he wrote to his relatives in 1913. "No matter how godforsaken this town may be, I like it better than in Paris."'

Lenin's didactic utilitarian yardstick is also revealed in a comment of another Russian revolutionist, Vorovsky, to Valentinov: '... Lenin knows none of Goethe's works except *Faust*. He divides literature into two parts: what he needs, and he doesn't need . . . he has managed to find time to read all the volumes of *Znanie* (Knowledge) (a popular literary miscellany) while he has consciously ignored Dostoyevsky: "I haven't got time for this rubbish!" After reading *Memoirs from the House of the Dead* and *Crime and Punishment*, he felt no desire to read *The Possessed* and *The Brothers Karamazov*. "I know the subject of both of those malodorous works . . . I looked through [*The Possessed*] and threw it away. I don't read such literature—what good is it to me?"' Nikolay Valentinov, *Encounters with Lenin* Oxford University Press, 1968, pp. 147 and 49–50.

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probable increases in population. All real needs would be exactly investigated and fully satisfied, thanks to the swift transport of goods to all localities and over all distances. And where was all this drawn from? From the experience of revolutionary France at war, from the logistical plan for the organization of supplies for an army of 1,200,000 men divided into 12 widely dispersed points.

Instead of peace, every industrial society has a *Wehrwirtschaft*, a term for which, significantly, there is no adequate English translation, but which we could call, perhaps, a 'preparedness economy', or a mobilized society. A mobilized society is one in which the major resources of the country are concentrated on a few specific objectives defined by the government. In these sectors, private needs are in effect subordinated to the mobilized goals and the role of private decision is reduced almost to nothing. The Soviet Union is a mobilized society *par excellence*. Most of the 'new states', in their quest for modernization, have become mobilized: the basic resources of the society—capital and trained manpower—are geared to planned economic change.

IN recent years, America has taken on the features of a mobilized polity in that one of the crucial scarce resources, that of 'research and development'—and more specifically the work of most of the scientists and engineers in research and development—is tied to the requirements of the Military and of war preparedness. The United States has not done this by outright commandeering of talents, or by restricting the right of nongovernmental units to engage in R & D. But since R & D is always a risk, in that no immediate payoffs or profits are assured, and the costs of R & D have become astronomical, few institutions other than the government can underwrite such expenditures. And the government has been compelled to do so because of the extraordinary revolutions in the art of war that have occurred since 1945.

In one sense, as Herman Kahn has pointed out, military technology has supplanted the 'mode of production', in Marx's use of the term, as a major determinant of social structure. Since the end of the second world war there have been almost three total revolutions in military technology, with complete and across-the-board replacement of equipment, as older weapons systems were phased out without being used. Neither the first world war nor the Second World War represented such complete breaks in continuity.

The sources of these accelerated revolutions—changes in the character of atomic weapons, from manned bombers to missiles, from fixed missiles to roving missiles and from medium range to intercontinental missiles—has been the concentration of research and development and concerted planning for new systems of weaponry. And the technology of 'custom-crafted' missile construction, as against bombers, was a chief element in changing the 'production-mix' of

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the aerospace industry labour force, so much so that the Budget Bureau Report on Defense Contracting (the David Bell Report of 1962) estimated that the ratio of engineers and scientists to production workers in the aerospace industry was roughly one-to-one.

In the Economic Report of the President presented to Congress in January 1963, President Kennedy declared: 'The defense, space and atomic energy activities of the country absorb about two-thirds of the trained people available for exploring our scientific and technical frontiers. . . . In the course of meeting scientific challenges so brilliantly, we have paid a price by sharply limiting the scarce scientific and engineering resources available to the civilian sectors of the American economy.' By now it is likely that President Kennedy's estimates were too low, and if one looks at R & D alone, about three-fourths of the engineering and scientific brains of the country are devoting themselves primarily to projects that derive from a mobilized polity.

But it is not only in the engulfing of technology that a significant change has taken place; there has been similar change in the modes of decision-making which has brought the technocratic figures to the fore. It is the McNamara 'revolution' that has transformed military logistics, and for this reason one can say that McNamara joins Saint-Simon and Frederick W. Taylor as a hierophant in the pantheon of technocracy.

In the days before the revolutions in military technology, an airplane might be designed by the Air Force and farmed out to a private contractor. It was common practice in the 1950s for the Air Force to pay the development costs of four or five planes and then choose one for quantity production. All of this was possible so long as the development costs (designs, tools, mockups) of a single prototype were about $100 million. By 1956 this cost had increased by a factor of five, and over the same period the estimated cost of a single missile had increased by a factor of 50. By the time Robert McNamara became Secretary of Defense, costs had risen so enormously that some system of 'value engineering'—computing the cost-effectiveness ratios of alternate weapons systems—had to be introduced.

In the long run, the 'systems revolution' in the Pentagon may turn out to have been as vital to the spread of technocratic thinking as any combination of numbers of the scientific personnel within military projects. For what it did was to introduce a new form of rationalization of governmental structure. The key idea, of course, is not just cost-effectiveness, but assessing the value of a weapons system in different kinds of programmes and objectives. In the system of programme budgeting, the entire structure of line-item budgets, which had been traditionally organized, was overhauled to serve 'functional' programmes.[15] The system of programme budgeting adopted by the

[15] Thus, the American defence effort is organized not along the traditional lines of Army, Navy, and Air Force, but in nine basic programmes: Strategic Retaliatory Forces, Continental Air and Missile Defence Forces, General Purposes Forces, Airlift and Sealift Forces, Reserve and National Guard Forces, Research and Development, down into 'programme elements' (there are now 800 such elements in the

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Department of Defense proved so successful that in May 1966 President Johnson ordered all departments and agencies of the government to reorganize their fiscal arrangements on the basis of the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System.

In a technical sense, there can be little quarrel with an effort to regroup in some logical fashion the scattered efforts of government programmes and put them down in some systematic form. In the fiscal 1965 budget, for example, funds for education were dispersed through more than 40 agencies. The expenditures of the U.S. Office of Education constituted only one-fifth of the total federal education budget. A programme-budgeting system can thus unify what constitutes the education programme of the American government. The difficulty arises, however, when one goes one step further and tries to discover, within a narrow economic calculus of cost-effectiveness techniques, the social value of one programme as against another. Expenditures for defence may constitute the first line on a federal budget because, in the language of utility theory, defence constitutes a 'single-peaked preference curve' in which the society, by and large, is agreed on the importance—and priority—of these efforts. But what about the situations in which there is no such agreement—such as science policy, or social policy, or welfare policy? How does one decide? When men have different valuations, how does one choose? For this the technocratic view has no answer.

DECISIONS are a matter of power, and the crucial questions in any society are: *Who* holds power, and *how* is power held? Forty-five years ago, Thorstein Veblen, in his *Engineers and the Price System*, foresaw a new society based on technical organization and industrial management, a 'soviet of technicians', as he put it in the striking language he loved to use in order to scare and mystify the academic world. In making this prediction, Veblen shared the illusion of that earlier technocrat, Henri de Saint-Simon, that the complexity of the industrial system and the indispensability of the technician made military and political revolutions a thing of the past. 'Revolutions in the eighteenth century', Veblen wrote, 'were military and political; and the Elder Statesmen who now believe themselves to be making history still believe that revolutions can be made and unmade by the same ways and means in the twentieth century. But any substantial or effectual overturn in the twentieth century will necessarily be an industrial overturn, and by the same token, any twentieth century revolution can be combatted or neutralized only by industrial ways and means.'

If a revolution were to come about in the United States—as a

Defence Budget) which are intended to accomplish common missions. The original rationale is laid down in a book by Charles Hitch and Roland McKean, *The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960). A more extended application of the concept is contained in the Rand volume, edited by David Novick, *Program Budgeting—Program Analysis and the Federal Budget* (Cambridge, Mass., 1965).

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practised sceptic, Veblen was highly dubious of that prospect—it would not be led by a minority political party, as in Soviet Russia, which was a loose-knit and backward industrial region, nor would it come from the trade-union 'votaries of the dinner pail', who, as a vested interest themselves, simply sought to keep prices up and labour supply down. It would occur, he said, along the lines 'already laid down by the material conditions of its productive industry'. And, turning this Marxist prism to his own perceptions, Veblen continued: 'These main lines of revolutionary strategy are lines of technical organization and industrial management; essentially lines of industrial engineering; such as will fit the organization to take care of the highly technical industrial system that constitutes the indispensable material foundation of any modern civilized community.'

The heart of Veblen's assessment of the revolutionary class is thus summed up in his identification of the 'production engineers' as the indispensable 'General Staff of the industrial system'. 'Without their immediate and unremitting guidance and correction the industrial system will not work. It is a mechanically organized structure of the technical processes designed, installed, and conducted by the production engineers. Without them and their constant attention to the industrial equipment, the mechanical appliances of industry, will foot up to just so much junk.'

This syndicalist idea that revolution in the twentieth century could only be an 'industrial overturn' exemplifies the fallacy in so much of Veblen's thought. For as we have learned, no matter how technical social processes may be, the crucial turning points in a society occur in a political form. It is not the technocrat who ultimately holds power, but the politician.

The major changes which have re-shaped American society over the past 30 years—the creation of a managed economy, a welfare society, and a mobilized polity—grew out of political responses: in the first instances to accommodate the demands of economically insecure and disadvantaged groups—the farmers, workers, Negroes and the poor—for protection from the hazards of the market; and, later, because of the concentration of resources and political objectives following the mobilized postures of the Cold War and the space race.

ALL of this opens up a broader and more theoretical perspective about the changing nature of class and social position in American society. A class, in the final sense, means not a specific group of persons but a system which has institutionalized the ground rules for acquiring, holding, and transferring power and its attendant privileges. In Western society, the dominant system has been property, guaranteed and safeguarded by the legal order, and transmitted through a system of marriage and family. But over the last 25 to 50 years, the property system has been breaking up. In American society today, there are three co-existing modes of power and social

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mobility, and this baffles students of society who seek to tease out overlapping and often conflicting social positions. There is the historic mode of property as the basis of wealth and power, with inheritance as the major route of access. There is also, however, technical skill as the basis of power and position, with education as the necessary route of access to skill. And finally, there is political office as a base of power, with organization of a machine as the route of access.

The rise of the new elites based on skill derives from the simple fact that knowledge and planning—military planning, economic planning, social planning—have become the basic requisites for all organized action in a modern society. The members of this new technocratic elite, with their new techniques of decision-making (systems analysis, linear programming, and programme budgeting), have now become essential to the formulation and analysis of decisions on which political judgments have to be made, if not to the wielding of power. It is in this broad sense that the spread of education, research, and administration has created a new constituency—the technical and professional intelligentsia.

While these technologists are not bound by a sufficient common interest to make them a political class, they do have common characteristics. They are, first, the products of a new system in the recruitment for power (just as property and inheritance were the essence of the old system). The norms of the new intelligentsia—the norms of professionalism—are a departure from the hitherto prevailing norms of economic self-interest which have guided a business civilization. In the upper reaches of this new elite—that is, in the scientific community—men hold significantly different values, which could become the foundation of the new ethos for such a class.

ACTUALLY, the institution of property itself is undergoing a fundamental revision, in a significant way. In Western society for the past several hundred years, property, as the protection of private rights to wealth, has been the economic basis of individualism. Traditionally the institution of property, as Professor Charles Reich of the Yale Law School has put it, 'guards the troubled boundary between individual man and the state'.

But in modern life property has changed in two distinctive ways. One of these is elementary: individual property has become corporate, and property is no longer controlled by owners but by managers. In a more subtle and diffuse way, however, a new kind of property has emerged, and with it a different kind of legal relationship. To put it more baldly, property today consists not only of visible things (land, possession, titles) but also of claims, grants and contracts. The property relationship is not only between persons but between the individual and the government. As Professor Reich points out, 'The valuables dispensed by government take many forms, but they all share one characteristic. They are steadily taking the place of the

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traditional forms of wealth—forms which are held as private property Social insurance substitutes for savings, a government contract replaces a businessman's customers and goodwill. . . . Increasingly, Americans live on government largesse—allocated by government on its own terms, and held by recipients subject to conditions which express "the public interest".'

While many forms of this 'new property' represent direct grants (subsidies to farmers, corporations, and universities) or are contracts for services or goods (to industry and universities), the most pervasive form is claims held by individuals (social security, medical care, housing allowances) which derive from a new definition of social rights: claims on the community to ensure equality of treatment, claims legitimately due to a person so that he will be able to share in the social heritage. And the most important claim of all is full access to education, within the limits of one's talent and potential.

The result of all this is to enlarge the arena of power, and at the same time to complicate the modes of decision-making. The domestic political process initiated by the New Deal, continued in the same form in the domestic programme of the Johnson administration, was in effect a broadening of the 'brokerage' system—the system of political deals between constituencies—although there are now many participants in the game. But there is also a new dimension in the political process, which has given the technocrats a new role. Matters of foreign policy are not a reflex of internal political forces, but a judgment about the national interest, involving strategy decisions based on the calculation of an opponent's strength and intentions. Once the fundamental policy decision was made to oppose the communist power, many technical decisions, based on military technology and strategic assessments, took on the highest importance in the shaping of subsequent policy. Even a reworking of the economic map of the United States followed as well, with Texas and California gaining great importance because of the electronics and aerospace industries. In these instances technology and strategy laid down the requirements, and only then could business and local political groups seek to modify, or take advantage of, these decisions so as to protect their own economic interests.

In all this, the technical intelligentsia holds a double position. To the extent that they have interests in research, and positions in the universities, they become a new constituency—just as the military is a distinct new constituency, since this country has never before had a permanent military establishment seeking money and support for science, for research and development. Thus the intelligentsia becomes a claimant, like other groups, for public support (though its influence is felt in the bureaucratic and administrative labyrinth, rather than in the electoral system or mass pressure). At the same time, the technicians represent an indispensable administrative machine for the political office holder with his public following.

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THOUGH the weights of the class system may shift, the nature of the political system, as the arena where interests are mediated, will not. In the next few decades, the political arena will become more decisive, if anything, for two fundamental reasons: we have become, for the first time, a national society (though there has always been the idea of the nation), in which crucial decisions, affecting all parts of the society simultaneously (from foreign affairs to fiscal policy) are made by the government, rather than through the market; in addition, we have become a communal society, in which many more groups now seek to establish their social rights—their claims on society—through the political order.

In the national society, more and more projects (whether the clean-up of pollution or the reorganization of the cities) must be undertaken through group or communal instruments. In a tightly interwoven society, more decisions have to be made through politics and through planning. Yet both mechanisms, paradoxically, increase social conflict. Planning provides a specific locus of decision, as against the more impersonal and dispersed role of the market, and it thus becomes a visible point at which pressures can be applied. Communal instruments—the effort to create a social choice out of the discordance of individual personal preferences—necessarily sharpen value conflicts. Do we want compensatory education for Negroes at the expense, say, of places for other students when the number of positions is limited? Do we want to keep a redwood forest or provide a lucrative industry to a local community? Will we accept the increased noise of jets in communities near the airports, or force the reduction of weight and payloads, with a consequent increased cost to the industry and the traveller? Should a new highway go through old sections of a community, or do we route them around the section with a higher cost to all? These issues, and thousands more, cannot be settled on the basis of technical criteria; necessarily they involve value and political choices.

The relationship of technical and political decisions in the next decades will become, in consequence, one of the most crucial problems of public policy. The politician, and the political public, will have to become increasingly versed in the technical character of policy, aware of the ramified impact of decisions as systems become extended. As one sociologist had pointed out: The views of Adam Smith may have been popularly digestible; an econometric study of alternative public-investment programmes is not. And the technical intelligentsia must learn to question the often unanalyzed assumptions about efficiency and rationality which underlie their techniques.

In the end, however, the technocratic mind-view necessarily falls before politics. The hopes of rationality—or one should say, of a particular kind of rationality—necessarily fade. There may still be, in the language of Max Weber, a *Zweckrationatilät*, a rationality of ends that are intertwined with means and become adjusted to each other.

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But this is possible only when the ends are strictly defined and the means, then, can be calculated in terms of the end.[16]

POLITICS, in the sense that we understand it, is always prior to the rational, and often the upsetting of the rational. The rational, as we have come to know it, is the routinized, settled, administrative and orderly procedure by rules. Much of life in a complex society necessarily has this character. In going by plane or train to Washington one does not haggle with the airline company or railroad over the fare, as one might with a taxi driver in the Levant. But politics is haggling, or else it is force.[17] In Washington one haggles over the priorities of the society, the distribution of money, the burden of taxation, and the like. The idea that there is a 'social decision' which can satisfy all is an illusion. On the theoretical level this has been annihilated by Kenneth Arrow, who in his 'impossibility theorem' has demonstrated that no social decision can amalgamate the diverse preferences of a group in the way a single individual can amalgamate his own. Thus, theoretical economics, in its denial of a communal welfare function which would be similar to the ordering principles of individual utility, undermines the application of rationality to public decisions. In a practical sense, this is something every politician knows in his bones. What is left is not rationality as the objective scaling of social utilities but bargaining between persons.

As for politics, what is evident, everywhere, is a society-wide uprising against bureaucracy and a desire for participation, a theme summed up in the statement, already a catch-phrase, that 'people ought to be able to affect the decisions that control their lives'. To a considerable extent the participation revolution is one of the forms of reaction against the 'professionalization' of society and the emergent technocratic decision-making of a post-industrial society. What began years ago in the factory through the trade unions has now spread to the neighbourhood—because of the politicalization of decision-making in social affairs—and into the universities; in the next decades it will spread into other complex organizations as well. The older bureaucratic models of hierarchically organized centralized organizations functioning through an intensive division of labour clearly will be replaced by new forms of organization.

Yet 'participatory democracy' is not the panacea that its adherents make it out to be, no more so than efforts of 50 years ago at creating plebiscitarian and political mechanisms such as the initiative, the referendum, and the recall. (In California, the referendum has been

[16] In the terminology of Weber, rationality is of two kinds, *Wertrationalität* and *Zweckrationalität*. *Wertrationalität* is the rationality of 'reason' whose ends are to be considered by themselves as valid, independent of means. *Zweckrationalität* is the rationality of function.

[17] I deal here with the politics of interest. There is, of course, the politics of passion, the politics of expressiveness and symbolism. Much of this is the politics of the New Left.

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the chief means of defeating open housing and probably will be used to restrict the universities.) With all the furore about 'participatory democracy', it is curious that few of its proponents have sought to think through, on the most elementary level, the meaning of the phrases. If individuals are to affect the decisions that change their lives, then under those rules segregationists in the South would have the right to exclude Blacks from the schools. Similarly, is a neighbourhood group to be allowed to veto a city plan which takes into account the needs of a wider and more inclusive social unit? But at that point one would have to say that the South is not an independent entity but part of a larger polity, and must comply with the moral norms of the more inclusive society, and so does the neighbourhood. In short, participatory democracy is one more way of posing the classical issues of political philosophy; namely, who should make, and at what levels of government, what kinds of decisions, for how large a social unit.

THE conception of a rational organization of society stands confounded. Rationality, as a means—as a set of techniques for efficient allocation of resources—has been twisted beyond the recognition of its forebears; rationality, as an end, finds itself confronted by the cantankerousness of politics, the politics of interest and the politics of passion. Faced with this double failure, the adherents of rationality—in particular the planners and designers, are now in the difficult position of having to rethink their premises and to understand their limits. And yet, the recognition of those limits is itself the beginning of wisdom.

In the end there is the beginning, as T. S. Eliot wrote, and we return to the question that is the root of all political philosophy: What is the good life that one wants to lead? The politics of the future—for those who operate within the society, at least—will not be quarrels between functional economic-interest groups for distributive shares of the national product, but the concerns of communal society, particularly the inclusion of disadvantaged groups. They will turn on the issues of instilling a responsible social ethos in our leaders, the demand for more amenities, for greater beauty and a better quality of life in the arrangement of our cities, a more differentiated and intellectual educational system, and an improvement in the character of our culture. We may be divided on how to achieve these aims, and how to apportion the costs. But such questions, deriving from a conception of public virtue, bring us back to the classical questions of the polis. And this is as it should be.

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A Critique of Bell

Jean Floud

WHAT'S in a name? Not much nowadays. Modern sociologists coin catch phrases and mnemonics ('the affluent society'; 'the knowledgeable society'; 'the expert society'; 'the technetronic age'; 'the active society'), where their predecessors, who took social morphology and classification more seriously, devised typologies embodying theories, intended to have some explanatory force. Is Daniel Bell's 'post-industrial society' an aide-memoire, intended as a reminder and summary of striking social trends and portents, or is it part of a theoretically informed typology? He disclaims any systematic theoretical intentions; but the extracts he has made available from his forthcoming book make it plain that he means the notion of post-industrial society to be more than a reminder of the social developments in contemporary America that he describes with so much verve.

'How does one identify a new, emerging social system?' he asks. He does not expend much time on the answer, but his account of the emergence of what he believes to be 'the skeletal structure of a new society' is redolent of theory—as when he talks of 'fundamental social change', 'the new crucial variable', 'technological foundations', 'the defining characteristics of a new system', 'structural differentiation', 'a distinct structural change in the boundary systems of the society', 'functional sub-systems' ('adaptive' or 'integrative' as the case may be), 'key groups', 'dominant classes', and 'central institutions'.

Daniel Bell is far from being theoretically unsophisticated. He is, however, an eclectic, content to select and interpret the developments of which he writes with the aid of a vestigial Marxism and the odd Parsonian category as it seems to fit. Why not—if it works?

UNFORTUNATELY, it does not work. It seems to me that we are more easily misled by confusion than by error. Theoretical constructions in sociology are either a help or a hindrance; there is no half-way house. I am inclined to argue that Daniel Bell's construct 'post-industrial society' is a hindrance to an understanding of modern societies; that it cannot be defended on the only relevant grounds—namely, that it rests upon important distinctions between social activities or aspects of social life, and upon discoveries about causal relations between them. In so far as it claims to have explanatory force, it is, in my view, no less wrong but much less profound and instructive than Marxism.

Daniel Bell's account of 'post-industrial society' is open to two sorts of criticism: we can object to the assumptions he makes and the concepts he uses; and we can object to his interpretation of the facts.

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First, as to his assumptions: they are not hidden, but nor are they explicit; by and large they are Marxist assumptions, used even more loosely and inconsistently than by Marx and Engels themselves, and unrefined by their fate at the hands of later social theorists. He accepts, by implication, Marx's view that 'it is not the articles made, but how they are made and with what instruments, that enable us to distinguish economic epochs'. Industrial society, he says, organizes machines for the production of goods; but post-industrial society organizes science for the production of theoretical knowledge and its application to production. He also accepts Marx's view of the relationship of economic to other social activities, from which it follows that, to classify economies is *ipso facto* to classify societies.

But distinctions between types of society make sense only in terms of differences in the moral, legal and political relations between their members, or in the principles of social organization which prevail in them such differences as those conceptualized by Durkheim as between 'mechanical' and 'organic' solidarity, or by Weber as between 'class', 'status' and 'party'. Marx's attempt to demonstrate the dependence of these characteristics upon the mode of production was notoriously a failure, albeit a failure in the grand manner which teaches us more than any other body of theory about how social phenomena are to be classified and about causal relations between them.

UNDERLYING Bell's discussion of modern technology and its social consequences is the idea that it is in some sense 'fundamental' to social life—or, if not fundamental to social life generally, then, at least, fundamental to life in industrial societies. In studying economic and technical change, one is studying overall, structural or integral social change at its source.

One does not want to be pedantic. When Bell says 'it is with the economy that we are first concerned, because technology is the foundation of industrial society' he may be speaking loosely, making a statement of the kind he makes elsewhere when he says: 'If there is a radical gap with the past, it lies in the nature of technology, the way it has transformed social relations and the way in which we look at the world.'

Yet his theoretical intentions are quite clear. He wants to do more than identify portents and extrapolate trends. He is after the key to overall, integral, structural change. He believes in the social system and the crucial variable. He wants to grasp something he calls 'fundamental social change' and he believes that this can be done by identifying 'some specifically defining characteristic—the ganglion, so to speak, of the social system—which becomes the source of stratification and change in society'; and he believes this to lie in the economy.

Spelled out, the assumptions underlying his construct 'post-industrial society' are as follows. First, that in modern societies the different social activities or aspects of social life are so interrelated

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that we may reasonably and profitably talk about them as constituting a *system*. Secondly, that within the system there are certain activities and aspects of social life that are 'fundamental,' in some sense which is unspecified; but, presumably, they are held to be a precondition of the rest of our activities and to be relatively immune from their influence. Thirdly, there is also within the system a central source of change—the so-called 'ganglion' or nerve-centre—constituted by certain activities, presumably among those classed as fundamental, changes in which have consequences for the rest of social life which are both wide-ranging and closely interrelated; in particular, the consequences for social stratification are regarded as crucial for the system as a whole. Social forecasting, in the interest of social policy-making, should be grounded in the study of these particular fundamental activities which, so to say, govern the system. Forecasting changes in them broadly defines the shape of the future social order and hence the scope of politics and the social problems which we may expect to confront.

HOW appropriate are these assumptions and the concepts to which they give rise?

It is surprising that Daniel Bell should invoke the notion of 'the social system' in discussing modern societies. It has been, and remains, notoriously unilluminating. Admittedly, interdependence is the essence of system, as well as a striking feature of modern social life. But we should not be misled by the scale of modern social life and by the extraordinary facility of modern communications, by the integration of the economy and the range of activities of the modern state. These features do not make of modern society as a whole a system in any but the weakest sense of the term, viz. a network in which everything is connected with something else.

In the strong sense of the term, a system comprises a number of parts which are causally related in such a way that a change in one changes all the others. Only an inclusive society could constitute a social system of this kind—that is to say, only an aggregate of individuals entering into social relations with each other over the full range of their activities, so that the complete network of their relations would constitute a single system of interaction, 'the social system' of their society. This is the theoretically limiting case, of course; but it would be worth examining industrial societies as departures from it if, in fact, they showed signs of approximating to it. It need hardly be said, however, that they do not, and that, moreover, they are retreating from it at a great pace and precisely under the impact of technological change. Their inclusiveness is undermined by the growing internationalism of economic and social life, so that the boundaries of 'the social system' are rendered increasingly vague as markets get larger, international corporations multiply and ease of communication in all media enlarges the scope and scale of professional, political and ideological associations of all kinds. Their structure becomes increasingly complex as specialized social net-

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works multiply; and causal connexions between these networks become ever more tenuous with the progressive individuation of patterns of social participation—the tendency to which Durkheim drew attention in his *Division of Labour*. The notion of integral social change in 'the social system' is less and less applicable, as time goes on, to the shambling, highly differentiated social agglomerations which are modern industrial societies.

EVERYTHING in them, no doubt, is connected with something else; but it is in the nature of the case that the connexions are numerous, diffuse, hard to establish and even harder to predict. Every major social activity gives rise to a network of relations which has, more or less, the character of a system. But the relations between these networks are not systemic. The consequences of change in one sphere of activity (say, the economy) for relations in another (say, politics, religion, education, crime, or the arts and sciences) cannot be predicted on general theoretical grounds. Structural invariances, if they exist, are empirical, not theoretical, discoveries. It was Marx's error to suppose otherwise, and his attempt to distinguish among social activities the fundamental from the derivative, and in social structure the base from the superstructure, failed.

The distinction cannot be sustained logically (*pace* G. A. Cohen); and, since one cannot postulate causal relations between social activities that cannot be properly distinguished from one another in the relevant respects, it follows that the notion of the economy as 'fundamental' to the social system of industrial society is theoretically barren.

It is empirically true that changes in some social networks will have greater repercussions than changes in others, if only because more people participate in them and regard their participation as taking priority in their lives over other activities. These repercussions may be specific to particular other areas of social life, or they may affect social life generally by introducing or diffusing a particular principle of social organization or a particular characteristic of social relations. Thus, for example, for all sorts of reasons, located within and without the economic sphere itself (such as the rising material expectations of the general public, and the scale, complexity and integrated character of economic activity), modern societies are committed to economic growth, a large part of government activity is devoted to economic management, and economic conflict preoccupies large sections of the population. The consequences are well known and were notably summed up by Weber in his concept of 'rationalization': the field of purposive, rational behaviour is increasingly extended; interest groups multiply; the character of social differentiation changes; Marxian propositions about class formation prove false; the basis of political legitimacy shifts from religion to science.

It is, then, a fact that a great deal can be understood about industrial societies and their development in terms of economic imperatives or

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clashes of organized economic interest. But from this it does not follow that the economy is 'fundamental' to industrial society in any sense that makes the proposition theoretically worthwhile. Of course, it might be thought to offer, at some much less ambitious level, an approach to the understanding of the similarities and differences between these societies, and to be defensible on this ground. But this, too, seems doubtful. If their governments were not committed to economic growth and were not preoccupied with technical problems of economic management, these societies would not cease to be industrial societies; but experience teaches us that they would fall into serious difficulties in the shape of crises of production, mass unemployment and misery, which would threaten the social order. This possibility leads one to prefer the (empirical) proposition, '*politics* is fundamental to industrial society'. If economic management is crucial to the orderly development of modern societies, it may make sense to classify them, as does Raymond Aron, with reference to the principal social determinant of modes and rates of economic growth, namely, the structural relationships of government to economy.

IT is not my intention to argue for or against this particular approach to the comparative analysis of industrial societies. If empirical, rather than theoretical, considerations are allowed to dictate the basis of classification, many possibilities are open to us. The trouble with Daniel Bell's approach seems to be its basically doctrinaire character: unexamined and unacceptable theoretical assumptions and concepts are at work.

Perhaps one should not make such heavy weather over the theoretical status of his construct 'post-industrial society'. Why not examine it as an interpretation of the facts? If it proves illuminating, so much the better and who is then to declare misleading the theory implicit in it?

It is bad practice in sociology, no less than in mathematics, to arrive at the 'right answer' by wrong reasoning from untenable postulates. The chances are that, next time, the answer will not be 'right'. It is noteworthy that though Daniel Bell writes exclusively about the USA, and has much to say about developments there which is novel and penetrating, the theory implicit in his narrative and accompanying speculations carries the suggestion that he is talking about industrial societies generally. In fact, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that he subscribes to some form of the so-called 'convergence' theory of modern social development. From the social consequences of modern technology and principles of economic organization, he derives what he terms '*axial* principles of social organization'. All industrial societies, he implies, committed as they are to economic growth and planned management of the economy, will turn to modern technology and principles of economic organization; they will consequently have in common these same 'axial' principles of social organization. Other

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things being equal, they will resemble each other in all important respects; from which it follows that the problem of the sociologist is to account for (in the sense of 'explain away') the manifest differences between them. One might regard these differences as historical contingencies; but Daniel Bell seeks a more theoretical approach. Some social activities or aspects of social life are 'more decisive' than others. If the choice falls upon political traditions and institutional forms, these must be accounted for; either they are themselves 'fundamental,' or they are derivative, determined by, or in some sense reflective of, some other activity or aspect which can be termed 'fundamental' in the social system.

This is a dubious and restrictive view of the problems and prospects of macrosociology; but we may now leave the theoretical issues and turn to Daniel Bell's interpretation of the facts of social development in contemporary America.

HE says that post-industrial society is 'organized around knowledge', and to the objection that knowledge is necessary for the existence of any society, he replies that what is new and distinctive about 'post-industrial' society is 'the centrality of *theoretical* knowledge—the primacy of theory over empiricism, and the codification of knowledge into abstract systems of symbols that can be used to illuminate many different and varied circumstances'.

This notion of the centrality of theoretical knowledge is obscure. But leaving aside the difficult questions it raises about the nature and forms of knowledge, one may ask what it is, in the most straightforward sense of the words, for a society to be 'organized around knowledge'? Bell proposes an indicator: 'the *weight* of the society—measured by a larger proportion of GNP and a larger share of employment—is *increasingly* in the knowledge field.'

Marx remarked on 'the propensity of modern industry . . . which makes science a productive force distinct from labour and presses it into the service of capital'. Daniel Bell is saying that this propensity to *use* science in production has reached its apogee in the second half of the twentieth century, and that there has now set in a new propensity to *produce* science, by investing hugely in programmes of scientific research and development and in national educational systems designed on meritocratic principles to provide for the constant screening and promotion of scientific talent.

To be 'organized around knowledge' a society must be so sophisticated a consumer of science as to feel the need also to produce it. Reading Daniel Bell's vigorous narrative, and swept imperceptibly from the consideration of striking facts about the rate of technological innovation, the changing composition and distribution of the labour force, or the rate of educational investment, to assertions about their consequences for politics and the class structure, one finds persuasive the suggestion that America is moving towards a new social order which

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needs to be conceptualized in a new name and analysed in fresh terms. It is, or has almost become, a 'post-industrial' society, organized around knowledge instead of around machinery. Why? Because the majority of the labour force is employed in service occupations; because among the fast-growing white-collar occupations, the professional and technical occupations are growing phenomenally fast; because government, private industry and non-profit-making institutions all invest in research and development on a colossal scale; because there is a national science policy and a powerful sector of science-based industry; and because a serious attempt is being made to provide higher education for all.

All industrial societies are profoundly affected by the enormous rise in the productivity of labour engendered by the application of modern science to production. In all these societies the tertiary sector of the economy grows at the expense of the secondary and primary sectors, and all are impelled to expand and democratize their educational provision, particularly in the universities. The class-structure of each and all is placed in the melting pot by consequential changes in the form, social functions and distribution of wealth, political power and social esteem.

WHY should these developments result, in America, but not elsewhere—not, for example, in the USSR or the UK—in the emergence of new 'post-industrial' principles of social organization? Implicit in Daniel Bell's account is the suggestion that all the major industrial countries are moving along the America Road, due to become post-industrial societies with the same axial principles of social organization. It is not clear exactly what these principles are; but it seems that they have, as rather vaguely formulated consequences, that the professional and technical classes become 'pre-eminent'; that the principle of meritocracy prevails in social selection; and that the university usurps the role of the business enterprise as the 'central institution' in societies in which the professional and technical expert, rather than the business man, becomes the representative figure, and in which the potential economic bottleneck is in the mobilization of talent and the flow of scientific manpower, rather than in the accumulation of capital and the flow of investment funds.

If these things are really already happening in American society we must infer that they are a direct consequence of *scale*, since this is the only relevant independent variable which, on the assumption that all are impelled by the logic of industrial development to produce broadly similar social arrangements, could account for any special feature of American society.

But a theory which throws us back upon the technological or scientific gap for explanations of variety in the social organization of industrial societies is unsatisfactory. The national investment in science and education in the USSR is close to being of the same order of

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magnitude as that in the USA[2]; but it would be perverse to speak of Soviet society as being 'organized around knowledge'. The case of the UK is more interesting; it would, *prima facie,* be less perverse than exaggerated to speak of British society in this way.

The same dramatic changes as in the USA are taking place in the UK, in the occupational distribution of the working population. Though at the last Census the majority (two-thirds) were still manual workers, this group is a diminishing one; between 1961 and 1966 the number of non-manual workers increased at an average rate of 1%, and there is every reason to expect that the 1971 Census will show a continuance of this trend, and a further shrinkage of the manual groups. There is, in the UK, as in the USA, a national science policy and large-scale investment of public funds in research and development; the absolute global and *per capita* sums are of course smaller, but expressed as a proportion of the national product they are not so very far from those expended in the USA. The meritocratic orientation of the educational system is a by-word; and the neglect of applied in favour of pure science has been notorious. There is an expanding and highly endowed university sytem which is still rigorously selective of its intake and purist in the selection of subject-matter for research and teaching. It accounts, as in the USA, for close upon half of all basic (pure and applied) research in the country. It is true that there has been a traditional reluctance, now under attack, to recognise 'the centrality of theoretical knowledge as a source of innovation' in industry. British business enterprise spends less than American on research and development. But a higher proportion of what it does spend goes to finance basic research. In any case, the American figure is inflated by Federal Government subventions; if these, which represent about one-third of company-financed research, are excluded from the calculation, the net figure is close to that for other countries, including the UK. In the UK, moreover, there is, perhaps, less reluctance to recognise the role of research in policy formation—for instance, in the matter of economic policy and management of the national economy.

IN respect of Daniel Bell's 'five dimensions of post-industrial society' the UK is remarkably like the USA writ small. Why should we baulk at describing it as 'organized around knowledge'? Can it only be on account of its size?

The differences of degree in technological and scientific sophistication that are crudely represented by differences in the size of national investment in programmes of research and development, do not correlate well with the differences in kind of social organization to which Daniel Bell is drawing attention.

[2] In the following paragraphs, all comparisons between the U.S.A. and other countries are based upon figures and information provided by OECD in published reports of the national science policies and educational programmes of member countries.

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Governments are the authors of national science policies and the principal providers, in every country, of funds for research and development; and the size of their contribution is directly proportional, in every country, to the importance they attach to certain kinds of research and development connected with political objectives. The development of civil science is another matter. It is only loosely dependent on recognition of its value in application to problems of production, and the part played in it by government is still indirect because largely confined to subsidy of the research component in the activities of publicly maintained universities. Though the interrelations of military and civil science are the subject of debate, and there are difficulties in drawing a clear distinction between them, it will not do to conflate them in considering the consequences of scientific and technological development for modern social organization.

Daniel Bell, of course, recognizes the significance of the so-called 'external challenge' in the creation and shaping of US science policy: but he does not distinguish between the roles of military and civil science respectively, in making for the emergence of 'post-industrial' society. To make the distinction, however, is at once to see the origin of the special features of American society which lend credence to his construct of an emerging new social order.

THE USA is the only society which is both producer and sophisticated consumer of 'theoretical knowledge'. For historical reasons, America has the highest capacity in the world to absorb the fruits of civil science into the productive process; she also leads the world as a producer of military science. The USSR, on the other hand, is a producer of military science on a comparable scale, but only an indifferent consumer of civil science, with obstacles to industrial innovation 'built-in' to her economic and social organization. The UK is a modest producer of military science and a great producer of civil science, but a poor, though improving, consumer of its findings. Japan is a negligible producer of military science, but a growingly sophisticated consumer of civil science and a great importer of 'theoretical knowledge'.

It is not difficult to see how, alone among the industrial societies of the world, American society comes to make the impression of being 'organized around knowledge'. Not merely the magnitude of the Federal Government's investment in military science, but the remarkable diversity of private and public agencies through which the national science policy is implemented, creates the impression of a society uniquely geared on a wide institutional front to the production of knowledge. The diverse research agencies which partner the Federal Government in a unique division of labour are the institutional embodiment of America's long-standing lead as a consumer of science for industrial purposes. In particular, her universities, as Professor Ben

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David has shown,[3] have always stood in a special and creative relationship with the national economy, as entrepreneurs of innovation and producers of graduates marketable over a very wide range of occupations. Today, as Daniel Bell points out, they dominate the so-called 'knowledge industry'; they are consolidating their hegemony, in the European manner, over the rest of the national educational system, which increasingly assumes a meritocratic orientation alien to the non-selective traditions of American education.

How far might these developments have proceeded without the special impetus of the military research effort? And, more importantly, in view of current economic developments in the USA, how far will they be sustained in face of a cut-back in defense appropriations?

It seems, *prima facie,* no more likely in the case of America than of other industrial countries that the logic of economic growth dependent on rapid and sustained technological innovation could, by itself, have carried them to the same pitch, or will sustain them at this pitch. It is true that military science has received the lion's share of the Federal investment; but it is not clear that civil science could have absorbed funds on the same scale and at the same pace, with the same dramatic consequences for the occupational structure and the educational system. However that may be, it is doubtful, in any case, whether military science has produced the institutional structures to sustain a national science policy which might be turned over in a changed political climate to civil purposes. As Professor Eli Ginzberg has pointed out,[4] the remarkable post-war achievements of American science have been the result of an *ad hoc* liaison with Government, brought into being by the personal, and largely informal, efforts of a small scientific élite. President and Congress have been persuaded to support 'big science' and to finance a system of mass higher education, but no institutional basis for a broadly-based national science policy has been created: no stable arrangements for assessing the demand and planning the training and employment of scientific manpower; or for evaluating the (as it happens, seriously distorting) effects on the universities of the scale and distribution of government research contracts; no decision-making arrangements designed to ensure electoral and congressional support for agreed priorities when funds are less than flush.

Admittedly, the propensity to 'produce' science manifested itself first and foremost in America, and the development of civil science as a factor of production happened earlier and developed faster there than elsewhere. It is also true that in other industrial countries, an important, though very variable, fraction of the investment in research and development is directly attributable to the American presence and

[3] In his illuminating essay *Fundamental Research and the Universities*, OECD, Paris, 1968.

[4] In a forceful article, 'What Science Policy?' in *Columbia Forum*, Fall, 1970.

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the desire to emulate the achievements of her science policy. Nevertheless, the American lead in civil science can be exaggerated.

Military effort apart, the signs of a planned 'knowledge industry' in the US are few—or, at least, no greater than in the other industrial countries. If the comparison is controlled for scale, by taking the countries of Western Europe together, the quantitative differences tend to disappear. Two-thirds of the whole American research and development programme is financed and executed by government outside business enterprise. The remaining one-third represents in dollars (50 billion) no more than the overall European effort. As to education, in terms of all indicators of overall educational effort, the US is, of course, far ahead of Europe. But in terms of the proportion of that effort devoted to science and technology, the US is far behind Europe, in which the UK is prominent in placing, today, a remarkable emphasis on science and technological subjects in higher education.

If, in all countries, civil is separated from military science, the novelty, the quantitative as well as the qualitative significance, of American developments is much reduced. 'Post-industrial society' turns out to be another name for the American *Wehrwirtschaft*. If we abstract, artificially, the effects of 'external challenge' on the development of industrial societies, the changes to be captured in the new construct, 'post-industrial society,' are severely muted. In no society would they tempt us, as they do in contemporary America, to speculate upon the emergence of new principles of social organisation.

This exercise of the imagination does not, of course, detract from the significance of current developments in the USA. If new principles of social organization are emerging there, it is important, if possible, to name and explain them, whether or not they can be accounted for in terms of a general theory of transition from industrial to post-industrial society.

I DO not propose to do more here than point out the difficulties that arise in connexion with one such principle named by Daniel Bell, which seems to be crucial for his assertion of an emerging new social order.

He says that the stratification system is coming to turn upon the distribution of educational qualifications rather than of property. In post-industrial society, not only power, but wealth and status too, will, in effect, be distributed by the educational and intellectual institutions of post-industrial society: '. . . the entire complex of prestige and status will be rooted in the intellectual and scientific community.'

This prognosis represents an extreme formulation of a thesis which has become a commonplace in the sociology of education. The implication is usually that something like a meritocracy is coming into being, as education, and especially higher education, increases its importance for the economy. But the evidence does not support this suggestion; Professors Blau and Duncan have recently reported that though they

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were able, in their comprehensive enquiry into *The American Occupational Structure*, to detect a tendency for education to play a larger role in determining a young man's career prospects today than in the past, this trend is so small and so slow as to be almost imperceptible. (Other US Census studies of the relationship between education and income have also failed to reveal significant tightening of the links between schooling and careers, at least since 1940, when the first reliable data were collected.) Blau and Duncan also find that, despite enormous increases in the absolute numbers of young people attending American institutions of higher education since 1914, the relative advantage of the prosperous has not diminished overall; if anything, it has increased a little.

If, however, no more is meant by the prognosis than that the same processes of selection and differentiation are at work, but that they function increasingly in terms of education and the marketing of skills, rather than in terms of property and the accumulation of wealth, it is somewhat more acceptable in the light of the facts; but it is also less noteworthy and represents no radical departure from well-known trends in social stratification consequent upon changes in the modern institution of private property.

The lesson seems to be that in trying to develop the macro-sociology of industrial society we should stop chasing theoretical hares of dubious pedigree.

All industrial societies share certain problems of economic management, among which is the need to keep abreast of technological advance. But their capacity to arrive at solutions to these problems, and, above all, the style and intensity of their efforts to do so, vary widely, as Mr Shonfield has shown in his admirable comparative study *Modern Capitalism*. He traces this variety to its source in the differences of cultural and political context in which economic goals are set and the technical problems of economic management are worked through.

We cannot reduce this variety to dependence on any single variable, other than the activity of governments standing in a special relationship to the economy in each country, deciding to enforce economic growth, or merely to aid it, to introduce non-economic (i.e. political, ideological or military) considerations into the calculations that underlie economic policy, or to stick closely to criteria of economic rationality. Certain of these hypothetical decisions presuppose particular political arrangements such as a one-party state, or the prevalence of particular ideological views which, in turn, presuppose particular features of social organization, such as private property and corporate enterprise. But they do not flow automatically from these political and cultural prerequisites. To explain them we need to know about the composition, structure and motivation of ruling-groups, and cultural establishments, and about their relations among themselves. These political and cultural group formations, in turn, do not derive directly from developments in the economy. A large class of professional and technical workers is

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inevitable in an industrial society today, but their will and their capacity to develop as a self-conscious political force, espousing a particular, so-called 'technocratic' ideology, cannot be predicted on general grounds, though propositions about favourable and unfavourable structural and cultural conditions for their doing so can, of course, be formulated.

We may be able to link the occurrence of certain of these conditions with general features of social life associated with particular phases of economic development; for example, with urbanization, bureaucratization or the mass market for consumer goods. But theoretical, as well as empirical, considerations should make us wary of generalizing about the principles of social organization of industrial societies, and deter us from constructing general theories of social transition from industrial to post-industrial society.

A Comment on Bell

Peter Wiles

CONFERENCES are most fruitful when recollected in tranquillity. These, then, are the ideas that stick with me, though heaven knows with whom they originated, merged with further thoughts of my own, which, probably cribbed from someone else anyway, should surely have been given utterance at the time.

What post-industrial *capitalist* society *is*, we can see around Los Angeles, San Francisco, Boston, New York, London and Paris. There is a large 'modern tertiary' sector of employment: in advertising, consultancy, research, higher education, entertainment, psychiatry, public relations, tourism, interior decoration, museums, communications, etc. This is Bell's basic definition, and I have no quarrel with it, provided always that we qualify 'tertiary' with 'modern', because from pre-industrial society onwards there has always been a very large 'primitive tertiary' sector. Transport and trade, to wit, may not always occupy the whole time of particular people in India and China, but they do take up about the same proportion of the nation's labour-hours and capital as in other socio-economic formations.

Transport and trade alter their form of course in post-industrial society, with for instance the aeroplane, the supermarket and the data processor, miscalled computer, that tells us what seats are empty on the former, which shelves in the latter. But then industry and agriculture also alter their forms. It is the 'modern tertiary' occupations that are

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the *differentia specifica*. We are bound in all seriousness, as good empiricists, to add the 'occupation' of educated social drop-out: the education bum, the non-student, the addict, the hippy, the quasi-revolutionary are all clearly as integral a part of the new 'employment' pattern as the advertising account executive. Nor let us judge here which does more harm.

Government is not part of the modern tertiary sector, but it establishes a tremendous demand for its products, and capital cities are good breeding-grounds for post-industrialism. Perhaps for this reason, middling poverty is not an absolute bar. Is not Rome, has not Rome been for 2,000 years, a post-industrial city? The poetaster, the gladiator, the cicerone, the cicisbeo, the paparazzo . . . these are all in some very real sense post-industrial figures. Nor is Rome exactly deprived of interior decorators and professors. We omit the Vatican as clearly part of the 'primitive tertiary' sector; and even so Rome surely qualifies.

SO let us note *en passant* (but should it be only *en passant*?) that very large capitalist capital cities have always tended to be post-industrial, even though the nation was poor. How does the concept suit communism? We have already excluded government as 'primitive tertiary', but what about central planning? May we, like Marx, distinguish it from government? Very much hangs on this decision, since the number of central planners and their hangers-on in a communist capital city is very large. Logic points to Cuba, Albania and the countries of Asiatic communism, and bids us exclude the central planner also from the 'modern tertiary': for how can pre-industrial countries have post-industrial capitals? Our answer to logic is, why not? If poverty is no serious bar, and Rome is a serious candidate, why not Pyongyang? Are central planners—economists, communications workers, statisticians, computer experts, five-per-cent men, accountants, engineers divorced from machines—'what Bell really meant' or are they not? My inclination, after listening to him for so long but before hearing him on this precise question, is to say that they are, and that therefore little shoots of post-industrialism spring even out of the poverty-stricken soil of Asian communism.

In any case the comparative poverty of even European communism, which will surely not last, partly explains the absence of other post-industrial elements. But more serious is Marxist hostility to the service trades. Tertiary is non-productive is bad Marxism: this still holds. Advertising is minimal, and will surely remain so—more praise to communism. Public relations is a part of *Agitprop*, a Party monopoly: monstrously well developed for the most important leaders, but absolutely not open to anyone else to buy on the market. Tourism, entertainment, communications and doubtless interior decoration are now fast recovering from the reluctance of primitive Marxists, obsessed with material production, to invest in them. They shared this disability with such obvious 'primitive tertiary' sectors as retail trade and

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passenger transport, which are also beginning to flower under the creeping revisionism of modern times. Higher education and research have always been favoured, 'unproductive' or no. Consultancy must develop—as it has already in Yugoslavia—owing precisely to the volume of research. Museums and such were always favoured, owing to the admirable communist insistence on a mass classical culture. Psychiatry calls in question the Marxist view of man, and so is likely to remain in the doldrums until it is shown to raise productivity and/or credulity. Drop-outs will of course continue to be persecuted out of existence.

My total prognosis for communism, then, is that it will indeed develop an idiosyncratic post-industrial structure, with more waste on bureaucratic planners but less waste on advertising cynics, psychiatric quacks and educated people who deny the state a return on its money by not working.

In the way in which I have defined the concepts, continuing increases in primary, secondary and primitive tertiary productivity will release labour and capital, under all systems alike, for modern tertiary use. This is itself, of course, an assertion about the nature of technical progress and the income-elasticity of demand by consumers and governments: they *might* re-employ the released factors to produce yet more goods and services of the old types, but they *will* not. This assertion is not self-justifying and it may be wrong. Caution compels us to mention the vacuum-cleaner and a dozen other domestic devices, saleable manufacturing commodities each one of them, that have driven out that very tertiary figure—the maid. Nor are modern tertiary workers exempt from the threat: teaching machines threaten even university professors, pharmaceuticals threaten psychoanalysts. It is not even out of the question that we should demand more and more sophisticated food, clothes and housing, while entertainment lags.

THERE is perhaps here a serious defect in the whole notion of 'post-industrial'. For its denotation is new services replacing goods and old services, while its connotation is a more educated labour force, living more by its wits and less easy to boss about. But these are not identical, merely overlapping, concepts. TV repairmen are much more sophisticated individuals than receptionists, even outside their speciality. Farmers need and get degrees. Industry employs thousands of 'post-industrial' figures not as hired consultants but on its permanent staff, quite close to the production line. Then too there are many indefinable borderline cases. The society photographer seems the quintessence of modern tertiary, but he operates a complicated, manufactured tool and requires great manual skill. The violinist, the surgeon and the pilot are notorious parallels to him, surviving in good health from an earlier technology. In sum, the changes to which Bell draws attention, and in the decisive importance of which I still believe, affect also agriculture and industry. 'Post-industrial' is not the best possible name.

Let us speak, then, more simply of a massive sophistication of the

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labour force. What are we to infer, first for capitalism? Some things are obvious:

more higher education, especially *re*-education, as technical change continues, alas, to accelerate;
a working life that begins later and is interrupted more often by courses; but a later age of retirement as medicine progresses;
more participatory styles of management;
a more serious problem with ineducable drop-outs, who can neither hold a job down nor benefit from managerial participation;
more work of doubtful social use in all sectors—a result, this, of sheer affluence, which reduces the marginal utility of income;
more alienated but educable people, who can 'see through the pretensions of the system' and had rather do nothing than be an advertiser or a receptionist.

All these consequences are, so to speak, Marxist: they follow from the changed technology. Other consequences, claimed by Bell, seem to me to be doubtful or even wrong. In every such case the technology is far away and independently operating factors have been underestimated.

Thus first, the student revolution is due to cultural diffusion (see below). It is true that students will revolt against the university if their careers depend on its examinations and it thus determines their whole future. But the homeland of *this* kind of student revolution is India! As to student power, it is a medieval idea which travelled from Southern Europe to Latin America and revived there in the 1920s. The merely theatrical, anarchic, non-serious, drop-out side of the movement is Dutch (the Provos of Amsterdam, early 1960s). The technique of non-violent (latterly quasi-non-violent) confrontation is again Indian. It migrated via the British Committee for Nuclear Disarmament to the US civil rights movement; but it is in any case a natural ploy for unarmed masses. It is true that all this came together in the United States in 1965 in the post-industrial city of San Francisco, but there is little evidence that the regional job structure or even Californian affluence played much of a role.

Secondly, the sexual revolution is due to contraceptives and the decline of religion. Both phenomena are decades old. And while no doubt contraceptives—a technical change—are ineradicable, nothing points to a continued decline of religion. True, humanity has lost faith in its old religious structures—a process in which the post-industrial United States has conspicuously lagged behind Western Europe. But the thirst for faith was never more plain, and particularly among the alienated young, with their tarot cards, their LSD and their little red book. In particular there is a widespread loss of faith in technical 'progress': it is not true that religion can no longer look science in the eye. So we may confidently expect new religious structures to arise, with new sexual codes built into them. Of these new codes we can only say for sure that they will take account of the pill and other merely

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technical changes; for the rest they may for all we know be surprisingly restrictive, just as the nineteeth century was more restrictive than the eighteenth.

ABOVE all it is difficult to infer much from post-industrialism about the form of government. The occupational structure itself, the basis on which the whole theory rests, is likely to be somewhat different according to who governs, as we have seen. This is of course what Stalin would have called the 'active role of the superstructure'—quite correctly. Moreover, new techniques merely give governments more choices.

This is not, indeed, true where there is keen competition, as in international trade or in warfare. In such activities one must either follow technical 'progress' or accept grave disadvantages, such as lower real wages or a defensive posture. But government is not like that: there are too many variables and unknowns. Notably technical sophistication presupposes a technical, not a liberal, education; and there is no necessary carry-over from the one to the other. The post-industrial society does not render free *social* thought technologically necessary. Again it is obvious from experience that a successful R and D are compatible with many forms of government—though not indeed with theocracies that claim revealed knowledge of science (Stalin, Mao). As to the new technical possibilities of spying on and documenting the hapless citizenry, they do not have to be exploited: there is no competitive pressure on any government to do so in peacetime. On the contrary, very similar techniques of communication and data storage can be used for more and more consultation (the Swiss referendum, the French public opinion poll). Similarly the techniques of opinion moulding grow no more quickly than their antidotes, such as education and foreign broadcasting.

In a word, we get the government we want, or that some tyrannical group among us wants. The development of the economy, let alone the job structure, has very little to do with it. History, tradition, military conquest, revolution—these are the determinants. I say this with the more confidence since I have just failed to correlate various social indicators with parliamentary democracy in Latin America: an ideal area for such an attempt since the forms of government differ so widely within a fairly uniform history and culture.[1] The most, perhaps, that can be said for social indicators is that the very poor and uneducated have no time or energy for politics. Participatory forms could only be imposed on them by an oligarchy very devoted to such forms, and they would remain a sham (India). In a post-industrial society on the other hand it would be merely inefficient not to have some consultation in the workplace; but this need not carry over into politics proper.

[1] Wiles in *Journal of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies*, New Delhi, April-June 1970.

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What I am insisting upon is the basic *unpredictability* of nearly everything. That society is becoming post-industrial as defined is true. The change is very important *per se*. But we do not know what it portends for other aspects of human affairs, and here Bell is altogether too much of a Marxist.

LET us go further. Post-industrialism is a *dialectical* theory, not in the sense that negations occur and are then themselves negated, but at least in that societies develop according to an inner logic, which can be grasped by the human mind to form the basis of predictions. Technology, technical education and the occupational structure are indeed rather like this [2]; but their influence on the rest of society is quite uncertain. If, notably, forms of government have their inner logic of development it is independent of technology and will have to be separately discovered. The very first step in such discovery has not yet been taken.

Dialectics underestimates, indeed competes as an explanation with, *diffusion*. Technology itself is diffused: a man in one place observes and imitates a man in another place, at almost the same time. The dialectics of technology is world-wide, not country-wide; merely, certain countries are too poor to apply what is known. The arts, literature and music (part taste, part technology) are largely diffused. The student revolution is a classic case of cultural-political diffusion, cutting across nearly all national development stages. Forms of government, however, are rather more weakly diffused. There is imitation, notably in Western Europe in the nineteenth century and within the Third World today. There is also military conquest (itself a form of diffusion). But there are also strong governments that simply resist such influences. Since they have no dialectic either, they are unpredictable.

Diffusion is becoming an even stronger influence, through the improved techniques of travel and communication. There is no longer a national technology (except in China) or a national architecture. The other arts, less technically determined, are in scarcely better case. Even communist governments are succumbing to the diffusion of the arts. What does this mean for a post-industrial society? It may perhaps be the cultural leader of the world, communicating mainly outwards. This is not because technical superiority confers that kind of leadership, but because the mere numbers of its artists and thinkers are greater. But it is also open at more pores than any other kind of society to foreign influences; so it will in any case develop, where its technical superiority is not determinant, like the rest of the world.

It is hard to discern exactly what imbalances face a world in which wealth is and remains highly unequal while technology and culture are instantly diffused. Certainly it means that many known techniques will

[2] Though I am totally unable to accept Bell's further claim that given inventions can be predicted. To predict an invention with any certainty is to have made it already.

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as at present be unusable in many places. But culture is always 'usable' nearly everywhere, and the strains this situation produces in an unequal world may be more interesting, but they will surely be less serious. Forms of government will continue to pursue their own sweet way. At no point do I find much on which to base a prediction of any actual state of affairs. I can only say that the leading countries, except China, will have post-industrial occupation structures, and that the world will be one in science and culture, but highly diverse in applied technology, wealth, and political systems.

Post-Industrial Society and the Paradoxes of Welfare

François Bourricaud

I MUST say first of all that I am not entirely in agreement with the increasingly widespread and indeterminate use of the concept of the post-industrial society. I am distressed by the tendency to oppose two types of social organization as being absolutely distinct from one another: one is pictured as being a radically obsolete 'former' type of society and the other as a radically original 'later' type of society. This sharp distinction does not take into account the cross-checks, overlappings and even confusions which seem to me to be so strikingly evident at the present stage in the evolution of our respective societies.

We will agree, however, that they display a number of characteristics which alter their outward appearance and which one could describe as being 'post-industrial'. At the outset, I shall accept this concept of Daniel Bell's, who originated both the term and the concept and who has, incidentally, made much more cautious use of it than some of his European disciples who have not always exercised as much discretion. As Daniel Bell said,[1] 'A number of years ago, I coined the phrase *the post-industrial society*, but this is not, let me emphasize, a statement as to what a complete society will be like in the future.' He added this remark as a warning against the danger of attributing to an ideal type of society a coherence which it probably does not have: 'In the post-industrial society, there are many different dimensions.' Here are the principal characteristics which are pointed out by Daniel Bell: 'The majority of people don't work in industry any longer; already the majority in the United States work in service

[1] François Duchene: *America: Endless Crisis*. A book on the Princeton Seminar published by Simon & Schuster, New York.

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occupations; the professional and technical class is becoming the largest rising class in the labour force. More basic still, the future sources of innovation in society depend increasingly upon the codification of theoretical knowledge.' [2]

I propose to examine, on an entirely provisional basis, the consequences entailed by the changes Daniel Bell indicated in the functioning of our modern democracies and to concentrate on the consequences which are likely to result in the political field from the increasing preponderance of the tertiary or service sector over the other sectors of economic activity.

BEFORE starting that analysis, I shall begin with a brief synopsis of the political system of our advanced industrial societies—at least the image of that 'system' which is given by most observers. What strikes me most of all is the inadequacy of the models worked out by the classic theorists, who claimed to be deriving the 'general will' from the aggregate of individual wills. Seen in that perspective, law appears to be the will of all, or at least of the greatest number. A whole current of modern thinking [3] disagrees with that interpretation and no longer places a mass of individual minds at the centre of the stage, each deciding for itself 'in the silence of the emotions', but rather *groups* capable of reaching effective compromise agreements after more or less laborious negotiations. An author who has most clearly developed this concept of *group politics* is Arthur F. Bentley,[4] and another, more recent, is David B. Truman.[5] Further on we shall examine more closely the shortcomings of this concept, but it has had the great merit of shedding new light upon the difficulties (such as the famous paradox of Condorcet) enveloping the atomistic individualism of the classic authors.[6] Moreover, the views of Bentley and Truman are more acceptable if we give a bit of flexibility to the cohesion which they attribute to their 'groups' and thereby restore to the individual in the political process a certain degree of freedom and of the capability of deciding for himself. Merely by the fact that an individual may belong to more than one group and that these groups may be rivals or simply of diversified composition, the cohesion of each group is weakened, and the individual compensates in freedom of action for the psychological strain imposed upon him by his multiple and sometimes contradictory group-adherence.[7]

However that may be, the group theory obviously cannot reduce

[2] Ibid.

[3] One of the most famous exponents of this critical attitude is Joseph A. Schumpeter in '*Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*'.

[4] Arthur F. Bentley, '*The Process of Government*'.

[5] David B. Truman, '*The Governmental Process*'.

[6] Cf. Georges Th. Guilbaud, 'Les Théories de l'Intérêt Général' (Theories Concerning the General Interest), *Economie Appliquée*, V, 1952.

[7] That is one of the factors in the concept of *cross-pressure*, suggested by Paul Lazarsfeld in '*Voting*', pp. 19–20 and 130–131 in particular.

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political life to a mere 'dialogue' between individuals or even 'groups'. The nature of such a 'dialogue' and the conditions governing it must be specified, and perhaps first of all the ways in which it takes place. A political situation scarcely ever takes the form of a conflict between the individual and society as a whole, or as a conflict between *the* individual and a group, but it reflects the tension and opposition between various groups which mobilize the loyalty, devotion, the interests and emotions of their members more or less effectively for the survival and increase of the group. Thus the political process must temper the relationships of groups between themselves by certain rules as well as those between individuals and groups. But the political process does not boil down to 'group politics', since it can force upon negotiating groups relationships which have not been negotiated and without which no negotiation would be possible. That, at least, is the way I interpret the existence in our political systems of political parties along with pressure groups and also the fact that these pressure groups are forced to defer to the choice of the voters and to accept their verdict.

We need go no further than this very brief analysis to see that the political process cannot be reduced to a mere showdown between groups settling their affairs among themselves alone and negotiating at will their conflicting interests. But although politics stands out as pre-eminently the *central* activity—the activity by means of which society confers upon itself the right to inspect and control the manner in which groups struggle for their particular interests and reserves for itself the exclusive use (of force, for example) or simply the priority use of those means and facilities which are considered to ensure the accomplishment of collective goals—it is nevertheless true that the extent to which this exclusive competence can be applied varies.

It is true that opinions differ on how far the centre can *legitimately* enforce its control. Most observers agree that government power has already become too great, but that contention contains many obscure points. The fact that a government has a hand in everything does not mean that it also has the capacity of deciding everything. In many cases it may intervene only when requested to do so. What is expected or required of it is not necessarily direction, but aid or support, and a group which exercises pressure in order to obtain such aid or support would oppose the idea of the government attempting to impose a solution to the group's troubles. The public authority may therefore have its capacity to decide a matter paralyzed and at the same time be concerned with finding a way of carrying out a policy which it has not itself chosen.

In general, this concept which reduces the national government to a sort of logistic supply service stems from all the theorists whose definition of democracy is the least amount of government possible. The paradox is that a minimum of government may be combined with a maximum of administration. I am not referring in this case

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to the contrast established by Saint-Simon between 'the government of people' and the 'management of things'. The difficulty of which I am speaking is of quite a different character. It concerns the ability of a political system based on negotiation between groups to work out a sound policy of collective choices, even if it succeeds in mitigating the practice of bi- or even multilateral negotiation by the arbitration of competitive claims undertaken on behalf of the government by individuals acting as citizens desiring only the common good.

If we seek to explain how modern societies succeed in defining and implementing a minimum number of common objectives, we are led to distinguish two categories of causes or conditions. First it is necessary that the various elements which we have mentioned—pressure or interest groups, political parties and the mass of individual voters—be linked together in a control structure which converts a mere expression of 'wants' and 'demands' into a co-ordinated decision-making system. This very general aspect of political systems is especially stressed by David Easton and also by Almond and Coleman. As regards our own societies, observers are led to consider a certain number of factors in their operation which enable us to grasp their original and specific nature.

THE fact that our societies have been able to maintain a certain minimum degree of *consensus* in spite of the extremely heterogeneous character of the groups and interests clashing with one another, cannot be explained simply by the existence of common values ('the American creed', for example). I think we must look for the explanation in two directions—one I shall call endogenous, and it has to do with the political 'sub-system' itself, and the other exogenous, relating to the way in which the political sub-system fits into society as a whole. The differentiation between the functions of initiative and suggestion on the one hand and of decision-making on the other hand made it possible to establish between the governing and the governed a series of relays which formed a sort of *circuit* between them—a circuit fulfilling two conditions which were difficult to reconcile. In the first place, this circuit became relatively sensitive and, having acquired a strong receptive capacity for information (enabling the governing authorities to know what was going on down below and at the same time enabling those down below to make themselves heard by the governing authorities), it served as a lead to the decision-making centres, being connected to them by various mechanisms of a feedback nature.

But if a sort of adjustment and harmony was set up in this way between the governing and the governed, the fact is that the *transfers* of real revenue resulting more or less directly from the government decisions were fairly tolerable for all the various groups involved. Concerning these transfers, it will suffice to note the following characteristics: They were received both by those who had to bear them and those who

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benefited from them as being levied on the superfluous and not on the basic necessities of the privileged. As they did not radically, and most of all immediately, change the relative situation of the various groups, they did not encounter any passionate resistance on the part of those who had to pay them nor very great enthusiasm on the part of those who expected to receive them. In fact—and this is my second point—these conservative transfers probably came much less from what was taken from some groups and assigned to the others than it did from the procedure involved in the sharing of the surplus resulting from technological progress between the different groups. Due to the fact that an increasing quantity of goods and services could be produced at decreasing costs, mass productivity provided an increasingly large number of consumers with an increasing purchasing power who could afford the enjoyment of goods from which they had previously been excluded. (I refer in this connection to the optimistic concept of technological progress developed in France, in particular by Jean Fourastié.) After all, these transfers, which have the fundamental effect of heightening the base of the pyramid of real income, take place comparatively slowly, over a long period of time. Thus the individuals who scarcely perceive any improvement in their situation continue to voice their dissatisfaction daily, which can be explained both by the delayed transformation in their present situation in comparison with their expectations and by the *costs of mobility* which technological change imposes upon them. Raymond Aron very aptly applied the expression 'quarrelsome satisfaction' to this attitude torn between a sort of long-term optimism and the itch for immediate satisfaction.

Such is, I believe, the prevailing interpretation among the leading students of the advanced but, so to speak, pre-post-industrial societies. Everybody agrees that the main clashes of opinion, the greater tensions in the field of ideologies and of ways of behaviour which were so evident in the industrially developed countries in the period between the beginning of the great depression and the end of the Second World War, were gradually beginning to relax. And they feel sure that the political system of these countries, the 'polyarchies'—to use the expression of Robert Dahl—would be capable of handling all the problems arising from the clash of the different groups as a daily routine, while sticking to the policy of following the trend outlined for them by technological development, thanks to a sufficiently sensitive information system and a sufficiently efficient decision-making system.

I can mention only briefly the principal failures of the polyarchic method, which became increasingly apparent during the 1960s, in the United States as well as in most of the other Western countries. During the years which followed the end of the Second World War, the most immediate challenge which the American society had to meet came from abroad. The United States succeeded in meeting the Soviet threat without too much damage to its political institutions, with the possible exception of a few rough spots like the period of McCarthyism.

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But the social difficulties which had calmed down since the end of the war gradually reappeared, taking—it must immediately be noted—very new forms. The conflict between industrial firms and the trade unions, the class struggle, no longer occupied the centre of the stage. The clash between the races, the student rebellion, slum clearance—those were the problems which became increasingly absorbing during the 1960s. And gradually the comparative optimism of the 1960s is yielding, among conservative thinkers, to a feeling of concern and of scepticism as to the capability of the polyarchic method to handle the problems with which it is confronted in the new stage of our societies.

LET us now return to the remarks by Daniel Bell quoted at the beginning—to the effect that in the post-industrial society the majority of people do not work any longer in industry, but in service occupations—and let us ask what effect the preponderant weight of this tertiary sector of the economy may have on the functioning of our societies.

I do not believe that the significance of Daniel Bell's remark can be fully appreciated without a more accurate definition of what is meant by '*service occupations*'. It is true that the author refers to 'the professional and technical class', which he explicitly designates as the 'largest rising class' in the post-industrial society. I admit that I am somewhat taken aback by this Marxist touch [8] which would claim to characterize a type of society by the 'domination' of a leading class. But we shall leave this point for the moment. I consider it important first to identify more closely the range of this 'tertiary' or 'service' sector—in order to bring to light some operational difficulties which may characterize post-industrial society.

If we are content to speak only of 'service' in referring to the tertiary sector of the economy, we are overlooking an essential distinction. The barber who cuts my hair renders me a service but so does the underground passage constructed by the Public Works Department which enables me to reach my office more quickly or the out-patient department of a hospital which discovers in time a fatal ailment which could be cured by prompt treatment. If it is important to stress that the post-industrial society is a society of services, it is obviously services of the second category which are meant. A very striking series of consequences results from this concept. Let us point out first of all, using Parsons terminology, that the second category services are 'diffuse' while those of the first category are specific. Moreover, it is especially difficult to determine the beneficiaries of second category services and therefore to assign their costs.

Using the terminology of the *Welfare* economists and of Pigou, we shall say that they are, in whole or in part, *external* to the unit which

[8] The author was fully conscious of this Marxist echo and he explicitly refers to that fact (p. 133).

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has produced them and which cannot make use of them under conditions as strict as in the case of first category services. Let us quote Pigou in this connection: 'The essence of the matter is that one person A, in the course of rendering some service, for which payment is made, to a second person B, incidentally also renders services or disservices to other persons (not producers of like services) of such a sort that payment cannot be exacted from the benefited parties or compensations enforced on behalf of the injured parties.' Pigou cites a series of examples, one of which he borrows from Sidgwick: 'It may easily happen that the benefits of a well-placed lighthouse must be largely enjoyed by ships on which no toll could be conveniently levied.' And again: 'Uncompensated services are rendered when resources are invested in private parks in cities.' Pigou also mentions 'resources devoted to afforestation . . . lamps erected at the doors of private houses . . . the prevention of smoke from factory chimneys', and also refers to the 'resources devoted to the fundamental problems of scientific research and also to the perfecting of inventions and improvements in industrial processes'.[9]

Pigou's work enables us to grasp the concept of external economies and diseconomies in the full diversity of its aspects. Sometimes the effect is positive and constitutes, so to speak, a gift for those who benefit by it and for whom it is like manna from heaven, as in the case of the lamp installed before the door of a private house, thus lighting the way for passers-by or of the lighthouse guiding ships at sea; and sometimes it is of the nature of what our contemporaries call a 'fallout' or a by-product—as for example the advantages derived by industry from the special metals produced for a space programme. But it must also be recognized that the external effects may be negative instead of positive. When negative they are said to be nuisances, for example the factory chimney and its smoke, and when positive they are blessings, as in the case of the pedestrians whose way is lighted at night by a light in front of a private house without any cost to themselves. It is even possible to make a distinction between *externalities* which are deliberately created or at least ensured by the economic agency which pays for them—for example the public authority which decided to construct the lighthouse—and those which by the nature of things cannot be controlled, simply because the agency which decided to produce the service for its own purposes cannot exclude others from the benefit or force them to pay any part of the cost which was incurred.

I WANT to emphasize the importance of the distinction drawn by Pigou between 'private net product' and 'social net product', the difference between which he endeavours to explain by such factors as 'externalities'. I am tempted to consider this distinction as important as the intuition of Keynes concerning the underemployment equilibrium. Both of these great

[9] A. C. Pigou, *The Economics of Welfare*, pp. 182–185.

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English economists, although they proceed by different channels, question the traditional concept that the equilibrium between costs and returns, between the values of the elements of production and of the products, is spontaneously established by the machinery of the market. But Pigou, by calling attention to the gap between the private net product and the social net product, gives us an entirely decisive insight into some of the characteristic difficulties of the post-industrial society.

That which the author of *Economics of Welfare* brings to light is the problem of *control,* which arises whenever an economic agent creates, without having expressly intended to do so, costs or income which may fall to the lot of undetermined third parties. Classic theory did not take such a situation into account and it is instructive to compare its teachings with those which can be derived from Pigou's analysis. In a market where the competition is pure and absolute, an exchange involves an equal cost for both parties. But when external effects come into the picture, the question arises as to whether (and how) third parties who have suffered a loss should be compensated—for example a person living near a factory who has suffered the annoyance of the smoke or noise—or on the contrary should even be required to pay back some part of the free benefits they have received from a service which was not created by them and in the cost of which they did not share.

Compensation gives rise to all kinds of difficulties, and very serious ones, on which we will not dwell at this point except to point out that the importance of such delicate operations as these *transfers* would help to make more frequent and more necessary the intervention—or, if you prefer, the arbitration—of the government in economic affairs. Moreover, it is not enough to say that these economic interventions would be more frequent, but it is also necessary to know in what stage of the process they would take place—whether they would aim to make an *ex post* correction in the distribution of income or to provide an *ex ante* direction of the factors of production. This distinction, which is not very clear in the work of Pigou, will be shown further on to be of very great importance and will enable us to present in new terms the problem of government intervention in post-industrial societies.

The external effects (costs and returns) do not, however, involve the question of transfers by government arbitration, about which the welfare economists have argued so profusely. The 'externalities'—since they may finally fall to individuals who have had no part in their production—may become the goal of a chain of artifice and dodging which could have political consequences of the greatest importance. Let us start with the definition which Mancus Olson Jr [10] gives of the 'common or collective advantages procured by the government'. He explains that the advantages referred to are such that if they are enjoyed

[10] *The Logic of Collective Action,* p. 14.

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by an individual X_i in a group X_I it is impossible to exclude any member of that group from enjoying them also. This concept appears to be narrower than those concepts that can be derived from the Pigou example to which we have previously referred. Goods and services which produce external revenue are not necessarily 'public goods' in the sense suggested by Mancus Olson himself.[11] It is not inconceivable that the government would wish to reserve the enjoyment of certain services for certain types of users or would arrange to make such services more or less costly according to the type of user. For example, education and health are not, strictly speaking, 'public goods'—even if they are largely 'socialized'—but they nevertheless produce external effects because the state of health and the diffusion of knowledge produce beneficial effects which extend to the entire population. As a matter of fact, these authors do not define 'public goods' only by the impossibility of excluding anyone from benefiting by them, but also by the fact that since they are produced in 'jointness of supply' it is not only impossible to carry out an inflexible process of assigning their costs but it is essential that they be produced in an indivisible amount.

The fact that a large part of the services rendered by the government are offered in bulk, so to speak, and that when the government undertakes to sprinkle a single plant it is obliged to water the entire garden entails two chains of consequences, affecting respectively the behaviour of individuals and groups and the functioning of society itself. The first point was very nicely clarified by R. A. Musgrave when he explained that persons who do not pay for these services cannot be deprived of the advantages which they engender and since they cannot be excluded from the enjoyment of these benefits, they will not willingly consent to make any payment of their own accord.[12] The enjoyment of collective advantages or goods, either by gambling on the impossibility of being excluded or at least on the 'external effects', may be the ambition of the type of individual, clever but to be condemned morally, whom the economists might call an uninvited guest but who, in more common parlance, is a gate-crasher or a profiteer.

THE effect of that jockeying is reinforced by the tendency of public budgets to be 'too small'—as Anthony Downs[13] shows in a remarkable paper. In what seems at first to be a paradoxical proposal, but which when clarified and more closely defined by our previous analyses seems to be quite sound and well founded, Downs endeavours to show that in the modern democracies—owing to the most essential characteristics of these regimes themselves—public expenditure seems to remain below its normal volume. This normal volume is defined by

[11] And by the authors he refers to in his note 21, p. 14.
[12] R. A. Musgrave, *Theory of Public Finance*, p. 8.
[13] Anthony Downs, 'Why the Government Budget is Too Small in a Democracy' in *World Politics*, July 1960.

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Downs in a first analysis as the level at which the public expenditure would be held if the voters were adequately informed. The question then arises as to why the public is kept in ignorance. The budget appears to be the result of a series of implicit transactions between the governing and the governed, but according to the somewhat cynical hypothesis put forward by Downs, those who govern are not seeking the welfare of the citizens but the votes of the citizens, and since they are out to get the greatest number of votes—or at least a number sufficient to enable them to stay in office—they are inclined to measure the marginal utility of every expense to be entered in the budget by the amount of public support it will bring them, measured insofar as possible by the number of votes which that expenditure is likely to bring them. The voters, for their part, calculate inversely but in a supplementary way and make their support for a party or candidate subject to the net advantage which they can derive, after due allowance for the tax increase which they may have to pay, from the public expenditures initiated by that party or candidate. If the governing and the governed calculated accurately, they would succeed in establishing for the national budget a level which would constitute the *optimum* for both sides, ensuring for the governing the best chance of being re-elected and for the governed the maximum advantages from public expenditure. But Downs considers that in actual fact the budgets of democratic governments tend to be kept below that optimum.

Downs gives three explanations for this tendency. In the first place, the citizens are very incompletely informed, especially as regards the advantages which they can obtain as users of the public services. In the second place, Downs invokes an argument which seems to be borrowed from the classic analyses of Festinger on 'cognitive dissonance'. On the one hand, the benefits which a citizen may derive from a social security programme are remote and uncertain, and on the other hand the cost which the establishment of such a programme entails are immediately and painfully felt, because they bring an increase in taxes and quota charges. In the third place, the eventual beneficiaries are unorganized individuals who not only are rather incapable of perceiving what their interests really are but who, even if they succeeded in understanding their real interests, would be lacking in the means to make them prevail.

This latter argument serves to emphasize the relative weakness of unorganized individuals in comparison with the pressure groups which by their influence or by means of threats succeed in getting the lion's share of collective resources assigned to them. These exploiters may consist of a small number of groups whose bargaining power depends on two conditions—first, the advantages which they insist upon even when they inflict on the community a very high cost, do not require any very heavy concession for the time being from any other particular group. For example, when certain industries obtain a higher customs duty to protect them, this measure, although its effects may be extremely

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harmful to the national community in the long run, does not meet with any serious resistance because it is not counter to any large interests capable of making themselves heard. The second factor which serves to measure the bargaining power of a pressure group is its capacity for making allies and buying off possible opponents.[14]

The decrease in the benefits which the general mass of voters might derive from public expenditure, combined with the successful exploitation of that expenditure by organized interest groups, probably produces not so much a general insufficiency of budget expenditure, as Downs maintains, but rather an incorrect distribution of these benefits—a distribution in which the public services are to some extent discriminated against, while subsidies and direct compensation to private interests are, on the contrary, abusively increased. In other words, appropriations for health, education and urban development tend to be constantly below the optimum, that is to say, below the level at which they would be established if there were control of the effects resulting from the systematic devaluation of advantages derived from the public expenditure by the citizens in general and those involved in the exploitation of common resources by interest groups.

With this developing production of services not involving really heavy financial transactions, in which the external effects (costs and benefits) become much greater, Downs' argument takes on its real importance. It is by no means an academic paradox, as the polemical zest of the author might lead us to believe. In fact, Downs leads us to an understanding of the most basic difficulties of the post-industrial societies. With Pigou, the hope remained that the intervention or arbitration of the government could correct the inequalities resulting from blessings and nuisances. As Downs casts doubt upon this hope, I consider it essential to examine some of the implications of his analysis and for this purpose to place it in its broadest perspective, that is to say in the light of the various functions of the national government.

BESIDES the tutelary functions of a government, which are expressed in acts of legislation and which establish a certain number of common rules, it is necessary to make a distinction, as we have said, between *ex post* functions of distribution of revenue after it has been produced and a function of redeployment of the factors of production. One initial fact seems to me to characterize the present situation, which may be of crucial importance for the future of post-industrial societies, and this is that the *ex post* redistribution method has reached the limit of its effectiveness. I want to put forward two main arguments to support my thesis. First, the existence of irreducible poverty is now well established in most of the industrialized countries. Consider, for example, the following data about France: the other France, the poor side, can be defined as consisting of families which, in 1962, before

[14] This phenomenon, known as 'log-rolling', has been brilliantly analysed by Buchanan and Tullock in *The Calculus of Consent*.

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receiving any transferred amounts—and even that is partially inaccurate in the case of farmers who received a good part of their transferred allowances through the medium of agricultural price aids or controls—had an annual income of less than 4,000 francs, which was insufficient to cover their basic needs.[15]

From the above data, I deduce two propositions. The first is quite explicit, but nevertheless deserves a moment of attention. It is the fact that in a relatively affluent country a sizeable percentage of the households can scarcely cover their *basic* needs. It is true that the average income per family of which Chabanol speaks is understood as being *before* the transfer of any allowances and therefore does not represent the total net income available to those families. But it must also be understood that the amount of the transfers is not more than 20 per cent[16] of the budget, and the actual social effort for 1965 represented 14 per cent of the national budget, which considerably reduces the effect of the redistribution of taxes at the level of incomes which the average poor families really receive.[17] Having recognized the fact that poverty exists, let us now see who the principal victims are. In the French figures analysed by Chabanol, they consist of 50·8 per cent of the inactives (essentially old people), 72·2 per cent of the farmers, 36·4 per cent of the hired farm help and 26·9 per cent of all families in general. I note immediately the absence of industrial workers on this list and I infer that if poverty must continue to exist in the post-industrial society it will not affect the types of people who were particularly exposed to it in the industrial society of former times. I will add that the poor people are either unorganized (the inactives) or poorly organized (farmers, for example) who must endure their lot as it is or else resort to 'decentralized violence'[18] to defend their interests, rather than to an institutional method of solving the conflict, in the absence of a method of settling conflicts on an institutional basis.

The existence of irremediable poverty should draw the attention of sociologists and economists to certain effects of technological progress which were neglected in former years. As long as progress is conceived of as a process which reduces the real costs of products and thereby makes them accessible to an increasing mass of consumers, one can adhere to an optimistic view which has been popularized in France by the writings of Fourastié. (The only fly in the ointment is that the reduction of costs is irregular according to the products, and especially the fact that it is not found at all in the field of the services.) It is true that observers of underdeveloped countries question that complacent concept. They have been led to distinguish between a central and a peripheral economy and to consider the 'imperialist domination' as

[15] Daniel Chabanol, 'L'Autre France, Réflexions sur la Distribution des Revenus en France', in *Analyse et Prévision*, VII, 1969, p. 73.

[16] Ibid. p. 77.

[17] Especially since these allowances have a strict upper limit.

[18] I borrow this expression from Albert Hirschmann.

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the cause of this dissymmetry. As a matter of fact, this distinction has appeared less and less clear as even in the rich countries there have come to light cases of exclusion and of discrimination which although not as severe as the phenomena thus designated in the underdeveloped countries nevertheless resembled them. The case of the negroes in the United States is a fairly good illustration of this point.

The disruptive effects of technological progress are multiple. I will confine myself to pointing out a few cases which would not seem to lend themselves to correction by an efficient and well-meaning action on the part of the national or local government authorities. In the first place, technological progress introduces a *difference* between those who bear it and those who benefit by it with a resulting increase in their power, and this inequality is so essential to progress that it is not possible to eliminate it, at least not immediately, without eliminating progress itself. In the second place, some of the differences thus introduced are cumulative, to such an extent that the individuals or groups who have benefited ultimately constitute themselves into distinct categories in relation to the individuals or groups with which they were originally akin. Moreover, these differences, in so far as they bring power, are increased—sometimes to an exaggerated extent—by those who are deprived. Technological progress can therefore produce two kinds of effects—one of exclusion by differentiation and the other of competition (which may take very diversified forms) by means of which those excluded try to catch up with the rest of the crowd. This is well demonstrated by the question of education in our societies: (1) Education is increasingly becoming the basis enabling one to belong to the favoured categories. (2) The most decisive advantages of education are those conferred not by the initial and common type of training but higher and specialized training. (3) The demand for *university* education is therefore increasing. (4) The structure of this demand is almost contradictory—on the one hand the benefit of university education should be extended to the greatest possible number, but on the other hand the *difference* which it confers and which makes it so desirable can be fully enjoyed only by a relatively small number. The result is an effect of crowdedness—because the service is an object of increasing demand—and an effect of down-grading which results from the contradiction I have just mentioned.

LET us now compare the results of our analysis with the paradox of Downs. He established reasons for the insufficiency of the collective demand for public services. Taking into account some of the effects of technological progress leads us to understand why those services, the amount and cost of which the public authority tends to establish below the optimum, are nevertheless desired or should be desired by the victims of technological progress. Note that I said 'are or should be desired'. Indeed, we have been led to assume that the victims, the poor, are strong demanders of these services. But a great surprise

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awaits us in this connection and will enable us to understand why the national or local governments are not very well equipped to play the part traditionally assigned to them by the welfare theorists.

Let us listen to what Richard M. Titmuss [19] has to say:

> We have learnt that the higher income groups make better use of the National Health Service. . . . In the field of financial provision for old age we have learnt that the State now makes a larger contribution to the pensions of the rich than it does to the pensions of the poor. . . . Under the universal system of family allowances and children allowances . . . the rich man gets thirteen times more from the State than the poor man in recognition of the dependent needs of children. . . . In the field of housing, the subsidy paid by the State to owner occupiers of many categories of houses is on the average greater than the subsidy received by most tenants of public housing schemes. For my last example I take education. . . . We are now entering a period in which secondary and higher education may become one of the major disequalizing and socially disruptive forces.

From this passage by Titmuss—all the more significant since he is an expert in social security matters as well as a convinced socialist—I draw certain consequences. The first is trivial. It is that the underprivileged categories for whose benefit the major programmes of official redistribution of incomes have been created really benefit from them less than the privileged categories themselves.[20] Going beyond this observation, we can set up a series of assumptions with a view to establishing as accurately as possible such factors as being poorly informed, lack of ambition, the spirit of resignation, and shyness in facing the indifferent or even hostile atmosphere of the bureaucratic institutions, and it is clear that these factors, which can so easily be seen in the behaviour of the underprivileged, are largely interdependent and mutually reinforcing.

In all events, one consequence seems to stand out in a practical way from the observations made by Titmuss, namely that when inequalities are once established they are extremely difficult to eliminate and that they should therefore be dealt with, if I may say so, in a preventive manner, before they have crystallized in a distribution of incomes that tends to stick fast. The core of the new welfare policies is therefore less an *ex post* correction than an *ex ante* control, an intelligent orientation of the factors which lead to keeping at a minimum not only the internal but also the external costs of growth and to promote the various factors of production in such a way that they will create positive internal effects (for themselves) and external effects (for society). How can this result be obtained?

[19] Richard M. Titmuss in 'Towards Socialism', ed. by Perry Anderson and Robin Blackburn, in *New Left Review*, 1965.

[20] The French data collected by Chabanol conveys the same conclusion.

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WITHOUT entering into a technical discussion which would not be appropriate at this time, I will mention two conditions which directly concern the structure and operation of post-industrial society. The first has to do with the procedures of the participation and constitution of underprivileged groups in particular, while the second concerns the procedures for the action of the public authorities. A basic difficulty arises when one endeavours to show exactly how the 'poor', the 'excluded', 'those who are discriminated against', can by their own effort change to their advantage a situation which technological progress does not make increasingly advantageous to them—all optimistic illusions to the contrary—by virtue of a sort of providential destiny. Some believe that they are solving this difficulty by merely saying that they should 'organize' themselves. But Downs has shown quite clearly that the population are ignorant of the advantages which they could obtain from the enjoyment of collective goods and services, or at least that they are inclined to underestimate them in a general way. Moreover, the very concept of an organization by which the individuals would be in a position to defend themselves must be held up to question. The theorists of group politics put forth two equally contestable assumptions. They assume that groups balance one another and they also assert that all interests organize on their own account. Actually, these two assumptions are linked together—the assumption of balance (countervailing powers) being dependent on the assumption of action on one's own account. Mancus Olson, Jr,[21] quite soundly suspected that those assertions were not well-founded. I believe that I have shown quite convincingly that the act of organizing is not by any means a spontaneous phenomenon, the reason being that an individual who is not a member of an organization but exercises the same activity or has the same status derives exactly the same advantage from the success of the organization as its members do. Non-union members benefit by a reduction in work hours the same as the organized workmen do, and that is why the trade unions try to enforce the closed shop principle making union membership obligatory.[22] There is therefore a strong probability of non-participation or, shall we say, an attitude of apathy, with the obvious reservation that a minimum number of members is necessary to ensure the effectiveness and 'credibility' of a group.[23] That is obviously the case with the free associations, even in the United States, where they are nevertheless considered as having the most favourable ground. I believe that there is every reason to expect that this state of things will be confirmed, if not strengthened, in the case of post-industrial society, in which the stakes of collective action—since they will be increasingly constituted by diffused services the importance

[21] *The Logic of Collective Action.*

[22] Ibid. p. 77.

[23] I am passing over the distinctions made by Mancus Olson between 'inclusive groups', 'exclusive groups' and 'latent groups'. Anyway, a full and effective participation by all those who are concerned does not appear to be the normal situation in any of these three cases.

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of which will scarcely be perceived even by those who are excluded from them—will not lend themselves to any brief conventionalized description which will enable them to be fully realized with a view to organizing for the struggle.

The industrial society of the past had reached a practical state of conflict which is perhaps now tending to disappear. Essentially, the stakes were private, definite and material, such as wage rates, working conditions and work hours. The struggle was intense, but limited. It took place within bounds which were clearly marked by both sides. Once organized labour had been recognized and its capacity to contract for all its members and even for all workers, whom it was supposed to represent, was admitted, and when it had accepted in fact if not in theory that its action would be confined to specific limited objectives, a sort of institutionalization of the industrial conflict became possible under rules more or less explicitly admitted by both sides and if these rules were violated by either side the political authorities called it to their attention and took official steps to make them effective.

I agree that this description is very sketchy and that it has been mostly applied in the United States since the Second World War.[24] But it enables us to understand how the institutionalization of the conflict by explicit determination and limitation of the stakes has helped to reduce riotous demonstrations of protest. But what if the nature of the stakes involved is changed? In that connection I wish to make two remarks: first, in the standard practice of institutional conflict the stakes have always been of an essentially private nature and the public authority only intervened in case of necessity in order to recall or re-establish the rules of the game. But the situation will no longer be the same if the public services or more generally the major activities of external effects become the principal objectives of the competition. I am inclined to think that the post-industrial society will be of an intensely political character. This statement seems to contradict what we have said about an apathetic attitude and non-participation, but actually the two statements are easily reconciled if we bear in mind that an initial apathy is not incompatible with a later convulsive development. The same individuals who have long been unaware of the benefits which they could derive from certain public expenditures may find that the deterioration of a public service or its crowded condition (due to the irrepressible rush combined with the poor quality of access or receptive facilities) have become simply intolerable. What has happened in the last two years in a public service such as education in France would serve as a good illustration of this situation.

I should be rather inclined to believe that 'decentralized violence' will reappear in a more or less durable way in our new society. In some respects it takes us back to the pre-industrial age, and in other respects it takes on traits which remind us of the underdeveloped countries. A

[24] See in this connection Kornhauser's *Industrial Conflict*.

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student *sit in*—by the way it develops, the motives of those who organize it and the results which it involves for those against whom the demonstration is directed—invites comparison with the '*invasiones*' by the peons in Peru or Colombia.

To the difficulties of methodically organizing the interests which will try to express themselves and make themselves heard in the post-industrial society must be added the equally heavy difficulties which will harass any action by the government in the functioning of that society. It strikes me that many of the current discussions on what is called 'bureaucracy' are obscured by a serious confusion between two very different functions which are still vaguely assumed by most public administrations. First, they have executive problems involving the recruitment of their personnel and at the same time involving the manner in which these personnel perform their duties. The criterion of bureaucratic action being thus understood, it is the conformity of the acts of the public servant with the text of the laws and regulations which must guarantee the good operation of the service, preserving the rights of the officials as well as those of the users of the service. In opposition to this concept of the bureaucracy of administration there is the bureaucracy of incentive, initiative and management—if these terms do not clash too strongly. To give an idea of what we mean in this connection, I will say for example that the Delegation for Area Planning and Regional Development (D.A.T.A.R.) of the French Government has nothing to do with the protection of mortgages. The second type, as we have said, places a value on initiative, while the first envelopes itself in a routine which prolongs indefinitely the situations acquired.

I put forward the hypothesis that post-industrial society will be bureaucratic in the second sense of the word, and I agree that, at first sight, there is nothing original about this assertion. But let us examine it more closely. It is easy to perceive that in post-industrial society the functions of planning and arbitration will be of decisive importance. The necessity of planning or forecasting is indicated as a counterweight to the thoughtlessness, or rather the insensitivity, of individuals to their common interest as citizens. As to the necessity for arbitration, it is due to the excessive extent to which those who are organized profit by and abuse their power. Nothing indicates that government will fail and perish, and nothing indicates the advent of independent and co-directed units. To the extent that the services producing external effects acquire a more decided preponderance, the weight of the centre over the periphery has every chance of becoming more substantial. It is as hard for me to believe that the activities mentioned by Titmuss (education, health, housing) can be dealt with on a strictly cost or monetary basis, as a market activity, between private dealers, as it is to imagine that small *really* independent and co-directed units will take over such collective responsibilities.

What strikes me about post-industrial society, as we can see it dimly outlined in the future, is the disharmony arising from the lack of

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organization of the interests and activities which its own progress will help to give an increasing importance to and the nature of the control which its operation will require. I confess that I do not see clearly how these divergent trends can be reconciled, and that is why I anticipate a regressive return of such phenomena as those which, in the words of Hirschmann, we have called 'decentralized violence'. In all events, I exclude the possibility that the responsibilities of growth can be taken over by mere market machinery or following the model of the associationists, by a system of spontaneous, independent, and decentralized self-management.

Technological Forecasting and Politics

Giovanni Sartori

NOT only our understanding of the past but also our conjectures about the future rest ultimately on what was formerly called a philosophy of history. This means that to approach the problem we need an explanatory key before anything else. Disagreement arises because we use different deciphering keys, different explanatory searchlights.

In principle, once we have settled for an explanatory key, it should apply both to retrospection and forecasting. In practice, however, the forecaster finds certain keys more manageable than others. It is by no means fortuitous that the futurologist opts mainly for technological and technostructural bases of explanation. If technology and the technological environment are the 'ultimate causes' of change, then our conjectures are rooted in relatively firm ground and can draw on hard data. Conversely, the more we leave the firm ground of 'objective determinants', and the more our explanatory key is focused on 'subjective factors', the uneasier we feel about forecasting. This implies that whereas the sociologist and the economist working on hard data can easily switch to technological forecasting, this adjustment is much more difficult for the historian and the political scientist working on soft data.

We can thus draw a rough distinction between *technological predictions* supported by hard evidence whether economic or sociological, on the one hand, and, on the other a *predictive uncertainty* largely supported by historical, politiological and cultural soft data.

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THE recent writings of Daniel Bell on *The Post-Industrial Society* represent, in my opinion, the best that has been written using the technological base of forecasting, in the fullest and most subtle meaning of the expression. Bell deserves particular commendation as he is very much aware of the scope afforded by the technological path of enquiry. In his paper on *The Post-Industrial Society: Technocracy and Politics* he is careful to emphasize how the technocratic concept (which embodies a particular definition of rationality) relates to politics. In Bell's wording, 'The technocratic mode is bound to spread in our society. But whether the technocrats themselves will become a dominant class, and how the technocratic mode might be challenged, are different questions'.[1] Bell goes on to note that, 'In the next few decades the political arena will, if anything, become more decisive, for two fundamental reasons: . . . crucial decisions . . . are made by the government rather than through the market; in addition . . . many more groups now seek to establish their social rights—their claims on society—through the political order'.[2] He concludes that politics 'is always prior to the rational, and often the upsetting of the rational'.[3] Clearly, Bell is well aware of the fact that technological forecasting falls short of politics.

The problem of how the technological imperative relates to politics was only confronted indirectly at our conference. If I understand Daniel Bell correctly, he wishes to suggest that there is an intermediary element between technology and politics: the cultural factor. Bell seems to imply that were we capable of accounting for cultural diversity, we would be in a better position also to account for the upsetting uncertainties of politics. Therefore the conference's main preoccupation was to ascertain whether 'value patterns and cultural traditions are more decisive than other factors (economic and technological) in accounting for the variations in society'. Bell follows up this query in an interesting way, noting the fact that although 'culture seems to be internationalized and values (as expressed in science and learning) become universal', yet political differences remain. Consequently 'if political differences are the source of divergence between societies, how does one account for these differences?' I take it, therefore, that Bell's ultimate concern remains the relationship between technocracy and politics; but that he would feel more able to explore the issue if politics could in turn be plugged into 'culture,' i.e. into something which is less elusive and inconstant than politics *per se*.

THE first issue discussed at the conference was, therefore, how the technological imperative relates to culture and cultural diversity. In our discussions we have proceeded in a parallel, rather than in a converging fashion. The reason for this is that, technology and culture point to, and flow from different bases of explanation. To be

[1] pp. 12–13 Bell's manuscript.
[2] pp. 21 Bell's manuscript.
[3] Ibid.

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sure, there was an effort to keep a footing in both camps, that is, to account for both variables. For instance Bell does grant importance to what he vividly calls the 'adversary culture.' Nonetheless it is clear enough that the post-industrial society hinges on 'objective' techno-scientific and techno-structural predictors. To Bell politics and the emergence of an adversary culture are intervening, and indeed disturbing variables. Whereas from the other point of view—when Crozier lays the emphasis on the 'cultural crisis', and Stanley Hoffmann on the 'psychological revolt'—the cultural factor appears to be an independent variable.

This does not imply that the scholar pursuing the cultural thread of explanation cannot accept most of what Bell has to say. The culturally oriented scholar does not need to challenge arguments about the industrial imperative, scientific inevitables, and the technocratic outlook. He may well concede that the technological revolution alters the occupational structure radically, and that this in turn affects the social structure and, ultimately, our way of life. But he will find all this evidence highly inconclusive. His disbelief in 'objective determinants' is reflected in his objection: when all is said concerning the *environment*, what about *man*? For the culturally oriented scholar will not concede that man reacts to his environment as simplistically as assumed by socio-economic explanations. At this point the issue is joined, and we stand in opposite camps.

ANY possibility of discovering a common, unified searchlight, appears highly implausible. But we can do better than simply tossing the ball back at each other. I shall therefore attempt to answer the question, how can we converge or to what extent can we bridge the gap between the technological and cultural points of departure? The whole 'technological bundle' can, and should, be simplified by considering the following aspect of the question: within the broad spectrum of all the technological factors, which elements appear crucial in having a more direct and decisive impact on man? A distinction can be drawn between, (1) *indirect* change agents, i.e. those factors which change man through his environment, and (2) change agents which affect and attack man *directly*.

Man, or better, each generation, can accommodate itself to very different modes of production, ways of living, and political frameworks. But the technological revolution contributes in a very real sense to creating a 'new man' (new by being a different, not a better man), and thus becomes a *technology of man*. The technology of production confronts us with changes resembling earthquakes; similarly the technology of man may produce a 'manquake'. There are at least two reasons for shifting the focus from the technology of production to the technology of man. First it bridges the abyss between the technological and cultural approaches. The second reason is parsimony. That is with respect to the destiny of man the argument can be confined to two major

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factors: (a) historical acceleration, i.e. the growing speed of the time machine, and (b) the mass media revolution, i.e. the message bombardment.

Although the acceleration of history goes back to the French and the romantic revolutions, there must be a speed at which human beings cannot live, to which they could never become accustomed. The present acceleration of the time machine outdates the individual long before his biological exhaustion, and the pace of change is such that all the life experience of an age cohort is subjected to traumatic discontinuities. This problem is well known and I would prefer to dwell, instead, on the mass media revolution, which is often appraised in a shortsighted and very parochial manner.

WHAT is entailed by the mass media revolution is, in the first place, the 'victory of the gun'. Throughout history there has been a race between weapon and armour, gun and shield, tanks and the Maginot line. For millennia the pendulum has been swinging back and forth, sometimes on the side of offence, and at other times on the side of defence. But now—both in war (the Bomb, the Germ) and in peace (the message bombardment)—this balance is definitely broken: the pendulum no longer swings, the gun has triumphed. Man as a mental animal (and a feeble animal at that) has never been as exposed, as vulnerable, as unprotected, as he is today. If the potentialities of mass media technology are really efficiently exploited, man's mental defence mechanisms have little, if any, chance of resisting the message bombardment (feedbacks notwithstanding).

Let me confess that I place little confidence in the Rostow-to-Galbraith types of 'convergence theory' between West and East, between democracy and communism. I am willing to risk, however, a 'convergence prediction' in the sphere of the mass media, namely, that communication technology is breaking down a longitudinal (i.e. historically rooted and diversified) world of nations, and replacing it with a horizontal *synchronic* world of mass movements. I very much agree, in this connection, with the point made by Eisenstadt that the nation-state is less and less a significant unit of analysis in the face of the 'growing internationalisation of social systems'. Eisenstadt's remark about the 'destruction of niches' fits my argument equally. From a somewhat different point of view we may also—following Daniel Bell—refer to the 'loss of insulating space'.

Now, if mass media diffusion destroys the niches, deprives us of insulating space, breaks down vertical barriers (such as historical differentiae and cultural roots), what follows from this is a *horizontal world* organized around the 'message and image' unit of analysis. We could thus envisage roughly three kinds of communication networks, and thereby three worlds: (i) a multi-centred mass-communicating world (Western democracies); (ii) totalitarian, unicentric mass-indoctrinated worlds (Soviet Union, China, and their respective satellites); and

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(iii) a residual, embryonic mass-communicating world (without TV but with transistors). And the relevance of these 'communication aggregates' could be measured by indexes of radio-TV density. However that may be, the point is that the nature of the 'symbolic habitat' has radically changed, passing as it were from the centrality of the written-spoken word to the visual image; the visual image affects our lives more and more deeply; and the inhabitant of the technological society becomes increasingly 'one-dimensional', being shaped by the sole dimension of an instantaneous 'present time'.

MY convergence prediction is, then, that the impact of free-floating horizontal lines of mass communication 'liberates' the new man from his past, from his cultural roots, and from whatever anchors human beings had formerly—for better or for worse. In this sense men are definitely converging, i.e., becoming more monotonous, more similar, irrespective of nations and national borders (but not, let it be stressed, across the world: for new borders are created by the communications network to which each communicating community belongs). But, if anything, this convergence brings additional uncertainty. I am implying that in a flat, horizontal world the historian may well run out of business, and also that a similar destiny may well be shared by prophecies based on the force of a 'rational imperative'. For a world anchored—or unanchored—in the mass media drifts in accord with 'flash movements' of opinion and passion. This drifting has two aspects. On the one hand, the more the voice of the message rules, the more human beings can be manipulated and mobilized in very different directions. On the other hand, the 'reinforcing effects' of mass media contagion produces results which escape control—as the explosion on campuses throughout the United States during the Cambodian invasion showed.

To sum up, historical acceleration plus the all-pervasive intensity of a 'diffusion phenomenon' reinforced by contagion effects undermines not only our reliance on historical conditions and conditioning, but also the basis of rational, and thereby technological, predictability. Here we have also reached the point at which the 'germ' of socio-economic determinism (as Stanley Hoffmann would say) loses its virulence. What next?

If the communication revolution is the decisive revolution, the next question is: *who* will control the message bombardment and *how*? Here politics clearly enters, or re-enters, the scene.

IN a number of ways politics is the most difficult theme to pursue in the discussion. For one thing, we do not have a 'political imperative' in the same sense in which we can speak of a 'technological imperative'. The difficulty with a political imperative is that values, indeed fundamental values, are involved. There can be no political imperative—in the full sense of the expression—without a corresponding 'value

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imperative'. To be sure, 'democracy' is the concept to which most people currently pay lip-service; but a successful slogan cannot be taken as an indicator of common values, of a shared conception of the Good Life. No such concensus exists.

However, one may speak of the political imperative in a narrower meaning, that is, setting aside the value question. In this more limited meaning the political imperative points to the type of governmental machinery required—we may say for technical reasons—by a highly interdependent and thereby highly vulnerable technological society. This is a manageable, or rather more manageable issue; although we seem reluctant to confront the problem. The slogan of the new generation (intellectuals included) is 'more democracy', meaning more participation, more decentralization, less orders, less restraints. How these demands are, or can be, reconciled with the highly regulated world of a technetronic society remains a mystery to me. For the purpose of this discussion the mystery can be left unplumbed, with one comment: that political issues which are said to be objectively intractable, may well owe their intractability to their subjective unpopularity.

With this warning in mind, let me return to my previous question: who will control the mass media, and how? Again, this is not an unmanageable question if we link it to the related question: will democracy survive? The link between the two questions is not far-fetched.

WHATEVER our normative views as to what democracy *ought* to be, the fact remains that liberal democracies, or constitutional democracies, actually *are* 'protective systems' (for each and all individuals). Therefore if democracy as a protective system survives, we shall still be in a position to neutralize the 'media weapon' to a sufficient extent. But if no protective political system (such as democracy) is likely to survive, then the prediction is fairly safe: the alternative is perfect tyranny—perfected by the availability of a technology of man. Orwell's *1984* is a very plausible imagery of what a totalistic, totalitarian 'symbolic control' can accomplish. And the question for the future is whether we shall pass from 1970 to 1984. How do we pass from the present-day permissive society (and/or populistic democracy) to Big Brother? This is no small question. But, as Crozier reminds us, 'crisis' can be anticipated for sure. And authors such as Tocqueville have been prophetic, they have been able to foresee the trends and the inner development mechanisms of democracy. Thus my point is, again, that to predict the future, or non-future, of democracy (as a protective system of checks and restraints, i.e. in its *sine qua non* minimal condition) is neither intrinsically more difficult, nor more risky, than to speculate about the year 2000. The difference is that we have been paying far less attention to political matters than to technological matters. It is relevant to consider why.

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There are very obvious reasons for this. New themes—such as the technological revolution—are more exciting than traditional themes. Another reason is that behavioural persuasion in political science has its drawbacks, one of these being the atrophy of imaginative thinking. Nonetheless exercises in foreseeing the future are hardly realistic if unaided by politological imagination. The point can be illustrated, with reference to Bell's prediction that the dominant class of the future will be (as Shonfield labels it) the 'theory class'. Bell's emphasis is actually more on 'science', and it is with respect to scientific knowledge and learning that Bell has argued that intellectuals and intellectual institutions will be the 'dominant institutions' of the post-industrial society. Yet Shonfield is right in detecting in Bell a theory of the 'theory class'. And in that I cannot follow Bell any longer. It is at this juncture, in fact, that Bell's approach—and, in general, the socio-economic and techno-scientific paths of enquiry—fall short of politics.

IN essence the problem is how *knowledge* (who knows) relates to *power* (who is master). We have here four possible combinations, or cases:

(1) power without knowledge;
(2) knowledge without power;
(3) the knowledgeable have power;
(4) the powerful have knowledge.

By and large, until the advent of the industrial society, power holders and the theory class did not mix, except marginally. Those in power had little knowledge, and the theory class had little power. With the advent of a technological and technetronic society this compartimentalization—which amounts also to a power-limiting state of affairs—breaks down. However, shall we have a government *of* science (case 3), or a government *by* science (case 4)? My feeling is that the 'theory class' prediction shares the recurrent Platonic illusion, and delusion, of the philosopher-king. For one thing, even if a man of science governs, he need not govern as a scientist. In my view, political power—the power over the *polis*—rests with the people who specialize in power-seeking and power-wielding; and these are the people that we call 'politicians'. Thus speaking of power we have to reckon with a 'power class'. And to the extent that intellectuals are intellectuals, and scientists remain scientists, they do not qualify as a 'sovereign' (i.e. political) power class. A theory class has power in its own domain, which is intellectual institutions, not political institutions.

My conjecture is, therefore, that the government will always remain a government of politicians; but will be a government aided and, eventually, reinforced by expert advice. This qualifies the fourth hypothesis. By saying 'the powerful have knowledge' I do not imply that those in power have it themselves. Of course not. What this shorthand expression implies is that expert skill and knowledge are recognized as

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an additional and necessary resource of political power. And this is indeed how the modern politician perceives and utilizes the theory class: as a strategic *resource.*

The 'government by science' development can be interpreted optimistically or pessimistically. The optimistic view—which generally coincides with the technocratic view—is that to the extent that a power class needs the theory class, the former is conditioned by, and must share its power with, the latter. The pessimistic view—which is also my view—is that power plus science make for *more power,* and indeed make for a fantastic multiplication of the potentialities of power. For I take a dim view of the theory class—at least in power game situations. Intellectuals are not warriors; they live on thin margins; they perform in hot-houses and ivory towers. Throughout history they have 'served'. They had to—all right. But I find no counter-evidence, on this score, today. With rare, morally magnificent but numerically small exceptions, intellectuals protest against governments and refuse to collaborate with governments only in permissive societies—and indeed in those societies in which to be on the side of rebellion is a safe, if not rewarding, course of action. Elsewhere, and under unsafe circumstances, mental workers—i.e. intellectuals—are, if anything, more malleable than manual workers: their mind moves quickly, and quickly discovers ways and alibis for adjusting. Under any and all command systems we have a *trahison des clercs.* And it is not really, or necessarily, a matter of betrayal. The humanist who abandons the values that he formerly professed can be called a traitor; but a technological theory class just goes ahead with its own business. I cannot share, therefore, the view that the relation of science to government is a recalcitrant matter. This is not a safe prediction for times of hardship. Under stress, the mental worker is a very soft, very fragile creature. Intellectual institutions may well be the dominant institutions of the future; but it does not follow in the least that intellectuals themselves will be dominant rather than dominated.

Technological forecasting generally assumes, more or less implicitly, more or less naïvely, that political conditions—an open, pluralistic, tolerant order—will remain approximately equal. But 'political statics' is highly implausible in a fast-moving world in which everything else changes at a traumatic speed. And my emphasis is on what a technological habitat adds, or might add, to the power of power. It is especially with regard to the 'technology of man' that the power of some men (the politicians) over other men (thereby including the theory class) takes the proportions—or disproportions—of an *n* power problem. With such prospects ahead *political forecasting*—which is also a way of shaping the course of the future—should live up to its responsibilities. This is a difficult, but not impossible task. For politics is not as 'predictively intractable' as it has been made to appear.

The difficulty with politics is that we are ultimately left with a 'game against persons'. To be sure, social and economic life is also

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a game against persons. But the latter are subordinate games, subordinated—among other things—to the rules of the game enforced by politicians—*the* rule-makers. The politician is, instead, the rule-maker of his own power game. Bell wonders whether politics can be conceived as the source of divergence between societies. In my mind there is no doubt that this is the case, and that the power game of politics is indeed an independent, self-sustaining source of differentiation and conflict. So whether politics will remain 'tamed'—as innocuous as it has been with democratic protective systems—becomes the crucial question of, and for, the post-industrial society. Surprisingly enough it is a question which has been almost entirely neglected.

Post-Industrial Society and Cultural Diversity

Ken'ichi Tominaga*

HITHERTO many sociologists have referred to the advanced countries of the Western world as the 'industrial society', commonly characterized by such things as highly developed productive force, differentiated systems of the division of labour, incessant social change and development, achievement orientation, and the like. It is often emphasized that the concept of the industrial society goes beyond the distinction between capitalism and socialism. For example, Raymond Aron [1] characterizes it by the common traits of the two. Talcott Parsons [2] designates it as the combination of universalism and achievement.

However, the industrial society or industrialism is an old term. Indeed, it is 150 years since it was coined by Saint-Simon (1821). It is, therefore, no wonder that a phrase originating in the age of the steam engine came to be regarded as obsolete in the contemporary nuclear age. One can argue that 'industrialization' is a past event for the advanced countries of today, and that what is going on in these countries is something more than mere 'industrialization'. Thus it is quite natural that the phrase 'post-industrial society' should be coined to designate this new state of affairs.

* This article is drawn from the author's contribution to the Zurich conference.

[1] Raymond Aron, *La lutte de classes: nouvelles leçons sur les sociétés industrielles* (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), p. 22.

[2] Talcott Parsons, *The Social System* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1951), p. 184.

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In Japan, also, many people have realized that we are now apparently entering an entirely new stage as a result of rapid technological innovation and economic growth. This new stage is often called 'the information society'. This is a popular phrase and cannot be defined exactly; but roughly speaking we may say that the post-industrial society and the information society are fundamentally the same concept, because one of the important factors characterizing the post-industrial society is the increasing weight of the tertiary sector, the core of which is the information industry or the knowledge industry.

Such considerations lead us to conclude that we are now entering a new stage which lies beyond the traditional concept of the industrial society. But is the term 'post-industrial society' really adequate to describe this new stage? The name as such is a misleading one as it suggests society after the completion of the whole industrialization process. Actually, post-industrial society does not mean that; it is rather an extension of industrial society with its highly developed productive forces and incessant social change, inheriting also the various characteristics of industrial society such as differentiated systems of the division of labour, achievement orientation, etc. It is therefore a concept which is already inherent in the process of industrialization.

THAT the industrial society and the post-industrial society cannot be separated schematically from each other can be demonstrated by comparing the thoughts of Saint-Simon, who originated the concept of the industrial society, and those of Daniel Bell, who originated the concept of the post-industrial society. Bell[3] emphasizes that, while the leading institution of the industrial society was commerce, the leading institutions of the post-industrial society are science and technology. However, according to Saint-Simon,[4] the ideal plan for the industrial society was that 'spiritual power' lay in the hands of the scientists and 'secular power' in the hands of the industrialists. Thus for Saint-Simon the leading institution of industrial society was not only science but also commerce. Throughout the entire process of industrialization and including its present post-industrial stage, the development of science and technology has consistently played the part of prime mover. The increasing preponderance of the knowledge industry in post-industrial society is merely the end result of this process.

The term 'post-industrial' presupposes the trichotomy of 'pre-industrial', 'industrial', and 'post-industrial'. My point is that the boundary between pre-industrial and industrial constitutes a real break whereas the boundary between industrial and post-industrial lies within

[3] Daniel Bell, 'Notes on the Post-industrial Society' (I), *The Public Interest*, No. 6, 1966, p. 28 ff.

[4] Claude-Henri Saint-Simon, *Lettres d'un habitant de Genève à ses contemporaines* Geneva, 1802. *Oeuvres choisies*, par Charles Lemonnier, Bruxelles: Fr. van Meen et Cie, 1859, tome 1, p. 32.

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the continuous process of industrialization. This concept will emerge more clearly if we characterize the three phases of the industrialization process.

IT is now widely accepted that the relative weight of the economically active population shifts from the primary to the secondary sector, and from the secondary to the tertiary sector. These three phases differ from the trichotomy of pre-industrial, industrial, and post-industrial society or of agricultural, industrial, and post-industrial civilization in that they are concerned with the development *after* industrialization has begun, whereas in both the latter cycles the first category designates the stage *before* industrialization begins. If we assign the term 'stage' to the distinction between the pre-industrial and industrial to mean that there is a real break, the shifts of relative weight within the industrialization process could then appropriately be termed 'phases'. The essential point is that the 'post-industrial' society is not a stage resembling the distinction between pre-industrial and industrial, but a phase within the industrial stage of society.

The first phase of the industrialization process is characterized by a state where the percentage of population in the primary sector is decreasing but still occupies a relatively dominant position vis-à-vis the percentage of population in the secondary and tertiary sectors. From the technological point of view this corresponds roughly to the development of simple mechanization. Mechanization brings about mass production, but it is still limited because the standardization of the products and their parts is incomplete. The production process thus consists of a few skilled and some unskilled workers, whose wage level is generally low; thus high mass consumption cannot be fully developed.

In the second phase the percentage of population in the primary sector is no longer predominant, and it is the secondary sector which dominates over the other two. This corresponds to the appearance of mechanical automation, which makes full-scale standardized mass production possible. This production process is carried on by a mass of semi-skilled workers. An increase in wage and a lowering in the cost of the products bring about fully developed mass consumption.

The third phase is reached when the increase of population in the secondary sector reaches a ceiling owing to high labour productivity and the saturation of the demand for industrial products. Technologically this corresponds to the development of process automation and business automation, which release the worker from repetitive monotonous work based upon specialization. Many of them become intellectual workers. On the other hand, business automation decreases simple clerical work, thereby expanding the number of professional workers. A high level of income enables each household to spend more money on education and this encourages large-scale higher education to develop and produce intellectual workers and professionals to meet the demand.

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It must be emphasized again that these three phases form a continuous line of development which can be logically explained. The expansion of the knowledge industry according to Fritz Machlup [5] is merely a consequence of this same logic inherent in industrialization, the essential factor in which is the growing increase of labour productivity resulting from technological progress.

PRODUCTIVITY can be defined in relation to every factor of production in the formula of production function. Thus we get the major categories of physical productivity, capital productivity, and labour productivity. Technological progress can enhance all these types of productivity, but from the sociological point of view the rise in labour productivity is decisive. By generalizing the concept of labour productivity beyond the mere economic definition, we may say that technological progress brings about a rise in the density of human activities. This concept will remind sociologists of Emile Durkheim's statements [6] on dynamic density. Durkheim related the increase of dynamic density to the development of the division of labour. But now we must add that the rise in the density of human activities is a function of the development of science and technology just as much as of the division of labour.

The three stages mentioned above are the locus of this persistent process of increase in the density of human activities. In the pre-industrial stage the increase in density was quite slow, if any, and the social structure was thus static on the whole. Since industrialization started, the rising curve has shown an exponential growth rate. What is now called post-industrial society is the latest part of this growth curve as exemplified in the advanced countries of the contemporary world.

WE may now consider whether Japan has entered this 'post-industrial' phase. During the 60 years from the 'take-off' period of the 1890s up to the end of the period of recovery from the damages of the Second World War, Japan was in the first phase of its industrialization process. It can easily be seen from Table 1 that the years around 1955 were an important turning point. After 1955 the percentage of population in primary industry, which had so far been only slightly diminishing and had been boosted by war damage, began to decrease remarkably by an average annual rate of 2 to 3 per cent. It lost the position of relative primacy during 1955–60; in contrast, the population in the secondary sector expanded rapidly by an average annual rate of 7·7 per cent during this same period. Similarly from Table 2 it is

[5] Fritz Machlup, *The Production and Distribution of Knowledge in the United States* (Princeton University Press, 1962).

[6] Emile Durkheim, *De la division du travail social* (Paris: F. Alcan, 1893).

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apparent that the curve for production process workers and clerical workers rose rapidly from 1955. These observations tell us that the year 1955 was the boundary between the first and second phase. However, when the percentage of population in the primary sector dropped below its former leading position, it was the tertiary sector, not the secondary that supplanted it. Should this fact be interpreted to suggest that Japan skipped the second phase? Rapid increase of the population percentage in the tertiary sector had already begun in 1950; in the tertiary sector there was a precipitous expansion of the knowledge industry during the 15 years after 1950, as is shown in Table 3. But at the same time there was an explosive rise of population in the secondary sector in this same period. Thus, the factors characteristic of the second phase and those characteristic of the third phase are inseparably interwoven and synchronize with each other in the case of Japan. This means that Japan did not skip the second phase although it did not assume a typical form there.

Economic statistics show that industrial production recorded a remarkable growth on both the supply and demand side during the decade 1955–65. Also from Table 2 we see that the growth rate for production process workers reached 56 per cent in this decade, and for clerical workers the growth rate was 78 per cent. Apparently the decade 1955–65 was an age of explosive change for the manufacturing industry. The reason why in spite of this fact the population percentage in the secondary sector did not attain predominance will be explained by the rapid rise of labour productivity in the manufacturing sector. The index of labour productivity for the manufacturing industry in 1965, taking 1960 as the base, is 149. It seems that this circumstance permitted the population percentage in the tertiary sector to expand simultaneously with the secondary.

The high rate of economic growth related to the expansion of manufacturing production reached its peak with an annual rate of 15 per cent in substantial terms during the three years 1959–61. High economic growth still persists up to the present except for short-term fluctuations, however, on the average the rate is slightly decreasing. Correspondingly, after 1965 public opinion gradually turned to emphasize the evil effects of giving priority to economic growth. Furthermore, as is shown in Table 2, the increase in production process workers seems to have stopped after 1965; in contrast the numbers for professionals began to rise precipitously. It seems that these facts can be regarded as symptomatic of the transition to the third phase of the 'post-industrial' age. We can conclude that though the characteristics of the second and the third phase have manifested themselves simultaneously, the features of the second phase were more dominant in 1955–65 while those of the third phase became gradually more and more apparent after 1965.

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TABLE 1

Employed Population by Industry and their Growth Rate

Population (thousand)

	1920	1930	1940	1950	1955	1960	1965	1968
Primary	14,442	14,490	14,193	17,209	16,111	14,237	11,731	10,842
Secondary	5,577	5,993	8,419	7,812	9,220	12,764	15,395	16,764
Tertiary	6,424	8,788	9,402	10,568	13,928	16,682	20,465	21,393

Percentage

	1920	1930	1940	1950	1955	1960	1965	1968
Primary	54·6	49·5	44·3	48·4	41·0	32·6	24·6	22·1
Secondary	21·1	20·5	26·3	22·0	23·5	29·2	32·4	34·2
Tertiary	24·3	30·0	29·4	29·6	35·5	38·2	43·0	43·7

Average Annual Growth Rate

	1920–1930	1930–1940	1940–1950	1950–1955	1955–1960	1960–1965	1965–1968
Primary	0·0	−0·2	2·1	−1·3	−2·3	−3·5	−2·5
Secondary	0·8	4·1	−0·2	3·6	7·7	4·1	3.0
Tertiary	3·7	0·7	1·2	6·4	4·0	4·5	1·5

Data source: Japanese Census

TABLE 2

Employed Population by Occupations (selected) and their Indices

Population (thousand)

	1920	1930	1950	1955	1960	1965	1968
Professional	1,007	1,253	1,601	1,910	2,137	2,490	3,032
Administrative	430	519	666	841	1,017	1,295	1,388
Clerical	1,814	2,187	3,059	3,416	4,556	6,058	7,507
Sales	2,005	3,032	2,993	4,182	4,613	5,706	6,045
Farmers	14,286	14,342	17,017	15,874	14,253	11,654	10,752
Production Process Workers	5,434	6,236	7,943	9,451	12,485	14,743	14,724
Service	889	1,152	1,464	2,383	2,827	3,390	3,024
Total (incl. other occupations)	29,966	29,341	35,626	39,261	43,691	47,610	49,006

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TABLE 2—*cont.*

Employed Population by Occupations (selected) and their Indices—cont.

Indices by Time Series (1955=100)

	1920	1930	1950	1955	1960	1965	1968
Professional	53	66	84	100	112	130	159
Administrative	51	62	79	100	121	154	165
Clerical	53	64	90	100	134	178	220
Sales	48	73	72	100	110	136	144
Farmers	90	90	107	100	90	73	68
Production Process Workers	57	66	84	100	132	156	156
Service	37	48	61	100	118	146	127
Total (incl. other occupations)	69	75	91	100	112	122	125

Data source: Japanese Census

TABLE 3

Knowledge Industry Population (thousand)

	1950	1955	1960	1965
A. Workers in Knowledge Industry				
Publishing and Printing	231	331	411	540
Communication	350	419	489	578
Service to Establishment	93	146	442	278
Film and Entertainment	191	364	311	344
Medical and Health Service	398	544	673	868
Education	769	927	1,032	1,274
Other Services	302	330	712	786
Government	1,376	1,361	1,328	1,484
Total	3,710	4,422	5,398	6,512
B. Employed Population of All Occupations	35,626	39,261	43,691	47,633
A/B Ratio	10·4	11·33	12·4	13·7

Data source: Japanese Census

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TABLE 4

Markov Trend of Future Occupational Structure derived from 1955 and 1965 Social Mobility Surveys (Japan National Samples)

Markov Trend derived from 1955 Mobility Table (per cent)

	p(0)	p(1)	p(2)	p(3)	p(4)	$\lim_{t\to\infty} p(t)$
Professional	7·1	8·5	9·2	9·6	9·8	10·1
Administrative	4·6	4·8	5·0	5·1	5·1	5·2
Clerical	11·6	13·4	14·2	14·5	14·7	14·9
Sales	12·9	13·9	14·4	14·7	14·9	15·0
Skilled	12·1	14·3	15·5	16·1	16·3	16·6
Semi-skilled	7·5	8·4	8·8	8·9	9·0	9·1
Unskilled	6·3	6·4	6·4	6·4	6·4	6·4
Farmers	37·9	30·3	26·5	24·7	23·7	22·7
Total	100·0	100·0	100·0	100·0	100·0	100·0

Markov Trend derived from 1965 Mobility Table (per cent)

	p(0)	p(1)	p(2)	p(3)	p(4)	$\lim_{t\to\infty} p(t)$
Professional	6·1	7·7	8·5	8·9	9·1	9·4
Administrative	8·8	10·4	11·3	11·8	12·0	12·2
Clerical	13·7	16·0	16·9	17·3	17·4	17·6
Sales	17·6	19·6	20·6	20·8	21·0	21·1
Skilled	14·9	14·7	14·2	13·9	13·7	13·5
Semi-skilled	12·8	14·4	14·4	14·3	14·2	14·0
Unskilled	7·2	7·2	7·0	6·8	6·7	6·6
Farmers	18·9	10·0	7·1	6·2	5·9	5·7
Total	100·0	100·0	100·0	100·0	100·0	100·0

Data source: Ken'ichi Tominaga, 'Trend Analysis of Social Mobility 1955–1965', *Japanese Sociological Review* Vol. 21, no. 1, 1970, 2–24 (in Japanese).

ANOTHER main issue to be explored is whether industrialization brings about a certain degree of cultural convergence between otherwise dissimilar countries. Has industrialization made Japan the same as the Western advanced countries, or does Japan still keep its unique non-Western character despite industrialization? Will the transition to the 'post-industrial' phase strengthen the Westernization of the future Japan, or will it permit the country to remain different from the West?

Industrial civilization was initiated by Western civilization. However, the important point is that present industrial civilization is no longer a 'Western' civilization, that is, a local one. There have been many local civilizations in the world, and 'Western' civilization is one of them. But industrial civilization now occupies a special position and can

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no longer be considered 'one of them'. It was originally created by the West, but now many other countries such as Japan, the USSR, the East European countries, Australia, the Latin American countries, India, China, etc., participate or are going to participate in it. It is worth noting that even Arnold J. Toynbee, who rebelled against the historical outlook which centres itself on Western Europe, finally concluded that Western civilization has spread to enfold the entire world.

We can explain the special position of Western civilization in the world by the fact that it alone gave birth to the industrial society. Science and technology, the prime movers of industrialization, are more universal and therefore more communicable and transferable than other elements of culture such as religion, the arts, ideology, and so on. The latter can also be communicated and transferred to some extent but any attempt to do so usually brings about much friction and tension. Thus, the Tokugawa government prohibited Christianity in the seventeenth century, but it did not prohibit science in the later Tokugawa period.

THE hundred years of Japanese history since the Meiji Restoration present much evidence to support the 'convergence' theory. To take only one example, Japan, while under the Tokugawa regime and up to the opening of the ports in 1854, lay completely outside the converging influence of Westernization, and was a peaceful traditional society. Throughout the entire Tokugawa period since 1603 Japan had never made war against other countries for the purpose of obtaining land before 1894. When capitalist development in Japan reached the 'maturity' stage, the country waged several 'imperialist' wars; but as Jiro Sakamoto [7] points out, this is not explicable in terms of the innate character of the Japanese; it is rather to be attributed to the fact that, as industrialization proceeded, the Japanese political leaders began to adopt attitudes common to Western leaders.

Another example is the structural change of the family and kinship system. It is well known that the structural basis of the family system in Japan is the patriarchal 'stem family', which is characterized by the vertical connection of the generations. Before the Second World War, this family system was said to be the institutionalization of Confucian ethics. However, even at that time the stem family was disintegrating, especially among the new middle class families in the cities. After the war, the revision of the civil law removed the legal background of the patriarchal family system. Urbanization further promoted this disintegration. The result is that, in 1964, 69 per cent of the total families were of the nuclear family type. This same trend also weakened the traditional type of kinship system which like the vertical family system was based upon the recognition of family descent.

In more general terms, is it possible to say that the case of Japan

[7] Jiro Sakamoto, *Chishikisangyo-kakumei* (Knowledge Industry Revolution) (Tokyo: Daiyamondo-sha, 1968), pp. 144–146.

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supports the convergence theory of industrialization? I would say that to a certain extent it does. First, the affluent economy that advanced industrialization creates has a more or less similar effect on people's value orientations and their style of life in every country: a levelling of the masses in favour of middle class ideology, a trend away from desperate radicalism towards realistic gradualism, desire for leisure, and the like. Secondly, advanced industrialization weakens conventional institutions which are structurally incompatible with industrialized and urbanized life. The disintegration of the patriarchal family system and of the traditional kinship system already mentioned are typical examples. Thirdly, the great flow of information resulting from the development of the communication networks as well as the increased opportunity to travel following on the development of high-speed transportation all strengthen the effect of psychological conformity on a world-wide scale Fourthly, the negative effects of industrialization such as environmental disruption and psychological alienation are also problems common to all advanced industrialized societies.

At the same time, however, we must add that this tendency towards convergence is true only *to a certain extent.* We do not know yet whether there will be such a thing as complete convergence in the distant future or not. At the present time convergence is still limited in many spheres. For example, after the Second World War Japan experienced overwhelming 'Americanization' in all social and cultural fields; yet it has never developed an American type of two-party system which lacks a Marxist party. It is true that there has been a split among the intellectuals over Marxist orthodoxy and that the Socialist Party is on the decline among labour unions; but Marxism itself is constantly being reproduced in spite of the various 'post-industrial' trends. This state of affairs can be partly attributed to the Japanese intellectual tradition as well as to Japan's geographical location, near as it is to China and the USSR, unlike the United States. This latter situation tells us that the dynamics of international politics will continue to exert influence on Japan.

The trend followed by the developing countries is a different problem. Here again we do not know what their position will be in the distant future. The important point at the present stage is that these countries, which are the last to be industrialized, cannot follow a course similar to the advanced countries. This is especially true inasmuch that industrialization was a self-generated process in the present advanced countries but it cannot be so for the latecomers. For them the decisive condition of successful industrialization is that it be accomplished much faster than in the advanced countries; otherwise they will be eternally at a disadvantage in all competition. That is, they cannot afford to wait for their societies to reach maturity, and their industrialization will inevitably need strong political power from above. Indeed it seems that the Western type of democracy will meet with extreme difficulty in the developing countries.

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Inzhir

Joseph Berger*

IN 1948 I was suddenly arrested in the camp near Norilsk. The camp regime had just got worse, possibly as a result of the conflict with Tito, and, by special order from Moscow, hundreds of prisoners, many of whom had been in prison for 10 to 14 years, were isolated in special camps without any new charges being brought against them. The following year it turned out that some of them, including myself and 16 others who were now in the Alexandrovsk prison near Irkutsk, had been picked out 'by mistake' and were now to be sent on to other camps. We never knew our destination in advance; the official reason for this was that it made it more difficult for a prisoner to escape. In reality it was done to make the prisoners feel that they were regarded not so much as human beings as cattle being led to the slaughter. Every transfer at this time, when the new wave of terror was making itself felt, led to grave suspicions and anxieties on the part of the prisoners. I was a little reassured when, after the necessary preliminaries, I was brought into a cell where there were several others in the same situation as myself. By talking to the other prisoners it was possible to get some idea of what was happening and overcome one's fear of the unknown.

I soon realized that we all belonged to the same category—political prisoners who had been sentenced again on newly-invented charges as soon as our first terms of imprisonment had expired.

One prisoner particularly attracted my attention. He was an old man with a pale, typically Jewish face, a sharp nose and haggard cheeks, but his manners and speech showed at once that he was a highly cultured man with a great experience of life. He introduced himself as Lev Ilyich Inzhir, a specialist in financial matters. I remembered that I had heard of him before as a gifted accountant who was employed for a number of years as bookkeeper for the Soviet State Bank and as chief accountant for Belomorstroy, a canal joining the Baltic and the White Seas which was built in the early thirties by hundreds of thousands of prisoners. Inzhir was famous because on the very day when the year's work ended he had the balance sheet for the year all ready to hand in to the authorities. Legends were told about him; he was said to be an exceptional organizer who was set up as an example to the whole Soviet Union by the head accountants of various huge enterprises. Inzhir and I arranged to travel side by side—an interesting companion made a lot of difference during a journey which sometimes lasted several days.

* This is an excerpt from the author's forthcoming memoirs, *Shipwreck of a Generation*, to be published by Harvill Press later this year.

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He told me that he had been arrested in 1938 and charged, as usual in those days, with deliberate sabotage, i.e. 'economic counter-revolution', and, under Article 58/10, with anti-Soviet agitation, as a result of which accusations he was sentenced to 15 years. He gave no further details about this, but he was only too ready to talk about politics and economics in general, which was rare among old prisoners who had been cut off for so long from the outside world, and he asked me to tell him all I knew about the West. It turned out that he had worked in fairly privileged conditions in camp, had had access to various scientific publications, monthlies and fortnightlies, read all the chief Soviet daily papers, often listened to the radio and even conversed with salaried officials employed by the Central Directorate of the Siberian Camps (Siblag). It was easy to tell from what he said that his theoretical line was very different from that of the Soviets and that he was heart and soul on the side of the European socialists, agreeing with them in their evaluation of the situation in the USSR and in the world. He thought that the only chance for the success of socialism lay in the victory of America in its struggle for world hegemony. As for Soviet expansionism, he saw it as a reactionary attempt to hold up progress and hamper the future victory of socialism: this was the basis of all his political judgments. We had several arguments in which I tried to defend Lenin's approach to capitalism, although I said I disagreed with the interpretation of it on individual questions in the Soviet press. When Inzhir became convinced that he had nothing to fear from me he said that, just as 32 years ago, he was still against the seizure of power by the working class when it was as weak and backward as was the Russian proletariat in 1917. He thought that Lenin's seizure of power was a colossal mistake. Since 1912, when he began his political life, he had been and still was a supporter of the 'father of Russian social democracy', Georgy Valentinovich Plekhanov; he thought it an unforgivable crime on the part of Lenin to demand at the beginning of the First World War that there should be a schism in the International. The Parties which had remained faithful to the Second International were for him the only true representatives of the Marxist tradition. So strong was his conviction of this that he hated not only Lenin, as the one who was chiefly responsible for the schism, but also Trotsky and his followers who helped to create it, for on this question there was hardly any division between Lenin and Trotsky at the time of the war. He even hated Martov and all those Social Democrats who took up a 'centralist' position after the October Revolution and did not resist the disintegration of the International.

I learned the further details of his life only after we arrived at our destination. This turned out to be the 'special camp' of Tayshet, where there were tens of thousands of political prisoners and where the regime was particularly severe. I heard the story of his life backwards. During the first years after the victory of the Bolsheviks he

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had given up his political activity and devoted himself entirely to economic questions. Like most Mensheviks and Plekhanovists he believed that the Bolsheviks would not hold out for long. To prevent the final collapse of the country for the sake of its future he thought that he must conceal his beliefs and join in the work of reconstruction and sorting out the financial chaos.

During the twenties he was trusted by the government and treated respectfully as a 'specialist' in his field. While Sokolnikov was in charge of fiscal policy Inzhir took part in stabilizing the ruble according to the gold standard and later in fixing the exchange value of the new ruble. In 1926, although he was a former Menshevik who had not made his public recantation, he was included in the Soviet delegation to the international conference on finance which was held in Holland. He later published a number of articles on its work and results.

At this time there began a struggle between the leadership and the Opposition. Inzhir was particularly hostile to the Trotskyists and Zinovyevists and their friends. He regarded them as thorough-going Bolsheviks, whereas the 'economic group', that is, the Right Wing, were people with whom he thought those outside the Party could cooperate, people who sought stabilization and were opposed to adventurism. He realized that the Left Opposition wanted to continue the policy of Lenin in which he saw the root of every evil. He thought the defeat of the Opposition was a just punishment for all that the Leninists and the Social Democrats who thought like them had done. He stressed endlessly his loathing of Trotsky and the Trotskyists, and kept saying that historical nemesis had manifested itself in the October Revolution more than in any other revolution before, and that the blackest reaction could not have punished the Bolsheviks more harshly than the Revolution itself did.

During those years he worked loyally and thought that in the course of time, if there were no drastic changes, he and his like could adapt themselves to the new regime. It appears that many 'specialists' such as Inzhir did indeed adapt themselves and were accepted into the milieu which was created around Stalin's power apparatus. They served him faithfully, concealing their thoughts in the hope that the historical process would of itself bring about different, more peaceful times. No doubt it was precisely to ensure their loyalty and eliminate any temptation they might have to protest against Stalin's methods that some of them had to be kept in isolation and the others threatened from time to time and made conscious of the sword which always hung over them.

INZHIR first got into trouble quite unexpectedly when he was arrested at the beginning of 1930. Why precisely he was chosen from among the former Mensheviks and Plekhanovists remained

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unclear to me, even though I read copies of the innumerable complaints and appeals he was still writing two decades after his first arrest. Perhaps he had expressed himself incautiously in some conversation. It was apparently at the time of his first arrest that something completely changed him and left its mark on him to the end of his days. Great pressure was used to induce him to confess. In those days such pressure was generally moral and intellectual rather than physical, as it was to become later, although physical methods were sometimes used even then to obtain signatures on false confessions and accusations of others more quickly. It is more than probable that the GPU succeeded in breaking Inzhir, not only by threats (it would have been easy enough to threaten him with a death sentence without trial and right of appeal), but also by promises. He was given the alternative of either refusing the 'information' required of him, in which case he would have disappeared without trace, his flat in the centre of Moscow and all his possessions would have been confiscated and his wife and children (whom he adored) repressed, or of giving in, in which case he was promised not only a speedy release but the chance of new and honourable work with better material conditions, of a better education for his children, and of promotion and special rewards for his services. Whatever it was that persuaded him, Inzhir did give in and evidently helped the GPU to mount the trial of the Mensheviks.

The moments when, 20 years later, he spoke of the methods used to make him betray his closest comrades and put his signature to lying accusations were moments of great bitterness and deep hatred for his persecutors. It was then, in 1930, that he decided that since he had been forced to behave in this base way he would devote the rest of his life to avenging himself on those who had robbed him of the most precious thing in life. And he began to take advantage of the trust which was shown him after he had fulfilled the wishes of his interrogators in order to 'undermine' the communist regime by means of the regime itself. He made it his aim to destroy as many communists as possible by means of other communists, so that in the end all of them would perish in the struggle between the factions and life would be easier for the rest of the world.

In 1931 Inzhir, who had been sentenced secretly to 10 years, was freed after a new and also secret examination of his case and given an important job in the secret police itself. He became the GPU's chief accountant for its enormous industrial undertakings which at that time were being set up in various parts of the country. This was the time of the collectivization of agriculture, which involved the deportation of five million *kulaks* and peasants classified as the abettors of *kulaks*. These mass arrests created a vast labour force which could be used in places and conditions which free workers would not have tolerated. This was how Inzhir got the chance to

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display his talents at the Belomorstroy and became renowned throughout the country.

For seven years he lived a double life. He devoted his knowledge and talents to the service of the regime he hated but thereby greatly benefited. He could not in fact do otherwise for the slightest act of sabotage in the kind of work he was doing threatened him with death. At the same time, as a secret informer of the political department of the NKVD, he took his revenge on the Bolsheviks by entangling and compromising Party members with whom he came into contact in the course of his work, and thereby helped to liquidate them.

In these activities Inzhir evidently found an inward satisfaction and felt that he was to some extent atoning for the betrayal of his fellow Mensheviks. As to the Bolsheviks he betrayed, his conscience did not trouble him in the least. He was sure that the strife which he helped to fan amongst them was only a small part of the punishment deserved by those who were responsible for the catastrophe which had beset Russia and socialism.

At the height of the mass arrests of Bolsheviks, and particularly Old Bolsheviks, in 1936 and 1937, and during the show trials of Zinovyev, Kamenev, Pyatakov, Radek, and their friends, Inzhir reached the summit of his career. Appointed by N. I. Yezhov, he became the chief accountant of Gulag, the control directorate of the labour camps, which had in its charge hundreds of enterprises and thousands of building sites where, in the course of the thirties and forties, it employed tens of millions of prisoners.

He owed this appointment not only to his reputation as an expert but to his links with the top people of the NKVD at the time when the man who held this job was supposed to be completely reliable. Directly or indirectly the chief accountant of Gulag came to know more than anyone else (the Gulag enterprises included some which were highly important for the security of the state, such as fortifications and secret bases), including the plans for the creation of new industries: before these were handed over to their respective ministries they were checked for years and classified as top secret. The balance sheets of the Soviet economic institutions, of which Gulag was one, revealed the whole scope of their activities, the methods of financing them and the use made of the capital invested, and it was easy, on the basis of these accounts, to follow even the most secret details of Soviet development. At the time of the early Five-Year Plans Inzhir had at his disposal all the figures showing production costs and thus knew exactly what it cost to lay the foundations of the powerful State machine. The Gulag chief accountant received daily schedules drawn up in all the labour camps of the Soviet Union over an area of more than 20 million square kilometres from Dickson Island and Spitzbergen to Kamchatka and Central Asia; in every one of them a daily check was made on the prisoners under the headings of hours of work done, sickness and absenteeism. All the data col-

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lected at each camp were sent on and finally reached the Moscow Gulag. In addition there were also daily figures on transit points, railway stations and harbours, to check on who and what was in transit, and finally a special heading showing how many prisoners had arrived at their destination and what their sentences were, how many others had been released and how many had died. On the basis of all this material the daily schedule of Gulag was put together and handed over to the chief accountant's department, which kept the information in its own books. This daily report was put on Inzhir's desk; at the time when the purges were at their height he was one of the very few people who knew the exact figures of the prisoners in camps.

Talking about it years later Inzhir told me of the horror he felt as day by day he followed the growing figures under the headings 'Arrivals' and 'Deaths'. He and the other members of Gulag who knew some, if not all, of the figures, had the impression that the whole country was being turned into one gigantic camp. The ever-increasing mortality rate was often discussed among them and as a result orders were sent to the camp commandants. When there were thousands of deaths every day it was obviously impossible to check the circumstances of each one. But a maximum permitted mortality rate was laid down; so long as mortality remained within these limits it was considered normal. If in any place or at any time it went down a long way below the permitted maximum this attracted attention as unusual and had to be investigated so that conclusions might be drawn and praise or blame assigned. If, however, mortality greatly exceeded the norm this meant that the plan was in danger of not being fulfilled and energetic measures were taken: telegrams went out demanding immediate explanations and urgent orders were given 'to stop mortality' (*prekratit smertnost*); finally investigating commissions were sent out with the task to reduce the mortality rate to the proportions which had been laid down. Sometimes, according to Inzhir, the camp commandant himself went on trial and was either dismissed or, in extreme cases, put to death. In other words, it was not the camp system as such that was blamed (nobody would have dared to blame it), but those in charge, who were sometimes punished; this was often made known to the prisoners, evidently in order to give them some satisfaction or compensation for their sufferings.

INZHIR worked as the Gulag chief accountant for two years and all the time felt that it could not end well. The group of experts to which he belonged had replaced another group employed under Yagoda, who had been head of the NKVD from 1928 to 1936, and which was removed when Yagoda was liquidated. By the spring of 1938, after the trial of Bukharin, Rykov and others, including Yagoda, Inzhir felt that the position of Yezhov, who had replaced Yagoda

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and was in constant contact with Stalin, was beginning to be shaky. He told me about a meeting he had had at that time with one of the veterans of the NKVD, a Jew whose speech was full of Talmudic sayings, and who had firmly clung to his post from the early twenties onwards despite the fact that he was originally non-Party, perhaps because he had got his appointment through the recommendation of Dzerzhinsky. This man, who survived all the purges and who, I was told in 1956 in Moscow, retired on a pension when he was over 70, warned Inzhir in a heart-to-heart talk that there were signs of a new storm and that he had better retire while there was still time.

Inzhir tried to follow his advice and asked to retire on grounds of health. After a while he was summoned by the deputy minister of the NKVD, Chernyshev, who had special responsibility for the labour camps, and was told that his request had been refused. As to his health, he could have a holiday for six weeks in one of the rest homes in the Caucasus and come back refreshed to his job where, as Inzhir knew, he was under constant supervision. He went to a rest home reserved for NKVD employees which was exceptionally comfortable and well run. On his return to Moscow he found the atmosphere even more threatening than when he had left. Yezhov had by then received an additional appointment as Minister of Waterways. Late one night he summoned Inzhir, who until then had had only short and strictly business talks with him. Yezhov was sitting in his shirt sleeves on a sofa behind a table laden with bottles of vodka. His hair was ruffled and his eyes were swollen and inflamed: he was obviously drunk but he also seemed excited and alarmed. The conversation was constantly interrupted by telephone calls in which Yezhov gave rude and cynical answers to the callers. He suggested that Inzhir should leave his work in Gulag and come to work as chief accountant for the Ministry of Waterways where, according to Yeshov, there was nothing but theft and embezzlement; the chief accountant there was hopeless and would have to be imprisoned, and the books were full of errors. Inzhir tried to cry off this responsible post on grounds of health but Yezhov insisted that he should immediately take it over. As they said goodbye Yezhov suddenly asked about some detail of Inzhir's past and gave him a searching look which boded no good. Inzhir suddenly realized that Yezhov hated him and that his fate was decided.

A few days later (he had been in his new office only a couple of times) Inzhir was arrested and brought to that very Lubyanka where he had so recently had his conversation with Yezhov. He was accused of 'sabotage with a counter-revolutionary purpose' in the course of his work for Gulag, and to this were added various other accusations connected with his past, including those which had been annulled when his case was revised and he had been released.

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It turned out that although the order for his arrest had been signed by Yezhov himself he had in fact been removed from his work and arrested *on account of* Yezhov, as a member of his staff and his collaborator. It was not a matter of bringing charges but of getting rid of him. For the first few days he feared that because he had worked for Yezhov and had enjoyed the confidence of his assistants his fate would be the same as theirs. However, only a few dozen of them were shot and Inzhir survived. He was merely sentenced to 15 years.

Presumably he was saved by his connexions in Gulag, where his former colleagues came to his assistance when he caught their attention again, this time as a prisoner. He was deported to South-Western Siberia where the camps were considered relatively mild, both because the climate was better than to the north of the Trans-Siberian Railway and because these camps had by now a certain tradition and experience. (In general the older camps were better than the new ones, where the living conditions were appalling, the supplies unorganized and the administration poor.)

Soon after his arrival Inzhir managed to get a job as book-keeper in one of the camp departments and, as his sentence did not include the confiscation of his property, his wife and children, who had remained in his Moscow flat, were able to send him parcels. After a short time his wife even got permission to visit him in camp and came to spend several days there.

From time to time he addressed appeals to the authorities for a revision of his case. They were unsuccessful, but inside the camp he knew neither hunger nor heavy labour. He read books on economics and made notes for a book which he proposed to write after his release.

INZHIR told me all this during the journey. After we arrived at our destination we met only from time to time. We were too busy and too tired in our broken-down state of health for long conversations. As we got to know our fellow-prisoners rumours and warnings about Inzhir began to reach me. It is a tradition which goes back to Tsarist times that prisoners think it is their duty to warn their comrades against informers. I was told that Inzhir was a very dangerous man and advised to have nothing to do with him. Among those who were most insistent on this was a Lithuanian whom I will call George. He had been an active Party member, was arrested in 1937, sentenced to 10 years and had had another 10 added on while he was in the camp. He seemed to be trying to compromise Inzhir in every way, and at first I thought he simply wanted to ingratiate himself for some reason with me (jealousies and even hatreds of this kind often develop in camp conditions). He would not desist and after a few months he came to me with an offer. He would arrange a 'confrontation' with Inzhir and get him with his back to the wall. I avoided this encounter for several weeks—it was unpleasant in

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itself and if Inzhir was indeed an NKVD agent it could be highly dangerous—but in the end George arranged it against my will. On some pretext or other he brought me to a barrack-block, all of whose inmates were out at work; Inzhir was the man on duty. George locked the door before Inzhir could leave and immediately went into the attack: 'When you were with me in such-and-such a camp you made notes for several years and reported our conversations to the Third Section [Secret Police] and put all sorts of lies in as well. Then when the war broke out I was arrested and your reports were read out to me and you were used as a witness at my trial and you confirmed all the accusations. Now you're going to say in front of Berger whether this is true or not. I want him to know and beware of you because I'm quite sure that you're still carrying on in the same way'. Inzhir didn't answer for a while, and then he said: 'Suppose it's true; you must also tell Berger that it was I who saved your life'. George turned to me: 'Yes, that's true as well—he saved my life'.

It appeared that at his trial George had no chance to deny Inzhir's evidence because there were other witnesses to the fact that in 1940 he had commented very adversely on Stalin's pact with Hitler. But what interested the court was something else and it was on this that his life hung: did the accused continue his anti-Soviet propaganda after the outbreak of the war in 1941? In peacetime this was a crime punishable by 10 years; in wartime it fell under Article 58/10 and was punishable by death, and at that time the death sentences were invariably carried out. Inzhir said that George had not continued his propaganda after the German invasion, and thereby he saved George's life.

This dramatic scene between two prisoners filled with mutual hatred and blind rage in the dark barrack guarded by barbed wire and the machine-guns on the look-out towers in the middle of the Siberian *taiga* made me think of some medieval tribunal. It seemed wrong and impossible to make any judgment. George insisted that Inzhir was still an informer. Inzhir replied that it had needed only a word from him to destroy George, a man who was not only his personal enemy but who belonged to the tribe he so hated—he was a Bolshevik and a Trotskyist.

After this I avoided political discussions with Inzhir but I did not break off all contact with him. I realized that such discussions could be dangerous, but at the same time the confrontation had confirmed my earlier opinion that Inzhir still had the remnants of a conscience.

He had had every opportunity to get rid of George, who was a person who had definite evidence against him as an informer, and he hadn't taken advantage of it. Moreover to break off relations completely could also have its dangers, as I had already told him quite a lot. A prisoner's life could be endangered not only by what he did but equally, and sometimes more, by what he refrained from doing,

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and also by the opinion which the authorities and their informers had of him.

Inzhir never referred to the incident again except to make it clear to me that he felt no remorse. A prominent communist who had persecuted members of other parties was fair game. He added that a number of Jews must have suffered on George's account as well (he felt himself to be a Jew and loved Jewish culture).

When the war broke out in Korea, Inzhir could not withhold his political comments. This may partly have been on the instructions of the Third Section who, whenever anything important happened, looked for adverse comments on the official version of events and started new cases of anti-Soviet agitation. The slightest discrepancy between what any prisoner said and the line taken in the newspapers showed that something was wrong with the 'mental condition' of the camp, and action had to be taken at once. When the first news of the fighting in Korea arrived Inzhir caught me with a copy of *Pravda* in my hand (*Pravda* came late but fairly often). He never doubted for a moment that the war was an act of aggression by Stalin against the U.S. '*He*' (this was how we referred to Stalin to avoid uttering the fatal name) 'wants to give them a fright, *he* wants to show Asia that even Truman is afraid of *him*, but now they'll teach *him* a lesson. The whole world will be enraged by this provocation. This time *he's* miscalculated'. When the Americans advanced deep into Korea he was triumphant. 'This is *his* second big defeat since the end of the war'. (The first was *his* failure to deal with Tito.) 'Now the end isn't far off'. But when the war continued and the Chinese volunteers came in he began to worry. 'That Truman doesn't understand that *he* has set him a trap. *He* wants to involve him with China to divert him from Europe, especially from East Germany. *He* is very happy to make use of the Chinese. What does *he* care if 200 million Chinese are killed off instead of 50 million Russians? Someone had better tell Truman what *he's* trying to do'.

Usually I only listened to Inzhir without replying, as I now thought that this was slightly less dangerous than saying anything, either in agreement or disagreement. In any case he was not interested in my opinions on such matters; however, once I made some criticism of Singman Rhee. A few days later Inzhir brought along a young Korean who had recently arrived in the camp. 'Here you are,' he said pointing at me, 'this gentleman thinks Singman Rhee is a reactionary. You tell him about Singman Rhee. And you might tell him how Kim Il Sung got to power and show him how the Soviet press is lying about Korea'. The young Korean had been arrested in Manchuria and condemned to 25 years for espionage. He spoke broken Russian but he told me many interesting things. Inzhir was delighted, though he added: 'I don't really need to hear all this to know that the South Koreans are right. It's enough to

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read the Soviet papers properly. What they write about North Korea is true of the South, and *vice versa*'.

He was convinced that the communists could have no influence over the masses in Europe and America. He explained their influence in Asia by the alliance between the nationalist movements in these backward countries and the Soviet government which helped the nationalists to organize and arm themselves: this had nothing to do with either socialism or communism. The nationalist leaders were ready to accept arms from anyone but they would use them as much against the socialists in their own countries as against the colonial powers. He considered that the Soviet government was making a miscalculation when it hoped to strengthen its influence in this way.

He thought the Second International was the only institution which had inherited the real socialist traditions and represented socialism at the present time, and he greatly exaggerated its influence. This I told him but he would not give up his dream. He argued that the attempt to create a Communist International had failed, whereas the Socialist International was more than 60 years old and would go on existing for decades until it had reached its goal. He was a great admirer of Harold Lasky, whom he regarded as one of the leading Marxist thinkers and a pillar of the Second International, whose activities he had followed for years. He spoke enthusiastically about British socialism just at the time when the Soviet press was furiously attacking the Labour government. The peaceful nationalization taking place in England seemed to him the realization of that socialist ideal which had been the dream of the founders of scientific socialism, whereas Bolshevism, he said, threatened not only to destroy the Russian people but to discredit the very idea of socialism.

There was only one category of people whom Inzhir thought worse than communists in general and that was *Soviet* communists, whom he regarded as renegades, traitors to the socialist movement and hired agents who had sold themselves to the Soviet regime. He was not the only one in whom I found this hatred of *Soviet* communism: 'French and English communists are not genuine communists. They are further from Bolshevism than from liberalism or reformism in the European sense. There is no communism in other countries no matter how much some naïve people want to call themselves communists and identify themselves with Soviet communism and imitate it. They simply can't grasp the *essence* of Russian communism, and it's impossible to explain it to them even if they think themselves one hundred per cent communists. Here there's an abyss between East and West that can't be bridged'. Among such scoundrels and traitors he counted Vyshinsky, who was then Foreign Minister, and the journalist Zaslavsky. Vyshinsky's speeches at UNO, which then filled the Soviet papers, always made him speechless with fury, but he was once even more enraged by an article by Zaslavsky full of jeers at Truman. Zaslavsky wrote that

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the Soviet Union would never capitulate to the West—this was in 1950. Inzhir was convinced that such was the balance of forces between the East and West that complete capitulation by the USSR was the only way of avoiding war, though war would mean the total defeat of the Soviet Union and the end of its 'nightmare regime'.

He thought those Western leaders who were ready to support the communists were fools who had not the most elementary understanding of even their own interests. He prophesied that they would be the first to be liquidated when the Bolsheviks seized power with their assistance. He particularly disliked Nenni (the only genuine Italian representative of socialism for him was Saragat, a member of the Second International). One day when I came in to his barrack I found him so deep in thought that for a long time he didn't notice I was there. When I finally asked him what he was thinking about he said with a sigh: 'It's no good—I simply can't see the difference between Nenni and Togliatti. I keep on trying to understand, but it looks as if I'll die before I do.'

As an invalid he was not made to do hard labour and the parcels he regularly received kept him from hunger, but his health was deteriorating fast. The parcels were supposed to come from affectionate well-to-do relations, but his enemies suspected that they really came from Section Three, as often happened in the case of informers.

In the summer of 1950 Inzhir was moved to another part of the camp twenty kilometres away. There he was soon put in charge of the cultural and educational department, which was supposed to help the 're-education' of the prisoners and simultaneously reduce the chances of their 're-educating', entertaining and organizing themselves on their own, without supervision. This was an enviable post. Those employed by this department were often released from other work: they had better clothes and lived either in a small room of their own or one they shared with only two or three others. (The ordinary barracks accommodated dozens or sometimes even hundreds of prisoners.) They belonged to the camp aristocracy. One of their functions was to write reports on other prisoners. These were used in examining complaints, appeals and requests for visits from families and for the reduction of sentences. (These reductions and promises of reductions exerted considerable influence in the life of the camp; some prisoners wore themselves out in the hope of earning premature release by hard work.) Usually jobs in the cultural and educational department were given to criminals, not to political prisoners, who were regarded as unfit to 're-educate' other people, so when the news came about Inzhir's new post it was regarded as further proof that he was indeed employed by Section Three. Soon after this George too was transferred to Inzhir's part of the camp, though not to his department. Before he left he told me he felt that this might be the result of a denunciation by Inzhir and that he was being moved in order to be

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'dealt with'. However, several months went by without any disturbing news and I was even told that in his new job Inzhir did much to help the intellectuals and politicals.

Then, unexpectedly, I too was transferred to the same section. I knew from experience that such transfers of several individual prisoners were always a sign that a new trial was being prepared in the camp. I decided to be exceptionally careful, but not to avoid all contact with Inzhir. He welcomed me in a friendly way. His new activities revealed that he was not only a brilliant economist but had an excellent knowledge of Russian literature and a good understanding of art. There were many Jews in this part of the camp and Inzhir did not hide his sympathy for them. He questioned them at length, especially the ones who had been outside the Soviet Union, and was very grieved to learn of the role of Jewish communists in the 'antipeoples' democracies' of post-war Eastern Europe. He thought they were participating in a crime for which sooner or later the Jewish population of these countries would have to pay dearly. Moreover he was convinced that the communists who were using Jews today would be the first to betray and liquidate them tomorrow when 'the Moor had done his deed'.

Inzhir's real friendship with some of the Jews in this part of the camp put him in a more and more ambiguous position vis-à-vis his work for the Third Section and his organically anti-Soviet attitude which he was unable to conceal. In April 1951 I was again moved and knew of his further fate only from what I was told by others. At that time severe measures were taken in the camps in preparation for a third world war. The MGB leaders pressed for the liquidation of dangerous or undesirable elements in the camps. Inzhir was asked for more and more reports on other prisoners and at the same time himself became a target. His sentence was supposed to end in 1953 but he knew too much ever to be released. It is also possible that he became a victim of the rivalry in the camp between the MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs) and the MGB (Ministry of State Security), each of which operated networks of agents, was extremely interested in spying on the other, and tried to outdo its rival in the number of arrests and scope of its activities. Anyway, at this time of new mass arrests in the camps, new investigations and trials and the construction of new isolators, Inzhir was arrested and involved in a case of 'former Trotskyists'. He was accused of hostility to the Soviet regime, of attempts to create a Trotskyist underground and agitation centre, etc. . . . A dozen or so prisoners were arrested with him but only three were tried. In addition to the other charges two men were accused of sympathy with the state of Israel and Inzhir of knowing of this and concealing it. The interrogators tried to get evidence of an attempt to set up a Zionist organization in the camp, but nothing came of this, largely because Inzhir refused to cooperate in any way. He declared categorically that he had seen and heard nothing of the sort. In the

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end the interrogators gave it up, though in other camps their colleagues were more insistent. (One of the devices used was to start a rumour that Ben Gurion had died and observe the reactions of the Jewish prisoners. This revealed any tendencies towards 'Jewish nationalism' which could then easily be dealt with in the appropriate way.)

Physical methods were not much used at that time in cases where the main object was to give prisoners another sentence and keep them on in the camp for a few more years. It was different in serious cases, when, for instance, there was a suspicion that prisoners had links with the outside world and were sending out information from the camp; then there was no ceremony, people were almost beaten to death, isolated in unheated punishment cells and subjected to other forms of torture. However, the normal conditions of those held in prison during an investigation were harsh enough to be a real torment, especially for people like Inzhir whose health was seriously undermined.

His trial was held in Tayshet. The evidence against him came chiefly from his conversations with his fellow prisoner K, who came from Kiev and had been arrested in 1943 and sentenced to 10 years. Inzhir did not deny that there were certain matters on which he disagreed with the Soviet point of view.

George, who was also tried, partly on the evidence of Inzhir, behaved with dignity and did not attack him. Inzhir, however, told the story of his confrontation with George and me in 1950 and claimed that the Trotskyists, who hated him because he reported on them, were now slandering him. But the court was hostile and he was sentenced to an extra 10 years. (George, whose third trial this was, got only five.) This sentence was a terrible blow to Inzhir, who lost all hope of ever seeing his wife and children again.

Prisoners who were sentenced anew were moved to another camp, apparently because they would probably now know who had sent in secret reports about them, and, if they remained in the same camp, would reveal who some of the agents were, and thus disrupt their future work.

Later I learnt that Inzhir had died in one of the Tayshet camp hospitals in 1954.

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The Great Terror Revised

Robert Conquest

THE editor of *Survey* has suggested that a note on the revisions made to my *The Great Terror,* to bring it up to date for the publication in February 1971 of a Penguin Books edition (together with a new hardback edition) may be of some interest in showing the nature and quality of the fresh material which sporadically becomes available, even now, on Soviet historical matters.

It might have been thought that apart from the revision of an occasional slip, there was little to be done. When I originally wrote it, I based it, of course, on a combination of the defector and other material long known in the West with the new evidence published in the Soviet Union in the decade following 1956. The latter had considerably diminished after Khrushchev's fall in 1964 and virtually ended by 1966. All this was, in a way, a fortunate circumstance for the writer of such a book. For there was little emerging during the actual composition which made it necessary to add or amend much as I went along. And with the increasing 're-Stalinization' in the USSR I thought at the time, like most people, that virtually no fresh information would become available unless and until some further political upset took place in Moscow.

As it turns out, this was wrong. There was little more official information, true. But one had not foreseen the efflorescence of *samizdat.* And this note revolves largely (though not entirely) on the question of *samizdat* material.[1]

It is a melancholy fact that on almost every point on which this new *samizdat* material provides new evidence, the position is rather worse than I had stated. For example, it was always thought that I. V. Kossior died naturally, as was announced at the time (3 July 1937), in good odour as a full member of the Central Committee. We now learn from Peter Yakir's *Stalin: A Plea for a Criminal Investigation,*[2] that he committed suicide (in circumstances evidently resembling Ordzhonikidze's): so that all five of the Kossior brothers, and not just four as already thought, were victims of Stalin's.

Another *samizdat* contribution of some interest is Yakir's statement that '110' of the members of the 1934 Central Committee were killed. (Roy Medvedev in his *Faut-il rehabiliter Staline* says 'about

[1] Most useful *samizdat* information, incidentally, on a different period from that of *The Great Terror,* was available to me for use in my *The Nation Killers:* in particular the accounts in the *Chronicle of Current Events,* nos. 7 and 9, of the Meskhetians. And these not only gave important factual material, but made it clear the scale on which information can still be kept secret, or largely secret, in the Soviet Union—in this case, a deportation of 200,000 people.

[2] *Survey,* no. 70–71, 1969.

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110'.) The previous figure we had was, of course, Khrushchev's '98 . . . were arrested and shot (mostly in 1937–38)'. The two figures could perhaps be reconciled by adding to Khrushchev's list the various suicides (Ordzhonikidze, Lyubchenko, Gamarnik, Tomsky, etc.), together with Kirov,[3] none of these having been arrested. (And possibly also those who survived to be members of the 1939 Central Committee, but were shot afterwards, such as Lozovsky.)

Again, I had deduced that a minimum of around 8,000 names must have been on the lists sent to Stalin for approval of their execution. We are now told by Roy Medvedev that these lists in fact included about 40,000 names, so that Stalin would, as often as not, be approving over 100 death sentences as part of ordinary office routine.

ONE of the most interesting pieces of information comes in the comments of Academician Andrei Sakharov in his *Progress, Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom.* On the question of casualty figures, he tells us that more than 1·2 million Party members alone were arrested during the Purge; that 600,000 of them were executed; and that of the others only 50,000 ever came out of prison. I had estimated from various lines of argument that the figure for Party arrests should be not far short of a million, which thus turns out to be an underestimate, though not a very grave one. The figure of 600,000 Party executions is reasonably congruent with my rough guess that *total* executions were 'something around a million': (I should now be inclined to revise this upwards). And, of course, his estimate of 50,000 survivors of the 600,000 imprisoned but not executed, fits with my statement that 'we can hardly allow 10 per cent to have survived'. (Roy Medvedev too speaks, more vaguely, of 90 per cent of those imprisoned never reappearing.)

Sakharov also remarks 'at the least 10 to 15 million people' perished by execution, in camps without the right to correspondence or in camps for exiled kulaks. This omits certain categories—notably the dead of the collectivization famine—which I include in my total of at least 20 million victims of the Stalin regime. Taking those into consideration, we have no substantial differences.

On a number of minor points Yakir, Roy Medvedev, L. P. Petrovsky and others usefully confirm or complement our earlier information For example, Yakir states that Corps Commander Lapin committed suicide in prison, confirming (or tending to confirm) reports originating with e.g. Lyushkov (see Alvin D. Coox, *Soviet Studies,* January 1968).

Petrovsky gives details which I had not previously seen of the 'Children's Case', in Leninsk-Kuznetsk—giving the number involved (160): the crimes to which they confessed (espionage, treason and links with the Gestapo); and the fact that similar trials took place in

[3] It is at least interesting that in his letter to the Central Committee dated 5 March 1969, L. P. Petrovsky includes Kirov in a quite natural way in a list of Stalin's victims.

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other cities. The detail that skilled interrogators were able to break down a ten-year-old boy in a single night and get him to confess to membership of a Fascist organization since the age of seven is also interesting.

Yakir develops further the case of Col. General Stern and others, the circumstances of whose execution on 10 October 1941 could be deduced from various sources: the date from the *Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopaedia* and the *Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopedic Dictionary,* and the fact from Ehrenburg's memoirs—and, earlier still, Svetlanin's *Dalnevostochni Zagovor.* Svetlanin's rare little book is typical of various more or less first-hand accounts of odd Soviet matters, whose value could only be assessed on a basis of its general congruity with known facts, and the other criteria I have developed in my Bibliographical Note. This sort of later confirmation of detail is helpful. This is not a field in which the general reliability of a source can be more than broadly established, or in which that general reliability absolutely guarantees any individual fact or statement. But nor is any other field. People who think that history can be more or less mechanized and the material divided into the absolutely proven and the totally rejected should read Gibbon's *Vindication,* that splendid manifesto on human judgment.

AS to lesser matters, Yakir's list of wives shot and of children shot or sent to labour camps in the various cases contains many previously untraced. (As the dialectic rather superfluously informs us, the accumulation of such details has more to it than mere arithmetic.) Similarly, Svetlana Alliluyeva's second book, *Only One Year,* tells us who moved into whose country *dacha* when the original occupant was shot. I would suggest that this sort of thing has not merely a minimal macabre interest, but also adumbrates the political atmosphere at the top level not insignificantly.

There are also certain points which are at least peripherally confirmatory. For example, Miss Alliluyeva's revelation, in effect, of Stalin's personal complicity of the murder in Minsk in 1948 of Solomon Mikhoels (already known from Soviet sources of the Khrushchev period to have been perpetrated by the MGB) amply confirms the fact that Stalin and his accomplices used the method of straightforward murder as well as arrest and execution, and blamed it on other factors or people; which ties up with the Kirov and other cases. (The official story was that Mikhoels had been killed in an accident, and at the same time a semi-official rumour was put out that he had been killed by bandits.)

Another obvious additional source came with the publication of accounts by Czechoslovakian survivors of the Slansky purge, in particular Evzen Loebl's. For this was the first time (apart from a short article by Pal Justus which appeared in Budapest during the Hungarian revolution) in which men who had actually made full set-piece con-

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fessions had given an account of the methods employed. Nothing very new, it is true, emerged. We had already had such accounts as that by Stypulkowski who, though he was not quite brought to the point of confession, experienced the larger part of the procedure involved. All the same it is valuable to have a full description by a man who was able to tell us how even after interrogation had ceased and he was being properly fed, he continued to accept the instructions of his persecutors because he had as he puts it, 'been deprived of his ego': I was quite a normal person—only I was no longer a person.'

It should be noted, incidentally, that one aspect of the interrogations of the Slansky period is not to be found in accounts of the Yezhovshchina. The use of drugs as reported by Loebl—and as suggested in many earlier reports of interrogations in the Eastern Europe countries—does not seem to have figured, or at least to have ever been noted, at the time of the Moscow Trials.

OCCASIONALLY, I have managed to track down a difficult or dubious reference. For example, the booklet *Zhertva Kulta Lichnosti* published by the Flegon Press gave an account by Boris Yefimov of the fate of his brother Mikhail Koltsov, with a number of details interesting beyond that particular case. However, no source was given and though there was some presumption that it was genuine, it was a little dubious and I did not use it originally.

I have since tracked it down to a contribution to the collection *Mikhail Koltsov Kakim on Byl* (Moscow 1965), unobtainable when I first wrote, and have used it in the current edition. It contains a striking description of Yefimov's attempts to help his brother by interviews with Ulrikh, etc. It gives an interesting account of orders to arrest sent direct to Mekhlis and Yezhov by Stalin. And, on a still very obscure subject, it casts some light on the sentence to imprisonment 'without the right to correspondence'.

I had previously thought of this as merely a disguised death sentence. The discovery in the mass graves at Vinnitsa of men who had been so sentenced certainly shows that this view was correct in some cases at least. But Yefimov tells us that Koltsov received such a sentence, while he is supposed to have died in 1942. This in itself is by no means conclusive (dates are often wrong), but Sakharov also tells us that there were special camps 'without the right of correspondence' where prisoners 'were machine-gunned because of "overcrowding" or as a result of "special orders"'. This clearly means that in some cases at least the sentence was not identical with a death sentence, at least to the degree that it implied a certain postponement of execution.

A certain amount of fairly recent 'unofficial' documentation had indeed been available for the original edition of *The Great Terror*—for example, the reports which then reached the West of the unpublished records of the military-historical discussions of February 1966. I had

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also seen and used a Russian manuscript of Zhores Medvedev's work on the purge in biology: but it lacked a good deal of the detail and in particular the extremely useful notes which the edition now edited in English by I. Michael Lerner under the title *The Rise and Fall of T. D. Lysenko* contains. In particular, his account of the trial and the prison life and death of N. I. Vavilov, together with the political manoeuvres at a high level in connection with the case, are of the utmost interest. As a result I have largely rewritten my pages on this theme, and incorporated certain of the book's other material elsewhere. (Zhores Medvedev incidentally strikes me as by far the clearest and most factual and well-organized of these *samizdat* writers—equalled only perhaps, in a different way, by Andrei Amalrik.)

Of other sources now available, if we are to mention secondary ones, Seweryn Bialer's *Stalin and His Generals* must be praised as a most useful and striking compilation. I had, indeed, read most of the books from which his very well-chosen extracts are taken. But there are points which I had missed: for example, Lieut.-Gen. A. S. Yakovlev telling of Stalin's remark to him in the summer of 1940 that Yezhov had been shot—adequate confirmation. A similar detail which I had unaccountably omitted was that given in Suslov's speech of 14 February 1964 [4] where he names some of the wives shot on 'List Four', together with the detail that Molotov personally altered a particular 'wife' sentence from 10 years to death.

There is still, indeed, a continuous little trickle of fresh details from these official sources. For example, the first volume of the third edition of the *Large Soviet Encyclopedia* has an article on Army Commander Alksnis, giving for the first time his death date—29 July 1938. That is to say, one more name is added to the already fairly long list of politicians, generals and others shot in the secret judicial massacre which then took place. As the volumes come out, we may expect to see further information of this particular type. Among those who have never been given an official date of death are a number of prominent figures such as Rukhimovich, Khatayevich, Khalepsky, Bulin and so on. The new edition may also clear up the ludicrous anomalies by which two precise, but totally different dates are given in each case in various Soviet reference books for Vice-Premier Vlas Chubar and for Marshal Yegorov.

THREE or four slips in my original have been pointed out by correspondents—and I hope that anyone else who notes or has noted such a thing, will let me know, together with any striking piece of source material which I may have missed. As to the latter, there are one or two books whose publication was announced in the USSR (usually in provincial towns) which I was unable to get copies of—mainly biographies, though it is true that most of those eventually secured,

[4] *Pravda*, 3 April 1964.

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such as one on G. M. Kaminsky, were of no assistance. Again, I somewhere came across a collection of poems by Corps Commander Eideman, the introduction to which gave a brief account of the June 1937 military trial, even naming the room it had taken place in—a minor, but not uninteresting addition, but one that I mislaid and have not been able to find again (and nor have various colleagues here and in America from whom I have begged news of it).

Revising a book of this sort does, perhaps, enable one to consider the whole business of writing a history of (or practically any other work about) the Soviet Union. Generally speaking, I think my method was the right one.

The Great Terror is supposed to be a work of history. That is, it tries to establish, within the limitations unavoidable at present, the sequence and detail of a great sweep of political and social events. It will hardly be necessary to tell an audience like the readers of *Survey*, actual students of the Soviet scene, that this is a different enterprise from that of proving that such and such an ephemerally fashionable academic 'model' was chugging away in Russia—rather like Max Beerbohm's cartoon of a Hegelian operating the dialectic.

Such little hostile criticism as the book provoked came almost entirely from reviewers so interested in the 'deeper' currents of history that they openly expressed indifference to—for example—the question of who it was that ordered the murder of Kirov. That is, they wanted a history purified of the coarse and vulgar *facts* which constitute its roughage. Odder still, and much sillier, were those who wished for a systematization—a fitting in of these events into the categories of 'political science' as laid down by behaviouralists or systems analysts. I have never seen an application of these to Russian history which did not either totally distort the raw material or clutter it up with meaningless and unreadable jargon, or both. As with all prematurely quantized or systematized studies, this sort of thing has a single advantage: a knowledge of the formulae, fairly easily arrived at, makes any study of the facts unnecessary—or rather only necessary to secure confirmation of the model by suitable selection (or invention) of the facts required.

Those who want these children's meccano sets should purchase them from one of the various purveyors, not bother serious students. And nothing, needless to say, could be more 'unscientific'. The bane of our academic culture is the notion that methods as rigorous as those of the natural sciences are available in literary criticism, psychology, sociology and history. It is impossible to think of a system of this sort which gives us anything much better than the systematization—complex, sophisticated, impressive and worthless—of the phrenologists.

To complete the tally of revisions: certain amendments have, of course, been made in the book's Epilogue, to bring the story up to the present day. For example, Raskolnikov, when I wrote, had been completely rehabilitated and posthumously restored to Party membership and Soviet citizenship. He has since been publicly derehabilitated.

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As far as the amendments to the main body of the book are concerned, it will be seen that the fresh material is not of revolutionary significance. In the main, it is a matter of a few detailed points in individual cases. But where it is more general (as in Sakharov's statistical information) it is not revolutionary for the simple and satisfactory reason that it by and large confirms the conclusions I had arrived at from the study of earlier sources. And this confirmation is both striking and valuable.

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Soviet Intellectuals Soldier on

Michael Scammell

AS always in the Soviet Union, the first thing you hear are the jokes; and, as always, the jokes tell you almost as much about the political situation as hours of discussion and debate. The favourite when I was there summed up the three current obsessions of the regime in a nutshell. Brezhnev, so the story ran, was being plagued by a nightmare: he dreamt he was in Red Square and saw a Czech eating matzos with chopsticks.

Of these three obsessions, it is undoubtedly China that looms the largest, and worry about China is by no means limited to ruling circles. It is difficult to say just why fears about China should have rooted so deeply in the Russian consciousness. Whether it is connected with some sort of racial memories of the Tartars and the menace from the East, or of an uncomfortable recognition in Mao Tse-tung and China of Russia's own immediate past under Stalin, or is simply the result of an unparalleled propaganda barrage put up by the Soviet press, the fact remains that otherwise sane and rational Russian intellectuals tend to grow vague and emotional on the subject of China and to indulge in extravagant flights of imagination. An admittedly extreme version of one sort of argument was put to me by a young painter who had invited me back to his studio. 'What', he demanded, 'was the West going to do about China?' I confessed that I did not know and did not even feel particularly strongly about it. He was appalled. 'Don't you know they're going to overrun Siberia? And when they've done that they'll advance on Europe? It will be the Dark Ages all over again. Surely the West will be on our side? Surely they will come to the defence of the white race against the yellow? The white race must stick together.'

Not everyone, of course, subscribes to this view of the conflict as a racial one. The more sophisticated base their fears on a direct analogy with Stalin and their own country. Knowing what *he* was capable of, they put no faith in the supposed rationality or peaceful aims of Mao and the Chinese, and draw what little comfort they can from similar thoughts of a rapprochement, or at least a *détente*, with the West. Few of them are naïve enough to suppose that the West would actively enter a war on Russia's side; but surely, they argue, even Brezhnev and Kosygin are preferable, in Western eyes, to the Chinese.

Thoughts of race and nationalism are far from alien, of course, to the Russian character and have a lot to do with parts two and three of the above joke's equation. Hostility to Israel in foreign affairs, apart

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from its merits or demerits as foreign policy, chimes all too easily and ominously with a tradition of anti-semitism at home. Undoubtedly the Jews are under psychological pressure in the Soviet Union at the moment, though fortunately that pressure is balanced by certain unaccountable bright spots, such as the unexpected permission, granted while I was there, for a prominent young intellectual to emigrate to Israel. But far more ominous in the long run is the related and rapidly growing phenomenon of Great Russian nationalism and the appearance of a rather amorphous group of people known as the *rusity*.

The *rusity* or 'russites' can be described at best as neo-Slavophiles and at worst as a Soviet version of the Black Hundreds, the nineteenth century reactionary group that followed a line of extreme chauvinism and advocated terror against radicals and liberals. At one end of the spectrum they link up with those numerous intellectuals who advocate taking a greater interest in the national Russian past and seek to rehabilitate pure Russian culture in all its forms. This has led to intensive studies of Russian folk culture and the Russian language and a sort of semi-mystical back-to-the-roots philosophy, and also a revived interest in the previously forbidden subjects of icon-painting and medieval church architecture. Relatively innocuous in itself, this tendency finds advocates among such writers as Lakshin, Dorosh, Soloukhin, and even Solzhenitsyn. The authorities, meanwhile, are not sure how to handle it. The celebrated Soviet film about the medieval icon-painter, Andrei Rublev, for instance, has won prizes in foreign film festivals, but has still not been released for general viewing by Soviet audiences.

But it is the other extreme that gives cause for alarm, for it expresses a powerful revulsion away from the token internationalism (however attenuated and distorted) of official Soviet policy and a flight into isolationism, chauvinism, and reaction. Worse still, there are signs that the *rusity* are to be found in very high places. According to one well-placed informant, they are particularly powerful in the KGB and security organs, while the intellectual arm of this group is represented by the magazines *Ogonyok* and *Molodaya gvardiya*, and the literary weekly *Literaturnaya Rossiya*. I was told by that same informant that this group is also tolerated and even encouraged as a sort of unofficial opposition to the ruling Party group. In this way it can be used to carry out much of the Party's dirty work, particularly through the agency of the KGB, while the Party is enabled to preserve its stance of internationalism and even to look relatively 'liberal' by comparison with this reactionary opposition. (This situation, incidentally, closely parallels the analysis made by that courageous Soviet dissenter Anatoly Marchenko, author of the book *My Testimony*, of the official Soviet attitude to Red China. While denouncing China loudly in the press, the Party is secretly glad of this ogre as a stick with which to keep the liberals in line. Similarly, the barely leashed ogre of nationalism is encouraged as a reminder that things could get worse.)

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IN the case of Czechoslovakia, it would seem that the Party and 'opposition' were united in their determination to crush the democratic forces there, the Party because it is terrified of the consequences of any part of East Europe getting 'out of control' and the *rusity* simply because they resented the spectacle of the pampered Czechoslovak poodle (as they regarded it) cocking a snook at the all-powerful Russian bear. 'To most Russians it was a question of just going like that!' as one friend explained it, making an eloquent gesture with his thumb as if to squash an insect. 'They just had to be taught a lesson and shown that they couldn't get away with it.'

For the liberals the Czechoslovak adventure was linked with two unpleasant tendencies that were both being much discussed in the Soviet Union when I was there and giving much cause for concern. The first of them was summed up in another popular joke going the rounds just now. A new toy, so it was said, had lately reached the shops in Moscow. It was a model of the Lenin Mausoleum—you pressed a button and out popped the figure of Stalin. The other tendency was the rise in the influence of the military, and both tendencies are illustrated in the latest hit film to open in the Soviet Union, which is still running simultaneously in half a dozen cinemas in Moscow.

I first heard about this film a day or two after my arrival. It was said to be yet another Soviet war epic devoted to Soviet feats of arms in the Second World War and was premiered before an audience of high government and Party officials on 7 May. Its special feature was that, for the first time since Khrushchev's secret speech in 1956, a major role was allotted to Stalin. And people were electrified by a rumour that flashed around Moscow saying that Stalin's appearance on the screen was being greeted by bursts of applause. Getting tickets proved to be no easy matter, but after being passed off by friends as a VIP French journalist (it is far better to be French than English these days when dealing with officials—and the opposite elsewhere), I was suitably supplied and accompanied them to see it.

Our destination was Pushkin Square, where the fountains were playing, the lindens were in bloom, and peaceful couples strolled the paths between the flowerbeds. It was a picture of ordered bliss on a beautiful spring evening. But the tensions beneath the surface were quickly apparent when I stopped to photograph the Pushkin Monument. Pushkin Square is famous as the scene of numerous demonstrations against such recent Stalinist phenomena as illegal arrests and rigged trials, and the *druzhinniki*—police auxiliaries in civilian clothes—are so thick on the ground there, watching out for new 'violations of public order', that my companions became visibly nervous and hurried me on. Ahead of us, at the far end of the square, stood the ultra-modern glass and concrete cinema, *Rossiya*, one of the successes of the modern functional architecture that has begun to appear in Moscow, although not up to the lovely old Strastnoi Monastery that was torn down to make

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room for it. Across the concrete marquee, in big bold letters, ran the legend: WIDE-SCREEN CINEMA EPIC IN TECHNICOLOUR: LIBERATION.

The film itself turned out to be incredibly long in the manner of all film epics and covered the period from the battle of the Kursk salient in July 1943—the turning point on the Eastern front—to the Teheran Conference in November–December of the same year, when the Western allies were persuaded by Stalin to open the second front. It was a turgid performance on the whole, with interminable tank battles raging across the wide screen and a perfunctory love interest between an heroic young subaltern and one of those tousled but loyal nurses without whom no war film would be complete. But parts of it were of undeniable interest. The battle scenes, for instance, display an objectivity and realism far removed from many of the stereotyped Soviet attitudes of the past. Not only is the sheer misery and confusion of the battlefield depicted with admirable clear-sightedness, but Soviet troops are shown being defeated and even, on one or two occasions, running away in the face of overwhelming German attacks. Nor are these occasions used as an excuse for the usual lessons in patriotism, with the 'traitors' being shot by stern, patriotic commissars.

The greatest interest, naturally, centres on the portrait of Stalin. What we are given is neither the almighty leader and hero of pre-Khrushchev times, nor the shadowy non-person of recent years, but rather a wise, benevolent elder statesman, ever-ready to listen politely to his generals and intervening decisively only when a final decision has to be taken. Unusually for Soviet films, he is also shown as old and in decidedly fragile health, walking with a slight stoop, puffing for reassurance on his favourite pipe and speaking in slow, measured tones. The effect of all this is to soften the image of the past and induce even affection in the spectator, though it is impossible not to shudder when some of the famous Stalin aphorisms are brought out, such as his remark to the Swedish Red Cross that 'we have no prisoners-of-war, only traitors', or his comment to Churchill at Teheran, when the latter is arguing that a second front opened across the Channel will bring terrible losses, that 'war without losses, Mr Churchill, is impossible'. One recalls Stalin's macabre fondness for losses in battle, even on his own side, and his insistence that a victory without losses was not a proper victory.

Two other scenes are also characteristic of the Stalin of the past. The first is when Stalin's captured son is offered by the Germans in exchange for General von Paulus. Stalin replies: 'I don't exchange field marshals for privates.' And the second is when he insists that Kiev be taken ahead of time and against the advice of his generals 'for military-political reasons', i.e. in time for the anniversary of the October Revolution. The city was indeed taken with, as the film shows, the requisite losses, but it fails to mention that Kiev was lost almost immediately to the Germans again and had to be retaken twice more, with further heavy losses, before it could be regarded as properly captured.

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The most fascinating aspect of the film, however, is Stalin's relations with his generals. As the generals appear on the screen one by one, great care is taken to flash their names up at the same time, so that the audience can easily identify them, and, as a series of military conferences and war councils unfolds, it becomes clear who is in charge and who is responsible for the Soviet military effort. No attempt is made in all this to apportion blame for the failures at the beginning of the war or for the desperate plight of the Red Army when the film opens, but it is the generals who plan tactics and strategy, evolve a formula to beat the Germans at Kursk and lay the foundations of advance and ultimate victory. Stalin, meanwhile, stays in the background, listening, taking advice and occasionally offering encouragement, his main activity being in the field of diplomacy rather than in military affairs. It is no accident, either, that the most prominent among the generals shown—Zhukov, Grechko, Rokossovsky, Shtemenko—are for the most part precisely those men who rose to power as a result of Stalin's purges of the army in the thirties and who control the military complex now.

Liberation, then, is yet another straw in the wind, and there is little doubt in the minds of Russian intellectuals as to which way the wind is blowing. For the KGB is widespread and growing all the time. A great shock to every one was caused by the midnight arrest and exile of Victor Krasin last December—not so much because of who he was or why he was arrested, but because of the *manner* of his arrest. In a matter of four days he had been carried off, sentenced in secret, and dispatched to Siberia, almost before his friends were aware of what had happened. This was in great contrast to what had been taking place till then (when at least a vestigial degree of 'legality' had been observed) and has reminded dissidents most forcibly —as was its purpose—of Stalin's methods and of the continuing power of the security police. The arrest of Amalrik, which occurred in a quiet village outside Moscow on the last day of my stay, will reinforce these fears, though there is hope that Amalrik is sufficiently well known by now for his whereabouts and fate not to remain as secret as Krasins.[1]

BUT what is the attitude of the intellectuals? Is the KGB winning or losing in its struggle against free thinking and relatively free behaviour? Sticking my neck out and taking the long view, I would say that, with one big reservation, it is losing, although in the short term it

[1] These personal impressions were jotted down immediately after my return from the Soviet Union in May and were intended (a) for the information of friends and (b) for possible publication in a less specialist journal than *Survey*, hence the high incidence of explanatory passages. In one or two instances events have overtaken these notes. Amalrik's fate is now known and the scientist from whom 250 items of *samizdat* were confiscated has since been named as R. Pimenov by the *Chronicle of Current Events* (no. 13). Rather than rewrite the notes with hindsight, however, I have decided to let them stand with whatever gains and losses the original impressionistic approach entails. M. S.

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is making tactical advances. It is true, for instance, that the intellectuals are more afraid now than at any time during the past 10 years. Arrests are on the increase and the KGB might well be excused for thinking that it can succeed in throttling the infant democratic movement at birth. But a number of things point to the reverse being the case.

In the first place, the number of people participating in protests, signing letters and petitions, writing articles, essays, and even books voicing dissent, is growing all the time, and each new round of arrests and trials seems to produce more new recruits to the cause than it suppresses. Hence, by the way, the reversion to secret arrests and sentencing without trial, since it has become clear that publicity for the KGB is counter-productive. Secondly, and of crucial importance at the moment, as I saw with my own eyes, many people are continuing to take risks and stick up for their principles *even though frightened out of their wits*. To presuppose a group of rationally motivated, cool, calculated, and daring dissidents with a clear purpose would be a great mistake. There are indeed a few cool, calculated, and well-motivated people among them. And the older generation, many of whom have been through the camps, and the very young tend to be bolder and more purposeful than the middle-aged. But the vast majority of the Soviet intelligentsia (I mean the true intellectuals, in a moral sense, who take pride in numbering themselves among the intelligentsia, not the boot-licking lumpen-intellectuals of the Establishment) are dissident out of a sense of moral outrage and a deep yearning for justice. This became clear when I asked some of them whether they agreed with the aims of the Russian Democratic Movement. 'Don't talk about aims,' they said; 'we agree with everything they are doing. If it came to building a positive programme, however, there would be quite a lot of disagreement.'

Yet another reason for optimism is the mushroom growth of *samizdat*, the unofficial duplication and distribution of uncensored literature that has become such a phenomenon of dissent in Russia today. The big names and successes of this literature are well known: Pasternak, Sinyavsky, Daniel, Solzhenitsyn, Evgenia Ginzburg, Lydia Chukovskaya, Brodsky, Marchenko. Other big names in the Soviet Union but somewhat less well known in the West are Varlam Shalamov, whose widely disseminated stories describe life in the camps in Kolyma, Siberia, and who continues to write prolifically, Vladimir Maximov, Vassily Grossman; and finally there are the young writers whose works lead a sort of shadowy existence, half in and half out of the officially approved literature, such as the poets Sosnora, Gorbanevskaya (now in gaol), Gorbovsky, Kushner, Chukhontsev, and prose writers like Golyavkin and Maramzin. Here too the KGB is having a few successes. Evgenia Ginzburg, whose book about her camp experiences (*Into the Whirlwind*) became a best-seller in the West after circulating in *samizdat*, has now finished parts two and three of her memoirs—only part one and a small section of part two were published—but prefers, as she told

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me, to keep them to herself for the time being. Having been through unimaginable deprivations and horrors in her earlier years, she hopes—and who shall blame her—to have a bit of peace in her old age and to avoid the inevitable harassment that would ensue if she let them once circulate. In most respects, however, the stream continues unabated.

And in this respect an incident that took place in Leningrad recently is most indicative. A liberal-minded scientist there was suddenly visited one day by the KGB, who searched his flat and found masses of *samizdat* material there, including manuscripts, photographs, tapes, etc. He insisted, as was his right, in having a complete list of these items drawn up by the KGB before they were confiscated—it came to the astonishing total of about 250 items.[2] He then promptly handed this list to a typist for duplication and circulated it as yet another *samizdat* document, his reasoning being that others ought to know what had been taken and should take steps to see that these items were available elsewhere, and in the case of rarities, sought out and quickly multiplied.

There is also the phenomenon of *tamizdat*, a pun on *samizdat* (itself a pun on the abbreviated name of the State Publishing House, *gosizdat*). *Tamizdat*, based on the word *tam* meaning 'there', refers to books originating in the West that are copied and circulated inside the Soviet Union in typewritten versions, and it operates in two ways. First there are the Russian works published in Russian abroad and brought in for personal use and then copied and circulated. In this way the poems of Tsvetayeva, Mandelstam and Akhmatova have often circulated and the current rage is for Nabokov in Russian, especially the early novels. Secondly there are the foreign-language works that are imported and then, as it were, 'spontaneously' translated into Russian by anonymous translators. The favourite author when I was there was thus George Orwell. His *Animal Farm* had been in vogue for a long time, but now it is *1984* that is having a great success—preferred by many to the earlier *We* by their countryman, Evgeny Zamyatin.

FINAL grounds for optimism may be detected in the resourceful way in which Soviet intellectuals keep themselves informed about world events. This is done partly through a random trickle of foreign magazines and newspapers, but mainly by listening to foreign broadcasts. These indeed play a crucial role in the formation of liberal attitudes and opinions in the Soviet Union and it is highly gratifying to a Briton to listen to Soviet discussions of the BBC and comparisons between the BBC and other foreign stations. The French, as a corollary to their official popularity in Moscow, have lost all credit with the liberal intellectuals and I was surprised, even appalled, by the vituperation against Russian-language broadcasts emanating from Paris. The most widely-listened-to station of all is apparently Voice of America in Russian. Radio Liberty, the other American-run station, is so

[2] See footnote 1.

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thoroughly jammed that it cannot be heard at all in Moscow and Leningrad. Deutsche Welle, the German service, is also growing in popularity, but both are held by intellectuals to be occasionally misleading and untrustworthy and always lowbrow. Their enthusiasm for the BBC, on the other hand, is embarrassing in its fulsomeness and is perhaps best illustrated by another story. Brezhnev and Kosygin, so it is said, were becoming worried by the BBC's uncanny omniscience and accuracy, and decided to put it to the test. Consequently, a special meeting of the Presidium was called in conditions of great secrecy. There was no agenda. All the members entered a hall in the Kremlin and the doors were locked, Kosygin in the meantime having ordered his secretary to listen to the BBC and inform him as soon as the meeting was mentioned. One hour passed, then another, in complete silence. At this point Kosygin leaned over to Brezhnev and whispered something in his ear. A few moments later the doors were opened and Kosygin's secretary entered bearing a chamber-pot. 'The BBC', said the secretary, 'has announced that Comrade Kosygin wishes to be excused.'

The BBC is also jammed, of course, being the second most jammed after Radio Liberty, but can be heard fairly reasonably on good sets on the shorter wavebands. Its leading political commentators, such as Maurice Latey and Anatol Goldberg, are great favourites with Soviet listeners and even the announcers have a following. But the main thing is the enormous trust and almost fanatical devotion that the BBC news service inspires in Soviet intellectuals. Its reputation for veracity, honesty and reliability is unparalleled. Listening to it in the shabby flats and attics and basements of Leningrad and Moscow one realizes that this is just how those first listeners to BBC foreign-language broadcasts must have felt in wartime France and Holland and a dozen other countries. The responsibility is a heavy one, but must be borne if the jokes are to continue to be told and the hopes they symbolize are ever to be realized.

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The Dilemma of Dissidence

Jonathan Harris

UNDER the Tsars, the Russian intelligentsia regarded itself not only as the major source of the critical spirit, but also as the fount of eventual social and political change. The Soviet intelligentsia* clearly regards itself as fulfilling the same role under the Soviet regime. Throughout the USSR, there are probably hundreds, if not thousands, of small groups who gather to discuss the nature of their own social and political system.

But the regime's fierce opposition to any attempt by the intelligentsia to analyse the social and political system in which it lives has an important impact on its own political attitudes and orientations. The regime continues to regard the creation of non-official alternative explanations and definitions of Soviet reality as 'anti-Soviet' activity. Although the regime attempts to create a sense of positive commitment to official goals, policies, and interpretations, it seems to be far more concerned, particularly after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, with repressing non-official explanations of Soviet policies and alternative definitions of the nature of the Soviet system. Thus, efforts are made to prohibit circulation of non-official analysis of the USSR not only by jamming foreign radio broadcasts and barring the import of foreign printed matter, but by simply refusing to provide an accurate picture of the nature of the current political order, or of past and present developments. In fact, the current regime seems to prefer to ignore the past rather than simply to distort it: to the CPSU leadership there is only pride in the present and glory in the future.

Deprived of accurate information about the past and present, and given the inadequacy of personal memories, the Soviet intelligentsia is hard put to make coherent comparisons (the basis of any clear political judgement) between the Soviet and other political and social systems, and between the various periods of Soviet development. In fact, the individual Soviet intellectual bases his political attitudes almost entirely on his own personal experience and on that of his immediate friends, with the occasional sporadic support of illicit non-Soviet explanations. For example, George Orwell's *1984,* which now circulates in *samizdat* form, has become extremely popular in the last two years, and is often cited as an accurate picture of Soviet reality. Although the intelligentsia is extremely quick to indict foreigners for their in-

* Soviet sources use the term 'intelligentsia' to describe all those with a certain level of education. Throughout this article the term will be used in its usually accepted sense in the West, i.e. those who aspire to 'independent thinking'.

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ability to 'understand' Soviet reality (more than one friend cited my inability to grasp the 'Russian spirit'), it is, through no fault of its own, woefully ill-informed about the social and political system as a whole in the USSR. Although many political attitudes are confused, incoherent, or contradictory, a minority is groping towards and actually forming coherent alternative conceptions of Soviet reality. One friend concluded, on the basis of a comparison of Germany and the USSR, that there were 'elements of fascism' in the Soviet political system.

Much like its predecessor, the Soviet intelligentsia, by definition, does not identify with the existing regime. Its critical stance flows in part from its peculiar position in Soviet society. Despite the vaunted and repeated claims of Soviet leaders to be building a 'new society', their short-range goal has been merely to increase production. In fact, the CPSU leadership has increasingly defined the Party's central function in terms of the direction and administration of the economy; its efforts seem designed to transform the Soviet Union into a mammoth, efficient firm.

While the intelligentsia often proffers skills necessary to provide momentum for the Soviet 'firm' and to persuade the population of the vast benefits of working in it, it has no desire to accept the 'factory discipline' (the term is Lenin's) demanded by the leadership. This attitude is probably reinforced by the concentration of intellectuals in institutions physically divorced from the centres of production in society, the farms and factories.

This relative isolation from society helps to provide the basis for an independent analysis of the political and social system; but it also effectively divides the critical elements of the society from the 'people' in whose name their criticism is often made. Moreover, the CPSU leadership, the obvious target of intellectual criticism, not only hopes to sustain the latter's isolation but seeks to manipulate the workers and peasants, in whose name it claims to rule, against the dissident elements of society.

The isolation of the intelligentsia from the workers and peasants produces an ambivalent attitude towards the 'masses' which is strikingly similar to that held by the Russian intelligentsia under the Tsarist regime. (In fact, many of today's critics trace their lineage not to workers and peasants, but to the pre-revolutionary intelligentsia.) On the one hand, the 'people' are regarded as relatively uncorrupted and therefore still capable of directly understanding the shortcomings of the existing order. The 'simple' (*prostoi*) Russian worker is regarded not only as a source of resistance to present inequities and repression, but as a source of the country's inevitable and eventual regeneration. As one friend declared, 'they have built this country with their sweat: they know the country with their backs and their hands'. But at the same time, the 'people' are criticized for their passivity and apparent acceptance of the status quo, their suspicion and even open hostility to the critical activities of certain members of the educated classes. This

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ambivalence is bolstered by the vast social distance between these two groups. The intelligentsia have hardly any friends or acquaintances among the former and even those few are greatly romanticized. One friend who marvelled at a carpenter who built him a set of bookcases in return for sharing a bottle of vodka concluded that 'the workers' remained uncorrupted by the system. It is probably legitimate to conclude that the intelligentsia knows little of the immediate problems facing the workers and peasants and the regime's control of communications serves to perpetuate this ignorance. Soviet journalists who travel around the country are regarded as one of the few groups with any real knowledge of existing conditions. 'They know, but they can't write about it', is the usual comment.

Although the intelligentsia claims to reject the official interpretation of development at home and abroad, official analysis does affect the intellectual's political perceptions. First of all, many have implicitly accepted the general components of a Marxist view of historical and social development. Thus, they share the belief that individuals, such as themselves, have little independent role to play in historical developments, that they are caught up or dominated by vast social forces which remain largely beyond their control. These same forces are seen, moreover, as having a positive effect over the long run, eventually undermining and eliminating the inequities of the present. The faith in the power of 'historical forces' to produce a more perfect social order in the 'future' is often coupled with a belief in the 'progressive nature' of technological development. Behind the chaos of events, it is insisted, there is some fundamental 'order'. Although there is some ambivalence over the alleged blessings of industrial society, material progress is still considered not only desirable but necessary. Clearly the negative features of an 'affluent' society can hardly be perceived as long as such fundamental needs as adequate food, clothing, and shelter are not met at home.

Furthermore, although highly critical of the existing limits on individual expression, particularly their own, members of the intelligentsia can rarely be described as libertarian in their political views. Most, in fact, seem to have absorbed the authoritarian political attitudes desired by the regime. Many regard Western democratic systems as 'too permissive' and warn their foreign friends of the need to curtail the action of those who threaten social stability. I was often criticized as a naïve liberal whose support of 'freedom' threatened to undermine the social and political order necessary for 'progress'. Even more striking, some acquaintances argued that an authoritarian government might be a prerequisite for genuine 'creative' work citing nineteenth-century Russia and the works of Solzhenitsyn as evidence.

Since the regime controls all 'popular' political participation in the USSR, the Soviet intelligentsia finds it extremely difficult to comprehend the variety of genuine political participation found in democratic sys-

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tems, either within a multi-party system or through mass demonstrations seeking political and social change. The intelligentsia tends to overestimate the extent of violence which accompanies these demonstrations, an attitude probably reinforced by the Soviet media's efforts to expose the 'oppressive nature' of the 'bourgeois' political systems. My enthusiastic description of the vast peaceful assembly in Washington in November 1969 was met with fears that such movements could easily lead to 'fascism' and were therefore extremely 'dangerous'. The failure, again through no fault of its own, to grasp even the most rudimentary aspects of alternative political systems clearly limits the intelligentsia's perceptions of the range of alternatives to the existing status quo. One person admitted that after 10 years of study of Western materials, he was finally beginning to understand the possible advantages of a multi-party system.

Moreover, the regime's failure to describe current reality with any accuracy has an important effect on intellectual attitudes. Although clearly repudiating the official description of the Soviet order as the most 'democratic', the Soviet intelligentsia cannot agree on or be sure of the exact nature of the system existing in the USSR. A tiny minority with access to non-Soviet analysis uses the term 'totalitarian' to describe the present system, others, as noted above, point to 'elements of fascism' in the existing order; others merely see the present system as a vast bureaucratic monster devoted merely to maintaining itself in power. And numerous others simply have no general conception of the nature of the system; they can describe their detailed objections to particular aspects of reality, but cannot conceptualize the possible source of various policies.

NEVERTHELESS, while all regard the current regime as an adversary, there are important differences based on age, sex, nationality, religion, and intellectual interests.

First of all, as in most societies, even the critical elements are plagued by a 'generation gap'. In the USSR, the crucial dividing line seems to be between those who participated in the Second World War and those who did not. Those who either served in the army or supported the war effort behind the front lines were politically conscious during the last eight years of Stalin's reign. Although critical of the existing regime, they are fully aware of the vast difference between the current regime's selective repression of dissidents and the police terror of the last years of Stalin's reign when people stopped talking to each other rather than risk incarceration and destruction. Moreover, their personal awareness of the tremendous losses caused by the war and of the recovery over the last 25 years tends to mute, or at least place certain limits on, their criticism of current economic and political difficulties. One veteran of the war who could heap vitriol on the former dictator insisted that the current regime could not yet be adequately judged, and that it was absurd to define it as 'neo-Stalinist'. In fact,

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he insisted, it provided a period of rest and respite from the horrors of the pre-1953 period.

There are, however, important exceptions within this generation, particularly among those freed from concentration camps in the post-Stalinist period. These people share a fierce determination to speak out against any step by the current regime which threatens to bring about a reversion to the Stalinist past.

Those who were children during the war and whose political consciousness was formed in the post-Stalinist period tend to be more critical of the current regime's policies, in particular those concerning the intelligentsia. In many instances, the younger ones tend to romanticize the period of Khrushchev's rule. Often totally unaware of, or more likely forgetful of, the unpleasant aspects of his reign (such as the introduction of the laws against 'parasites' and the disastrous agricultural policies), they often find the post-Khrushchev period 'worse' than the 1954–64 period, without defining the elements of deterioration. Memories are short and personal experience too diverse to provide adequate ground for the type of coherent comparisons necessary for clear political judgements. Whatever the basis of these judgements, this generation, while critical of the current administration, is also more optimistic about the future than its elders, for reasons to be discussed below.

Religious and national allegiances also have an obvious impact on the locus and nature of dissidence. The intelligentsia from national and religious minorities are particularly critical of a status quo which limits their job opportunities, their efforts to obtain increased autonomy from Russian control, and which legitimizes their subordination to a national group which they often hold in slightly disguised contempt. Anti-Russian jokes are not uncommon when various non-Russian intellectuals gather; they stress the alleged negative features of the dominant nationality—slowness, stupidity, lack of irony or sense of humour, lack of initiative and general passivity. Indeed, one still encounters members of national minorities, particularly from the Baltic, who ostentatiously want to converse in English and German rather than Russian.

In particular, the russified Jewish intelligentsia, which plays a major role in academia and the creative arts, now sees growing limitations on its social and political opportunities, stemming from the fierce anti-Zionist campaign of recent years. While only a minority fears a return to the horrors of 1948–52 when Jewish cultural figures were liquidated in vast numbers, many fear a resurgence of popular anti-semitism as a result of the official campaign against 'Zionism'. The intelligentsia from other minorities, although enjoying at least the trappings of national autonomy, continues to cringe under the regime's continued efforts at russification.

Although the intelligentsia from the national and religious minorities seems more critical than the Russian intelligentsia as a group, the most critical individuals seem to be Russians with an intense devotion to their

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homeland who fear that the vast human potential is being destroyed, wasted, distorted by the existing political order. As one such critic complained, 'in our country, the best people are unable to participate in the making of the most important decisions'.

Differences between men and women also seem to be quite significant, a result of the Soviet woman's particularly trying position in society. Except for the most privileged segment of society, most Soviet women were obliged to combine full-time work with arduous domestic chores. Since the shortcomings of the consumer sector are still immense, the women consider themselves more aware of the concrete difficulties of Soviet life. Many claim to provide the men with the moral and material support necessary to survive. Thus, Soviet women are wont to criticize the men for their alleged weakness, their propensity to alcoholism, their self-pity, and endless theoretical conversations. These women are often courageously outspoken, caring little for their own personal safety, and seem to play a disproportionate part in the movement for the country's 'regeneration'.

Significant differences in orientation also appear between natural scientists, social scientists, and those engaged in *belles-lettres*—writers, poets, critics, and editors. While it is difficult to substantiate, it seems that natural scientists, because of their training, are more prone to the natural rights theory with its stress on the rights of individuals pre-existing the state. Although the CPSU carefully controls the travel of Soviet academicians abroad, the natural scientists have greater opportunities for contact with their foreign counterparts than other intellectuals and, consequently, greater access to non-Soviet analysis of the USSR. Moreover, the natural scientists, by providing the basis for radical progress in the economy as well as the brain-power for the development of sophisticated weaponry, occupy a strategic position in Soviet society. Although the regime can take repressive measures against dissident scientists, such a policy always threatens to hamper work essential to the regime's very survival.

Because of their rationalistic orientation and position in the system, the dissident scientists have not only produced the most coherent critiques of the existing system, but apparently play a disproportionately large role in the civil rights movement in the USSR, which attempts to undermine current state policies by appealing to the guarantees of individual freedoms provided by the Soviet Constitution and the UN Declaration of Human Rights.

In contrast, dissident social scientists, because they contribute less directly to the fundamental sectors of the national economy, are more vulnerable to the state's repression. They present, however, a rather unique threat to the status quo. Some Soviet sociologists have not only managed to have a large amount of sophisticated non-Communist social analysis translated into Russian, but their own research into general theories of social explanation common to all industrial societies implicitly challenges the validity of the worn slogans of contemporary

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Marxism-Leninism. In the same spirit, even though the re-examination of Soviet history begun under the aegis of Khrushchev's criticism of Stalin has been brought to a halt by Khrushchev's successors, dissident historians have recently produced *samizdat* discussions of such fundamental questions as the roots of authoritarianism in Russia and its impact on current Soviet life.

The writers, poets, editors, and critics, like the social scientists, play no important role in the economy, and at first glance would appear to be easily controlled through their professional unions. However, their dramatic portrayals of Soviet life have a far greater emotional impact than the rational analyses of social and natural scientists. The writers implicitly provide definitions of Soviet reality totally at odds with the CPSU's sterile and static conception of Soviet life, and they clearly appeal for a far more responsive political system.

DESPITE differences produced by age, sex, national and religious orientation, the intelligentsia seems agreed on two aspects of current Soviet reality—that the system as a whole has reached a point of 'stagnation', and that the intelligentsia's position within the system has 'worsened' since the fall of Khrushchev. At the same time many are confused as to what is 'happening' in the political system; many conclude that the current regime has no clearly defined policy and is concerned merely with the day-to-day administration of the existing order. Few seem able to identify with any clarity the policy alternatives being discussed by the CPSU and their implications for the various groups within the system. And in recent years their personal lives have been more frequently interrupted by 'searches', 'telephone calls', and other 'threats' (the common euphemisms for greater police surveillance).

The 'stagnation' is attributed to the current regime's failure to respond to the material and spiritual needs of the population, a failure produced by two factors—total inability of official CPSU interpretatations of Soviet reality to comprehend the needs of the population, and the immobility and ineffectiveness of the vast bureaucratic apparatus. Ideology is considered primarily as a source of self-deception for the nation's leaders, while the administration is seen as incapable of responding to real needs because of the bureaucrat's lack of initiative, refusal to take responsibility, and fear of whimsical retribution from on high. Without 'paper' (the euphemism for some official permission to act in a particular way), it is said, the entire system could not operate. In short, the regime is seen as some sort of inefficient mechanism, fundamentally inhuman and therefore unresponsive to human needs.

The intelligentsia supports this view by condemning the current 'collective leadership' for not even attempting to cultivate some direct contact with the population, for wearing a 'faceless mask', and for perpetuating secrecy and anonymity in addition to refusing to discuss fundamental issues frankly or broadly. Whatever the shortcomings of the Khrushchev era, it is often stressed that at least Khrushchev dis-

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cussed immediate problems frequently (and, in retrospect, quite frankly) and made some concerted efforts to broaden participation in policy discussions. Most significant, his personalization of government, whatever its policies, seemed to make it more human and, in retrospect, more humane.

The current state of the economy is constantly mentioned as further proof of the 'stagnation' of the system. Although a foreign observer is conscious of improvements over the last five years, particularly in urban housing and hard consumer goods, those within the system perceive little change in general living standards over this period. The improvements in some areas are apparently offset in people's consciousness by startling shortages of meat, butter, eggs, and other vital products even in the major population centres, by the vast unsatisfied demand for adequate housing, by crying shortages of decent restaurants and cafeterias and other service facilities, and by the failure to meet long promised opportunities for private transport. Moreover, the social services provided by the state, in particular public transport, education, and medical aid, are seen as inadequate—failing to meet growing demands, aside from often being ineffectively administered and dependent on one's status in society.

But the intelligentsia is far more concerned with the deterioration of its own position within the political system than with the government's failure to improve the standard of living. This crucial shift is seen as the product of the post-Khrushchev regime's severe limitation and elimination of public, as opposed to private, expressions of criticism of Soviet life.

Five years ago, in 1964–65, the intelligentsia had a more optimistic conception of its role in the system as a whole. The fall of Khrushchev in the autumn of 1964 had a dramatic effect on public discourse in the USSR. The new CPSU leadership apparently hoped to bolster its own position by encouraging criticism of Khrushchev's policies; the regime was not averse to providing information on some of Khrushchev's most dramatic errors of judgement to discredit the ousted leader. But this policy, rather than winning support for the new leaders, stimulated widespread discussion of major problems in Soviet society and of the policies necessary to solve them. The intelligentsia responded dramatically to the new opportunities by public and semi-public criticism not only of Khrushchev's alleged failings, but of more fundamental aspects of the social and political system.

The following critical outbursts were witnessed by the author in late 1964 and early 1965 in Moscow; it can probably be assumed that there were other similar developments both in the capital and other major cities.

A public discussion of the 'young hero in Soviet literature' sponsored by the editorial board of *Iunost* prompted complaints that existing Soviet literature, with a few notable exceptions, failed to expose the 'bitter reality' of Soviet life, and made explicit attacks on the editorial

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board for failing to defend young Soviet writers who spoke the 'truth' against undeserved criticism by the authorities.

Public discussions were also encouraged in many instances after movies and plays. Thus a discussion following the film version of one of Schwartz's 'fairy tales for adults' featured accusations that the implicit criticism of Soviet reality within the film was insufficiently 'sharp'. In the same spirit, after a play lampooning the 'philistinism' of the Soviet middle class, a number of people charged that the entire Soviet public was guilty of 'philistine' attitudes in its failure to speak out against the methods used to unseat Khrushchev.

Dissident groups of artists were also apparently able to gain permission for exhibits and readings. One group of young designers was able to stage an exhibit of non-objective art for decorative purposes, and a group of dissident young poets, the so-called 'Smogists', not only read their personalized poetry, simultaneously staging an exhibition of their own and friends' non-objective art, but actually led a brief street demonstration from Mayakovskii Square to the headquarters of the Union of Writers under the banner 'freedom for poetry'.

But the most dramatic development witnessed came in a debate on the philosophy of 'cynicism' sponsored by a discussion group of the physics department of Moscow University in March 1965. Ostensibly designed to provide a framework for criticism of youthful indifference to the demands of the regime, it became instead a forum for outspoken indictments of the entire political system. The debate was transformed by the spontaneous speech of an 'independent artist' who not only assailed the regime's control over media, the interference in artistic creation, the excessive controls over individual behaviour, but accused the political leaders of 'cynicism'. His address was so sharp that many in the audience feared a 'provocation'. Many older members of the audience left, either to show their opposition or from fear. Nevertheless, the debate lasted four hours. But the major speaker had clearly gone 'too far'; soon afterwards he was detained in an insane asylum where he remains today.

THE demand for greater freedom of expression was not confined to dissident students, poets, and artists but was also supported by highly placed CPSU figures, including the newly appointed editor of *Pravda*. In February 1965, after considerable consultation with leading figures in the Soviet intellectual community, *Pravda* published a feature-editorial, 'The Party and the Intelligentsia', which advocated acceptance of far greater diversity of opinion on the grounds that the Soviet intelligentsia was a loyal supporter of the fundamental aspects of the Soviet order. Many members of the intelligentsia regarded this editorial as a sure indication of a fundamental change in the regime's entire approach to intellectual life, and as the first step towards the removal of the most onerous controls over intellectual activity. It is not surprising, therefore, that in early 1965 the intelligentsia concluded that the new

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administration might grant the critical elements in Soviet society a far more significant role.

But by the spring of 1965 there were some disturbing indications that the new leaders, despite initial verbal commitment to continue the anti-Stalinist orientation of the Twentieth and Twenty-second CPSU Congresses had decided to undermine the ideological basis for a critical stance toward the present by bringing the anti-Stalin campaign to an end. The new leadership apparently decided that the anti-Stalinist orientation could easily allow criticism of the entire social and political system which had been constructed during Stalin's reign and which remained the basis of the Soviet system. In fact, it was rumoured that a tape-recording of the debate on 'cynicism' held in March 1965 was sent to the Central Committee of the CPSU, and helped to create the atmosphere for reimposition of controls.

Beginning sometime in the spring of 1965, the new leadership moved increasingly to limit or eliminate public expressions of the intelligentsia's critical attitude in plays, public debates and discussions, as well as in the more easily controlled mass media, forcing the intelligentsia to limit its critical comments to the dinner table, or face the risk of varying degrees of state repression.

Over the last few years, while the intelligentsia has been bravely attempting to make their private views public once again, the regime has made it clear that it will use repressive measures to prevent it. The regime's fundamental task is to prevent the formation of a 'counter-culture' based on a set of values, explanations, and definitions alien to the regime. The critical intelligentsia, in the words of a friend, 'having learned to talk once again, is unwilling to forget', and armed with a formidable and growing collection of *samizdat* materials, is now engaged in a systematic effort to re-evaluate Soviet society, Soviet life, and in particular, the role of the intelligentsia.

The regime has turned to selective repression to keep these alternatives from a broader public where they might gain even more adherents. However, it must be emphasized that the regime has a wide range of means at its disposal, from simply refusing to publish a critical work to imprisonment for 'anti-Soviet activities'. At the moment, at least, it is agreed that the KGB prefers intimidation to massive overt arrest.

Arrest and imprisonment seem reserved primarily for those brave individuals who attempt to publicize their criticism by the production and circulation of *samizdat* materials, by publicly demonstrating and speaking out against Soviet policies, and by circulating petitions or open letters demanding redress of grievances. Punitive action against those bold enough to act on their convictions is clearly designed to deter other members of the intelligentsia from following suit.

But arrest and imprisonment are not yet at least used on a massive basis, since the KGB, by all reports, prefers to use less drastic means to intimidate actual or potential dissidents. Thus many members of the intelligentsia agree that the KGB has increased surveillance over per-

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sonal contacts and public utterances to rebuild its file of personal dossiers. Moreover, the KGB procedure now is reportedly: first to interview a dissident and to intimidate him and his contacts by warning him of the possible consequences of his behaviour; second, if this proves ineffective, the KGB then makes a 'search' for 'illegal' materials; third comes a threat of expulsion from professional unions or place of employment. If these measures fail to intimidate, the dissidents may be simply sent into exile 'administratively' without court procedures, sentenced to exile under the 'parasite' laws, sent for 'observation' to insane asylums for indefinite periods of 'treatment' (often with disastrous consequences), or actually brought to trial for creating, propagating, or merely possessing materials 'slandering' the Soviet order. The increased use of confinement to asylums seems to be the result of the KGB's search for an effective punishment for dissidents unimpeded by the publicity surrounding existing judicial procedures.

Repressive measures taken against those who move beyond private criticism, the increase in anti-semitism, and the continued suppression of individuals or groups seeking to organize substantive discussion of Soviet reality, or in more recent times seeking to bring about greater autonomy for national minorities, have produced widespread apprehension among the intelligentsia over the immediate future. But at the same time, many seem convinced that the stagnation and repression cannot be continued 'indefinitely' and that an improvement is somehow 'inevitable'. Although a few admit the current situation could grow even more difficult, or that present policies might well continue for a generation, most hope that the dissidents' views will eventually be given a wider hearing.

THE intelligentsia's prognosis for the future is influenced by inadequate information about the past and present, and by the very nature of intellectual discourse under Soviet conditions. When members of the intelligentsia discuss the present or future of the USSR, their views are often obscured by their concentration on vivid oral presentation, where dramatic effect often seems more important than logical analysis. This is most apparent in the discussion of the sources and route of the country's eventual 'regeneration'.

First, as opposed to five years ago, there is little hope of internal regeneration being helped or supported by non-communist states, particularly by the United States. In 1964–65 many expressed the view that a more conciliatory American policy towards the USSR might deprive the regime of a major justification for strict controls over intellectual activity. In particular, a less rigid American stance might, it was argued, lessen the leadership's 'paranoia' about 'bourgeois influence' and hence its fierce hostility to expressions of non-orthodox opinions. This rather naïve hope evaporated with the American intervention in South Vietnam and the bombing of North Vietnam.

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Probably even more significant, the United States is no longer regarded as a positive alternative model for the future Soviet society because of continued internal disorder, and the apparent failure to solve pressing social and political problems.

In contrast to five years ago, there is little hope of regeneration coming from within the socialist camp. In 1964–65 many expressed the hope that some of the 'progressive' political and economic policies being implemented by such countries as Yugoslavia might be introduced into the USSR as well. Now, after the Soviet overthrow of the Dubcek regime in 1968, there is no such hope. Some people refer vaguely to the possibility of internal reform prompted by some 'crisis' in the socialist camp, but have little conception of how this would actually occur. In general, the members of the socialist camp are now regarded either as unpleasant liabilities or as the locus of a variety of threats not only to the intelligentsia's position within the USSR but to the Soviet state's very existence. Thus, it is now widely recognized that the Soviet overthrow of the Nagy regime in Hungary in late 1956 provided a major setback for Khrushchev's original anti-Stalin campaign, while the Soviet overthrow of the Dubcek regime in 1968 reinforced the political influence of those CPSU leaders who advocate strict communist party control over all intellectual activity.

The intelligentsia's attitude towards China, however, is unique. Although suspicious and dubious of official interpretations of foreign affairs, many members of the intelligentsia do seem to share the official CPSU conception of China as a fundamental threat to the USSR and seem to fear that a war with China is inevitable in the next five years. The Chinese leaders are regarded either as ideological fundamentalists or fanatic nationalists bent on undoing the alleged inequities of the Soviet regime's forebears. Most striking, Russians seem to hold an extremely stereotyped view of the Chinese people; they are derided for their alleged lack of imagination, their xenophobia, and their hostility to Russians. One friend, known for his trenchant criticism of current Soviet policies, nonetheless seriously urged me to mobilize the American intelligentsia in support of Russia against the Chinese 'menace'.

But with the exception of China and Czechoslovakia, the intelligentsia seems to show far less concern than previously with foreign affairs, except insofar as it touches on internal developments. The criticism of Soviet support for the Arab states, for example, is related not to Arab politics but to the diversion of resources which could be used to solve domestic shortages.

But while the intelligentsia is primarily concerned with the transformation of the internal order, few can identify with any clarity the levers which might help to bring about the change they desire.

In this respect, the younger members of the intelligentsia, in particular, the students, are most coherent about the nature of change and most optimistic about the future. In their view, it is not the Soviet system *per se* which fails to respond to peoples' needs, but the present

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aged and rigid leadership. They place their hopes in a new generation of CPSU leaders, totally untainted by Stalinism. In their view, those who joined the CPSU after Stalin's death cannot possibly share the authoritarian outlook of the present generation of leaders, all of whom built their careers over the bodies of their colleagues who perished in the purges of the 1930s. Although now obliged to repeat the slogans of their superiors in the Party, this younger group, it is argued, will be more willing to dismantle the controls over intellectual life when it takes over the reigns of leadership in the 1970s and 1980s. As one student insisted, the coming generation of CPSU leaders will be as receptive to new ideas as to jazz and mini skirts.

Such an optimistic appraisal clearly implies that individual intellectuals have little role to play other than to concentrate on their own budding careers and avoid any action which might make them liable to some form of state repression, hoping that their contemporaries in the CPSU will be more tolerant of intellectual diversity when they come to political power.

Many others, particularly those who hold some type of position within the system, are neither as optimistic nor as fatalistic. The boldest among the intelligentsia regard the introduction of free expression and the elimination of CPSU controls over intellectual life as the absolute prerequisite to end the current sense of stagnation and drift towards greater repression. This group, which is probably extremely small (although this is impossible to determine), does not seek freedom of expression for its own sake, but as a means to discover new policies and programmes which would restore the USSR's forward motion and development. Although highly critical of the status quo, they are extremely patriotic and vitally concerned with the USSR's international prestige and position.

This element within the intelligentsia, by demanding an end to CPSU control over all intellectual life, thereby challenges *the* most fundamental assumption of the political system, that the CPSU as presently organized is the sole organ capable of defining current needs. Given the CPSU's less than outstanding record in dealing effectively with a wide range of social, economic, and political problems, the elimination of all limits on intellectual activity could eventually lead, if not immediately, to fundamental changes in the political system. The 'subversive' effects of free expression in allowing not only criticism of the status quo but alternative definitions of the nature of 'socialism' and its prerequisites became apparent in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Given the CPSU's attitude towards the Czech attempt to give socialism a 'human face', it seems impossible that the CPSU leadership would dismantle controls deemed necessary to the very essence of the political system.

While the boldest segment of the intelligentsia feels that it must petition the regime to dismantle these controls, others who share their

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commitment to freedom of expression conclude that such tactics are useless and hopeless and that only a major economic crisis can force the regime to make such a basic change. In their view, therefore, the continuation of the current stagnation or worsening of the economic situation might oblige the regime to lift its interference in intellectual life, if only to foster the development of alternative means of managing a sluggish economy.

This segment of the intelligentsia clearly favours the introduction of certain political practices common to Western 'democratic' political systems on the implicit assumption that the Soviet social system is sufficiently similar to Western societies to respond creatively to the introduction of free expression. Furthermore, it is implied that once the fundamental step of granting freedom of expression has been taken, other democratic institutions might be introduced as well.

But many other members of the intelligentsia are not so sure of the applicability of Western political institutions. In particular, they think that the vastness and national diversity of the USSR, the long history of authoritarian political systems, the relatively low level of political consciousness among workers and peasants, either precludes the introduction of Western political practices or at least limits their utility in Russian conditions. One friend, clearly critical of many aspects of the current status quo, ruefully conceded that Russia was so huge, and the potential for anarchy among the masses so great, that a strong central authority was absolutely necessary for the survival of the Russian state. In general, such people regard Russia as so 'unique' that its regeneration must come not by the adoption of 'alien' political practices, but by the re-creation or development of institutions more in keeping with Russia's pre-revolutionary traditions.

This conviction that Russia is unique is widespread, and applied to the present and the future in a wide variety of ways. Thus, while some merely criticize the current regime for its neglect of certain aspects of Russian tradition, others attack the entire Soviet structure as an alien growth or distortion of Russian tradition. In direct contrast, however, some represent the current system as the legitimate heir of all that is best in Russia's past.

In recent years, a number of intellectuals have spoken out against the alleged neglect of Russia's cultural legacy, in particular, against the regime's failure to protect outstanding examples of Russian architecture, its indiscriminate closing of Russian churches, generally regarded as a major depository of Russian culture, the distortion of Russian history, the practice of changing traditional street names, and the general failure to emphasize the historical and cultural links between pre-revolutionary and post-1917 Russia. This criticism seems to be in large part a natural reaction of educated people against the banality of officially sponsored Soviet culture, but it does not necessarily seem to be linked with a more fundamental assault on the political status quo.

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Others, however, carry this critique of the Soviet regime's neglect of Russian culture to its ultimate conclusion, arguing that the October revolution itself represented a repudiation of Russian tradition, and that Russia's subsequent difficulties can be traced to the doomed attempt to apply alien ideas and institutions. This stance is often accompanied by an overt anti-semitism stressing the Jews' role in the 1917 revolution and their alleged inability to understand the 'Russian spirit'. These so-called 'russites' have great faith in the Russian masses and their allegedly innate sense of the best of Russian tradition, as illustrated by their continued devotion to certain aspects of 'folk' culture in the midst of industrial society. While the masses are seen as a source of potential restructuring of the system based on traditional 'Russian' institutions, fear is often expressed about their alleged potential for anarchy and indiscriminate aggression. Most important, this critique of the existing order does not seem to be linked with any immediate or clear political programme to 'throw off' the domination of an alien order.

On the other hand, the most extreme 'russites' (many of their opponents refuse to bestow the term 'intelligentsia' on them because of their acceptance of the regime's fundamental propositions) consider the Soviet state as the heir and defender of all that is best in the pre-revolutionary tradition. Their belief in Russia's 'unique' character leads them to regard authoritarian government as 'necessary' for ruling Russia. In this light, it is argued that although Stalin might have made some 'mistakes', his policies did create a powerful, industrialized state capable of standing on its own in the international arena. This view merges with an intense chauvinism, a supercilious attitude toward the 'decadent West', a fierce anti-semitism, and an extreme sensitivity to any 'insult' to the Soviet fatherland, which is seen not so much as a 'progressive' state leading the oppressed of all mankind to a new order, but as a national state defending all that is best in the nation's history

MANY members of the intelligentsia fear that the current regime encourages the growth of Russian chauvinism as an emotional alternative to the discredited and lack-lustre slogans of contemporary Soviet ideology, and in order to counter those dissidents who demand the introduction of certain Western political practices. Others claim that the military leaders, who are regarded with great intellectual contempt, seek to foster these views to bolster their own growing role in the political system.

Furthermore, it must be added that much of the incoherence of the Soviet intelligentsia's discussion of current and future Soviet reality stems from their belief, to varying degrees, in Russia's uniqueness. Thus, all of our acquaintainces were convinced that no foreigner can 'understand' Russian reality. Convinced of Russia's uniqueness, many people combine their desire for greater freedom of expression with the

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fear that it would 'not work' in Russia, criticize bitterly the existing status quo but defend the Russian 'fatherland' as some mystical entity. Liberalism and authoritarianism, chauvinism and a sense of the inherent 'brotherhood of man', intense fatalism and wild optimism all intermingle.

Most of the intelligentsia, moreover, are faced with a terrible dilemma. Fully aware of the need for a responsive regime, they are unable to take any action to facilitate change without endangering their own position, their families, and their personal future. Discussion of the system's problems can be exhilarating, but without even considering how it might be transformed into action, it merely produces a sense of helplessness, despair, and fatalism. Action, on the other hand, particularly with others, leads inexorably to exile, the asylum, or prison. It is not surprising therefore, that individual moods can and do shift quickly and dramatically from the blackest despair over the future of the country to the most optimistic sense of inevitable regeneration.

But the regime faces an equally critical dilemma. Unwilling to return to the massive terror of Stalin's day, it attempts to curb the intelligentsia's criticism with selective repression of the most outspoken dissidents and the use of emotional slogans to create a more emotional bond between the state and society. Resort to mass terror could probably make further rapid growth in a highly complex industrial society almost impossible, but the further spread of disaffection and opposition to official interpretations of reality threatens, if unchecked, to force fundamental changes in the distribution of decision-making power. Thus the regime's ultimate fate is, nevertheless, bound up with that of the intelligentsia.

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Alcoholism in the USSR

David E. Powell

EXCESSIVE consumption of alcoholic beverages occurs in virtually all societies; it is a phenomenon with which almost all governments have had to contend. The USSR is no exception. Indeed, there is reason to believe that the problem there is of greater magnitude than in most other societies, one which has reached almost epidemic proportions. The task of investigating this phenomenon, however, is impeded by the almost complete absence of statistics and the fact that few (if any) sociological studies of it have been undertaken in the USSR. Significant social problems, such as crime, religious belief, nationality conflicts and alcoholism, are seldom the subject of serious scientific study. The Western student is thus compelled to rely on official propaganda and, to a lesser degree, personal observation.

Anyone who has spent an evening with Russians knows that they are formidable drinkers. And anyone who has walked down Moscow's Gorky Street, Leningrad's Nevskii Prospekt or Kiev's Kreshchatik late at night has surely observed dozens of Soviet citizens reeling under the influence of vodka. The Soviet press publishes frequent articles and letters to the editor commenting on the problem of excessive drinking, and the authorities constantly attack alcoholism through the application of the criminal law, administrative measures and propaganda. There is, then, considerable evidence of a substantial drinking problem in the USSR, one which profoundly disturbs the authorities. Periodic anti-alcohol campaigns, involving legal, economic, social and medical weapons, are designed to keep it from spreading further. The year 1970 witnessed the beginning of yet another campaign. Precisely how the Soviets understand their problem, and what measures have been adopted and/or recommended to cope with it, will be described below.

Heavy drinking is not a new phenomenon in Russian life; nor is the official effort to combat it without precedent. In pre-revolutionary Russia, the state drew a substantial proportion of its revenue—as much as one-third—from its alcohol monopoly.[1] At the same time, there was a flourishing private market in illegally produced *samogon*, or home-brew. Heavy drinking was a common phenomenon, particularly in the countryside. Both the pre-revolutionary regime and the early Bolshevik regime attempted to curb such excesses. Thus Tsar Alexei, following the advice of Patriarch Tikhon, decreed in 1652 that only one cup of vodka should be sold to a customer in taverns. More than two and a half centuries later, after the Bolsheviks had come to power, they adopted a programme which stressed, among other things, the need to combat

[1] Elena Korenevskaya, 'Combating Alcoholism in the USSR', *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol* (hereafter *Quarterly*), vol. 27, no. 1 (1966), p. 97.

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alcoholism.[2] Such pronouncements changed people's lives very little: they were seldom enforced and soon forgotten. In the past decade, however, when the Party has begun to claim that the Soviet people are within sight of the goal of communism, there has been a considerable increase in the energy devoted to the question of alcohol. Since Brezhnev and Kosygin succeeded Nikita Khrushchev in the fall of 1964, the authorities have transformed the occasional campaigns against alcoholism into a major component of Soviet policy.

SOVIET commentators are more outspoken in dealing with the causes of alcoholism [3] in old Russia and the West than in the USSR. They attribute the problem to the iniquities of the capitalist system, frequently quoting Engels' remarks in *The Condition of the Working Class in England*. In this study, published in 1844, Engels argued as follows:

> The working-man comes home from his work tired, exhausted, finds his home comfortless, damp, dirty, repulsive: he has urgent need of recreation, he *must* have something to make work worth his trouble, to make the prospect of the next day endurable. . . . His enfeebled frame, weakened by bad air and bad food, violently demands some external stimulus . . . [He seeks] the certainty of forgetting for an hour or two the wretchedness and burden of life . . .[4]

Though far less industrialized than Engels' England, nineteenth-century Russia also provided an environment eminently suited to the encouragement of heavy drinking. The great mass of the peasants lived in poverty and ignorance, conditions which conspired to drive many to drink. In the words of a Soviet journalist:

> For centuries heavy drinking seemed an indispensable and necessary part of Russian life. The endless grey monotony of peasant life with its constant threat of famine and spine-breaking toil, the dirt and degradation of squalid city slums, the stifling atmosphere of merchants' homes—all this was an appropriate frame for 'vodka' . . .[5]

If these descriptions are accurate—and it seems clear that they are—it may be asked whether they help to explain the prevalence of vodka in the USSR today. The failings of the Soviet system are many.

[2] Vera Efron, 'The Tavern and the Saloon in Old Russia', *Quarterly*, vol. 16, no. 3 (1955), p. 498; *KPSS v. resolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh s'ezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsK*, vol. 1 (Moscow, 1954), p. 430.

[3] The Soviets, by and large, do not distinguish between alcoholism and excessive drinking. Both are seen not as a sickness, but as a harmful habit to be condemned by decent people. To speak of someone as 'suffering from alcoholism', a Soviet physician has observed, is no different from saying that one 'suffers' from hooliganism, sadism or the propensity to steal. See *Izvestia*, 1 October 1968, p. 5. For the opposite view, which seldom appears in print, see *Izvestia*, 23 June 1965, p. 4.

[4] Friedrich Engels, *The Condition of the Working Class in England* (London, 1936), pp. 102–103.

[5] Korenevskaya, op. cit. p. 97.

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Inadequate and crowded housing, low wages, the lack of consumer goods, a backward peasantry, a repressive political system—all contribute to restlessness, frustration, discontent and (one suspects) alcoholism. Unfortunately, the argument must remain on the level of intuition and surmise; it cannot be proven until Soviet or Western social scientists are permitted to investigate the alcohol problem scientifically.

Of course, official sources deny any major shortcomings or contradictions in the Soviet system. According to the *Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya*, 'In the USSR, where the welfare of the population increases all the time, the social roots of alcoholism have been eliminated'.[6] But the elimination of alcoholism's 'social roots' does not imply elimination of the problem itself. Changes in people's behaviour are said to lag behind changes in social conditions. 'Survivals of the past' (*perezhitki proshlogo*) or 'survivals of capitalism' (*perezhitki kapitalizma*) will be manifested even though their 'social roots' have been destroyed.[7]

To call alcoholism a 'survival of capitalism' is not a very adequate explanation of the phenomenon.[8] Soviet authorities do more than this. They point to a number of factors—some of them found in other societies and some of them distinctively Soviet—to account for widespread drinking in the USSR. Six of these are central to understanding the problem.

Indulgence towards social drinking—even drinking to excess—is said to be a major force contributing to the problem of alcoholism. 'No matter whom you talk to', a *Pravda* article pointed out in 1965, 'everyone is *against* drunkenness, but *for* "drinking bouts"...'[9] Social pressure to drink, or at least a benign attitude towards those who do, perpetuates the custom. Some imitate out of curiosity, others fear rejection by their peers, and still others simply enjoy drinking. There is little social pressure to abstain: public opinion is said to be strongly on the side of those who drink.[10]

Soviet citizens, like their counterparts elsewhere, celebrate significant events in their lives and major public occasions by arranging drinking parties. Most cultures celebrate the birth of a child, a wedding or a birthday. But it is apparently the custom in the USSR to arrange a party to celebrate one's first payday, the distribution of bonuses, or other occasions which other cultures would not mark by drinking. Each Sunday is the occasion for much imbibing. In addition, the October Revolution holiday, May Day, and International Women's Day (8

[6] Second edition, vol. 2, pp. 117–119 (entry on 'Alkogolizm').

[7] See *Pravda*, 7 August 1964, p. 4.

[8] Soviet commentators also recognize that personal or family problems, as well as defects in Soviet society, may lead to drinking. See, e.g. *Komsomolskaya pravda*, 9 October 1964, pp. 2, 4. For a view which rejects the very concept of 'survivals of capitalism', viewing it as an artificial construct, more a barrier than a guide to understanding anti-social behaviour, see *Nedelya*, 9–15 December 1962.

[9] *Pravda*, 19 September 1965, p. 6.

[10] *Komsomolskaya pravda*, 18 February 1970, p. 4.

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March) do not pass without significant numbers of citizens drinking in honour of the occasion. In some cities, office personnel arrange elaborate drinking parties to celebrate the approach of Builders' Day, Miners' Day, Chemical Workers' Day and other days set aside to honour one or other occupation.[11] The custom of marking such occasions by drinking heavily has proved difficult to eradicate.

Soviet citizens do not have sufficient opportunity or resources to spend their increased leisure time creatively. Relatively few people own television sets or automobiles, and the number of clubs and youth cafés is hardly adequate to meet the needs of the people. Often citizens, particularly restless young people, buy a bottle of vodka out of boredom. The problem becomes most acute in the evening, when people do not know how or where to spend their time. With their own apartments overcrowded and univiting, many drink simply to escape.[12] Perhaps the most articulate expression of this phenomenon appeared in a letter to the editor of the principal youth newspaper:

> . . . the reduction of the working day has found many people unprepared. . . . Vodka is the cheapest and simplest form of amusement, and this is a very important factor, especially for young people. We have not been able to provide materially for their free hours . . . with a correspondingly sharp increase in centres of culture. Hence the lines at movie theatres, the crush on dance floors and so on. And I must also mention the cost of these pleasures—it is high, especially tickets to the theatre or to a good concert. According to a simple computation that anyone can work out, vodka is a good bargain.[13]

Thus drinking is, at least in part, an expression of the unavailability of alternative sources of amusement. Crowded restaurants, theatres, cinemas, dance floors—all conspire to induce people to drink.

Home-brewing is a major contributor to the problem of excessive drinking. Precisely how significant a factor it is cannot be ascertained from available sources, but judging from the frequent references to it in the press and in literature, moonshining is widespread.[14] The few statistics that have been published suggest that home distilling goes on in virtually all villages.[15] Despite legal and propaganda measures, untold thousands—probably millions—of Soviet peasants brew and

[11] *Pravda*, 7 August 1964, p. 4; *Izvestia*, 27 May 1967, p. 4; *Pravda*, 13 September 1968, p. 3; *Izvestia*, 6 January 1970, p. 4. Not everyone needs a special occasion to get drunk. A Leningrad survey concluded that only one out of nine drunkards was celebrating a special event; most got drunk for no particular reason. See *Izvestia*, 27 May 1967, p. 4.

[12] *Pravda*, 7 August 1964, p. 4; *Izvestia*, 12 October 1965, p. 4.

[13] *Komsomolskaya pravda*, 9 October 1964, p. 2.

[14] According to a prominent legal figure, the production of *samogon* is 'dangerously widespread'. See the remarks of Professor A. Gertsenzon in *Izvestia*, 6 January 1970, p. 4.

[15] See N. Zarubin and S. Uskov, 'The Struggle Against Home Distilling is Going Poorly in Voronezh Province', *Sovetskaya yustitsiya*, no. 13 (1961), in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (hereafter *CDSP*), vol. XIII, no. 36, p. 16.

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drink their own liquor.[16] Raw materials—potatoes, wheat and sugar-beets—are readily available, the cost of production is low, and (except during the anti-alcoholism campaigns which periodically seize the country) the authorities deal leniently with illegal distillers.[17]

Commercial organizations and outlets are vitally interested in the sale of alcoholic beverages, which are sold in special shops, grocery stores and in restaurants and cafés. The fulfilment of economic plans is contingent upon achieving the maximum sales of such beverages,[18] for they account for a large part—approximately one-third—of sales plans in the public catering industry. Enterprise managers, sales clerks, waiters and waitresses are thus personally interested in the liquor trade. Moreover, to increase profits, commercial organizations try to place wine and/or vodka outlets near mass markets. This does not only mean that liquor is sold near plants and factories; in some parts of the country, over-zealous officials sell hard liquor in parks and on beaches, and they have installed wine-vending machines in public places.[19] Thus, pressure from the Soviet equivalent of a liquor lobby influences the drinking habits of the population.

According to a small but vocal group of Soviet analysts, the problem of alcoholism is intensified by advertising practices and propaganda messages contained in the mass media. Stores arrange elaborate and attractive displays to advertise alcoholic beverages, corrupting adults and young children alike.[20] At the same time, films, television, and popular literature are said ' to praise the pleasures of alcohol to excess '.[21] Apparently (at least in the minds of those concerned about excessive drinking), ' abundant and pointless drunkenness is frequently shown in theatres, on the screen and on television.[22] An eminent legal scholar has remarked, '. . . we see the heroes of our films drinking with gusto. I can hardly think of a single picture in which there is no drinking '.[23] Other Soviet commentators have seconded this view. While the argument seems puzzling to an outsider—it would seem to have more force if applied to the American media—it is advanced sufficiently vigorously and frequently for us to take note of it. There may, after all, be deviations from pure socialist realism, and some of these may in fact encourage drinking.

EXCESSIVE drinking, a form of anti-social behaviour in its own right, often leads to problems involving the health, welfare, safety and economic well-being of the community. Intoxication contributes heavily

16 Korenevskaya, op. cit. p. 99.
17 See below, pp. 12–13.
18 See *Komsomolskaya pravda*, 10 September 1961, p. 4.
19 *Nedelya*, no. 42 (10–16 October 1965); *Komsomolskaya pravda*, 9 January 1970, p. 4; *Komsomolskaya pravda*, 18 February 1970, p. 4; *Pravda*, 29 March 1969, p. 3; *Komsomolskaya pravda*, 10 September 1961, p. 4.
20 *Komsomolskaya pravda*, 18 February 1970, p. 4.
21 *Izvestia*, 9 July 1958, p. 3; see also *Izvestia*, 6 January 1970, p. 4.
22 *Pravda*, 7 August 1964, p. 4.
23 *Izvestia*, 27 June 1965, p. 6.

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to crime, delinquency, accidents, divorce and mental retardation. Most of those convicted of criminal activity act under the influence of alcohol, and most traffic accidents occur when either the driver or a pedestrian is inebriated. Indeed, more than half of all fatal accidents involve individuals who are drunk. Drunkenness is also the cause of millions of lost man-days, diminished output and increased wastage in plants, factories and farms. Industrial enterprises each year report hundreds of thousands of cases of absenteeism and tardiness due to drinking. On Mondays and the days after holidays, labour productivity usually falls off markedly, and cases of defective work and accidents become more frequent.[24] For all of these reasons, the Party is anxious to ameliorate the situation.

It is not possible to draw a profile of the typical drinker, for Soviet sources provide very little data on the number, social class, sex, employment status or income levels of alcoholics. They do acknowledge that 'the harm caused by alcoholism is exceptionally great',[25] and they also reveal that few social groups are immune from the problem. Even athletic champions, Party officials and schoolchildren (as young as fifth-graders) are reported to have become alcoholics. According to the available evidence, heavy drinkers typically take up drinking in early youth, right after finishing school. Few of them are women: the ratio of male to female alcoholics in Moscow and Leningrad is estimated by Soviet physicians to be approximately 10 to one. It appears, moreover, that the incidence of drinking is higher among certain nationalities than others. Georgians, for example, seldom become alcoholics. Indeed, while the population of Soviet Georgia is only about 20 per cent Russian, Russians comprise approximately 80 per cent of all alcoholic patients in the republic. (Georgians tend to drink wine rather than vodka, and they seldom drink to excess.) Precise data dealing with other sections of the country or other social strata are lacking, but impressions gained from visits to the USSR suggest that excessive drinking is, by and large, a problem among less educated, usually working-class or peasant, men.[26]

If Soviet statistics on alcohol consumption—which, it should be emphasized, do not include consumption of home-brew—are to be believed, citizens of the USSR drink less than their counterparts in the West. Data taken from official sources indicate that consumption levels are on a par with or slightly below those achieved in West Germany,

[24] *Pravda*, 29 March 1969, p. 3; Korenevskaya, op. cit. p. 98; *Izvestia*, 27 May 1967, p. 4; *Izvestia*, 14 July 1965, p. 4; *Pravda*, 6 October 1969, p. 3; B. S. Vorontsov *et al.*, 'O prestupnosti nesovershennoletnikh v gorode i sel'skoi mestnosti', *Sovetskoye gosudarstvo i pravo*, no. 3 (1969), p. 104; *Izvestia*, 27 June 1965, p. 6; *Pravda*, 14 April 1970.

[25] *Izvestia*, 27 June 1965, p. 6.

[26] *Komsomolskaya pravda*, 23 June 1968, pp. 2, 4; *Komsomolskaya pravda*, 9 January 1970, p. 4; *Sovetskaya Rossia*, 15 July 1970, p. 3; *Pravda*, 19 August 1970, p. 3; *Pravda*, 31 January 1970; *Pravda*, 2 January 1970; Vera Efron, 'Notes from a Visit to the Soviet Union', *Quarterly*, vol. 26, no. 4 (1965), pp. 657, 663, 664.

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Britain or America, but appreciably below those of Italy or France.[27] But these figures, which represent the total amount of alcohol contained in beverages consumed, mask the fact that Soviet citizens are far more apt than Westerners to drink hard liquor. The fact is that strong alcoholic beverages account for only 4 per cent of total consumption in France, the other 96 per cent consisting primarily of wine. In the USSR, on the other hand, strong alcoholic beverages (i.e. vodka) account for approximately two-thirds of consumption.[28] Russians do not like mixed drinks; they consume straight vodka and, unlike most of their counterparts in the West, they drink to get drunk.

Moreover, it appears that Soviet citizens are consuming more and more alcoholic beverages each year. Per capita consumption fell sharply between the Revolution and 1950, in part because of the devastation caused by the Second World War.[29] But, according to Western scholars, consumption of vodka, wine, and beer in the USSR doubled between 1950 and 1960, and increased by another 50 per cent by 1966.[30] Sharp restrictions introduced in 1958 on the sale of alcoholic beverages caused vodka consumption to drop precipitously, but the consumption curve quickly began to rise again. Within three years, it had reached its former level, and now, slowly but surely, it continues to move upward. At the present time, alcohol consumption is still on the increase.[31]

SOVIET authorities differ on how best to cope with the nation's drinking problem. There are two major schools of thought and a number of minor ones. Some believe that those who drink too much are guilty of anti-social behaviour and should in some way be punished. Others argue that the problem is medical in nature and can be solved only through hospitalization. Official policy combines both approaches. In addition, local officials have experimented with alternative approaches, and suggestions for newer and better ways to handle the problem appear regularly in the press.

Legal sanctions. Anyone who appears in public after having drunk to excess is likely to spend some time in a 'sobering-up station'. Probably the most widely used institutions treating drunks, these are special facilities, under the jurisdiction of the police, to which drunkards are

[27] Annual consumption (in absolute alcohol per capita) in the mid-1960s was: Britain —4·4 litres; West Germany—5·2 litres; USA—6·0 litres; Italy—15·5 litres; France —22·9 litres; USSR—4·7 litres: *Izvestia*, 27 June 1965, p. 6.

[28] Ibid. See also A. Lebed, 'Alcoholism in the Soviet Union', *Bulletin* (Munich), vol. X, no. 7, p. 36; *Izvestia*, 27 May 1969, p. 4.

[29] Vera Efron, 'The Soviet Approach to Alcoholism', *Social Problems*, vol. 7, no. 4 (1960), p. 308.

[30] Y. Mironenko, 'The Fight against Alcoholism in the USSR', *Bulletin* (Munich), vol. XIV, no. 9 (1967), p. 28.

[31] A. Smirnov-Cherkezov, *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 13 May 1970, pp. 12–13. The typical workers' family spends almost as much on alcoholic beverages (93 rubles a year) as it does on the cinema, the theatre, newspapers, and other cultural goods and services: *Izvestia*, 3 December 1967, p. 1.

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brought. There they spend the night, wash up, are given breakfast—and are fined. As the network of these institutions has expanded,[32] they have come to assume a rather stern mien. At first they were seen as 'curative' institutions which treated 'sick people' gently and comfortingly. They were said sometimes to resemble inns or hospitals. According to one description, 'The "guests", after taking a pre-slumber bath or a shower, snore serenely on beds with puffed-up pillows and snow-white linen in large, spacious rooms'.[33] The station provided a bath, a clean bed and a hearty breakfast—all gratis. 'Small wonder', a Soviet journalist wrote, 'that many a drinker came to regard the sobering-up station as a blessed oasis of tranquillity.'[34] Drunkards were not fined, though they did pay a four ruble 'medical service fee'. The fee, which originally covered less than half the cost of maintenance, has since been raised to eight rubles. In addition, a report on every patron is sent to his place of employment or study.[35]

Citizens who appear in public in an intoxicated condition may also be assessed a fine of 10 rubles, simply by virtue of being drunk. At one time there were suggestions that those who appeared in the streets drunk be declared *ipso facto* guilty of disturbing the peace and be punished for petty hooliganism. This never became official policy; at present, only those who actually disturb the peace are punished, typically by being sentenced to 10–15 days in jail.[36] Problem drinkers who do not get into trouble with the police may, if their drinking persists over a protracted period of time and offends their neighbours or fellow workers, run afoul of the anti-parasite laws. Inveterate drinkers are frequently exiled from their place of residence.[37]

Use of the criminal law and anti-parasite laws is designed to reduce the incidence of hooliganism and, at the same time, to deter citizens from drinking. In fact, the 1967 decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on increased liability for hooliganism is said to have persuaded many not to drink. One worker, arrested for petty hooliganism, was quoted as having said: 'I used to drink and walk the streets, and nobody arrested me. Therefore, I didn't believe there were any changes in how drunkards were handled. However, the decree put me on my guard. . . .'[38] These remarks are very likely apocryphal; it is

[32] While there were only two such stations with a total of 75 beds in Leningrad in the mid-fifties, a decade later there were 17 of them, each with 10–30 beds, in Moscow alone: Vera Efron, 'The Soviet Approach to Alcoholism', op. cit. p. 312; Efron, 'Notes from a Visit to the Soviet Union', op. cit. p. 655.

[33] *Izvestia*, 29 March 1961, p. 6. See also *Komsomolskaya pravda*, 10 September 1961, p. 4.

[34] Korenevskaya, op. cit. p. 98.

[35] *Izvestia*, 29 March 1961, p. 6; *Izvestia*, 5 April 1961, p. 4; *Pravda*, 26 June 1970, p. 3.

[36] *Komsomolskaya pravda*, 10 September 1961, p. 4; *Izvestia*, 7 July 1965.

[37] See, e.g. *Izvestia*, 20 June 1965, p. 5; *Pravda*, 10 July 1959, p. 4.

[38] *Izvestia*, 27 May 1967, p. 4.

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difficult to imagine a hooligan or potential hooligan reasoning this carefully. Nonetheless, his observations clearly indicate official thinking on the deterrent effect of the decree.

The evidence suggests that such laws have had relatively little impact on either drinkers or violators of public order. While the 1967 decree stipulates that hooligans be compelled to work, only a third of those arrested actually do so. They are placed in the custody of those for whom they are sent to work, but supervision is poor and, as a result, most 'eat free bread . . . , do not suffer any pangs of remorse . . . , absent themselves from work freely [and] get drunk. . . .' Similarly, comrades' courts do not always adopt a hostile stance toward drinkers; they often regard such transgressions as harmless. Finally, suggestions that drunkards who commit acts of petty hooliganism be sentenced to corrective labour, that part of their wages be withheld, or that they be made to serve jail terms on their days off or vacations, have so far gone unheeded.[39] Still, the threat of exile or jail is always present, and it may well deter some from drinking to excess.

The laws against moonshining appear to be more severe, but they too are not enforced strictly. A 1948 decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet called for the imprisonment of those guilty of making, keeping or dealing in moonshine or the equipment used to make it. But for many years the law was applied infrequently and mildly: 'malicious moonshiners and speculators' were said often to 'escape the punishment they deserve'. Those who were convicted invariably received light sentences or suspended sentences. Laws passed in 1960 and 1961 in the Russian Republic strengthened the authorities' hand in dealing with moonshiners, and other republics soon added similar provisions to their criminal codes. But the authorities to this day continue merely to issue warnings, levy insignificant fines, and in general deal mildly with moonshiners.[40]

The authorities may resort to milder administrative penalties in situations which do not call for exile or criminal punishment. Among the measures presently employed or suggested for future use are depriving drunkards of the right to receive wages personally (pay is given to their wives), depriving them of bonuses, reducing their vacation time, noting in their labour booklets that they have been dismissed because of drunkenness, transferring them to lower positions on lists for new housing or visits to sanatoria, or demoting them. It has even been proposed that entire brigades be deprived of prizes or be fined for 'winking

[39] *Izvestia*, 1 April 1965, p. 3; *Pravda*, 26 June 1970, p. 3; *Izvestia*, 7 October 1965, p. 4.

[40] *Sovetskaya Litva*, 31 October 1958, in *CDSP*, vol. X, no. 48, p. 27; *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR*, no. 5 (76), 5 February 1960, in *CDSP*, vol. XII, no. 5, p. 21; *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR*, no. 18 (139), 11 May 1961, in *CDSP*, vol. XIII, no. 19, p. 22; *Izvestia*, 3 July 1965, p. 4; *Izvestia*, 6 January 1970, p. 4.

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their eyes at drunkards, debauchers and slackers ' in their midst.[41] Thus social pressure and collective responsibility are combined with individual punishment.

Medical care. Those who have become physically addicted to alcohol are urged to undergo medical treatment. For many years, the authorities relied exclusively on voluntary hospitalization; however, since few alcoholics chose to undergo treatment, medical and legal authorities were compelled to adopt stronger measures. Recent years have thus witnessed a movement toward the compulsory treatment and ' labour re-education ' of habitual drunkards. At present, both voluntary and compulsory treatment are practised.

Bringing medicine to bear on the problem of alcoholism is not a new idea. Nearly half a century ago, in the mid-1920s, the USSR opened its first centres for the treatment of alcoholism. In 1929, the first Soviet hospital for the treatment of acute alcoholic disorders was established, and three years later the first hospital for the prolonged treatment of alcoholism was opened.[42] At present, there is a nation-wide network of special hospitals (including special units at psychiatric hospitals) to deal with alcoholics. Several approaches to treating patients are used. Some physicians consider hypnosis, either individual or collective, the most effective way of dealing with alcoholism, while others (particularly psychiatrists) apply conditioned-reflex theory. Treatment often is accompanied by the use of drugs, particularly disulfiram. Given the Soviet bias against Freudianism, it is not surprising that few doctors consider protracted and intensive psychotherapy a useful tool.[43] The method which has achieved the greatest success and publicity is that developed by a Dr. Burenkov in Chelyabinsk. Burenkov's approach involves a variation on the conditioned-reflex theme, giving alcoholics a violent emetic with a glass of vodka.[44] Burenkov's method is said to be remarkably effective. Only a minority of patients treated by more traditional means are cured (success rates range from 10 to 40 per cent), while Burenkov's method is alleged to result in an abstinence rate of approximately 80 per cent. Moreover, it is far cheaper than other methods: while in-patient treatment usually costs the state some 250 roubles, the Burenkov approach entails a per-patient expenditure of only a few rubles.[45]

Programmes involving voluntary hospitalization have been widely criticized in the press. Patients are accused of being ' healthy . . .

[41] *Izvestia*, 27 June 1965, p. 6; *Pravda*, 5 July 1965, p. 2; *Izvestia*, 29 August 1965, p. 4; *Izvestia*, 5 September 1968, p. 5; *Pravda*, 26 June 1970, p. 3; *Pravda*, 19 August 1970, p. 3; *Komsomolskaya pravda*, 9 October 1964, p. 4; *Izvestia*, 5 September 1968, p. 5.

[42] Efron, ' The Soviet Approach to Alcoholism ', op. cit., p. 312.

[43] Efron, ' Notes from a Visit to the Soviet Union ', op. cit., pp. 655–658.

[44] Patients are first given an elaborate meal, then a foul-smelling and evil-looking ' cocktail ' comprised of various medicines, and finally a glass of vodka as a ' chaser '. They invariably become sick and develop a resistance to alcohol.

[45] *Izvestia*, 4 June 1966, p. 5; *Pravda*, 23 June 1964, p. 4; *Pravda*, 29 March 1969, p. 3; Efron, ' The Soviet Approach to Alcoholism ', op. cit. p. 313.

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parasites . . . robust loafers' living in 'a paradise', while the institutions themselves are described as 'dormitories for loafers who take advantage of our humaneness'. Patients who undergo treatment voluntarily are said to be attracted not by the possibility of cure, but rather by 'idleness, free food . . . the fact that all the "sick" people receive sick pay . . . [and the fact that] you can lie around for weeks and read'.[46] The alcoholic's expenses are, after all, paid, and he also receives paid sick leave. Criticisms of the existing arrangement have brought change. Special hospitals have recently been set up in which people suffering from alcoholism work to cover the expense of their upkeep and treatment. Medical treatment is thus combined with socially useful labour. (Indeed, some of these hospitals have shown a profit.) After discharge, patients are usually seen on an out-patient basis for reinforcement and maintenance therapy.[47]

Not many such facilities exist, however, and few people who suffer from alcoholism or habitual drunkenness are willing to submit voluntarily to medical treatment. The Party therefore has had to resort to more vigorous means to deal with the problem. After many years of uncertainty, the authorities finally decided to compel chronic drinkers to seek the assistance of a doctor. This decision involved a basic revision of existing practices, for Soviet law had permitted compulsory treatment only in situations where the alcoholic had committed a crime. Drunkards who did not break the law could not be compelled to undergo treatment.[48] During the 1960s, the press published numerous articles and letters urging that all alcoholics be compelled to undergo medical treatment, either in hospitals or in special 'labour-cure camps'.[49] In the mid-sixties, a number of republics adopted measures designed to achieve this objective,[50] and finally in April 1967, the Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet adopted a decree on the 'compulsory treatment and labour re-education of habitual drunkards (alcoholics)'. It established that:

> . . . habitual drunkards (alcoholics) who regularly misuse alcoholic beverages, shun voluntary treatment or continue to drink to excess after treatment and who violate labour discipline, public order and the rules of the socialist community, in spite of public or administrative measures taken against them, are subject to be sent to treatment-labour medical institutions for compulsory medical treatment and labour re-education for a period of one to two years.[51]

[46] *Izvestia*, 24 December 1964, p. 4; *Izvestia*, 12 October 1965, p. 4; *Izvestia*, 5 September 1968, p. 5. [47] *Pravda*, 29 March 1969, p. 3; *Izvestia*, 25 December 1968, p. 3.

[48] *Izvestia*, 1 April 1965, p. 3; *Izvestia*, 14 July 1965, p. 4; *Izvestia*, 12 October 1965, p. 4.

[49] See, e.g., *Komsomolskaya pravda*, 9 October 1964, p. 2; *Izvestia*, 1 April 1965, p. 3; *Izvestia*, 3 July 1965, p. 4; 'Antiobshchestvennye yavleniya, ikh prichiny i sredstva bor'by s nimi', *Kommunist*, no. 12 (1966), pp. 66–67.

[50] *Izvestia*, 27 June 1965, p. 6; *Izvestia*, 3 July 1965, p. 4; *Izvestia*, 14 July 1965, p. 4; *Izvestia*, 12 October 1965, p. 4. See also *Kazakhstanskaya pravda*, 31 October 1964, in *CDSP*, vol. XVI, no. 47, p. 16.

[51] *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR*, no. 15 (13 April 1967), in *CDSP*, Vol. XIX, no. 15, p. 11.

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Thus, those who drink to excess, whether or not they commit a crime, are now subject to compulsory treatment. While it is too early to assess the effectiveness of the new approach, it appears that the network of these new institutions is still very small and inadequate to the task of combating alcoholism.[52] The mere existence of such a law however, should serve as a deterrent to excessive drinking.

Restrictions on trade in alcoholic beverages. Since the late fifties, steps have been taken to restrict trade in alcoholic beverages. By cutting off the supply of these products and controlling their availability in retail outlets, the authorities have sought to alter the habits of consumers. To begin with, many of the stores, stands and booths selling beer, wine or vodka were closed, particularly those near plants, factories, and public parks. Sale of vodka to minors was forbidden, and restaurants were told they could serve no more than 100 grammes of vodka to each patron. Restrictions were also placed on the hours of sale of alcoholic beverages: stores were required to wait until 10 a.m. (after the working day had begun) to sell vodka.[53]

Most of these regulations, however, have been systematically ignored or circumvented by tradesmen. Thus, forbidding the sale of vodka in the morning hours (a prohibition which itself is violated frequently) does not achieve its purpose, since other alcoholic beverages are sold as soon as the store opens. In restaurants, despite the 100-gramme limit on vodka consumption (another regulation which is seldom enforced), customers may be served all the brandy, cognac, liqueur or rum they want. And vodka is still sold in stores near industrial enterprises, hospitals and educational institutions—even in butchers' shops and bakeries. Indeed, in one village in the North Ossetian Autonomous Republic, wine was even sold in a secondary school.[54]

The current wave of reform includes further restrictions on trade in alcoholic beverages and a general effort to improve enforcement of pre-existing policy. As a result of steps taken in early 1970, for example, citizens of Moscow and Leningrad are now able to purchase liquor only between the hours of 11 a.m. and 8 p.m.[55] Commentators have suggested additional restrictions as well, e.g. that vodka be sold only in very small (or else very large) containers, that it be not sold at all on Saturdays, Sundays or holidays (or else only on those days), or that it be sold only in special stores.[56] There has even been some talk about introducing a 'dry law'. While most authorities agree that such a law would be unworkable and would

[52] *Pravda*, 18 March 1968; *Pravda*, 29 March 1969, p. 3.

[53] *Pravda*, 7 August 1964, p. 4; *Pravda*, 10 July 1959, p. 4; Korenevskaya, op. cit. p. 99; *Komsomolskaya pravda*, 3 March 1961, p. 4; *Izvestia*, 27 May 1967, p. 4.

[54] *Komsomolskaya pravda*, 10 September 1961, p. 4; *Izvestia*, 23 June 1965, p. 4; *Izvestia*, 3 July 1965, p. 4; *Izvestia*, 14 July 1965, p. 4; *Moškovskaya pravda*, 9 October 1969, in Joint Publications Research Service no. 49,339, p. 89.

[55] *Moskovskaya pravda*, 30 January 1970; *Trud*, 13 March 1970.

[56] *Izvestia*, 6 January 1970, p. 4; *Komsomolskaya pravda*, 6 January 1970, p. 4; *Pravda*, 30 June 1970, p. 3.

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only bring about a flourishing of home-brewing, advocates of a ban have been permitted to state their position publicly. They point out that the only countries which have tried and failed to make prohibition official policy are the Western capitalist states—where 'the exploiters are not at all interested in having the workers stop drinking'.[57] Proponents of prohibition remain a rather sectarian minority, and there is little likelihood that their proposals will be introduced in the near future.[58] Still, given the magnitude of the problem and the apparent failure of remedies introduced so far, adoption of a dry law cannot be ruled out.

Anti-alcohol propaganda. Most Soviet authorities recognize that medical, legal and administrative measures are not capable of solving the alcohol problem. A wide-ranging educational and propaganda effort is therefore conducted throughout the country; it is designed to explain the harmfulness of drinking and to persuade citizens to give up the habit.[59] Many techniques are employed: lectures, consultations with physicians or propagandists, the theatre, films, posters, pamphlets, tape recordings, portable displays—all are brought to bear on drinkers and potential drinkers.[60] Even Soviet schoolchildren devote time to studying the evils of alcohol in the eighth grade course on human physiology and hygiene. They are encouraged to perform scientific experiments illustrating the harm of alcohol, e.g. pouring a spoonful of alcohol every day on a growing plant and observing the harm done.[61] It has been suggested that a public organization be set up to co-ordinate and improve such efforts, on the model of the All-Union Council of Anti-Alcohol Societies of the 1920s. The latter body published a magazine, *Trezvost' i kultura* (*Temperance and Culture*), distributed other scientific and popular literature, and organized anti-alcohol propaganda. The existence of such a society today, it is said, 'would help to ensure a planned, systematic and purposeful struggle by broad masses of the population against drunkenness'.[62]

[57] *Komsomolskaya pravda*, 6 January 1970, p. 4. See also *Izvestia*, 6 February 1966, p. 3.

[58] See the remarks of the Deputy Minister of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, *Sovetskaya Rossia*, 24 January 1970.

[59] See Mark G. Field, 'Alcoholism, Crime and Delinquency in Soviet Society', *Social Problems*, vol. 3, no. 2 (1955), p. 107; *Sovetskaya Litva*, 27 July 1969, in Joint Publications Research Service no. 48,660, p. 95.

[60] Korenevskaya, op. cit. p. 100; *Pravda*, 7 August 1964, p. 4; *Pravda*, 29 March 1969, p. 3; *Sovetskaya kultura*, 1 August 1970. This propaganda barrage is frequently criticized for its superficiality and tendentiousness. Its utility is apt to be quite limited, if for no other reason than that measures are usually attended by non-drinkers. See M. D. Shargorodskii, 'The Causes and Prevention of Crime', *Voprosy Marksistskoi sotsiologii, The Soviet Review*, vol. 5, no. 3 (1964), p. 47.

[61] Efron, 'Notes from a Visit to the Soviet Union', op. cit. p. 663. Propaganda among the youth is a matter of considerable concern. As a legal official has remarked, 'Wherever the views of young people are not moulded by purposeful work, they take shape fortuitously, under the influence of "the street"'. *Izvestia*, 17 April 1969, p. 4.

[62] *Pravda*, 29 March 1969, p. 3. See also *Izvestia*, 27 June 1965, p. 6 and *Izvestia*, 27 May 1969, p. 4.

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Other approaches. Many other approaches have been tried, and still others are advanced by concerned citizens and officials. One of the most widespread practices of the Khrushchev era, which seems to have become less popular in recent years, involves public shaming. Satirical displays are arranged on public bulletin boards or in wall newspapers; they identify specific drunkards (with photographs and/or caricatures) and ridicule their activities.[63] Some enterprises assign a 'guardian' to each heavy drinker; he is responsible for maintaining strict supervision over the drinker's habits both at work and during their leisure hours. A plant in Minsk puts drunkards in a 'workers' circle', where they are confronted with hostile questions and comments from their fellow workers. And at one plant in the city of Gorky, heavy drinkers receive their wages not at the regular pay window, but at a special booth in the shape of a vodka bottle.[64]

Some of the proposals advanced in the press are equally imaginative. One that is frequently suggested involves increasing production of beer, wine, fruit juices, and *kvass* (a mildly alcoholic carbonated beverage made from fermented rye bread), and simultaneously expanding the network of public-catering enterprises. As noted above, the incidence of alcoholism is significantly lower in the southern, wine-making republics, where the population drinks wine instead of vodka.[65] Perhaps the most intriguing suggestion appeared in a 1969 *Pravda* article. A citizen suggested placing a picture of a cemetery on vodka bottles. He even designed a label with a picture of a cross-legged skeleton, sitting beside a dark crypt and holding a placard with the inscription: 'Alcohol is poison. Every glass poisons your system and leads to cell death, tuberculosis and dementia.' *Pravda* responded that this would not stop drunkards and would instead only spoil decent people's fun at weddings, anniversary parties, etc. 'Attempts to counter drunkenness with tasteless and . . . primitive drawings cannot possibly succeed.'[66]

NONE of the remedies proposed or already adopted seems to offer much chance of success. Campaign follows campaign, and there is no reason to expect the 1970 version to be more effective than its predecessors. Whether the struggle against drunkenness is a priority matter or allowed to recede into the background, the problem persists and grows more serious. 'Place our hopes on agitation against drunkenness?' one commentator has asked. 'Alas, it is a poor hope. We have been agitating for many years already, but the demand for vodka somehow does not decrease. Apparently, bottles in store windows agitate more strongly.'[67]

[63] *Izvestia*, 7 July 1965; *Izvestia*, 29 August 1965, p. 4; *Izvestia*, 27 May 1969, p. 4.
[64] *Izvestia*, 29 August 1965, p. 4; *Izvestia*, 12 April 1964, p. 3.
[65] *Izvestia*, 21 August 1965, p. 3; Korenevskaya, op. cit., p. 101.
[66] *Pravda*, 10 July 1969, p. 6.
[67] *Komsomolskaya pravda*, 6 January 1970, p. 4.

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The Soviet experience with industrialization and modernization has so far resulted in severe dislocations in people's daily lives. Alcoholism is only one expression of these dislocations. The Party's refusal to provide the public with the amenities of a civilized life—economically, socially and politically—has only exacerbated the problem. The Soviets profess to view social phenomena as conditioned by environmental factors. Thus, improvements in living standards, greater opportunity for the creative use of leisure time, and a lightening of the average citizen's burdens might do much to solve the problem. Ultimately, people who drink do so for their own personal reasons. But their environment may either promote or inhibit excessive drinking, and the government's policies can either stimulate people to drink or draw them away from such practices. The Soviet regime is, in great part, to blame for its citizens' excessive drinking, and it has shown itself to be almost helpless in dealing with the situation.

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From Marx to Marcuse

Neil McInnes

IN September 1914, when French and German working men under the commands of Joffre and Moltke were locked in decisive combat along the Marne, Lenin bought several school exercise books and settled down in Bern to annotate Hegel's *Science of Logic*. He found it heavy going. There are numerous complaints in his notes and in the margins about Hegel's obscurity. Still, Lenin found what he wanted, for there are just as many 'NB', and 'Well said!!!'. The proletariat that was to make the revolution had fallen under the sway of social-democrat parties and had been led into an imperialist war. Something had gone wrong and the new way forward was to be found in a fresh reading of Hegel.

In March 1920, Lukacs, just out of a Viennese prison, wrote an essay 'Class Consciousness' containing, as he later said, 'a Hegelianism more Hegelian than Hegel'. (It was published three years later, along with some earlier essays written in the spirit of Rosa Luxemburg and some later essays in the spirit of Lenin, as *History and Class Consciousness*.) The communist revolution in Hungary in 1919, in which Lukacs had played a role, had failed and Bolshevism's effort to spread westward had been thwarted. Something had gone wrong and the new course was to come from a re-Hegelizing of communist theory.

In February 1929, Gramsci began scribbling the 2,848 pages of his notebooks in the prison of Turi di Bari. In the third of his 32 notebooks he wrote, 'It is necessary to effect on the philosophy of Croce the same reduction that [Marx and Engels] practised on the Hegelian philosophy. This is the only historically fruitful way to bring about an adequate renovation of [Marxism].' Gramsci had been condemned under Mussolini's laws of exception, along with other leaders of the Italian Communist Party, to a long gaol term and the whole Italian Party had been wiped out by fascism. Something had gone wrong and the way forward led via a new infusion of Hegelian idealism.

On January 30, 1933, Hitler became chancellor and a Nazi apologist, Carl Schmitt, said, 'on this day, one can say, Hegel died'. Marcuse, a refugee in Geneva, agreed that Schmitt spoke truer than he knew. Hegel and the labour movement that was his heir were indeed dead—so Hegel must be resurrected by a new reading. Marcuse proceeded to this, in essays published from 1934 on in the expatriate *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*. The working class movement in West Europe had come to grief. This could have something to do with the fact that Marx, Lenin, Lukacs and Gramsci had read Hegel incorrectly. If something had gone wrong, a new reading of Hegel would show the way forward.

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THAT the history of Marxist theory in this century can be told as the story of successive re-readings of Hegel is not surprising, because Marxism began in the last century as a reading of Hegel. Indeed, Marx's was only one of a series of readings of Hegel, and one that depended on several made before it, notably on Feuerbach's. That people should go on for 140 years looking in Hegel's books for something that might more realistically be sought elsewhere (e.g. in the study of social movements) is due to two things. First, to acceptance of Hegel's own claim that in his work all previous human thought culminated, came to a head in a system that took up, corrected and preserved everything worthwhile men had ever thought on important questions. Now, to have the whole intellectual history of the race in a capsule, even if it were such a mouthful as Hegel's books, would be a great saving of time and labour. Such a history, if it existed, would contain vital political lessons. Secondly, there is the fact that Hegel's philosophy is exciting but incomprehensible. What he says is so fantastic that he cannot mean it but it sounds portentous. For non-religious readers at least, it is a strange dream that challenges interpretation.

Some early attempts at interpretation were to the effect that Hegelianism was really about politics, about the need of a radical liberal revolution in Germany but that Hegel became obscure and contradictory in trying to hide this, out of cowardice or conformism. The rational was not real but it ought to be and a radical revolution would make it so. These were the opinions of the Berlin Doktorklub, including Engels, and they were still alive after Marx's death, in Engel's *Ludwig Feuerbach.*

Feuerbach read Hegel very differently, in a way that is easy for us to understand because we have seen the rise of analysis, first in the economic interpretation of history, then in psycho-analysis, later in the sociology of knowledge and in linguistic analysis. That is, we treat many utterances as symbols. When a person says something that we refuse to take at face value, we do not scold him for lying (which is what the *Doktorklub* did to Hegel). We say it *means* something else: it *stands for* an economic interest or a sexual wish or a class bias or a disguised command, depending which analysis we practise. Feuerbach started all this by saying that Hegel's cloudy philosophy symbolized a psychological condition, mankind's projection of its own virtues into an alien god. Marx saw the brilliance of the method but, adopting a suggestion of Moses Hess, he read off a completely different meaning. Hegelianism was not an allegory of religion but of economics. The adventures of Spirit, its passage via objectification back to itself, were a symbol of man's sufferings in a divided economy and of his eventual return to wholeness by the re-appropriation of what was really his own but seemed alien, the economic process.[1] Having decided this was what

[1] Marx also believed that once the symptom stood revealed as a symbol, it would disappear. He wrote to Feuerbach that Schelling's first philosophy was 'a youthful and fantastic dream' of which Feuerbach had discovered the symbolic sense,

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Hegel was about, Marx dropped him and spent decades opening up what he considered a new continent he had discovered for science, the study of economic history.

Although his intention, and to some extent his achievement, were scientific, there were traces in his work of the origin of his inspiration in a particular reading of Hegel. Of course, no one would bother going back to that source as long as they took Marxism for science. It was only when things went wrong that some people, those who do not look at social facts to explain disappointments, started to re-mystify Marx, working back to Hegel. Lenin adumbrated this *ricorso* but Lukacs was the first to show how considerable were the traces of an interpretation of Hegel in Marx's work. Lukacs could demonstrate in 1922, in a clever exercise in re-mystification, that behind the notion of commodity fetishism in *Capital* one could detect not merely the alienation of young Marx but the 'objectification' of Hegel's Spirit. Once the earliest writings of Marx had been published a decade later, anyone could do the same and there grew up a whole academic industry of that sort, *die Marxbeschäftigung*.

FOR the Second International, however, and for contemporaries who took Marxism seriously, none of this mattered yet. They were puzzled by the theological language Marx sometimes used to describe the commodity [2] and they were irritated by his 'coquetting with the dialectic'.[3] Still, these had clear meanings: mankind had a basic or real or proper set of wants, notably a need for psychological integrity or personal wholeness, which shortly would be satisfied in communism, a system that would put an end to commodity production for profit. The reason one knew it would arrive shortly was that capitalism was digging its own grave by using men as commodities. It was at this point that one could, if one wished, flirt with the dialectic by saying that capitalism's negation of proper, basic human wants was about to be negated. That figure of rhetoric was the only use Marx came to have for the dialectic of contradiction. It was a cute way of putting his main finding, that capitalism would be buried by its victims, the labourers whose pay was just what it cost to produce labourers, but they would maintain all of capitalism's productive achievements in a society that satisfied men's real wants.

adding, 'Schelling is therefore your *anticipated caricature*, and as soon as reality, comes out against a caricature, the latter must vanish like a mist'. Quoted by G. V. Plekhanov, *Fundamental Problems of Marxism* (London, 1969), p. 24

[2] He called it *ein sinnlich übersinnliches Ding*, and 'a most complex thing, full of metaphysical subtleties and theological caprices'. The socialists of 1890 could make nothing of that but today all the restorers of *anticipated caricatures* can see in it Hegel's object, in which spirit lies estranged, and young Marx's goods, in which man's mutilated humanity lies alienated.

[3] Including Lenin himself in 1894. Cf. Karl Korsch, 'L'ancienne dialectique hégélienne et la nouvelle science matérialiste', in *Etudes de Marxologie*, No. 7, 1963, p. 182.

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As is known, this did not happen. Most people looked at the social facts to see why not. The Revisionists concluded that capitalism must have *other* laws of development, while Sorel drew the conclusion that revolutionary movements must have *other* modes of operation. In their various ways, they stayed with Marx, studying the social facts. Lenin, the first of a line, went back to Hegel. He gave as his reason: 'You cannot completely understand Marx's *Capital* and in particular its first chapter, without having studied and understood *all* the *Logic* of Hegel. So not one Marxist has understood Marx after a half a century!!'.[4] Thanks to a re-reading of Hegel, Lenin will be the first man to understand Marx and to show how to 'continue the work of Hegel and Marx'.[5] One might deduce from the time he did it, however, that Lenin had other things in mind too. The working class that was, at that moment, marching to fratricidal slaughter on the Marne and that would soon be fed by the hundred thousand into the world's first mass death factory at Verdun surely could not be the 'heir of the classical German philosophy', that sum of all humanity's wisdom that culminates in Hegel. It, or leaders acting in its name, had usurped that heritage. The first Marxist reading had produced a suicidal monster; a new reading of Hegel would decipher the *lettres de noblesse* of another revolutionary movement.

IT was Lenin who said that philosophy was just politics carried on by other means,[6] so one must expect his philosophising to be cavalier and practicalist and one must look to see what the political problem was that he was trying to carry over into philosophy. In September–December 1914 it was the collapse of the workers' international. As Lenin saw it, the Marxists had converted Marxism into a rigid metaphysics, into an historical astronomy dressed up as what Kautsky called 'the science of social development'. This scientistic veneration for the laws of motion of society had led them into gradualism and a distaste for revolution. Incidentally, it also implied that agrarian Russia was no place for a proletarian expropriation of capitalism. Moreover, the worker's movement had fallen under an inadequate leadership that was politically incompetent because it did not have the sort of party Lenin had invented. The upshot was that the proper wants of the workers, those that could be satisfied only in communism, had been lost and perverted in a lot of false, short-term wants such as capitalism consented to satisfy in order to buy off the 'aristocracy' of working men—at the expense of other workers and of their own proper wants.

Lenin opens Hegel's *Science of Logic* in the light of these issues. His method is the opposite of Feuerbach's and Marx's. Instead of analysing the whole dream, interpreting it as a single allegory, he

[4] V. Lenin, *Cahiers sur la dialectique de Hegel* (Paris, 1967), p. 241.
[5] *Cahiers*, p. 204.
[6] L. Althusser, *Lenine et la philosophie* (Paris, 1969), p. 18.

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dismisses some dream sequences as silly and accepts others as literally true. He condemns as obscure, mystical and abstruse all that does not suit his own book but endorses enthusiastically misunderstood snippets that do. For example, when he notes Hegel saying 'Nature = submersion of the concept in exteriority', Lenin comments 'Ha-ha!'[7] Marx did not laugh at this; he interpreted it to mean 'Commodity = submersion of humanity in reification', i.e. personality is mutilated in the production of marketable goods. Lenin gives this account of his manner of reading: 'I am trying all the time to read Hegel as a materialist: Hegel is materialism stood on its head (according to Engels)—that is, I am mostly eliminating God, the Absolute, the pure idea, etc.'[8] The absurdity of reading a systematic thinker in this way was to be repeated later by those who 'read Marx as an idealist', leaving out the bits about the proletariat.

What does Lenin's method yield? First, he copies out Hegel's attacks on evolutionism, writing in the margin 'Leaps!', 'Interruptions of continuity' and then 'NB' next to Hegel's remark that gradual transition explains nothing without sudden jumps. Lenin is taking Hegel's criticism of the logic of pre-formation as support for his quarrel with gradualism in politics. Plekhanov had made careful note of these same passages and not reached that conclusion, but Lenin wants to fracture Kautsky's 'science of social development' with revolutionary leaps and surprises, so as to make room for voluntarism, beginning in semi-feudal Russia.

Secondly, Lenin copies out approvingly what Hegel says on the contradiction in things, endorsing such passages as: 'all things are contradictory in themselves', 'movement is existing contradiction itself' and 'only in so far as something has contradiction in itself does it move, have impulse or activity'. Lenin comments, 'Universal elasticity of notions, elasticity that leads to the identity of contradictories—that's the whole point . . . that's the dialectic'.[9] He overlooks the passages where Hegel speaks of the negation of that negativity, of the surpassing of contradictions. Whereas for Hegel self-contradictoriness is a sign of the inadequacy of objects, of their inferiority and of their need of recuperation by the Idea, Lenin wants to hypostasise contradictions. Hegel means to surpass contradictions toward the Absolute but Lenin wants to wallow in them.[10]

From this incoherence Soviet philosophers are still trying to elucidate Lenin's 'sixteen laws of dialectic'[11] but an anti-philosophical Leninist long ago saw what it really meant: suppleness of political tactics.[12] All Lenin cares for in Hegel's dialectic is 'elasticity of notions' such as will allow one to hold contradictory opinions either

[7] *Cahiers*, p. 248.
[8] *Cahiers*, p. 160.
[9] *Cahiers*, p. 167.
[10] L. Colletti, *Ideologia e società* (Bari, 1969), pp. 166–67.
[11] B. Jeu, *La Philosophie soviétique et l'Occident* (Paris, 1969), pp. 343–46.
[12] Max Eastman, *Marx, Lenin and the Science of Revolution* (London, 1926).

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simultaneously or in quick succession. Under the 'mysticism and empty pedantry of Hegel' what Lenin sees is that 'human concepts too must be refined, worked up, supple, mobile, relative, linked one to the other, united in oppositions, so that they can embrace the universe'.[13] Instead of the one big contradiction that interested Marx, when the working class 'negates' capitalism, Lenin wants a myriad of daily contradictions in order to warrant a flexible political practice where alliances can change rapidly, where policies can be reversed overnight and where no force is permanently Left or Right but at once that and its contrary.[14] That sort of dialectic was established on the political scene soon after the 1917 revolution, when the Bolsheviks declared Kemal Pacha a progressive revolutionary and the western working class anti-revolutionary and reactionary.

In the Hegelian mythology of the re-appropriation of things by spirit (which Marx saw as the symbol of the return from alienation, of the rehumanizing of the economic process) Lenin sees a pragmatist theory of scientific verification[15]—a curious pedigree to claim for his practicalist bias. Finally, Lenin wholeheartedly takes over Hegel's absolute idealism, the notion that everything is in touch with everything else in one vast moving totality.[16] This is that 'total movement' that is to be so useful in Lenin's political writings. It is the overall picture, to which the Party has privileged access, and in terms of which other people's political actions can be declared too Left, too Right or even (this happened also) too Centre. The total movement of history is leading to the reconciliation of real wants and apparent wants, that is, to the point where workers actually demand communism. It passes by the exposure of those who pander to false, short-term wants, the social-democrats. The Bolsheviks will float on this great stream; everybody else is just drops of water in the river.[17]

LUKACS'S new reading of Hegel was less clumsy, if only because he had been at it longer. He began as a Hegelian and, on becoming a revolutionary during the war, he sought, 'essentially on Hegelian grounds, to synthesise Hegel and Marx in a philosophy of history'.[18] That was because he was dissatisfied with Marx's reading and wanted another that would better advance the only revolution he was interested

[13] *Cahiers*, p. 204.

[14] Lenin later advised 'militant materialists' to constitute 'a sort of society of materialist friends of Hegel's dialectic' by publishing '*fragments* from Hegel's principal works to interpret them materialistically, commenting on them by examples of the application of dialectics in Marx, and also by those examples of dialectics in the field of economic and political relations which recent history, especially contemporary imperialist war and revolution, provides *in large numbers*'. (Emphasis added.) Quoted in G. Petrovic, *Marx in the Mid-Twentieth Century* (New York, 1967).

[15] *Cahiers*, pp. 257–58, 278–86.

[16] *Cahiers*, pp. 195, 205.

[17] *Cahiers*, p. 205.

[18] G. Lukacs, 'Mein Weg zu Marx', in *Schriften zur Ideologie und Politik* (Neuwied and Berlin, 1967), pp. 325–26.

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in, an anti-bourgeois cultural renovation.[19] Lukacs participated in Bela Kun's revolution in that spirit, as a syndicalist disciple of Sorel and Rosa Luxemburg, but its failure began his evolution toward Leninism. He was to reach that doctrine—indeed to surpass it in ruthless cynicism—in 1924.[20] *History and Class Consciousness* is an incident in that political evolution.

Because he wants an anti-industrial cultural restoration rather than an anti-capitalist industrial liberation, Lukacs must re-mystify Marx. Presented by Marx with the economic interpretation of the Hegelian dream, he must reconstruct the dream, clouds and all. Where Marx denounced the fetishism of commodities, Lukacs attacks reification (*Verdinglichung*), including under that name not only the '*alienation*' of the youthful Marx (still unknown in 1920) but the objectification of Spirit (*Vergegenständlichung*), that laying out of the Idea in objects that was Hegel's bizarre explanation of objectivity. As Lukacs admitted later, 'an historico-social problem is thereby transformed into an ontological problem'. It is not only capitalism that is being attacked but all industrialism, and by implication all objective science, if not objects themselves.[21]

DRAWING explicitly on Hegel, Lukacs magnifies Lenin's 'total evolution of society', the grand movement of history, into an Absolute, compared to which all mere social particulars are relative, inauthentic, subjective and possibly counter-revolutionary.[22] Isolated facts are nothing against the 'destiny of global society', the social totality. Though this is presented as Leninism, Lukacs is actually preparing Stalin, as when he says, 'Only relationship to the whole destiny of the proletarian revolution makes an idea, a measure etc., right or wrong'; even to know whether an event is a victory or a defeat, one must know the whole 'historico-social development'. Lukacs is explicit that only a few have such knowledge.

As a good Hegelian, Lukacs naturally throws out Lenin's materialist dialectic of contradictories. Engels too is castigated for this illogical talk of 'fluid concepts' (*Geschichte*, pp. 15–16). It was no doubt for this reason that Lukacs's book was pilloried by the Comintern. Wishing to play fast and loose with political rationality, the Party needed a philosophical apology of self-contradiction and 'fluid concepts'. In contrast, for Lukacs the dialectic becomes once again what it was for Hegel, the movement of Spirit through alien matter back to itself, except that now the hero of this adventure, the subject that makes all objects out of itself, is not Spirit but the proletariat. In this neo-

[19] D. Kettler, *Marxismus und Kultur: Mannheim und Lukacs in den ungarischen Revolutionen* (Neuwied and Berlin, 1967).

[20] G. Lukacs, *Lenin: Studie über den Zusammenhang seiner Gedanken* (Berlin and Vienna, 1924).

[21] Cf. Colletti, loc. cit., pp. 181–182.

[22] G. Lukacs, *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein* (Berlin, 1923), pp. 198–203.

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Hegelianism, all history comes to self-knowledge in the proletariat, the self-conscious agent of the total process. Lukacs insists that in this affair Marx was more Hegelian than he realised himself (p. 46).

Though the Party thus seems to lose the dialectic pretext for fluid concepts and elastic notions, Lukacs is preparing for it a more magnificent power. Revolutionary disappointment has taught him, what Lenin learned years before, that the proletarian God of History does not always know its real interests, its proper wants. The contrast of real wants and false wants is now conceived in a frankly idealist way, as an instance of the two levels of being. On the one hand, there is *essence*: proper wants, which are the goal of the total social process, known to the communist party. On the other hand, there are *phenomena*: false wants, the partial satisfactions of everyday life, which are pandered to by social-democrats. Thus the class consciousness of the proletariat, which is to be the self-consciousness of the God of History, is not 'the actual empirical thoughts' of working men. It is not 'the psychological consciousness of individual proletarians nor their general mass mind'. There is a great distance between even the most revolutionary workers' level of awareness and genuine class consciousness. That latter is in reality an unconsciousness. It is Objective Mind. It is what the proletariat would want if it properly grasped its historical situation, if it saw the total process.[23] So the Leninist Party must be the mind of this day-dreaming god. The Party will be the custodian of its real interests and proper wants, against the false gratifications of social-democracy and neo-capitalism, for the Party alone knows 'all that is really at the base of [the masses'] unconscious actions and confused thoughts and feelings'.

The restoration of idealism is complete. There is a sovereign Absolute (history) reigning over dependent particulars (men). There are two levels of being: essential, authentic wants in the Party and false inauthentic appearances among mere ignorant working men. Condemned by the Comintern, this was nevertheless to be the secret doctrine of the movement for decades to come because it offered to solve, in its dialectical dualism of essence and appearance, the problems that worried intelligent communists: Party and masses, direction and spontaneity, Jacobinism and primitivism, theory and instinct, the Party line and what the workers wanted. 'The Party is thus a mystery of reason, as it were; it is that point in history where the meaning that exists (*le sens qui est*) understands itself, where concept becomes life.'[24]

GRAMSCI turned back to Hegel because of the utter failure of Leninist strategy in Italy,[25] but also because of his anxiety about the rise of Stalinism, the 'Byzantine-Bonapartist' bureaucracy. He

[23] *Geschichte*, pp. 61–63, 86–88, 190–91.
[24] M. Merleau-Ponty, *Les Aventures de la dialectique* (Paris, 1955), p. 71.
[25] For Lenin's role in the defeat of Italian socialism by fascism see H. König, *Lenin und der italienische Sozialismus* (Tubingen, 1967).

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agreed that Marx had been too optimistic in thinking that 'contradictions' in the economy would spark a revolution, so Lenin was correct to arm the workers with a Bolshevik party. Even then, the revolution in West Europe had been defeated because politics was not enough either. There were moral and ideological restraints preventing the workers from revolting, so the struggle had to be broadened to take in cultural questions such as had engrossed Gramsci (like Lukacs) before he became a Leninist, as well as ethical questions such as Sorel had said were fundamental for socialism. In that way, the revolution became a project for 'moral and intellectual reform'. This meant that tough-minded materialist jargon about the 'real basis' and 'mere ideology' had to be discarded. In particular, the distinction between essence and appearance in society was indefensible; it was nothing but political polemic, anyhow.[26]

The reason world communism had failed was that it had been vulgarized and had become too 'materialist', and the fault for that was Lenin's.[27] To overturn the capitalist state, one must first win hegemony in the moral and cultural institutions of civil society. To that end, the movement needed new ideas[28] and they were to come from idealism and first from Hegelianism, that 'world-historical moment of philosophical enquiry'[29] of which Marxism was a first reading.[30] To see more in civil society than economic life, to see its independent cultural institutions, was indeed to go back from Marx to Hegel but there was no reaction here because Vico had shown how *ricorsi,* historical re-runs, could be progressive. This new reading of Hegel would be 'at a higher level' and it would reinstate the workers as heirs of classic idealism,[31] an inheritance they had forfeited because Leninism had degenerated into that 'materialist superstition' that comes naturally to the lower classes.[32]

Unfortunately, Gramsci's Hegel is a Neapolitan. In drawing his revivifying transfusion from the Italian neo-Hegelians, Gramsci contracts an extreme case of subjective idealism. Not only is his 'moral and intellectual reform' a translation of Croce's 'ethico-political history', but he insists that historical materialism is not materialism at all but absolute historicism.[33] That is, because culture is determined by the class situation of its producers at a certain moment in history, it is all relative and transient. Even science's assertions are subject to historical categories because science is related to human needs. Indeed, reality itself is merely the historical subjectivity of a social

[26] A. Gramsci, *Il Materialismo storico e la filosofia di Benedetto Croce* (Turin, 1955), pp. 69–70.
[27] Ibid. pp. 75–76, 223–27.
[28] Ibid. pp. 80–81.
[29] Ibid. p. 159.
[30] Ibid. p. 199.
[31] Ibid. p. 91.
[32] Ibid. pp. 79–87.
[33] Ibid. p. 159.

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class.[34] Everything, literally everything, is for Gramsci what the simple-minded materialists had called 'mere superstructure'—but he thinks there is no material substructure.

This looks to be the very opposite of Lenin's materialism, but where Gramsci innovates most is in rejecting the essence-phenomena dualism that had supported the dichotomy of real and false wants, and in restoring the autonomy of ideology, ethics, and culture. It is henceforth impossible to say the workers really want what the young Marx said they should want and what Lukacs said they would want if only they knew what the Party knew, and that all other wants can be dismissed as false appearances. Wants, which form clusters called moralities, exist in their own right, all on the one level. The first question to ask about them is whose they are, whether they are the demands of isolated Utopians or the morality of a great mass movement.[35] If the latter, they will need coherent exposition by people belonging to the relevant movement, its 'organic intellectuals'. Above all, they will need political leadership if they hope to prevail, to become the ruling culture. They will need a Leninist Party,[36] one that can no longer dictate 'real wants' but can simply exercise the specialized function of 'directing spontaneity'.[37]

Gramsci, then, is back with the problem of all the communists, the relation between Party and masses, between direction and spontaneity, but now it is an empirical question that can be handled all on the one level of being. The problem is how a set of wants makes its way and specifically what Proudhon called *la capacité politique des classes ouvrières*. The discussion therefore covers the dangers Sorel pointed out, about the misrepresentation of new moralities by intellectuals and their betrayal in bureaucratized parties. In this nexus of problems, Hegelianism has once again been reduced to a turn of phrase: the 'rational' (an ethic) will 'become real' (win power in the state) when it has fervid mass backing, an intellectual formulation and determined political leadership.[38]

Although Gramsci is more liberal than earlier communists in not imputing 'proper' wants to workers, he is still a communist. His Party is a Machiavellian philosopher that is not content to put in words the dumb language of the workers' native institutions but seeks to educate the masses. In doing so, it risks getting more than 'one step ahead' of them and becoming a patronizing elite.[39] Moreover, his relapse into subjective idealism leads him to assign an exaggerated role to intellectuals who then, as he well sees, have to be kept in line by the Party.[40] Finally, the morality for which he seeks to secure hegemony is the 'national-popular' culture, a solidarist ideology that at

[34] Ibid. pp. 55–56, 142–43.
[35] Ibid. pp. 69, 199.
[36] A. Gramsci, *Note sul Machiavelli, sulla politica e sullo stato moderno* (Turin, 1949).
[37] A. Gramsci, *Passato e Presente* (Turin, 1954), pp. 65–67, 70.
[38] *Materialismo*, p. 39.
[39] C. Riechers, *Antonio Gramsci: Marxismus in Italien* (Frankfurt, 1970), pp. 167–68.
[40] *Materialismo*, pp. 18–19.

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the very time Gramsci lay in prison was being put about by fascists and which, more recently, has been embraced by an Italian Communist Party anxious to share power with other political parties.

WHEN a Nazi said that Hegel died the day Hitler came to power, he meant that this event marked the end of German illusions about the 'ethical state'. In concurring, Marcuse meant that 'it was not with Hegel's death but only now that the fall of the titans of classical German philosophy occurs. At that time [i.e. when Hegel really died] its decisive achievements were saved in the scientific theory of society, in the criticism of political economy [i.e. in Marxism]. Today, the destiny of the workers' movement, in which the heritage of that philosophy had been preserved, is uncertain.'[41] In other words, Hegelianism had been kept alive in Marx's reading as amended by the successive re-readings of communist theorists, all of whom had seen the working class as the demiurge of history and who saved appearances (explained the proletariat's failures to live up to that role) by reference to the Communist Party. The triumph of Nazism, coming atop the workers' other defeats since 1918, showed that Marx had been wrong to interpret 'self-movement of the Idea' as 'labour movement' and Lenin and Lukacs had been wrong to declare the Communist Party custodian of that essence of history that had so much trouble emerging in historical actuality. As for the sort of absolute historicism that Gramsci had made out of historical materialism (not that Marcuse could have read Gramsci himself) it had become a Nazi weapon—for if truth were relative to history and history consisted of politics, there was no objectivity, just political propaganda.[42] Moreover, as a Berlin social-democrat, Marcuse must have seen the disaster that came from the dialectic of contradictories in communist hands. The political zig-zags it was meant to excuse had ended in the Party's annihilation. It was Thalheimer, one of the KPD leaders of the 1920's, who had discovered such 'dialectical contraries' as man and woman, day and night; suitably enough, he was himself eliminated by one of the Comintern's dialectical about-turns, several years before the whole Party succumbed.

Hegelianism in that debased form having foundered, Marcuse proposed another reading. He had already essayed a vitalist-historicist reading of Hegel[43] under the influence of Heidegger, which means, in this respect, under the indirect influence of Lukacs. Now Marcuse recoiled from that line of thought, for the same reason as Lukacs repeatedly disowned *History and Class Consciousness* in the 1930's, because they now saw its fascist possibilities, become explicit in Heidegger. The Hegel that mattered now, after 1933, was the secretly, or at least implicitly, revolutionary Hegel imagined by the Berlin

[41] H. Marcuse, *Kultur und Gesellschaft*, vol. I (Frankfurt, 1965), p. 55.
[42] p. 46.
[43] H. Marcuse, *Hegels Ontologie und die Theorie der Geschichtlichkeit* (new edition, Frankfurt, 1968).

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Doktorklub, the Hegel whose theory of essence was a programme for revolution. This aspect of Hegel, said Marcuse, had been dropped by idealist philosophy [44] but kept alive by Marxism, for which essence signified a programme, 'the task of a rational organization of society to be achieved through practice that alters its present form'. What Marxism had got out of Hegel and what Marcuse wanted to salvage from the wreck of the German Marxist movement was the notion of two levels of social being, real wants and false wants. 'Here appearance and essence become members of a real antithesis arising from the particular social structure. . . . The essence of man and of things appears within that structure; what men and things could genuinely be appears in "bad", "perverted" form. At the same time, however, appears the possibility of negating this perversion and of realising in history that which could be. . . . Materialist theory takes up the concept of essence where philosophy last treated it as a dialectical concept—in Hegel's *Logic*.' [45]

MARCUSE could hardly be clearer, given his training under Heidegger. He means that what is to be saved from the ruin of German communism is that doctrine to which communists had been forced by the failure of the working class to meet Marx's expectations: the doctrine of real wants as the essential motive force in history, as against the bad, short-term, false interests of everyday life. This is all Marcuse wants to save—not the working class as exemplifying those real wants and not the Communist Party as the custodian of them in times when workers do not exemplify them. True, as long as real wants are exiled from history, it will be all one-dimensional, it will consist of mere facts: 'bad positivity', short-range interests of the sort Marcuse later denounced as consumerism. But real wants will not always remain out of history. One day they will break into this ordinary world, despite the fact that no class feels them and no party promotes them. The problem is not, as Hegel thought, timeless but historical in the sense that essence will out, in revolution. One day, somewhere, somehow, Heidegger's 'authentic life' (the true wants of Lukacs's absent-minded proletarian god) will burst into history. This is the neo-Hegelianism Marcuse proposed in 1936 and he has not varied from it since.

In 1934 Marcuse held that the workers' movement as the agent of essence (of essential wants) was in jeopardy. In 1936 he outlined the theory of real wants as a force in history and insisted that they must be incarnate in some social subject, but he did not mention the workers or any other group as a likely vehicle. In 1937 he declared that the workers' movement had been suppressed and defeated, yet he maintained that the theory of real wants, which it was supposed to exemplify, was still true. By 1938 he drew the implications of this

[44] H. Marcuse, *Negations*, (London, 1968), p. 55.
[45] pp. 66–67.

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even more crudely than Lukacs had[46]: the workers could not distinguish 'between true and false wants and interests, nor between true and false enjoyment'.[47] Consequently, the 'gratification of the individual's needs and wants is abstract and incorrect as long as it accepts needs and wants as ultimate data in their present form'.[48] There are so many dangerous and false pleasures about that folk think they are free and happy when they are not.[49] False interests, what people think they want, are decried in the name of their true interests in a 'happier real state of humanity [against which] the interest of the individual is no longer an ultimate datum'.[50]

This is the Lenin-Lukacs justification of the Communist Party, as against social-democracy, living on without any party or working class. By 1941[51] Marcuse makes plain that the bearer of real wants is 'reason' and that the fundamental, revolutionary principle of Hegelianism is: 'What men think true, just and good should be realised in the effective organization of their individual and social life.' Hegel did not say this outright because, as the Doktorklub maintained before Feuerbach and Marx interpreted him, he compromised with German conservatism.

This replacement of the proletariat and its Party by the proper wants of human reason was facilitated not only by the annihilation of the Party by fascism but by some features of the communist theory Marcuse was taking over. The proletariat had been glorified by communists as 'the universal class' which, as history-come-to-consciousness, lost all the empirical features of a social stratum (e.g. the characteristic proletarian culture and institutions that Sorel and Gramsci had described) to acquire the blank radiant face of man-as-such. This was already evident in Lukacs but it became much plainer in Marcuse because meantime the manuscripts of the young Marx had been discovered. Indeed, Marcuse was one of the first to give an account of them.[52] Young Marx, before he came in contact with workers' organizations, was an adept of Feuerbach's humanism and made much play with the essence of man, the real or proper wants of man in the abstract. A little later, in *The German Ideology*, Marx specifically abjured all such essence-mongering but Marcuse can work back to this 'anticipated caricature' in humanism and still claim to be Marxist. In fact, he was later to seek to mystify the whole history of the working class movement as really aiming at the proper interests of 'man, as man'.[53] By 1941 the ripest product of communist theory—

[46] The dates are those of essays now collected in *Negations* or in *Kultur und Gesellschaft*.
[47] *Negations*, p. 168.
[48] p. 189.
[49] pp. 190–91.
[50] p. 192.
[51] H. Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory* (London, 1941).
[52] H. Marcuse, 'Neue Quellen zur Grundlegung des historischen Materialismus', in *Die Gesellschaft*, 1932.
[53] H. Marcuse, *An Essay on Liberation* (London, 1969), pp. 14–15: 'The First International was the last attempt to realise the solidarity of the species by grounding

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the notion of the hidden real wants of a social class as the motor of history—had been taken back into the mainstream of Hegelian idealism purged of such impurities as the Communist Party and the working class.

BY then Marcuse had emigrated to America. The god immanent in Man and alienated in men's false, short-sighted wants must suffer a sea-change. There was never a Marxist labour movement in the USA, and scarcely a social-democracy, so a doctrine drawn from Lukacs and Lenin would be hard to acclimatize. There was, however, a widespread infatuation with Freudianism. So the real wants of man, that once had masqueraded as Hegel's world-self and later had been incarnated in the working class and cared for by the Communist Party, were resuscitated as Eros.[54] The mixture of psycho-analysis and Hegelianism gave some people the uncomfortable feeling that Marcuse was prescribing Freudian therapy for the Absolute, treating its self-exhibition in objects as a case of sexual frustration.[55] In reality, the notion of proper human wants that had been read into Hegel and that had been elaborated in communist theory, was appearing in a new guise.

Not that it was simply being served up *au goût du jour*. The new presentation had theoretical reasons. To invoke Freud helped one escape the paradox Lukacs was forced into when he maintained that class consciousness was really an unconsciousness, since the workers did not know what they should want. In Freudian terms it was easy to argue that proper wants were unconscious, even if Freud himself never said so. Secondly, one could explain why workers (or any other social group fit to incarnate those wants) never revolted. They were restrained not only by the economic motives Lenin had pointed to in his theory of the workers' aristocracy and not only by the ideological forces Gramsci highlighted in his theory of hegemony, but by psychological factors. They were repressed as well as oppressed. The fault lay in their very instincts. Anyhow, they were unscrupulously manipulated by the psychological technicians of neo-capitalism so that their real wants were replaced by perverse false wants and substitute satisfactions. Moreover, in Freudian jargon one could explain why such attempts at revolution as did occur, in Soviet Russia for example, failed: the revolutionaries carried their neurotic mentality into the new society.[56] There is here a blatant confusion of politics and psycho-

it in that social class in which the subjective and objective interest, the particular and the universal, coincided (the International is the late concretisation of the abstract philosophical concept of 'man as man', human being, *Gattungswesen*, which plays such a decisive role in Marx and Engels' early writings) . . . the distinction between the real and the immediate interests of the exploited . . . far from being an abstract idea, was guiding the strategy of the Marxist movement'.

54 H. Marcuse, *Eros and Civilisation* (Boston, 1955).

55 M. Ambacher, *Marcuse et la civilisation américaine* (Paris, 1969). Cf. R. Tucker, *Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx* (Cambridge, 1961), p. 50: 'Hegel's world-self is a neurotic personality'.

56 G. Rohrmoser, *Das Elend des kritischen Theorie* (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1970) pp. 67–71.

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pathology but it is held to be warranted because present-day society has no great social movements and is composed entirely of individuals; so it is justiciable to psychology.[57] Atomism, the claim that society consist of individuals who contain all their springs of action within themselves (over against a block called Civilisation) is indeed one of the shortcomings of much Freudian literature and Marcuse took it over uncritically.[58]

THE metamorphosis of the imaginary working class into Eros led to an uneasy masquerade. I doubt if one can say that Marcuse, who indeed runs back to the Young Hegelians on so many points, was relapsing into their sexual obsessions too.[59] Embarrassed by misunderstanding among young followers, Marcuse protested that he was not preaching pansexualism. To be sure, he cannot find words harsh enough for mere 'genital' sexuality. He was simply juggling with high-level entities drawn from Freud's meta-psychology and making an arbitrary choice among Freud's various hypotheses, in order to support a doctrine whose origin and purpose had little to do with psycho-analysis. For example, he seized on Freud's unsupported (and unsupportable) speculation that repression had an economic origin, i.e. that children were curbed because the family could not afford to indulge their every fancy. Marcuse wants to argue that the family can now afford, on economic grounds, to relax repression. In fact, Freud had other and more plausible accounts of how sexual fantasy came to be bridled and channelled, but Marcuse ignores them. The impossibility of saying in Freudian language what he wants to say is nowhere plainer than when he advances the suggestion for a rationally acceptable measure of sexual repression which will accord with our present economic possibilities and cause no psychological difficulties. As the psychoanalysts point out, you cannot forbid a child to run across a busy street (rationally justified repression) without grazing potentially serious difficulties about what motor-cars symbolize, about normal death wishes, about the effect of any parental prohibition whatsoever, and so forth. Marcuse's Utopia of a happily liberated Eros, with its *petit relent de bergerie*, finds no support in psycho-analysis.[60]

[57] H. Marcuse, *Psychoanalyse und Politik* (Frankfurt, 1968).

[58] Thus falling far below Lukacs who not only denies atomism but makes that denial the basis of his literary criticism. Novelists who set characters in a social milieu are naturalists, like Emile Zola and Victor Hugo. In contrast, novelists who fuse character and social milieu by portraying men as the vehicles of social movements and as the incarnations of conflicting moralities and institutions, are realists like Balzac, Dickens or Tolstoy. See G. Lukacs, *Balzac et le réalisme français* (trans. P. Laveau, Paris, 1967).

[59] A. MacIntyre, *Marcuse* (London, 1970), pp. 53–54. On the sexual proclivities of the Young Hegelians, including for a time Marx and Engels, see L. Feuer, *Marx and the Intellectuals* (Anchor edition, New York, 1969), pp. 70–83.

[60] J. Laplanche, 'Notes sur Marcuse et la psychanalyse' in *La Nef*, no. 36, Paris, 1969.

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The reason is that Eros is just a reincarnation of the universal class, of the essence of man and the *Gattungswesen*. Its Freudian dress keeps slipping, to reveal such familiar avatars as 'the integral satisfaction of total man', 'the complete individual', 'the metaphysical plenitude of total man' and the 'realised concept of man'. This resuscitation, from young Marx and Hegel, of the unitary theory of mind involves a serious retrogression from Freud, since Freud destroyed the monolithic notion of personality by showing the fact of conflict between motives. Instead, Marcuse revives the legend that all motives really seek the same thing—'gratification, fulfilment, peace and happiness'.[61] This accords well enough with absolute idealism (all particular motives subserve the whole mind, just as all particular individuals must serve the totality of society) but it does not accord with the facts, which indicate that men and motives want different things, to the point of acute conflict.

The ill-fitting Freudian dress was cast off when the proper wants of man came to be described as not erotic but aesthetic, imaginative.[62] Marcuse still held that Utopia would arrive in history the day an exiled set of wants, borne by no class and promoted by no party, supplanted false satisfactions, but now he said that those wants were artistic, if not surrealist. This entailed going back beyond the young Marx and Hegel to a writer who exercised a great influence over both of them, to Schiller. The epic dramatist was one of the first to complain that the division of labour in the new economy was crippling man's 'whole nature'. He added that politics would never restore the 'lost totality' (he wrote this during the French Revolution) but that art could.[63] Marcuse's reading of Schiller is selective and constitutes no guide to the dramatist's meaning but it gives Eros and the universal class their new name, Imagination, their new power, Beauty, and their new objective, to create 'society as a work of art'.[64] Yet there is more than a change of terminology involved because now the exiled wants take on a frankly irrationalist air that is foreign to the communist tradition Marcuse took over. The god that is betrayed by our false needs henceforth is art, the aesthetic imagination, and what it is rebelling against is not social-democracy or sexual repression but 'the dictates of repressive reason'. And of course the art in question is not the classic art of Schiller but the post-surrealist anti-art of a hippie avant-

61 H. Marcuse, *Five Lectures* (Boston, 1970), p. 30.

62 Marcuse declared Freudianism 'obsolescent' from 1963 (*Five Lectures*, pp. 44–61). The coming of Imagination, anticipated in *Eros and Civilisation*, is revealed in *An Essay on Liberation*.

63 F. Schiller, *On the Aesthetic Education of Man* (Oxford, 1967). The Letters relevant to Marcuse's reading of Schiller are the second, sixth and seventh.

64 *Liberation*, pp. 24–45. Politics as art is a favourite theme with fascists, which is no doubt why Joseph Goebbels in his novel *Michael* also plundered Schiller. On the Nazi veneration for Schiller see the Introduction to the *Aesthetic Education* by E. M. Wilkinson and L. A. Willoughby, pp. cxli-ii. On politics as art cf. Rohrmoser, op. cit., pp. 76–81.

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garde. So the attack on technology and positive science in Marcuse's earlier works (notably *One-Dimensional Man*) is broadened into a revolt against facts. It is brute facts and mere objects that are an outrage to the imagination, that negating potential that lies imprisoned under them. There is obviously here a relapse to that 'horror of objects' that Hegel's idealism was designed to cure but Colletti is also correct to say that Sartre's *La Nausée* well represents Marcuse's attitude.[65]

By now one has come some distance from Lenin, who initiated this long *ricorso,* and yet the theme has not varied. There is a dispossessed god whose names are legion—Spirit, whole man, Eros, imagination—and who is wandering like a lost soul outside actuality, begging for a social subject that will please, please help it back into history. As its desperation mounts, any social subject will do—the proletariat, the Communist Party, Negroes, hippies, Vietnamese, students, Puerto Ricans, the New Left, artists, radical minorities[66]—anyone as long as they will lead the god back into the one dimension, the only one that actually exists.

There is good reason to have no sympathy with this plight. The notion of *different* wants, of another set of needs than those at present obtaining satisfaction in society, is a liberating thought, for it suggests other ways to live and it robs established institutions of their supposed necessity. Naturally, such a thought at once raises Gramsci's question as to whose it is, whether it is the speculation of a lone Utopian or the moral criticism advanced by a social movement. If the latter, we then have the problem that Gramsci alone among the communist neo-idealists contributed to, the empirical, one-dimensional problem of how moralities make their way. In sharp contrast, the notion of *real* wants is an authoritarian thought for it asserts that there are things that it is illogical, improper and inhuman not to want although they are not currently demanded by any effective social movement. So these wants need to be dictated or interpreted by suitably qualified people such as Leninists and other elites. Because this is the one doctrine Marcuse salvaged from the collapse of communist theory, he is inevitably tempted by the pedagogic dictatorship, the armed aristocracy that will usher in Utopia, and yet he always incoherently backs away from it.[67] Whether or not he draws consistent political conclusions, Marcuse's aristocratism is the leading feature of his criticism

[65] Colletti, loc. cit., pp. 174–78. Cf. J.-P. Sartre, *La Nausée* (Paris, 1963), p. 177: 'Elles sont là, grotesques, têtues, géantes et . . . je suis au milieu des Choses, les innommables. Seul, sans mots, sans défenses, elles m'environnent, sous moi, derrière moi, au-dessus de moi . . . seul en face de cette masse noire et noueuse, entièrement brute et qui me faisait peur.'

[66] H. Marcuse, *La Fin de l'Utopie* (Neuchatel, 1968), pp. 43–44; *Liberation,* pp. 49–71.

[67] Marcuse's quandary about elitism is plainest in Marcuse *et al., Critique of Pure Tolerance* (London, 1969), pp. 114–37.

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of democracy, of industrialism and of the mass distribution of cultural works.[68] Thus he is at one with Right-wing critics of contemporary western culture such as Ortega y Gasset,[69] except in Marcuse familiar Rightist views are presented as Leftist, ultra-Leftist indeed, because they arose in a re-mystification of Marx, in a restoration of his 'anticipated caricature' in Hegel.

[68] On the missing second dimension as a cultural aristocracy see L. W. Nauta, *Theorie en Praxis bij Marcuse* (Baarn, 1969).

[69] The theory of playful aristocratic logic that rejects the plebeian empiricism of non-contradiction is laid out with more consistent insolence than Marcuse can manage by Ortega in *La idea de principio en Leibniz y la evolución de la teoría deductiva* (Buenos Aires, 1958).

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The Political Linguistics of 'Intellectual': 1898-1918

Lewis S. Feuer*

SOCIAL reality is characterized by universal themes; one of them has been the mistrust which people at large have had for the men of intellect. Shakespeare in depicting the workingman-rebel Jack Cade, in his second part of *King Henry VI*, made him the voice of populist anti-intellectualism. Jack Cade regards the intellectuals as oppressors of the labouring men. When he orders their chief to be put to death, he indicts him:

> Thou has most traitorously corrupted the youth of the realm in erecting a grammar-school: . . . thou hast caused printing to be used; . . . [T]hou hast men about thee that usually talk of a noun and a verb, and such abominable words as no Christian ear can endure to hear. Thou hast appointed justices of peace, to call poor men before them. . . . Moreover, thou hast put them in prison; and because they could not read, thou hast hanged them; . . .

Suspicion of the intellectuals has come from all directions; while from below, the workingmen and the poor have feared the intellectuals' pretension to power, other elites, the business, industrial, and military have been watchful of these men of books and words; and among the intellectuals themselves, jealousies, rivalries, and denunciations have been plentiful so that the self-hatred of the intellectuals alternates with their ambition.

THE history of the word 'intellectual' mirrors all these social strains. It is a word which is wrapped between quotation marks more often than any other. For thirty years a term of approbrium, it is only now emerging as a mark of higher calling. Its varying history is a linguistic word-line which records aspirations and anxieties, the emotional ambivalences in the making of what might be called the Age of the Intellectuals.

The word 'intellectual' (as a noun) was virtually thrust upon history during the Dreyfus Case debate by the politician and journalist, Georges Clemenceau. His newspaper, *L'Aurore*, on 14 January, 1898, published a protest 'against the violation of juridical forms in the

* The writer is indebted to the Canada Council for a grant which gave him the opportunity to write this article.

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trial of 1894' which was signed by such leaders of French thought and literature as Anatole France, Emile Zola, Marcel Proust, Charles Seignobos, and Léon Blum; ten members of the Institute of France, eight professors of the Paris Faculty of Medicine, a dozen from the Sorbonne, the Collège de France and the Ecole Normale led a corps of provincial colleagues to add their names.[1] They came forward as the self-constituted conscience of the nation, demanding the 'revision' of the trial. Clemenceau sensed a new phenomenon in the making. For years his own political career had seemed ruined in the involvements of financial scandal. Now he perceived a regrouping of moral forces taking place. By a happy inspiration Clemenceau wrote the title to the protest: 'Manifesto of the Intellectuals' (*Manifeste des Intellectuels*).

The new noun 'intellectual' evidently answered a new social need for denoting a novel social group. The story soon spread that it was invented as a term of mockery, a pejorative word, by those who hated the intellectuals. Zola's biographer, for instance, wrote that it was 'the professional Jew-baiters, the Clericalist leaders, and the retrograde littérateurs . . . who nicknamed their adversaries "the intellectuals", applying the word derisively . . .'.[2] Actually the intellectuals were christened by one of themselves. Soon, however, their critics were railing at the pretentious pride and (in their eyes) fraudulent self-righteousness of the self-named 'intellectuals'. The day after the *Manifesto's* publication, the vehement anti-Dreyfusard critic, Ferdinand Brunetière, told his audience at the salon of Mme Aubernon: 'As for this petition that is being circulated among the *Intellectuals*! the mere fact that one has recently created the word *Intellectuals* to designate, as though they were an aristocracy, individuals who live in laboratories and libraries, proclaims one of the most ridiculous eccentricities of our time—I mean the pretension of raising writers, scientists, professors and philologists to the rank of supermen.'[3] The next month Brunetière launched a full-scale attack on the intellectuals in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*:

> And how have so many *intellectuals,* as they call themselves, found themselves in the whole affair on the side where they shouldn't have been? . . . What then is an 'intellectual'; by what sign

[1] Louis Bodin and Jean Touchard, 'Les Intellectuels dans la Société Française Contemporaine: Definitions, Statistiques et Problèmes', *Revue Française de Science Politique*, Vol. IX, No. 4 (December 1959), p. 837.

[2] Ernest Alfred Vizetelly, *Emile Zola: Novelist and Reformer*, London, 1904, p. 447. Also cf. Matthew Josephson, *Zola and his Time*, New York, 1928, p. 448. Carter Jefferson, *Anatole France: The Politics of Skepticism*, New Brunswick, 1965, p. 102. Victor Brombert, 'Toward a Portrait of the French Intellectual', *Partisan Review*, Vol. XXVII, No. 3 (1960), p. 484. Jacob Axelrod, *Anatole France: A Life Without Illusions*, New York, 1944, p. 270. D. W. Brogan, *France Under the Republic: The Development of Modern France* (1870–1939), New York, 1940, pp. 336, 344–45. George D. Painter, *Proust: The Early Years*, Boston, 1959, p. 273.

[3] Maurice Paléologue, *Journal de l'Affaire Dreyfus*, Paris 1955, pp. 90–91. Cited in Bodin and Touchard, op. cit., p. 837. Translated in Brombert, op. cit., p. 483.

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> is he recognised, and from where, from what conception of life does he draw the superiority which he arrogates to himself over all those whom he does not honour with this name?

Brunetière argued that their reputations within their respective specialties did not bestow a moral authority upon the intellectuals' general ideas; furthermore, the 'intellectuals' were usually drawn from fields other than the exact sciences. These 'intellectuals', Brunetière charged, had for a hundred years done much evil as they mixed anarchic lawlessness with aristocratic elitism: 'the true intellectual can do nothing as a person. He's the "superman" of Nietzsche, or even more "the enemy of laws", who is not made for them but to place himself above them, . . . I do not see that a professor of Tibetan has the authority to govern his fellows, . . .'[4] The anti-Dreyfusards defined the 'intellectuals' as the enemy. The novelist Maurice Barrès ridiculed the 'Manifesto of the Intellectuals' as 'the product mainly of students and university teachers from the Paris Left Bank'. Barrès, who wrote of 'this little Jew' Dreyfus and the 'uprooted Venetian Zola', defined 'intellectual' in more philosophical terms: 'an individual who persuades himself that society should found itself on logic, and who doesn't recognize that it rests indeed on necessities antecedent and perhaps foreign to the individual reason'.[5] As the Dreyfus Affair became a struggle for power between a new and old elite, the intellectuals challenging the traditional military and clerical elite, the defining of 'intellectual' became a central problem for philosophers, critics, and social scientists.[6] The first class of intellectuals self-consciously defined itself by its group stand in a case of injustice; thereby it claimed the prerogative as the authentic conscience of society, superseding the collapsed authority of the traditional elite. At this juncture, the word 'intellectual' crossed the ocean into the United States.

TO his friend William M. Salter the Harvard philosopher William James wrote in September 1899 with a spontaneous, straightforward indignation against the French military caste: 'we "intellectuals" in America must work to keep our precious birthright of individualism, and freedom from these institutions. Every great insti-

[4] Ferdinand Brunetière, 'Après', le Procès', *Revue des Deux Mondes*, Paris, Tome 16, 15 March, 1898, pp. 428, 442, 443, 445, 446.

[5] H. R. Kedward, *The Dreyfus Affair*, London, 1965, p. 14. J. P. Mayer, et al., *Political Thought: The European Tradition*, London, 1939, p. 272; quoted from M. Barrès, *Scènes et doctrines du nationalisme*, Paris, 1902, p. 45. J. P. Mayer, *Political Thought in France from the Revolution to the Fourth Republic*, Rev. ed., London, 1949, p. 86. A Dreyfusard writer, Lemazurier, in his *Dreyfusard Catechism* of 1898 defined 'an intellectual as a man whose brain refuses to function to someone's order and whose smallest actions are inspired by leftist principles'. Cf. Kedward, op. cit., pp. 105–106.

[6] J. P. Mayer, *et al.*, op. cit. p. 271. Douglas Johnson writes: 'Many intellectuals were finding in the Dreyfus Affair a battlefield for issues which went deeper than the guilt or innocence of Captain Dreyfus.' Cf. *France and the Dreyfus Affair*, London, 1966, p. 120. Mayer notes that the Dreyfus Affair 'became a battle for power and rights between two *elites*'.

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tution is perforce a means of corruption—whatever good it may also do. One must do *something* to work off the effects of the Dreyfus sentence.'[7] James, a reader of *The Nation,* had no doubt more than a year earlier seen its editorial of 31 March 1898 in which it excoriated Brunetière, and as a by-product probably introduced the noun 'intellectual' into the American political language. Brunetière's writing showed, wrote *The Nation,* that the division of opinion in France arose from three causes: 'the anti-Semitic fury, the fear that an all-powerful army, sacredly guarded from every criticism, is a danger to a pure democracy, and the unhappy decision of certain "intellectuals", as Brunetière sneeringly calls them, to identify Zola's cause with that of liberty and justice. This is surely a painful spectacle—an intellectual man pouring contempt upon intellectual men for asserting what they believe to be the most precious rights of freedom.' Thus, at the outset, the American usage of 'intellectuals' involved a blend of linkage with the Jews, political protest, and the criticism of established institutions in the name of a higher ethic. An editorial a few months later, on 8 September 1898, was indexed as 'Brunetière and the intellectuals', the first titular use of the word. Brunetière, it asserted, came off worse in the Dreyfus business than anybody else. For Brunetière was not only on the wrong side, 'he went out of his way to sneer at the writers and professors and scientists who risked their positions and their reputations for the sake of what they believed to be truth and justice.' Brunetière, it said, had tried to kindle sentiment against what he called 'the exasperated vanity of a few "intellectuals"'. *The Nation* helped spread the notion that 'intellectual' was an abusive noun invented by Brunetière: '("Intellectuals" was the mocking name given the professional and literary men who spoke up for justice)'.[8]

Despite William James's forthright private use, the noun 'intellectual' was not adopted as a class-name by distinguished American thinkers and educated men. In France the word was needed by the intellectual elite which defined itself in battle with the military and clerical elites. But in America there were virtually no self-defined intellectuals in this sense. When an educated man such as Theodore Roosevelt decided to enter politics, it was not as an 'intellectual' but as a participant in the hurly-burly of American political parties.

THE intellectuals as a self-defined group began to emerge embryonically in 1900 in two marginal sectors of American life, first, in the ranks of the Socialist Party, which was then being organized, and second, in the immigrant Jewish circles of New York's East Side, where young men and women, working in shops and factories during the day, were trans-

[7] *The Letters of William James,* ed. Henry James, Boston, 1920, Vol. II, pp. 100–101.

[8] *The Nation,* Vol. 66, No. 1709, 31 March, 1898, p. 237; *The Nation,* Vol. 67, No. 1732, 8 September, 1898, p. 177. Cf. Elton Hocking, *Ferdinand Brunetière: The Evolution of a Critic,* University of Wisconsin Studies in Language and Literature, Madison, 1936, p. 66.

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muted in the evening into dwellers in the kingdom of the spirit, arguing between glasses of tea over Marx and Ibsen, and the claims of love and revolution. On 1 August 1900 the second issue of the newly-founded *The International Socialist Review: A Journal of International Socialist Thought* published the now classic essay 'Socialism and the Intellectuals' by Paul Lafargue, the son-in-law of Karl Marx. The magazine's publisher himself, Charles H. Kerr, whose sympathies lay with the left wing of the socialist movement, translated the article from the French. Lafargue's essay, originally an address to a Parisian socialist student club on 23 March 1900, sounded a warning against the 'bourgeois intellectuals' who were entering the French socialist movement. Lafargue feared not only for the purity of Marxism; he saw a new spectre, the rise of an intellectual aristocracy within socialism itself, 'an aristocracy copied after the model of the Chinese mandarin system', whose prophets were Auguste Comte and Ernest Renan, rather than Marx. The intellectuals, especially the students, were in his view condescending to the workers, and expecting to take their places as the workers' 'leaders and schoolmasters'. As a Marxist, Lafargue maintained that there was a material basis for the attraction which intellectuals were experiencing for socialism; an 'intellectual proletariat' had come into existence in the last forty years, 'a swarming and famishing throng of intellectuals whose lot grows worse in proportion to the increase of their numbers. These intellectuals belong to socialism.'[9] Apparently they had little in common with the favoured few who were absorbed in the management of capitalist industry. But as seekers for ministerial and parliamentary jobs, they tended ineluctably to dilute the party's revolutionary fervour. Lafargue had a certain antipathy to the greatest of the French socialist intellectuals, Jean Jaurès, who had brought to the movement the pure accents of an ethical socialism. It was Jaurès who persuaded the French socialists that a wrong done to a single individual, even though he was a Jewish bourgeois captain, was a wrong done to all, and that the working class must look beyond 'proletarian justice' to universal justice; it was Jaurès who debated publicly with Lafargue against the materialistic conception of history.[10] When Lafargue warned the socialist movement against the intellectuals, he thus portrayed an intellectual as one who was always a potential exceptionalist to historical materialism, a man who whether because of ambition or ethical consciousness, was not content with being a soldier of class struggle. Thus, the 'intellectual' as introduced to the American socialist movement by orthodox Marxism was delineated with an anti-intellectual and anti-ethical animus; the Marxist intellectual, Paul Lafargue, was imparting to the movement that distrust and self-mistrust of 'intellectuals' which has remained one of its ingredients.

[9] Paul Lafargue, 'Socialism and the Intellectuals', *The International Socialist Review*, Vol. 1, 1 August, 1900, pp. 84, 95, 96, 97, 98.

[10] Jean Jaurès and Paul Lafargue, *Idéalisme et Matérialisme dans la Conception de l'Histoire*, 1896, Paris, 1937.

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ON the East Side of New York, however, circles of young immigrants were appearing who were proud to call themselves 'intellectuals'; they were neither the children of the bourgeoisie nor students blessed with an affluent leisure; they were workingmen, or their children, who felt themselves possessed of a vision. Literary and cultural societies were founded on the East Side; more than a score of them had their meeting-places at the Educational Alliance, where seeking to identify themselves with American culture, they usually named themselves after famous American writers and thinkers—the Longfellow Literary Society, the William Cullen Bryant Literary Society, the Horace Greeley Literary Society, the Washington Irving Literary Society, the Jefferson Literary Society, the Franklin Literary Society.[11] The pioneer clubs were founded around 1895; five years later their burgeoning numbers, having survived a variety of ordeals, constituted themselves into the Federation of East Side Clubs. The young philosopher Morris R. Cohen later became chairman of its Lecture Committee, announcing a series of eleven lectures on the philosophical and social problems of the East Side.[12] Beside the clubs were the cafés where the young intellectuals, intense, brooding, could argue the deepest questions of existence over what the playwright Clifford Odets later called 'philosophical salami'. The noted social worker, David Blaustein, Superintendent of the Educational Alliance, wrote in 1901: 'The cafés are by far the most potent social and intellectual influence on the East Side.'[13] Above all, the cafés and clubs were generational enclaves, societies of the younger generation. Nowhere in America was generational conflict so intense as on the Jewish East Side; countless newspaper articles, plays, and stories were devoted to this theme of the alienation of the generations.[14] If the elders found solace in the synagogues and their *Landsmannschaften* (societies of fellow immigrants from the same European locality), the young sought the companionship of those like themselves forsaking the traditional Jewish culture. One Rabbi declared: 'The Jew no longer believes in Monotheism, but in Moneytheism.'[15] The young intellectuals rejected both. The intellectual on the East Side was above all a generational rebel. At the same time, the intellectual felt himself a member of the

[11] Cf. Nathaniel Phillips, 'The Club Movement of the East Side', *Alliance Review*, Vol. I, No. 6, September 1901, pp. 179–80; Jacob Epstein, *Let There Be Sculpture*, New York, 1940, p. 5; Sholom Aleichem, *Wandering Star*, translated from the Yiddish, New York, 1952, p. 233; Joseph Gollomb, *Unquiet*, New York, 1935, p. 324. An earlier period is described in Morris Hillquit, *Loose Leaves from a Busy Life*, New York, 1934, pp. 1–2. Melech Epstein *Jewish Labor in U.S.A. 1882–1914*, New York, N.Y., 1950, pp. 138–43; on the clubs, p. 356. 'Every Socialist party experienced a thinly veiled antagonism between the rank and file and the intellectuals', ibid., p. 257. Gregory Weinstein, *The Ardent Eighties*, pp. 96, 170.

[12] *Alliance Review*, Vol. 1, No. 12, March 1902, p. 378.

[13] David Blaustein, 'The Inherent Cultural Forces of the Lower East Side', *Fifteenth Annual Report of the University Settlement Society of New York*, 1901, p. 23. Also, *Alliance Review*, Vol. 2, May 1902, p. 445. Miriam Blaustein, ed., *Memoirs of David Blaustein: Educator and Communal Worker*, New York, 1913, p. 70.

[14] Miriam Blaustein, ed., *Memoirs of David Blaustein*, pp. 134–35.

[15] Ibid. p. 195.

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highest elite; he was among the spiritual nobility. One of their most beloved guides, Thomas Davidson, who twenty years earlier in Britain had been godfather to the Fabian Society, even challenged them to re-make the world.[16]

IN 1902 the young philospher Morris R. Cohen addressed some admonitions to his fellow-intellectuals. He warned that a certain cynical nihilism was affecting 'our most advanced intellectuals' on the East Side; he found they were too nervous, too intense, and inclined to spurn philosophy. Cohen proposed some philosophical therapy; he felt they should read the works of the optimistic American mind-curists, such as R. W. Trine and Horatio Dresser, writers who were scorned 'by our East-Side intellectuals', but who nonetheless would provide a corrective 'fundamental truth'.[17] 'Our East-Side intellectuals may laugh at the various sects of mind-curists, but they forget to search for the fundamental truth which makes it tenable to such great numbers. . . .'

The intellectuals of the East Side were something new in American life, a new psychological type. The clubs and the cafés were subdivisions of this type; those in the clubs were drawn to American culture, and were usually of college age; those in the cafés were virtually transplants from Russia and Poland, regarding themselves as basically still sharing the world of the revolutionary Eastern European *intelligentsia.* Young Gentiles used to come to sit with them in the cafeterias and restaurants during the late hours; never had they heard such animated, intense and sincere discussion of ultimates. Among them was Hutchins Hapgood who then wrote a classic book on the East Side, *The Spirit of the Ghetto.* Written with tenderness and admiration, it was the first book in America to tell of 'intellectuals'. The '"Intellectuals" of the Ghetto', wrote Hapgood, were 'the most picturesque and interesting' of its inhabitants. 'They are the "enlightened" ones, . . . and in matters of taste and literary ideals are European rather than American.' 'They are the anarchists, the socialists, the editors, the writers, some of the scholars, poets, playwrights and actors of the quarter.' This new class of intellectuals contained 'the many men of "ideas" who bring about in certain circles a veritable intellectual fermentation; . . .' They were arguing in East Side cafés over the same issues which Lenin, Martov and Plekhanov were wrangling in the cafés of Berne and Zurich. In Hapgood's words, they were stirred with 'the same kind of revolt which is apparent in the analogous literature of

[16] Thomas Davidson, *The Education of the Wage-Earners,* ed. Charles M. Bakewell, Boston, 1904, pp. 182–83. Also cf. Louis I. Dublin, 'Thomas Davidson: Educator for Democracy', *The American Scholar,* Vol. 17 (1948), p. 201. A. J. Kovar, *Thomas Davidson: Pioneer in Adult Education,* privately printed, New York, 1950. Also cf. Moses Rischin, *The Promised City,* Cambridge, 1962, p. 216.

[17] Morris R. Cohen, 'The East Side', *Alliance Review,* Vol. 2, No. 15, June 1902, pp. 358–359. On the works and influence of Ralph Waldo Trine and Horatio Dresser, see Donald Meyer, *The Positive Thinkers,* New York, 1965, Anchor Books Ed., 1966, pp. 17–19, 92–95.

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Russia'. They were riven by factions: 'The intellectual excitement in the air causes many "splits" among the socialists', but they are 'intoxicated with the excitement of ideas'. 'The ideal, indeed, is alive within them,' wrote Hapgood, and in 'their excitement and extremeness' they seemed to him to resemble 'the French "intellectuals" of 1789', and to differ from the staid 'conservative feeling' dominant in Anglo-Saxon communities. Nonetheless they seemed to Hapgood, too, tragic personalities whose talents would leave nothing behind them.[18]

Thus, the 'intellectual' as he first appeared in American life was an alien in its social setting; enthralled by the highest ideas, he had no corresponding place in the social system, no respectable job in a professional or commercial establishment. An immigrant, or an immigrant's child, he lived in the squalor of tenements. But his spirit soared and transcended the material environment. Rejecting his traditional culture, but still a stranger in the American, he dwelt in a surrogate trans-national world, worshipping at the pantheon of Ibsen, Marx, and Turgenev. The clubs and cafés of the East Side were the first cells of intellectuals in the United States. They called themselves 'intellectuals' too. Not infrequently they replaced Judaism with Marxism, and studied commentaries on *Capital* instead of those on the Bible. They could say with Abraham Cahan: 'I became a Socialist; for me it became a religion.'[19]

The word 'intellectual' now took on new overtones of meaning. Whereas the French 'intellectuals' had been men of distinguished position and reputation, whose ideas commanded a hearing, with the advent of the American East Siders, however, the word began to acquire the connotation of unrespectability or lack of status in society. The 'intellectual' was not only a person of the lower classes; he was also ethnically, religiously, and linguistically alien. The upper-class intellectual chose to be déclassé, to cast his lot with the lowliest. But these first East Side intellectuals moved in the opposite direction; they had ideas which were far and above their station. There was an incongruity about them, because their consciousness transcended their economic situation.

[18] Hutchins Hapgood, *The Spirit of the Ghetto: Studies of the Jewish Quarter in New York*, New York, 1902, Rev. ed., 1909, pp. 38–43. The word 'intellectual' did not appear in Hapgood's earlier essay, 'Realism on the Ghetto Stage', *The Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. LXXXV, pp. 839–43. Also cf. *The Education of Abraham Cahan*, tr. Leon Stein, Abraham P. Conan and Lynn Davison, New York, 1969, pp. 235, 267, 281, 350, 361. *The Autobiography of Lincoln Steffens*, New York, 1931, Vol. I, pp. 317–18. Ernest Poole, 'Abraham Cahan: Socialist and Journalist, Friend of the People', *The Outlook*, 28 October, 1911, pp. 467–78. Rudolf and Clara M. Kirk, 'Abraham Cahan and William Dean Howells: The Story of a Friendship', *American Jewish Historical Quarterly*, Vol. LII (September 1962), p. 50. Moses Rischin, 'Abraham Cahan and the New York Commercial Advertiser: A Study in Acculturation', *Publications of the American Jewish Historical Society*, Vol. XLIII (September 1963), pp. 21–22.

[19] Ernest Poole, op. cit., p. 470. Also Abraham Cahan, 'The Russian Jew in America', *The Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. LXXXII, 1898, p. 132.

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IN 1901, however, a political party was organized in the United States which beckoned to the intellectuals; various socialist organizations and factions merged at a Unity Convention in Indianapolis to form the Socialist Party of America.[20] 'Intellectuals' from the middle and upper classes cast their lot with the socialist movement. Like those from the lower classes, they were all intellectuals in the sense that their ideas, their consciousness, were not determined by their material existence. Jack London, Upton Sinclair, W. J. Ghent, John Spargo, Charles Edward Russell, George Herron, Robert Hunter, were well-known names of the new intellectuals. Typically they went through a 'conversionary experience' in which they rejected the System's norms. Jack London, for instance, described in 1905 how he became disillusioned with the rich, and defined himself as an intellectual:

> Morally and spiritually I was sickened. I remembered my intellectuals and idealists, my unfrocked preachers, broken professors, and clean-minded class-conscious working-men, . . . a spiritual paradise of unselfish adventure and ethical romance. And I saw before me, ever blazing and burning the Holy Grail. So I went back to the working-class, . . .[21]

Nineteen hundred and five, the year of the Russian Revolution, seemed to cast the intellectuals in their forthcoming role of historical drama; they responded everywhere with a renewed self-consciousness of historic mission.

The character and role of the intellectuals now became a primary theme for discussion. In 1905, Peter Kropotkin's *Ideals and Realities in Russian Literature* posed before American intellectuals their Russian prototype. The book was the outcome of highly successful Lowell lectures which the 'anarchist prince' had delivered in Boston in 1901. Kropotkin was sensitive to both the weakness and strength of the Russian intellectuals. He wrote of their courage and self-sacrifice, but also of 'how much the Russian "intellectuals" suffer from the disease of whining, . . . how rare among them are the aggressive idealists, the real rebels, . . .' He told how the novelist Maxim Gorky despised 'the average "intellectual" of our own day . . . these intellectuals who know and admire higher ideals, but are weaklings, utterly devoid of the nerve of life'.[22] Nonetheless, in Kropotkin's eyes, the intellectuals were bound to the workers in a revolutionary vocation. He wrote in an article in 1905: 'The two forces which hitherto have played the leading part

[20] Howard H. Quint, *The Forging of American Socialism: Origin of the Modern Movement*, Columbia, South Carolina, p. 387.

[21] Jack London, 'What Life Means to Me', *Cosmopolitan*, March, 1906, reprinted in *London's Essays of Revolt*, ed. Leonard D. Abbott, New York, 1926, p. 91.

[22] P. Kropotkin, *Russian Literature: Ideals and Realities*, First ed., London, 1905; Second ed., 1916, pp. 250, 275, 276, 332, 335. It was published in the United States as *Ideals and Realities in Russian Literature*. Kropotkin's historical work, *The Great French Revolution* 1789–1793, London, New York, 1909, also used 'intellectuals' several times, always within quotation marks, pp. 220, 243, 331.

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in the revolution—namely, the working men in the towns, fraternising with the younger "intellectuals", . . .'[23]

AMERICAN intellectuals during the decade from 1905 to the world war studied the writings of the European socialist masters to illumine their vocation. These works, translated into English, and published by the co-operative company of Charles H. Kerr, not only diffused the word 'intellectual'; they also alternately scolded and exhorted the intellectuals, rendering them alternately historically humble and historically elite. The book *Socialism and Philosophy* by the respected Italian Marxist, Arturo Labriola, warned intellectuals in 1906 against forgetting the causal basis of capitalist economy: 'Marx may become a mythical personage through the work of the intellectuals.'[24] The mistrust of the intellectuals was deepest in the ranks of the old Socialist Labour Party which had seen the exodus of almost all its intellectuals into the newly formed Socialist Party. The Socialist Labour Party had its 'master intellectual' in the person of Daniel De Leon who vituperated against anyone recalcitrant to his discipline. De Leon, clinging fast to his vicarious proletarian purity, wrote a vitriolic editorial on 19 March 1905 entitled 'The "Intellectual"'; 'Everywhere, the serious Socialists of the world are engaged in the effort to extricate the Movement from the meshes of the "Intellectual", and to set up barriers against his approach, or at least dams against his pernicious influence.' The 'Intellectual', according to De Leon, was superficial, lacking in the art of thinking, averse to the labour of acquiring exact knowledge, consumed with a 'malignant hatred' for those abler than himself. He comes into the Socialist movement 'to shine. . . . As a rule he considers himself a God-ordained Editor'. This was probably the ugliest portraiture of the 'Intellectual' that an intellectual ever wrote. 'The "Intellectual", named so in mockery,' said De Leon, 'is incapable of learning; and seeing that he joins the Movement, not for the Movement's sake, but for his own, at all critical moments he is found utterly oblivious of the Movement's interests, ready to sacrifice these interests to his own crossed malevolence.'[25] De Leon, however, was an isolated and vindictive figure, though Lenin later valued him highly. More representative of the hope and idealism of American intellectuals was Robert Hunter, pioneer in the study of poverty, who reported on the high role of intellectuals in European socialism. His book, *Socialists at Work* (1908) described their especial place in the Italian Socialist Party. 'Not only are the leaders, Ferri, Labriola, and Turati, what they

[23] P. Kropotkin, 'The Revolution in Russia', *Nineteenth Century*, Vol. LVIII (December, 1905), No. 346, p. 882.

[24] Arturo Labriola, *Socialism and Philosophy*, tr. Ernest Untermann, Chicago, 1906, p. 100. (Translated from a letter to Turati, 5 June, 1897).

[25] Daniel De Leon, 'The "Intellectual"', *Daily People*, 19 March, 1905, reprinted as an appendix to Paul Lafargue, *Socialism and the Intellectuals*, Brooklyn, 1967, pp. 44–45.

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call on the continent "intellectuals", but so also were many of the delegates from the unions, co-operative societies, and other working men's organizations.'[26]

Within the Socialist Party itself, however, both the left and right wings had fallen into the pattern of alternately denouncing the 'intellectuals'. The leftists charged that the 'intellectuals' were would-be aristocratic rulers of labour; the rightists accused them of being unbalanced, unrealistic, and prone to adventurism. When the American delegates to the Socialist International failed to oppose the immigration of Asians into the United States, Victor Berger in 1907 denounced them as 'intellectuals' who had betrayed the American proletariat. A left-wing coal miner declared that the 'so-called intellectuals' were dominating the press and platform of the Socialist Party; he charged they were 'radical bourgeois' who were more concerned with such aims as sexual freedom than with the 'stomach ideals' of the workers. Above all, they were birds of passage: 'They can steal over into the capitalist camp at any time—we can't. They can retire from the firing line—we can't. . . .'[27]

The able writer and speaker, John Spargo, was probably, despite his own origin as a Cornish miner's son, the chief personal target of the attacks on the intellectuals. Spargo, according to the gifted journalist W. J. Ghent, was one 'who in the service of the party, has travelled over the greater part of the United States, and whose writings are more widely read than those of any other American Socialist'.[28] The controversy became acrimonious when a demand was raised by one wealthy intellectual, William English Walling, that the National Executive Committee should exclude intellectuals, a proposal directed against such fellow-intellectuals as Morris Hillquit, Robert Hunter, A. M. Simons, and John Spargo. The socialist daily newspaper, *The New York Call*, tried to calm the polemical tempest by counselling Comrades Spargo and Ghent to remember that the intellectuals were stirring up an internecine warfare among themselves. Its editorial on 21 November 1909, 'Proletarians and Intellectuals', observed: 'are not the rank and file prone to follow the lead of any comrade claiming to be an Intellectual . . .?' The next week, however, the *Call* conceded the existence of 'grotesque and pernicious forms of the prejudice against Intellectuals'.

[26] Robert Hunter, *Socialists at Work*, New York, 1908, p. 312. Also cf. Kent and Gretchen Kreuter, *An American Dissenter: The Life of Algie Martin Simons*, 1870–1950, Lexington, 1969, p. 104.

[27] Ira Kipnis, *The American Socialist Movement 1897–1912*, New York 1952, p. 278. Quoted from Victor Berger, 'We Will Stand by the Real American Proletariat', *Social-Democratic Herald*, 12 October, 1907. Louis Duchez, 'The Proletarian Attitude', *International Socialist Review*, Vol. IX, April 1909, p. 788. Kipnis' work tended to suppress facts unfavourable to the leftist intellectuals. Cf. James Oneal, 'Fellow-Travelling History', *Institute of Social Studies Bulletin*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring, 1953), pp. 6–7. Harry W. Laidler, 'More on Fellow-Travelling History', *Institute of Social Studies Bulletin*, Vol. 2, No. 7 (Fall, 1954), p. 77.

[28] W. J. Ghent, *Socialism and Success: Some Uninvited Messages*, New York, 1910, p. 147.

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THE bitter conflict between intellectuals and anti-intellectuals led W. J. Ghent to think deeply upon the political semantics of 'intellectual'. He protested in his book *Socialism and Success* (1910) against the word itself.

> The very use of the term 'intellectual' as a name here in America is ignorant and absurd. In France, where numbers of educated men come into the movement for the sake of personal advancement, there is some justification for using the term in a depreciatory sense. It was there that the term was first employed, and it is the meaning given there that the demagogue has vaguely in mind when he uses it here. But there is no justification for its use in that sense in America.[29]

Ghent had forebodings as he perceived that envy was the root-source of the ideology of anti-intellectualism. A crude, spiteful resentment on the part of mediocrities against talented men often moved the anti-intellectuals. When a comrade chanced to write a book whose influence extended beyond socialist circles, 'these narrow schismatics and secretaries cry out in protest', wrote Ghent. 'Fearful lest they be overshadowed and no longer acknowledged as leaders, they resort to all arts of knavery and demagoguery to destroy those whom they regard as rivals.' Thus 'the contempt of knowledge', Ghent charged, 'has been elevated into a doctrine in the Socialist movement in America', all under the guise of a 'cult of ultra-proletarianism'. Thus Ghent tried to rebut 'the attempt to range the proletariat against the so-called "intellectuals" in the party'.[30]

Both Ghent and Spargo, like Kautsky and Lenin before them in Europe, affirmed the historic role of the intellectuals as the bearers of the socialist philosophy to the working class. '[T]he whole history of the movement affirms', wrote Ghent, 'that this tactic (class struggle) has come to the movement from the outsider—that the philosophy of it and the reasons for it have been given by educated men.'[31] Spargo called on the highest historical precedents; the founders themselves, Marx and Engels, had been 'assailed as intellectuals and members of the hated bourgeoisie'. He forecast that like Marx's Bakuninist antagonists, 'our anti-intellectuals' would end up either as anarchists or servants of the capitalists. Ghent pleaded pathetically that the comrades recognize the just place of the intellectuals in the new society: should a Darwin 'be compelled to manipulate a linotype machine for five hours a day or a Marx to handle a street-sweeper's broom for say, four hours a day; or a Burbank, or a Pasteur, or a Metchnikoff or a Huxley, . . . to sell goods in a state or municipal department store, . . .?'[32] More than a half-century later the Chinese 'Cultural Revolution' was to

[29] W. J. Ghent, *Socialism and Success*, New York, 1910, p. 165.
[30] Ibid. pp. 147–49, 152.
[31] Ibid. p. 163.
[32] John Spargo, 'Comment and Discussion', *The New York Call*, 14 November, 1909.

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answer: 'Yes'. In 1910, however, socialist intellectuals in America had the premonition that a cultural anti-intellectualism could find its breeding-ground in a socialist order.

To Ghent, there was no problem of defining the 'intellectual'; he was simply an educated person who joined the Socialist movement of the working class: 'The men who do these things are the "intellectuals"—the men of intelligence who come into the movement from other classes.'[33] Definitions were clear enough, but the socialist movement could never resolve the problems and ambiguities of the mission and status of the intellectual. Articles, editorials, and books continued to grapple with this problem. The *International Socialist Review*, the organ of the revolutionary intellectuals, published in 1909 by way of self-criticism several articles by the French syndicalist intellectual, Hubert Lagardelle, hostile to the intellectuals. Lagardelle accused them of harbouring the ambition to rule society; he cited a book by Henri Béranger, *Intellectual Aristocracy*, which 'set forth the claims of the intellectuals to a dictatorship of the world'. To those who brought up the examples of Marx and Engels as intellectuals, Lagardelle replied with dialectical acumen, or terminological evasion; Marx and Engels were not intellectuals.

> Marx, Proudhon, Owen intellectuals! Great Gods, whither is the confusion of words leading us. Evidently it would be agreeable to the throng of diploma bearers to call themselves the direct descendants of Marx, Proudhon and Owen . . . There is only one trouble. It is that neither Marx nor Proudhon nor Owen were intellectuals . . . These ideologists are not intellectuals. They have neither the aspirations nor the pretensions of the literary caste.[34]

The intellectuals were not, however, a 'new class' for Lagardelle, despite the fact that according to his view they were aiming for power. 'What are we to understand by intellectuals?', he asked. They were 'all the people who make a profession of thinking and derive profit from it . . . the lawyers, judges, doctors, engineers, professors, officials, journalists, writers', and also 'the teachers'. He insisted, however: 'They do not constitute a class for themselves.' They were selling their abilities on the market. It happened nowadays that 'the market for ideas is so glutted!'. Hence, arose the 'abuse of terms that we sometimes say the class of intellectuals', when in truth, they are only 'auxiliaries', at best a 'sub-class', or 'better still out-of-class'. These 'domestics of the pen', said Lagardelle, had helped the bourgeoisie to make their revolution. Since then their status had fallen, with the 'over-production of capacities' on the bourgeois market. Nonetheless,

[33] Ghent, op. cit., pp. 156, 166. Also cf. Lawrence Goldman, 'W. J. Ghent and the Left', *Studies on the Left*, Vol. 3, No. 3, Summer, 1963, p. 26.

[34] Hubert Lagardelle, 'The Intellectuals and Working Class Socialism', *The International Socialist Review*, vol. VII, no. 12, June 1907, p. 729; Part II, vol. VIII, No. 1, July 1907, pp. 36, 38.

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the intellectuals deluded themselves with the notion that their thinking was 'independent of social conflicts', and representative of society as a whole.[35]

THUS, a debate was waged on the morality of the socialist intellectual, his integrity, his possible hypocrisy. It was a poignant self-searching that the intellectuals were called upon to make. The editors of the *International Socialist Review* felt the critics should be heard, though they observed that Lagardelle, 'indeed practically all the "syndicalist" writers, spokesmen and leaders are members of the same despised class of intellectuals and this to an even greater extent than the "parliamentarians". . .'.[36] Another contributor, Charles Dobbs, took note that 'strangely enough it is the "intellectuals" who are attacking the "intellectuals". . .'; he felt that it was unhealthy that 'not a few of our Socialist "intellectuals"' were vying with demagogues in trying to arouse the prejudice of the 'horny handed sons of toil'; the latter were 'unfortunately' too ready 'to view with distrust the comrade who may have got a degree at college . . .'.[37] Another contributor wrote an article, 'The Evolution of an Intellectual', depicting in sympathetic terms his spiritual revolt against 'hypocrisy'.[38] The most significant, however, of the defences of the intellectual came in the form of an essay on a recent book by the great sociologist Roberto Michels on the Italian socialist movement. Michels in later years was to write the most penetrating criticism of the intellectuals. But in 1908 he declared: 'The great moral beauty of Italian socialism would perish if the intellectuals were driven from the movement.' The Italian socialist theories, he emphasized, were 'entirely the product of the Intellectuals'. The bourgeois socialists, in his view, were more proletarian in spirit than the proletariat, and there was therefore no cause for alarm in the fact that among the 24 socialist members of parliament, there were 10 university professors, six lawyers, three doctors, but not a single workingman. Michels also recorded the curious phenomenon, that intellectuals were the arch-agents in fomenting a sectarian animus against their comrades in intellect; Enrico Ferri, a noted professor of criminology, had tried to induce the workers to expel all those with a university education. Michels was an expatriate German who had left a country where bureaucratic controls were as strong in the Social Democratic Party as in the universities; he believed naturally that whereas the German intellectuals were arrested in their development at the level of the medieval caste system, the Italian intellectuals were socially and psychologically attracted to socialism.[39]

[35] Hubert Lagardelle, ibid. vol. VII, no. 12, June 1907, pp. 721, 724, 727, 729.
[36] Ibid. p. 730.
[37] Charles Dobbs, 'Brains', *The International Socialist Review*, Vol. VIII, No. 9, March 1908, pp. 533, 535.
[38] Robin Dunbar, 'The Evolution of an Intellectual', *The International Socialist Review*, Vol. IX, No. 3, September 1908, pp. 205–207.
[39] Dr Ervin Szabo (Budapest), 'Workers and Intellectuals in Italy', *The International Socialist Review*, Vol. IX, No. 8, February 1909, pp. 588–93. The book by

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INDEED, a certain feeling of kinship with the Italian intellectuals arose among some American intellectuals. Robert Hunter, as we have seen, wrote of their high role in the Italian socialist movement. *The New York Call* published an article by the Italian novelist Edmund de Amicis entitled 'The Student and the Social Problem'. Given originally as an address at the University of Turin, de Amicis foresaw the emergence of an 'intellectual proletariat' who would be vastly augmented in numbers by thousands of university graduates, and who, though prejudiced against manual labour, would be more militant and defiant than the common people.[40] An editorial in *The New York Call* held up to future intellectual recruits the high 'example of Comrade Robert Hunter. He came to the movement a typical, bourgeois Intellectual. But by his steady, patient, continuous, excellent propaganda work he has abundantly made good.' The newspaper admonished its collegiate readers to remember that their education simply 'crammed' their heads with 'obsolete' theories so that it would take years of actual experience in the socialist movement to undo, and to remould the recruit into 'a useful soldier of the social revolution'; until then, he should take his place in 'an honourable position in the rear'.[41]

Socialist intellectuals, beside having doubts cast on their characters, motives, and intelligence by fellow-socialists, were also in a growing debate with anti-socialist critics. Nietzsche's philosophy was having a certain vogue at this time. In 1910 the leading Nietzschean individualist, H. L. Mencken, engaged in an interchange with the Marxian socialist Robert Rives La Monte. The latter, using a Veblenite terminology, expressed his confidence that the 'psychological influence of the Machine Process' would compel 'more of these discontented intellectuals' to 'adopt the proletarian point of view, and place their trained minds at the disposal of the revolutionary forces'. Soon 'the cream of the intellectuals in both hemispheres' would be enrolled in the ranks of the International Social Democracy. Mencken, unmoved by the historical panorama, expressed his scorn for 'Prof Veblen' and 'the quack science of sociology as it is taught by vapid college professors'.[42] But Mencken was an outsider. More disconcerting was the attack the following year by the well-known Party ideologist, Austin Lewis; he called the intellectuals 'the curse of the socialist movement', and ridiculed their 'sham altruism, the maudlin note, the whipped dog whimper', which manifested itself in their literature and speeches. The

Roberto Michels which this article discussed was *Il proletario e la borghesia nel movimento socialista Italiano*, Torino, 1908. Michels was 'cold-shouldered' by German Social Democrats for having dared to criticize their chieftain, August Bebel. Cf. Ernest Belfort Bax, *Reminiscences and Reflections of a Mid and Late Victorian*, London, 1918, pp. 145–47.

[40] *The New York Call*, 17 October 1909.

[41] 'Proletarians and Intellectuals Once More', *The New York Call*, 28 November 1909.

[42] Robert Rives La Monte and H. L. Mencken, *Men versus the Man: A Correspondence*, New York, 1910, pp. 12, 13, 139, 184, 230. Cf. Ludwig Marcuse, 'Nietzsche in America', *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, Vol. L, 1951, pp. 335–36.

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indictment was almost Nietzschean in depicting the intellectuals as craven-hearted with a slave-morality. The Marxian socialist would not trust the intellectuals until they were 'driven by sheer economic interests into the movement'.[43]

ONCE more John Spargo was stirred to publish a defence of the intellectuals. His book *Sidelights on Contemporary Socialism*, published in 1911, contained a chapter entitled 'Anti-intellectualism in the Socialist Movement', which aimed to rebut the anti-intellectuals. But the word 'intellectuals' was still not naturalized; even at the hands of their champion, the word was punctuated with quotation marks every time it was used. The 'intellectuals', wrote Spargo, though 'mainly recruited from the privileged classes', had rendered the movement an 'incalculable service'. From Marx to Morris Hillquit, 'They have furnished it with most of its philosophers, economists, orators, artists, poets and political leaders.' 'It is to the "intellectuals" that the proletariat owes whatever understanding it has of its position, its social evolution, its mission and its opportunity.' Even their critics had to use phrases which the 'intellectuals' had coined for them. Then Spargo made his most cutting rejoinder: 'The leaders of the anti-intellectualist agitation are nearly always unsuccessful "intellectuals"—lawyers without clients, authors without publishers, professors without chairs, ministers without pulpits, and so on.' Anti-intellectualism itself 'has been a factional movement, fostered by petty, ambitious intrigues, aspirants to leadership devoid of the requisite intellectual equipment and learning'. Its worst effect was that it demoralized the rank and file by setting ignorance upon a pedestal. Spargo called himself a 'liberal Marxian socialist'.[44] With an unconscious prescience, he was tracing, however, a contradiction between the values of liberalism and the workings of socialist organization which he never consciously formulated. Decades later, however, disillusioned, and seeking hope in America's eighteenth-century past, he saw his early fears and warnings confirmed on the huge scale of Soviet anti-intellectualism.

Meanwhile, what was probably the first book on American socialism to be written by a college professor endorsed Spargo's defence of the intellectual. In Jessie Wallace Hughan's book *American Socialism of the Present Day* (1912), 'intellectual' still always occurs with the estranging quotation marks. Professor Hughan referred to 'the rather absurd spectacle of certain writers and lecturers more or less educated dubbing one another "intellectuals", and either hurling back the epithet or risking the still more unpleasant designation of "self-styled intellectual"'. The term was clearly still pejorative, 'malevolent' (we might say). Professor Hughan observed that there were 'intellectuals' well distributed in both wings—Hillquit, Simons, Hunter, Spargo, and Work

[43] Austin Lewis, *The Militant Proletariat*, Chicago, 1911, pp. 36–39.
[44] John Spargo, *Sidelights on Contemporary Socialism*, New York, 1911, pp. 10, 67–74, 84.

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were in the right wing, whereas Sanial, Untermann, Boudin, and La Monte were in the left. The reformist moderates, however, in the party had the greater support, having received the highest preferential votes for election to the National Executive Committee; the revolutionary wing, however, was 'led largely by "intellectuals"' who were joined to the 'ultra-proletarians'. Professor Hughan hoped that the hostility to the 'intellectuals' in general would diminish in proportion as such institutions as the church, university, and the press themselves became less unfriendly to socialism.[45] But there were varieties and sources of anti-intellectualism not encompassed in Professor Hughan's optimistic formula of 1912.

INDEED, that same year, 1912, the famed leader of the Socialist Party, its presidential candidate, Eugene V. Debs, took note as a matter of 'party concern' of the 'treatment of so-called "intellectuals" in the Socialist movement. Why the term "intellectual" should be one of reproach in the Socialist party is hard to understand', wrote Debs, 'and yet there are many Socialists who sneer at a man of intellect as if he was an interloper and out of place among Socialists.' For himself, Debs continued, 'I am always glad to see a man of brains, of intellect, join the movement'. He did not propose to punish a man for having brains. Yet Debs too was concerned that the intellectuals should not predominate among the leaders of the Socialist movement, 'which', he said, 'is essentially a working-class movement'. 'The intellectuals in office should be the exceptions, as they are in the rank and file.' The workers should officer their own party. After all, noted Debs, 'an organization of intellectuals would not be officered and represented by wage-earners; neither should an organization of wage-earners be officered and represented by intellectuals'. Thus Debs too stood opposed to the 'intellectuals' who often were the majority of the Party's National Executive Committee. He felt there was 'plenty of useful work for the intellectuals to do without holding office . . .' They could serve the Party 'without number' as 'lecturers, debaters, authors, writers, artists, cartoonists, statisticians, etc'.[46] In short, the intellectual, according to Debs, could do all he wished in the Party except that which he sought the most—to lead.

The attraction of leftist intellectuals to the use of violence was one of the incidental themes of the first study of the sociology of violence in American life, Robert Hunter's *Violence and the Labor Movement* in 1914. Hunter discussed the ferment among 'middle class "intellectuals"' in France, Germany, and England as they disputed in 'sectarian circles' over trade unionism, anarchism, and socialism. Where an impatience dominated their emotions, they developed the

[45] Jessie Wallace Hughan, *American Socialism of the Present Day*, New York, 1912, pp. 222, 226–27, 238, 254.

[46] Eugene V. Debs, 'Sound Socialist Tactics', *The International Socialist Review*, Vol. XII, February 1912, pp. 483–84.

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hyperaesthesia, ecstasy, and fanaticism of the anarchist, or Bakunin's student disciples, or on the other hand, they tended to find for themselves comfortable berths in the capitalist system.

During these years that the American socialist movement tried to resolve its emotions toward intellectuals a similar crisis had evolved concerning the role of the American Negro intellectual. Booker T. Washington, whom W. E. B. Du Bois characterized in 1903 as 'the one recognized spokesman of his ten million fellows' was embroiled in a bitter controversy with his intellectual critics.[47] They felt that he had waived the struggle for civil and political rights, that his emphasis on industrial education for the Negro was a tacit acquiescence to the latter's subordinate status; they felt he scorned the college-educated Negroes. By contrast, the young Du Bois regarded himself as a spokesman for the 'Talented Tenth', the Negro intellectuals. 'I believed in the higher education of a Talented Tenth', he wrote, 'who through their knowledge of modern culture could guide the American Negro into a higher civilization.'[48] Massachusetts born, a graduate of Harvard, a pupil of James and Max Weber, Du Bois did indeed speak for a small but growing circle of Negro thinkers, teachers, ministers, lawyers, doctors, journalists.[49] He felt that Washington was trying to discipline the Negro intelligentsia to conform to his 'Tuskegee Machine'.

Booker T. Washington replied with an indictment of 'The Intellectuals'. His determination to stand by the programme of his many years' work at Tuskegee had 'brought me', he wrote, 'into conflict with a small group of coloured people who sometimes styled themselves "The Intellectuals", at other times "The Talented Tenth"'. Their stock in trade, said Washington, was in attacking him. Their heads were 'crammed . . . full with mere book knowledge'; they felt the world owed them a living. 'In college, they studied problems and solved them on paper,' but they lacked a sense of reality: 'My experience is that people who call themselves "The Intellectuals" understand theories, but they do not understand things.' Washington felt that they should have got involved in practical work in the South; then they would not have succumbed to pessimism. As it was, they had introduced the spirit of intolerance and violence into the Negro community. The 'Intellectuals' had been the first, as far as Booker T. Washington could remember, in all these years, 'to interrupt me or to break up a meeting at which I was present . . .' That 'was attempted by "The Intellectuals" of my own race in Boston'; such were 'the defects of that type of mind which the so-called "Intellectuals" of the race represent'; they 'know books but they do not know men'. In Washington's opinion, there was indeed a certain hypocrisy about

[47] W. E. Burghardt Du Bois, *The Souls of Black Folk*, 1903, reprinted New York, 1953, p. 43.

[48] W. E. Burghardt Du Bois, *Dusk of Dawn*, New York, 1940, p. 70.

[49] Francis L. Broderick, *W. E. B. Du Bois: Negro leader in time of crisis*, Stanford, 1959, pp. 62–77.

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'The Intellectuals'. The disrupters of his meeting were 'the very people who have been loudest in condemning the Southern white people' for denying the Negro the right of free speech. 'The Intellectuals' had even stooped to recruiting for their mob 'some of the lowest men and women from vile dens in Boston'.[50] No American leader spoke the word 'Intellectual' with such unalloyed bitterness and scorn as did the Negro Booker T. Washington.

ON the eve of the First World War in 1914 the term 'intellectual' was still suspect and suggestive of the alien to American life. When Harry Wolfson, a Travelling Fellow from Harvard University, later its eminent historian of philosophy, journeyed among Jewish students in European universities during 1912 to 1914, he reported for publication in the first issue of *The Menorah Journal*, the organ of the American Jewish university intellectuals: 'Joining the membership of a student organization marks the entrance into that large class of "intellectuals".' He thought the 'appellative "intellectual"' corresponded 'to our "high-brow" rather than to our "college grad"'. The word 'intellectual' still seemed to this Harvard scholar a European term without a clear American counterpart. That it signified more, however, in experience than being a 'high-brow' was indicated by Wolfson's observation of the 'problem that confronts the Jewish intellectuals in Germany', the virulent anti-Semitism which defined them as 'the carriers of an alien culture, unabsorbable and unassimilable'.[51] The intellectuals were defined as aliens before they became alienated.

The vogue of Bergson at this time led some philosophers to wonder wherein lay his appeal to the 'anti-intellectuals'. A young logician, Clarence I. Lewis, wrote in 1914 that Bergson 'appeals to the Syndicalists (the I.W.W. here) somewhat accidentally because they too oppose the "intellectuals" who would subordinate practice to a set of preformed principles'. For all Lewis's devotion to pure logic, the 'intellectual' still remained for him a word to be used with its quarantining quotation marks. Yet he defined an 'intellectual' as one 'who maintained the logical or analytical function of mind to the highest, . . .'[52] Similarly, that distinguished historian of ideas, Arthur O. Lovejoy, writing two incisive and discerning articles on the practical tendencies of Bergsonism, described its attraction for syndicalists such as Sorel; to the latter 'the real enemies of the working class' were 'not so much the capitalists as the "intellectuals"'.[53]

[50] Booker T. Washington, *My Larger Education: Being Chapters from My Experience*, New York, 1911, pp. 112–27.

[51] Harry Wolfson, 'Jewish Students in European Universities', *The Menorah Journal*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1915), pp. 30–31.

[52] Clarence Irving Lewis, 'Bergson and Contemporary Thought', *Univetrsity of California Chronicle*, Vol. XVI (1914). Reprinted in C. I. Lewis, *Collected Papers*, ed. John D. Goheen and John L. Mothershead, Jr, Stanford, 1970, pp. 41–45.

[53] Arthur O. Lovejoy, 'The Practical Tendencies of Bergsonism', *The International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. XXIII, July 1913, p. 425.

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BY 1914, however, a new generation of socialist intellectuals were entering American life, and the hope was held they would overcome that estrangement and suspicion which had dogged the steps of Spargo, Ghent and Simons. The word 'new' was enjoying an extraordinary vogue at this time; conforming to the fashion, Robert Rives La Monte published in 1914 an essay 'The New Intellectuals', in which he rejoiced in the 'openness of mind' which was 'the finest trait of the New Intellectuals who have been entering the movement during the last decade and especially during the past four years'. Max Eastman and Walter Lippmann were the men whom La Monte regarded as most typical of the New Intellectuals. To his mind, they differed profoundly from the earlier generation of intellectuals, 'from the intellectuals (pitiably few) who came to socialism in the last decade of the last century!' 'In those days', wrote La Monte, 'we had only two types of intellectuals: the eager youthful American, convinced that Marx was outgrown, avid for the creation of a New American Socialism; and the equally eager, usually foreign, young student of Marx, whose culture was narrow and more or less barren, because he was as truly a one-book man as was the Seventeenth-Century Puritan of Cromwell's Army,' The New Intellectuals, however, were free spirits, not enclosed in dogma: 'They are steeped in the culture of the day and generation.' Walter Lippman and William E. Walling were American pragmatists in the way they dealt with Marx; their approach was anthropocentric in so far as they took human nature as the touchstone by which to evaluate social systems. The New Intellectual spoke naturally in the idiom of William James and Henri Bergson. Lippmann located the 'living force' of socialism not in the mode of production but in 'the will—a will to beauty, order, neighbourliness, not infrequently a will to health'. La Monte welcomed the new gladiators of the mind: 'Hail to the New Intellectuals! May they increase and flourish!' [54]

On the other hand, American liberals actively involved in practical politics regarded sceptically the outlook for socialist intellectuals. Brand Whitlock, mayor of Toledo, a disciple of the famed Democratic Governor John P. Altgeld of Illinois, described the hostile attitude of 'the machine' in the Socialist Party toward those whom they regarded as 'no socialists at all' but 'mere "intellectuals" or "sentimentalists"'.[55] Whitlock was filled with admiration in 1909 for such socialists as Robert Hunter, moved by love, but he thought the 'Marxist bigots and fanatics' were 'merely insubordinate haters seeking only such change as would permit them to change places with our present masters, and rule us with a tyranny beyond any we know now, . . .' [56] Were the 'intellectuals' fashioning their own destruction?

[54] Robert Rives La Monte, 'The New Intellectuals', *The New Review*, Vol. II, No. 1, January 1914, pp. 45–53.
[55] Brand Whitlock, *Forty Years of It*, New York, 1914, p. 316.
[56] *The Letters and Journal of Brand Whitlock*, ed. Allan Nevins, Vol. 1, New York, 1936, p. 118.

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THE year 1914 began a fissure between the intellectuals and socialism which lasted for fifteen years. Most of the American intellectuals experienced a new alienation when they saw the American Socialist Party dissociate itself from the nation's loyalties and aims during the war. Many of them re-traced their original emotional and intellectual steps, their original alienation and radicalization; re-enacting their original choice, they chose in the light of later experience a new direction. As for Walter Lippmann, the young New Intellectual, he fast became disenchanted with cults of the people and proletariat, and began to develop the view that the nation's salvation lay in the masters of statecraft, the natural-born leaders such as Theodore Roosevelt, who would have the wisdom to avail themselves of trained scientific experts. The life-cycle of an 'intellectual' did not seem to average more than a decade.

Thus, in mid-war, the 'intellectual' was still not wholly naturalized even in the socialist movement. The book by John Macy, the literary critic, *Socialism in America* in 1916 still bequoted the word: 'The intelligent revolutionary workman resents this intrusion of the so-called "intellectual", and justly distrusts writing and talking leaders.' Curiously, Macy looked for socialism to succeed not in the industrial regions but in the backward agricultural and mining areas, not 'in factory-black Massachusetts but in rural Oklahoma', among the Western 'nomadic' labourers rather than 'the slaves of the most advanced industrial centres'.[57] The revolutionary vocation of the 'intellectual' was still suspect; somehow, it was believed, his revolutionary loyalty was circumscribed by his quest for personal power and position.

A turning-point in the usage of 'intellectual', a brief interlude in its pejorative connotation, came during the first world war as a result of the moral vocation of Romain Rolland. Rolland's remarkable novel of the self-discovery of an intellectual, *Jean-Christophe in Paris*, translated and published in 1911, had already used the word 'intellectual' proudly without quotation marks. The hero's friend, Olivier, tells of his misgivings concerning the 'intellectual elite'—'a few dozen men of letters', ignored by the workingmen; 'even among our intellectuals', solitary artists and men of science, they are those who 'have never bothered their heads about politics'. Rolland beckoned the intellectuals to fulfil their role as conscience; it was intolerable that 'the intellectuals despised the politicians, the politicians despised the intellectuals'. But he was not happier at an emerging alliance between the politicians and the lowest class of intellectuals—'A new power had appeared which had arrogated to itself the absolute government of ideas —the Free Thinkers.' Rolland at this time was anxious concerning the potential for dictatorial elitism which intellectuals in power exhibited:

[57] John Macy, *Socialism in America*, New York, 1916, pp. 45, 47.

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> But the odd thing was when these men who in private conversation were skeptics, sensualists, Nihilists, and anarchists, came to action: at once they became fanatics. Even the most dilettante of them when they came into power became like Oriental despots: they had a mania for ordering everything, and let nothing alone: . . . The result was a sort of republican imperialism . . .[58]

It was a truth which Rolland a quarter of a century later in the Stalinist era preferred to repress.

A few days after the war's outbreak, the revered author of *Jean-Christophe* wrote his essay, 'Au-dessus de la mêlée' (Above the Battle), published in *Le Journal de Genève* on 22 September 1914. It was followed by a series of impassioned appeals to the intellectuals of the world to strive to halt the mutual killing of men. The intellectual emerged not as the seeker of political power but as, above all, the conscience of mankind. Rolland's appeal, moreover, was generational; he appealed not to the working classes but to the young men of the world. The Intellectual became the prophet and spokesman of the younger generation:

> O young men that shed your blood for the thirsty earth with so generous a joy! O heroism of the world! What a harvest for destruction to reap under this splendid summer sun! Young men of all nations, brought into conflict by a common ideal, . . . all of you, marching to your deaths, are dear to me. . . .

Gone from 'intellectual' were the ironic, self-deprecatory quotation marks which had usually surrounded it. For Rolland the vocation of the intellectual as humanity's conscience was the noblest in history. He noted hopefully that a genuine International of Intellectuals was being born; manifestos written by and for intellectuals calling for a moral unity, were being written in Sweden, in Holland, in Catalonia. As for the 'intellectuals of Germany', they had failed at the critical hour. The subservience of the 'ninety-three intellectuals' of Germany in their highly publicized endorsement of German war aims in 1914 had stamped them as an 'Imperial army-corps of German intellectuals'. In bitterness Rolland wrote: 'Give an intellectual any ideal and any evil passion and he will always succeed in harmonising the twain.'[58a] What was unthinkable to him was that Europe was murdering its elite, 'its priests, its thinkers, its scholars, its artists, the whole future of the spirit', and to do so was calling in 'barbarians from the poles and those from the equator', Sikhs, Sepoys, Senegalese, Soudanese, Congolese.[59]

[58] Cf. Romain Rolland, *Jean-Christophe in Paris*, tr. Gilbert Cannon, reissued, London, 1966, pp. 113, 288.

[58a] Romain Rolland, *Above the Battle*, tr. C. K. Ogden, Chicago, 1916, pp. 37, 60, 109, 126, 150, 162.

[59] Ibid. pp. 41, 167.

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ROLLAND'S book of prophetic essays was published in English translation in 1916. It appeared as American intellectuals were involved in a fierce debate as to whether the country should become involved in the war. Should they abandon their pacifist creed? Should they dare assert that the war against Germany could truly be made one for democracy? Were they yielding to mob emotions, the beating of the drums, or the behest of Wall Street? The intellectuals found themselves cast in the role of the people's conscience. When Elizabeth Shepley Sergeant reviewed Rolland's book for *The New Republic* in February 1916, she noted he was appealing to the 'friends of Jean-Christophe', to the 'international elite'. She observed his tragic pessimism, his fear that humanity remained enslaved to the phantoms of the mind, from which even the intellectuals would not emancipate themselves: 'in fabrication the intellectuals surpass the common herd'.[60]

The mantle of Rolland soon fell in the United States on the bent, deformed shoulders of Randolph Bourne, who, we might say, was the first native American to regard himself not pejoratively but electively as an intellectual. Rolland's plea had been set aside by the leaders of American thought, by the editors of *The New Republic*, and most dramatically by John Dewey, America's distinguished philosopher, who felt that democratic values were imperilled by Imperial Germany. Embittered by the American decision, estranged from his friends and old teacher, Bourne published a diatribe which has become a landmark for intellectuals, 'The War and Intellectuals'; it appeared in *The Seven Arts* in June, 1917, two months after America's declaration of war.

> To those of us who still retain an irreconcilable animus against the war, [wrote Bourne], it has been a bitter experience to see the unanimity with which the American intellectuals have thrown their support to the use of war technique. . . . A war made deliberately by the intellectuals! . . . The intellectuals, in other words, have identified themselves with the least democratic forces in American life.[61]

A few weeks later John Reed, continuing on the pilgrimage which was taking him from cheerleading to communism, followed Bourne's lead by declaring in *The Seven Arts* in August 1917: 'The thesis of our "intellectuals" is, of course, that common men are unfit for government.'[62] Probably such pro-war intellectuals as John Dewey, Upton Sinclair, and John Spargo were more devoted to democratic practice than either Bourne or Reed. But the envenomed atmosphere of ideological recriminations and prophetic posturing contributed little to the honour of the sobriquet 'intellectual'. Walter Lippman, for instance, the most gifted political mind among the younger generation, moved quickly to disengage himself from the last vestiges of what

[60] Elizabeth Shepley Sergeant, 'Romain Rolland: Above the Mêlée', *The New Republic*, Vol. VI, 12 February 1916, p. 50.
[61] *The World of Randolph Bourne*, ed. Lillian Schliessel, New York, 1965, pp. 147, 149.
[62] Ibid. p. 143.

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we today would call 'ideology'. His book *Public Opinion,* written shortly after the war assigned the intellectuals a much lesser role in the making of history than they were wont to claim; the intellectuals, in his view, scarcely spoke for the working classes: 'How very misleading it was to impute to the British working class in 1918–1921 the point of view expressed in the . . . pamphlets written by intellectuals.' The intellectual, as a pamphleteer, was a purveyor of 'stereotypes' (what today is called 'ideology'); far from cultivating clear ideas, the intellectual suffused his perception of reality with dramatic, imagic wish-fulfilment, permeating reality with myth, overlaying a modicum of fact with layers of fantasy, the stereotype-setter was no scientist.

> The stereotype of Labour as Emancipator selects the evidence which supports itself and rejects the other. And so parallel with the real movements of working men there exists a fiction of the Labour Movement in which an idealized mass moves towards an ideal goal.[63]

A WHOLE generation of socialist intellectuals during the early twenties were dissolving their ideological estrangement from American society—Spargo, Walling, Ghent, Russell, Simons. They ceased to be 'intellectuals'; they became journalists, writers of books on Colonial America and the Far West, publicists for the American Federation of Labor. Each in some poignant way found a new sense of community which seemed more real than that which life in the party had provided; each found a segment of contemporary existence which answered his emotional needs, so that the will to revolution was stilled. Randolph Bourne, beholding the onset of this process, turned therefore increasingly to generational revolt as the energetic source for social change. The intellectual became a leader in generational rebellion, a 'youth-master' (to invent a descriptive phrase). There was a 'lack of confidence', Bourne wrote, in 'the ruling generation', the elders were clearly seized with paralysis when the times called them to undertake urgent social innovations. Where intellectuals had once praised the spontaneous scientific insight of the working class, Bourne wrote instead: 'youth's attitude is really the scientific attitude'. Where intellectuals used to talk of Jesus the proletarian carpenter, Bourne rendered homage to the 'youthful radicalism of Jesus'. In the struggle of generations, youth was 'the only lever of progress,' 'the incarnation of reason pulled against the rigidity of tradition'. The historical tragedy, as Bourne saw it, was that 'youth rules the world, but only when it is no longer young'.[64]

Randolph Bourne became America's most distinctive intellectual

[63] Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion,* New York, 1922, p. 152.

[64] *The World of Randolph Bourne,* pp. 9–11. A. F. Beringause, 'The Double Martyrdom of Randolph Bourne', *Journal of the History of Ideas,* Vol. XVIII (October 1957), pp. 598–99. Sidney Kaplan, 'Social Engineers, as Saviours: Effects of World War I on Some American Liberals' *Journal of the History of Ideas,* Vol. XVII (June 1956), pp. 360–66

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because he exemplified most fully that trait which intellectuals later identified as their hall-mark—'alienation'. His physical deformity diagrammed his sense of alienation and impotence: 'I was truly in the world, but not of the world', he wrote. Above all, he was the forerunner of later American intellectuals in turning from the proletariat to the youth as the potential social saviours. His essay, 'Below the Battle', later published as a companion piece to Rolland's *Above the Battle*, affirmed that 'the nonmobilization of the younger intelligentsia' was 'the cardinal fact of our war'. If that war went on, he said, 'that bitterness will spread out like a stain over the younger American generation'.[65] Thus the intellectual sought his last possible ally in the young.

As the war ended, Bourne died. Romain Rolland continued to call for an international of intellectuals, but almost nobody listened: 'Workers in the realms of thought, companions dispersed to the four corners of the globe, separated for five years by armies, . . . Most intellectuals have put their knowledge, their art, their reason at the service of Governments. . . .'[66] In America, there was only one signer to Rolland's manifesto, the isolated spirit at Hull House, Jane Addams.

THE writings concerning intellectuals were for two decades of a polemical cast. Only one book appeared during all this time which was a genuine scientific effort to understand this new social type. Soon after the outbreak of the European War, in 1915, an English translation of Robert Michels' *Political Parties* was published. This enduring sociological classic enquired into the role of intellectuals in working class parties and the latter's oligarchical tendencies, bringing to bear a wealth of factual evidence unsurpassed in the scholarship on the history of socialism. Michels pondered the phenomenon of the dualities of hatred against the intellectuals, on the one hand, assailed for being reformists and right wingers, on the other, for being revolutionaries and left wingers. Michels noted how, as one report put it, people had no confidence in intellectuals, 'and this sentiment went so far that the word "intellectual" became equivalent to a term of opprobrium'. The Dresden Congress in 1903 of the German Social Democratic Party had above all been concerned with 'the problem of the intellectuals'. Michels knew the many-sidedness of human motivation. Evidently recalling his own biography, he wrote that the intellectual who breaks with his bourgeois environment 'needs more firmness of character, stronger revolutionary passion, and greater force of conviction, than the proletarian who takes a similar step'. But then comes the second

[65] Ibid. p. 165.

[66] 'Romain Rolland's Plea for a Post-War Unity: A Manifesto and a Reply', *The New York Times Current History*, Vol. XI, October 1919, pp. 148–50. Also translated in Romain Rolland, *I Will Not Rest*, tr. K. S. Shelvankar, New York, p. 91. Also cf. William Thomas Starr, *Romain Rolland and a World at War*, Evanston, 1956, p. 168. Stefan Zweig, *Romain Rolland: The Man and His Work*, tr. Eden and Cêdar Paul, New York, 1921, pp. 265–303.

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stage, as the intellectuals find themselves second-class comrades, objects of suspicion in the labour movement: 'The intellectuals, who have entered the party under the spur of idealism, soon feel humiliated and disillusioned.' Michels himself, finding himself at odds with the German working-class bureaucracy, turned towards syndicalist protest; finally he found a new identity as Roberto Michels, an Italian professor of political science at the University of Turin.[67]

The greatness and import of Michels' book were little appreciated when it first appeared. The reviewer for *The New Republic*, Morris R. Cohen, though he lauded much in the book, ignored its analysis of the intellectuals, and said that 'the author's conception of scientific method leaves so much to be desired'. Charles A. Beard, on the other hand, wrote with discernment that Michels 'has told us more truth than most of us can endure. . . .'[68] Probably this was why his book was so largely ignored during the next generation.

One textbook of history was published in 1918 in which the intellectuals emerged almost always unquoted, and sympathetically portrayed for their role in social movements, J. Salwyn Schapiro's *Modern and Contemporary Europe* (1918). To Schapiro, who himself had come to intellectual maturity in New York's Lower East Side, there was an aura of inspiring nobility about the Fabians, for instance, 'This group of brilliant intellectuals', and the French intellectuals of the Dreyfus Case.[69] Several hundreds of thousands of college students learned from his textbook, but it did not avail against the low esteem which prevailed for the intellectual in the decade of the twenties. An English philosopher has written that his country was spared an intelligentsia largely because of the influence of the elitist public schools which have discouraged 'any intellectual ebullition that does not serve the needs of government or of the professor'. England also has lacked cafes where intellectuals could congregate idly; her educated strata, occupied in productive employments, have found little time for 'free and dangerous speculation'.[70] The educated Englishman, according to the *Times Literary Supplement*, prided himself that 'Oxford and Cambridge are more in touch with reality than is the Ecole Normale Supérieure', that indeed the position of an 'intelligentsia' is 'abnormal' in any

[67] Cf. Roberto Michels, *First Lectures in Political Sociology*, tr. Alfred de Grazia, New York, 1965, p. 7, Roberto Michels, *Political Parties*, tr. Eden and Cedar Paul, New York, 1915, reprinted 1959, pp. 316–317, 323–325.

[68] C. A. Beard, Review of Robert Michels, *Political Parties*, *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. XXXII, 1917, p. 155. Morris R. Cohen, Review of Robert Michels, *Political Parties*, 'The New Republic' vol. 8, Oct. 21, 1916, p. 303.

[69] J. Salwyn Schapiro, *Modern and Contemporary European History*, Boston, 1918, 1923, pp. 91, 147, 148, 203, 251, 517, 539, 593. Also cf. J. Salwyn Schapiro, 'The Revolutionary Intellectual', *The Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 125 (1920), p. 827. Lewis S. Feuer, 'A Tribute to J. Salwyn Schapiro', *The New Leader*, Vol. XLII (2 March 1959), p. 10.

[70] Stuart Hampshire, 'An English Intellectual', *New Statesman and Nation*, Vol. LI, 28 April 1956, p. 457.

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country which takes the political views of its novelists seriously.[71] Clearly an 'intellectual' in the English social setting, though less an object of concern, has been regarded as a kind of footloose misfit more peculiar to unstable, idea-ridden societies. 'Intellectual' has been a bequoted word, and associated with the agitation of movements.

WHAT then is the upshot of our discussion? No word in contemporary political language has aroused such complex emotions of anxiety, hope, hatred, jealousy, admiration, contempt, as has 'intellectual'. During its first twenty years in America from 1898 to 1918, it never won the credentials of full naturalization. Of our sample of thirty-five users, at least two-thirds either placed the word between quotation marks, or prefaced it by 'so-called', or capitalized it in a derogatory fashion. William James, the editors of *The Nation*, Hutchins Hapgood, Peter Kropotkin, Daniel De Leon, Victor Berger, Louis Duchez, *The New York Call*, W. J. Ghent, Charles Dobbs, Erwin Szabo, John Spargo, Jessie W. Hughan, Eugene V. Debs, Robert Hunter, Harry Austryn Wolfson, C. I. Lewis, Arthur O. Lovejoy, John Macy, Brand Whitlock, Booker T. Washington, Randolph Bourne, Robert Michels, G. D. H. Cole, were among those in whose writings the word carried misgivings. And among the eleven writers who used the word without grammatical denigration, there were several like Austin Lewis whose dislike for the intellectuals was furious.

The 'quotation marks' that surround the 'intellectual' above all reflect the ambivalences of social emotion towards the intellectuals; these attitudes of others towards them were often internalized by the intellectuals towards themselves. From the outset of the word's appearance, the critics of the intellectuals called into question their psychological traits, their ethics and their talents; the word often connoted an alien religious or ethnic derivation. Prince Kropotkin speaking in Boston and Morris Cohen addressing his fellow East Siders depicted the neurasthenic, unstable, high-strung emotional natures of the intellectuals. Left Socialist writers charged that the intellectuals were using the movement for their personal ends of gaining power and dominance over others, and that in the measure as they achieved these goals, they became reformists, that is, dropped their revolutionary fervour. Right-wing socialist writers replied that the intellectuals, because of their nervous instabilities, tended to become revolutionary extremists. Many critics felt that the intellectuals were men of books, but not really men of science, because they had had so little contact with social reality; for an ideologist is very much like a pre-Baconian in physical science; he is a man of words, whose feelings make an impermeable layer between himself and reality. The intellectual was suspect because he was *déclassé*; he had separated himself from his class, whether it was upper,

[71] 'The Role of the Intellectuals', *Times Literary Supplement*, 16 September 1955, p. 533. Ian Weinberg, *The English Public Schools: The Sociology of Elite Education*, New York, 1967, pp. 35–36.

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middle, or lower; if he had left his upper class in a psychological sense to be a socialist, there was always a doubt as to his sincerity or future reversion; if he was a working man who read and talked of philosophy and literature, there was the suspicion that he regarded himself as superior to his fellows, and longed for a higher social status. One could be *déclassé* in a negative or positive direction, downward or upward. Either social vector was regarded as possessing a dubious component.

From the other side, the most forthright spokesmen for intellectuals who took pride in the ascription, regarded themselves as supremely the conscience of humanity, as its elite in the highest sense. Not only were their motives the least selfish, the least guided by economic considerations, the most self-sacrificing of status and position, they were also those most endowed with the capacity of thought and the acquirements of scientific knowledge. The conscience of humanity was also its scientist. And lastly, the conscience was frequently endowed with the energies of youth; it was a new conscience, not the traditional one, not of the past; it was a reversed conscience, the voice of the future. The claims were as high as any individual ever dared venture. Every would-be elite evokes the resentment of the rejected. All these complexities of emotion were embedded in the quotation marks which surrounded 'intellectual'. They were indeed rather marks of interrogation which only the future could answer.

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Beyond Dogma

Milovan Djilas*

IF today one were to point out the conciseness and beauty of Kolakowski's style or the refined perspicacity of his thought, one would merely be stressing again the obvious and undeniable qualities of this writer's work. Similarly one could point out again the important role Kolakowski played in freeing contemporary Polish society from the Leninist-Stalinist myths and dogmas, the perseverance with which he did this during the 'Polish October' of 1956. Even more important is the fact that he continued to do so in the years that followed; this required more courage for this 'October' never fulfilled its promise but only served to buttress the 'legal' autonomy of the Party bureaucracy within the framework of the Polish state.

Even if these qualities of Kolakowski had not already been widely appreciated and I were a literary critic, a philosopher or a historian, I would not dwell on them. These qualities are undoubtedly important but they are not those which distinguish Kolakowski from other writers and thinkers who criticize in communism the communist dogma and the contradictions between communist ideals and the privileges and unscrupulousness of the Party bureaucracy.

It is necessary to define these unique qualities of Kolakowski in order to evaluate him more fully, for they are what make him a vital and relevant figure in relation to contemporary currents of thought, especially in the communist world.

Kolakowski has been through all the phases typical of the heretics of communism: an emotional dizziness induced by 'Stalinism', a search for the sources of Marxism embodied in the young Marx (Kolakowski was one of the first to 'discover' him). This evolution seems deceptively typical, but we must examine it in order to ascertain which elements of Kolakowski's personality and thought have their origins in communism and other structures.

IT is essential to clarify the terms used in this context; 'Stalinist' and 'Stalinism' are applied to every former communist, irrespective of the reasons why he might have sympathized with Stalin and his methods. In fact these terms which came into being at the time of cold war simplifications and tensions have now become stereotyped formulas which only serve to delay any democratic changes in the communist world, making any attempt to sober up and view reality more difficult. They only help the Party bosses to delay any real criticism and real changes with 'de-Stalinizations' and 're-Stalinizations'.

* This article on Leszek Kolakowski's *Filosofski Eseji* (Belgrade, 1964) and *Marxism and Beyond* (London, 1969) was published in Paris in the Polish magazine *Kultura*. The English version appears here with the author's permission.

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The term 'Stalinism' is a mythopoeic formula and it is to this that contemporary communists cling. They are not the first to do so for previously 'Stalinists' hung onto 'Leninism'. Indeed 'Stalinism' was not a 'mistake' but rather the final consequence of Marxism. The sheer fact that Marxism, meaning communism, believes in its own scientific nature precludes the possibility of changing Marxism into some kind of communism which would not be 'Stalinist' in some way. Conversely, the disintegration of 'Stalinism' is the disintegration of Marxism as an ideology and of communist 'socialism' as a social system. On the other hand the ability to differentiate between people's reasons for being sympathizers of Stalin is necessary not only for evaluating individual moral attitudes, but also, which is no less important, for examining different existing tendencies and possibilities. There is a great difference between someone who *believed* in Stalin as the man who continued Marx's work and put it into practice and someone who was actually involved in the practical business of applying 'Stalinist' methods and rule. In the former case we would speak of revolutionaries and idealists, whilst in the latter we would speak of bureaucrats and political careerists who merely used the disintegration of 'Stalinist' forms to build up their own monopolies. I am not suggesting however that a revolutionary is free from faults or that idealism in politics may not generate even greater cruelty towards peoples and nations than the most egoistic and shortsighted realism. But it is important to bear in mind that 'Stalinist' idealists and revolutionaries can initiate—and have in fact long since initiated—criticism of 'Stalinism' from within (and thus also of Marxism and of communist practices), while the 'reformist' and 'liberal' Party bureaucracy reacts by a further monopolization of power. This is not a new phenomenon in history generally but it is new in communism: these heretics do not benefit from the changes yet they are the ones who inspire change.

Without a doubt, 'neo-Stalinists' and 'anti-Stalinists' are in a stronger position in the sphere of 'real' politics where the goal is to stay in power. Yet the future does not belong to them: at best they may slightly change the reality they are trying to perpetuate by 'adjusting' themselves. Criticism from within the system strips reality of its mystical, idealized shimmer, thus undermining all its foundations, opening up new perspectives. This is so because the criticism does not come from the alien outside world but springs from the evil and self-deception of communism itself. The bureaucrats may muzzle this criticism but they are not able to extirpate it because it arises inevitably from within communism itself, from its very existence. Soviet bureaucrats can dismiss the philosopher Berdiayev with a mighty 'No', but they cannot do this with Solzhenitsyn although the latter has neither the depth nor the philosophical truth of Berdiayev; the former opposed them from their very beginnings but the latter was born of the system itself.

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I need not stress the fact that Kolakowski belonged to the ideological stratum of former 'Stalinists' as did some of the most important theoreticians of contemporary Marxism: Georg Lukacs, Herbert Marcuse, R. Garaudy and others. Like Kolakowski, all these thinkers are considered by the Kremlin censors of Marxism to be revisionists and deviationists. But the Kremlin bureaucrats are what they are precisely because of their lack of feeling for nuances; everything which deviates in any way from their own conceptions appears homogeneous to them. However the above-mentioned thinkers and other similar theoreticians of Marxism may differ from each other, each has his own particular value and significance within the framework of Marxist literature in the communist movement.

There is however a basic and *essential* difference between these thinkers and Kolakowski. They continue to interpret 'Stalinism' as a distortion of the 'good' Lenin and the 'unblemished' Marx. None of them could bring themselves to think really independently, that is to say to think without harking back to the inherited Marxist 'canons' or to specific circumstances in the past. I am far from accusing these theoreticians of not 'noticing' the outdated and utopian character of Marxist formulas. I also do not wish to criticize them for not 'renouncing' Marxism. What matters is something else: as Marxists (that is while remaining within the framework of Marxism), and as far as I know Kolakowski remained within this framework until he was forced to leave Poland in 1968, they do not behave as men seeking the truth but as believers in an inherited dogma which cannot be challenged. It is because of this that none of them has been able to predict what happened, nor even to recognize the Marxist, and certainly Leninist roots of 'Stalinism', the roots which are so important in accounting for the strength and significance of 'Stalinism' as well as for an understanding of the different trends in the contemporary communist movement. Thus their criticisms of 'Stalinist' deviations—which undoubtedly did occur—remained vain. They all cherish their hopes instead of analysing their premises; instead of becoming aware they became bitter. Their truths remain half-truths. They analyse and perceive to a certain extent but none of them had the courage to abandon the comfortable mental world they have inherited. Because of this none of them is really creative and none of them wishes for anything else but to 'continue' and 'develop still further' the basic dogma.

However, Kolakowski did not hang back when confronted with sacred truths. He thought out everything independently and, thanks to this, also creatively. Thus he had no need to 'renounce' Marxism or to 'notice' its lack of realism. He was guided by his own conscience and his limited artistic ability. Instead of justifying and trying to save the inherited truths he examined them. The framework of dogma within which he lived and thought generated creative impulses as it degenerated in his mind, freeing his consciousness

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from the shackles it had imposed. This forced new moral tensions and mental efforts upon him. Kolakowski is passionate but he does not hate. His work reveals an irony born of resignation but never bitterness. His criticisms are always inspired by real phenomena—be they 'diversions', 'mistakes' or 'departures from the norms'—but he always perceives the essential point of the problem—dogmatism and its oppressive power as a human phenomenon, a phenomenon which in relation to European culture is disastrous to contemporary man and contemporary technology. In fact Kolakowski is not a 'revisionist' and it is only possible to speak of him as a 'reformist' in relation to his political and social activities. Kolakowski is primarily a thinker who does not 'reject' a specific dogma but who transcends it in his works.

ONE of Kolakowski's characteristics is that he did not criticize Marxism but he developed new ideas and terms which sometimes conflict with it but often run parallel to it or arise within its framework. He discovered a continuity in theme and motif between medieval scholasticism and contemporary dogmas and he did this in such a way that one cannot doubt that it is above all relevant to Marxism. Many authors before him have noticed the scholastic side of Marxism and of 'Stalinism' and 'Leninism' also. But only Kolakowski has demonstrated that it is a continuous and permanent element, one of the basic characteristics of European philosophical and social thought.

This is the reason why Kolakowski did not falter before the sacred and unchallengeable truths of Marxism. The destructive power of his logic and his perspicacity seem unlimited. It is by remaining within the framework of Marxism and developing his theses from its postulates that he destroys its basis—its scientific claims about the primacy of matter[1] and about the laws of historical development. New truths emanating from the Marxist dogmatism and 'socialist' reality of Poland and Eastern Europe made themselves heard through Kolakowski. He affirmed in a new way a very old human truth—the impotence and ineffectiveness of dogma when confronted by a free and creative spirit. By situating contemporary dogmas in the framework of an historical tradition in Europe and showing their inadequacy in relation to the contemporary conditions of human existence, Kolakowski established himself as a thinker who belongs to contemporary thought in general and not merely to Poland, to Eastern Europe, or to Marxist 'heresy'.

It is true that with his occasionally unrealistic deliberations on how to get out of the dead-end created by the 'omniscient' and 'omnipotent' Party bureaucracy he might provide the New Left with something to lean on. But the most essential element in his thinking is the belief

[1] 'All our thoughts about reality are also a part of reality no less important than others.' *Marxism and Beyond*, p. 56.

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in the inviolability of personal freedom and freedom of conscience. He thus has never belonged and cannot belong to the 'new' saviours of the human race with their old and well-tried methods of violence. Courageous and critical explorations—the main motive of Kolakowski's work—represent a kind of freedom, while new home-grown revolutionaries do not offer anything which has not been tried by many nations before and found impossible to realize—a bloody and reactionary utopia which even its own protagonists would gladly disavow if they had enough dignity and wisdom.

Kolakowski is not a contemporary philospher in the narrow meaning of this word but no one can deny that he is new and original within the framework and conditions in which he worked. He is probably the most original philosophical phenomenon of 'socialist' Eastern Europe.

My own critical thought has developed along similar lines to that of Kolakowski but mainly by means of political experience and literary imagery. Marxist philosophy has not yet passed through the fire of creative criticism—that is, criticism which grows out of reality and its structure. Kolakowski has been one of the foremost contributors but his work is not yet finished. No one has yet appeared in Europe or in the world to perform this task—maybe Kolakowksi himself will be the one to do it. It was this thought which awakened my admiration for him when I first read him in prison. I bowed before his talent and his independence. Because Kolakowski discovers and presents new feelings and new human values to the world, I am convinced that he is one of the untiring yet tragic protagonists of future victories and future truths emerging from the darkness of violence and the icy chains of dogmatism.

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India and the Soviet Union

Harish Kapur

SINCE the Bolshevik Revolution, the Soviet leaders have displayed a continuous doctrinal interest in Asia. From an ideology originally relevant to the advanced European countries, they had, over the years, transformed Marxism into a revolutionary strategy applicable to countries far removed from the preliminary stage of industrialization. From a theoretical concept, which aimed at the radical distribution of the already produced wealth, it had been converted into a movement of actual production of wealth through the coercive power of the state, thus becoming not a successor to capitalism, but its ferocious rival in societies which had still to achieve their industrial revolutions. And from an ideology which was to inspire revolutions in Europe, it had been slowly evolved into a concept which inextricably linked the success of revolutions in Europe with the consummation of revolution in Asia.

But despite the manifestation of deep doctrinal interest in Asia, Europe during the inter-war period occupied the principal place in Soviet diplomacy. It was towards this continent that the Bolshevik leaders first of all turned in order to incite communist revolutions. And it was in this part of the world that they primarily concentrated their offensive and defensive diplomatic actions, once it became apparent that revolutions had failed. In fact, so overwhelmingly important was this factor in Soviet practice that one can even suggest that Soviet policy towards Asia, in many ways, was influenced by Soviet requirements in Europe. A hardening of Soviet policy towards Europe, for example, invariably led to the embarkation of revolutionary offensives in Asia; a shift to a policy of moderation on that continent very often culminated in the implementation of soft policy in the Asian colonies. Even when Moscow had turned to Asia with deep interest, as was the case in the twenties, it had apparently done so with the primary aim of eventually creating revolutionary situations in Europe by putting its rear in jeopardy.

Immediately after the Second World War, Europe still continued to hold Soviet interest. For it was on that continent that the aftermath of war had brought in its train economic dislocation and political instability. Almost half of Europe had been brought under direct Soviet control, and the Communist Parties of France and Italy had been catapulted into positions of considerable power in the political lives of their countries.

It was thus inevitable that the development of such a situation would only reinforce the Soviet revolutionary mood, and encourage them to view with great expectancy the future prospects of communism in Europe.

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However, within two or three years after the war, the Soviet hope of exercising significant influence in Western Europe was dispelled. Despite the existence of mass Communist Parties in France and Italy, Western Europe rapidly asserted its determination to remain non-communist; and within a brief period of time the whole area became stable, irrevocably limiting the range of Soviet manoeuvres to minor shifts in orientation in one country or another.

THE situation in Asia, by contrast, was far from stable. As a result of the stresses and strains engendered by the war, almost the entire area was undergoing profound revolutionary changes. The colonial powers, greatly weakened by the turbulence of the war, were no longer in a position to reassert their authority. The Indian nationalist movement's demand for complete independence could no longer be forestalled by victorious but nonetheless weak Britain. The massive tide of nationalist revolts in Indonesia, Indo-China and other countries could no longer be contained. And China was deeply riven by an escalating civil war in which the interests of the Western world had been seriously compromised. Obviously, the Soviet Union could no longer assign Asia a secondary role. She could no longer permit her objectives in Europe to determine her policy in Asia. A new and independent assessment of the Asian scene and of Soviet response thereto had thus become necessary.

But the defeat of Japan with the advance of Soviet troops in China, Iran and North Korea highly coloured the generic Soviet view of the important political changes that were taking place in Asia. The nationalist revolutions, not being of the same dimension as the communist revolutions, were considered to be formalistic innovations of no major significance, the main purpose of which was subtly to disguise 'the continual presence of the colonial powers'.

In an elaborate article which appeared in *Bolshevik* in December 1947, Zhukov, principal Soviet spokesman on colonial affairs, sympathetically acknowledged the success of armed struggle in China and Vietnam, and unambiguously castigated the 'so-called theory of a third force'.[1] He characterized the concept as an 'imperialist device', the purpose of which was 'to slander the USSR by placing it on the same level with American imperialism'.[2]

If Zhukov's article was the first serious effort to apply Zhdanov's thesis to Asia, the Southeast Asian Youth Conference, held in Calcutta in February 1948, was the first convenient occasion to introduce this thinking in the operational strategies of Asian communist parties.

At this conference, the peaceful transfer of power in some countries was criticized, and armed resistance against the nationalist government as well as the colonial powers was endorsed as the only effective method for introducing viable revolutionary changes in Asia.

[1] E. Zhukov, 'Obostreniye Krizisa Kolonial'noi sistemy', *Bolshevik*, no. 23, 1947.
[2] Ibid.

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HAVING adopted a highly negative view of the Asian process of decolonization, it was hardly possible for the Soviet leaders to welcome the changes in India where political power was transferred to the Indian National Congress in 1947. What is indeed remarkable is that, notwithstanding Nehru's first declaration as Minister of External Affairs of the interim government, that the Soviet Union was India's neighbour with whom 'we shall have to undertake many common tasks and have much to do with each other',[3] the Soviet reaction to Indian independence was distinctly unfriendly.

The Mountbatten plan, under which independence was given to India and Pakistan, was criticized, and the leadership of the Congress Party was considered to have gone over to reaction by agreeing to British terms for a political settlement.[4] E. Zhukov, in an article on India, stated that the Indian leadership had capitulated to imperialism because the big bourgeoisie feared the masses more than they feared the British. Nehru, who had been regarded as a progressive liberal, was now accused of having moved to the right with such reactionary leaders as Patel.[5] Even Gandhi was not spared. His entire thinking was considered to be 'the basic ideological weapon of the bourgeoisie for the subjection of the masses to their influence, and a prime brake on the awakening of the class consciousness of the workers'.[6] The Indian policy of non-alignment was also condemned and was considered 'to justify a policy of collaboration with English capitalism, a policy of establishing closer contact between the Indian bourgeoisie and English capitalism'.[7]

As loyal adherents of the world communist movement, the Central Committee of the Indian Communist Party changed the Party line to fit it into the new global 'cold war' pattern. In December 1947, the Central Committee bitterly excoriated the Indian bourgeoisie and castigated the Congress, including Nehru personally. And at the Second Party Congress, held in Calcutta in February 1948, a new political line was instituted which gave a revolutionary call to the working class to initiate a programme of reckless violence and insurrection with the clearcut aim of overthrowing the existing Indian Government.[8]

Under the circumstances, it was hardly possible for the Nehru government to implement effectively its policy of non-alignment; for this required the existence of an international atmosphere, permitting not only the establishment of friendly relations with the existing blocs, but also the recognition by them of the existence of such a policy.

[3] *The Statesman*, 30 September 1946.
[4] *Izvestia*, 5 July 1947.
[5] E. Zhukov, 'K. polozheniyu v Indii', *Mirovoye Khozyaistvo i Mirovaya Politika*, Moscow, July 1947, pp. 3–4.
[6] A. Dyakov, *Natsionalny vopros i Angliiskii Imperializm v Indii* (Moscow, 1948), p. 33.
[7] E. Zhukov, op. sit. p. 4.
[8] For details, see M. R. Masani, *The Communist Party of India* (London, 1954), pp. 89–90.

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Therefore, while formally continuing to adhere to a policy of non-alignment, the Indian Government apparently had no other choice but to move closer to the West which, though equally critical of non-alignment, was nonetheless eager to develop close relations with India in the hope of convincing the latter to ally herself with the West.

INDIA'S initial orientation to the West was also partially influenced by her close identification with political ideas emanating from that region. Notwithstanding the firmly ingrained opposition to imperialism and emotional attraction to the Soviet experiment, many of the decision-makers were attracted, influenced and even shaped by the paradigm of political and social ideas rampant in the capitals of liberal Europe. Even the deep attraction to socialism noticeable among many of them was encrusted with political liberalism, making it possible to communicate with the West European nations within a generally acceptable framework.

It was thus not at all surprising to discern a pro-Western orientation in India's external relations during the first few years after independence. For instance, her attitude to Korean unification and the Greek civil war was closer to that of the West than that of the Soviet Union.[9] Indeed, according to K. M. Pannikar, Indian policy on the two issues led the Soviet and the Ukrainian delegations in the United Nations to adopt a less cordial attitude towards their Indian counterpart.[10]

At a meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers in October 1948, India gave her unequivocal support to Great Britain's decision to adhere to the association of West European nations under the Brussels Treaty. India's decision to continue her membership in the Commonwealth, and her agreement to give joint Commonwealth military aid to Burma for the obvious purpose of strengthening the existing government against the communist rebels, were also important indications of New Delhi's partiality for the West.

However, in order to obviate the inevitable impression that India was slowly sliding into the Western camp, Nehru, at the same time, made it a point to express openly his anti-imperialist views. On numerous occasions he proclaimed that the colonial world must become independent, and actually assured the nationalists of many subjugated countries of India's moral and material support. Although there is no doubt that by adopting such a policy Nehru was giving expression to his genuine convictions against imperialism, one should nonetheless not ignore the important fact that such open statements served the purpose of convincing the outside world of India's independence from the West. For instance, the convening of an Asian conference by Nehru in 1949 to take concerted action against the Dutch, who were trying to reimpose

[9] Karunakaran, *India in World Affairs* (Calcutta, 1952), p. 280.
[10] K. M. Pannikar, *In Two Chinas. Memoirs of a Diplomat* (London, 1955), pp. 10–11.

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their rule in Indonesia, must have gone a long way towards the projecting of an anti-colonial image of India.

Thus, during the first two years of her independence, India found herself in the position, on the one hand, of an anti-imperialist nation eager to assist the colonial world in the attainment of independence, and on the other, of establishing significant economic and political relations with the West to the exclusion of the Soviet Union.

With the communization of China, the relations between India and the Soviet Union became even more strained. For the Soviet leaders, the communist revolution in China was only a confirmation of the long-held view regarding the potentialities of communist revolutions in Asia.

But if Moscow was impressed by the unexpected success of the Chinese revolution, it was also perhaps fearful of the important influence communist China could exercise on the Asian communist parties. Such a possibility could not be excluded in view of the apparent similarities existing among the Asian nations which made the Chinese experiment more relevant to Asian conditions than the one that was taking place in the Soviet Union. An extra effort was therefore made to be even more belligerent, in their criticism of Nehru and his government. The Indian Prime Minister, who was visiting the United States during the month in which the Chinese revolution had taken place, was vehemently criticized by the Soviet press. Explaining the implications of Nehru's remarks in New York that India would support the United States in any 'defensive war', Dyakov said that 'India was prepared to offer all her resources to the Anglo-American bloc of instigators of a further cold war'.[11]

Another Soviet observer went even further and stated that 'the vacancy left by Chiang Kai-shek is being offered to Nehru'.[12]

FOR India, the dramatic events of China were hardly a favourable sign, for they had not only skewed the Asian balance of power in favour of the apparently monolithic communist world, but had, with the Chinese occupation of Tibet, brought a dynamic and an unfriendly communist state to the very doors of India. For the first time, the Himalayan region, which had remained dormant all through history, suddenly became a live frontier, generating new strategic problems that the country had never faced before.

But what could India do in the light of the new situation? A formal alliance with the West was excluded, in view of the forthright decision of the Nehru government to make non-alignment its article of faith. An alliance with the communist world was equally impossible in view of the profound ideological and political gap that separated those who were in power in India from those who were the decision-makers in communist countries.

[11] *Pravda*, 25 November 1949.
[12] *New Times*, 12 October 1949, pp. 20–21.

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Nonetheless, it was obvious that some new approach had become necessary so far as communist countries were concerned, for the monolithic unity of the bloc seemed threatening; and it was in response to this need that there arose a broad consensus among the Indian decision-makers to deploy different efforts to face the new situation.

First of all, a number of political and military steps were taken to strengthen India's defences. New treaties were negotiated with the strategic Himalayan states of Bhutan (1949), Sikkim (1950) and Nepal (1951), underlining in different degrees the interdependence between them and India. Discreet steps were taken to improve communications throughout the mountainous tribal areas, to increase the number of check-posts in the middle sector, and to extend the rudiments of effective administration in the North-East Frontier Agency right up to the McMahon line.[13] A high-level north and north-eastern border defence committee was also established (1951) to investigate the long-term aspects of Himalayan security.[14]

But most of these steps were primarily diplomatic, administrative and police measures, the purpose of which was to bring about a modest improvement in India's defences. All the concerted defence preparations were, however, studiously avoided, either because of a fear of an adverse reaction from China or because of economic reasons.

However, notwithstanding the partial strengthening of India's defences, there appeared to exist a general consensus among Indian decision-makers that political rapprochement with the communist world was really the only rational substitute for any military confrontation. There did not seem to exist, in their view, any other option that they could rationally decide on. India was presumably too weak to defy any big nations and too concerned with playing a moral role in international affairs to jeopardize it by having a showdown with any one of them.

IT was in this frame of mind that a diplomatic offensive was launched to seek some normalization, if not complete understanding, with the communist countries. China, geographically and spiritually closer to India, naturally became the first objective of Indian diplomacy. It was argued that traditional friendship between the two countries and the essentially nationalistic character of the Chinese revolution would, if properly manipulated, encourage the Peking leaders to give greater precedence to Asian solidarity than to Marxist dogma. Thus, notwithstanding Peking's adverse criticism of India, Nehru obstinately maintained that the development of friendly relations between communist China and India was of vital importance to both countries. He demanded the admission of Peking into the United Nations, insisted on the return of Formosa to the People's Republic, and declined to accept the invitation of the United States to go to San Francisco to sign the

[13] For details, see Lorne J. Kavic, *India's Quest for Security: Defense Policies, 1947–1965* (Berkeley, 1967), pp. 46–61.
[14] Ibid. p. 46.

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Japanese peace treaty, on the grounds that communist China, one of the major victims of Japanese aggression during the Second World War, had refused to accept the American draft treaty. Furthermore, when China had intervened in the Korean War, India refused to give her support to the United Nations resolution which condemned Peking as an aggressor. In fact, so great was Nehru's desire to seek some understanding with China that even when Tibet—of vital importance to India—had been forcibly incorporated by the Chinese troops in 1950, he avoided a showdown, though he did not fail to make it clear to Peking that he did not approve of such actions.

In the event, his single-minded policy began to pay off; for it became increasingly evident that Peking was slowly abandoning its belligerent line.

The first signs of change began to become apparent during the Korean War. The Chinese attitude towards India, for instance, underwent a change when it became increasingly evident that Nehru's attitude towards the Korean conflict was by no means identical to that of the west. Chou En-lai paid tributes to him for his contribution to end the war [15] and Mao Tse-tung, who personally proposed a friendly toast at the first anniversary celebrations of the Indian Republic, spoke to the Indian Ambassador in warm terms about the Indian Prime Minister, and expressed the hope of meeting him soon in China. He also underlined the importance of developing cultural and educational exchanges between the two countries.

India's refusal to sign the Japanese peace treaty was warmly received by the Chinese press. The *People's Daily* editorially welcomed the decision of the Indian Government to boycott the San Francisco conference and expressed the view that such an action proved 'that the age was past when imperialist governments can do whatever they please'.[16]

New Delhi was thus no longer considered to be tied to the apron strings of the West, and Nehru was no longer condemned as the 'running dog of imperialism'. With great rapidity, the relations began to develop on an even keel. Visits were exchanged, international affairs were amiably discussed, and a number of agreements were signed, the most important of which was the agreement on Tibet (April 1954) that contained the five principles of peaceful coexistence.

It would be, of course, presumptuous to attribute the change in China's policy exclusively to Indian patience and initiative. Obviously there were many different factors and circumstances that must have contributed to the formulation of the new policy. None the less, the Indian factor is important in so far as it was India's determination to adopt an independent line on many controversial issues concerning China that led her leaders to appreciate the importance of non-alignment in international affairs.

[15] K. M. Pannikar, op. cit. p. 123.
[16] *People's Daily*, 16 September 1951.

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Undoubtedly, this important change in the Chinese attitude towards India and her policy of non-alignment was the first major breakthrough for Indian diplomacy; for it disintegrated the monolithic view which the communist world had of India, and inaugurated a new policy towards the non-communist countries of Asia.

WITHIN a year after the shift in Chinese policy, the Soviet Union too began to show definite signs of change. Evidently, it was hardly expedient for the Moscow leaders to continue the old and rather unsuccessful line, when China, the largest and the most powerful communist nation in Asia, had decided to take a different line. For one thing, it would have only further aggravated Soviet isolation from Asia, leaving the diplomatic field wide open for China to increase her influence in the area. For another, it would have generated serious differences among the Asian communists who were already showing some signs of bemusement at the subtle manifestation of differences on the revolutionary strategy to be pursued in Asia. Perhaps the most decisive reason that led to an innovation in Soviet policy, however, was the disastrous consequences that had resulted from the pursuit of a militant line. Almost all the communist parties in the area had been crushed and isolated from the mainstream of Asian politics. In India, for example, where the Communist Party, over the years, had established impressive footholds among workers, peasants and intellectuals, the feckless revolts under the leadership of B. T. Ranadive and Rajeswar Rao—the one centring around the workers and the other around the peasants—plummeted their prestige to an all-time low, sharply declining the party's membership from an estimated 90,000 to 20,000.[17]

Such a serious setback, both in the political as well as the diplomatic front, made it imperative for the Soviet leaders to re-examine their policy; and it must have become evident to them that their assessment of the Asian political scene was based on a misconception of the political reality existing in the area. In the first place, many nationalist leaders and their political parties were too strong, and too deeply rooted among the people of their countries to be overthrown by the artificially created revolutionary upheavals. The communist parties, though powerful enough to create confusion, were not effective enough to take over the reins of power. Secondly, many of the Asian leaders, having been impressed at some stage of their lives by the Soviet revolution, had often proclaimed their intention of introducing a much more far-reaching socialistic pattern of society in their countries than had ever been intended by the non-communist leaders of the West. Obviously this was in many ways a unique situation; and a contemptuous identification of it with world capitalism had only shown the magnitude of Soviet dogmatism.

A rapid change was therefore instituted in Soviet ideological think-

[17] Overstreet & Windmiller, *Communism in India* (Berkeley, 1959), p. 357.

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ing and policy. Instead of striving for immediate control over these areas, Soviet diplomacy now limited its objective to the task of detaching them from the 'imperialist bloc', and then slowly attaching them to the 'camp of peace and socialism'. The new trend in Soviet policy was therefore identified as 'working with the national bourgeoisie' and it was more concerned with influencing the orientation of nationalist leaders in world affairs than encouraging their overthrow by the local communist parties.

So far as India was concerned, the new line initially manifested itself in relatively minor matters. For instance, the Soviet Government, which had so far kept itself aloof, suddenly agreed in the beginning of 1952 to build a Russian pavilion at the International Industries Fair at Bombay, and expressed willingness to make capital goods available to India.[18] Indian businessmen were unexpectedly invited to attend the International Economic Conference to be held in April 1952 in Moscow.[19] Stalin, who had not met any foreign diplomat for almost two years, granted a parting interview to the Indian Ambassador, Dr Radhakrishnan, on 5 April of the same year.[20] And the Soviet Government promptly agreed to the appointment of K. P. S. Menon as the new Indian Ambassador to Moscow.[21]

The occurrence of such minor events in a non-communist country may not be considered of any particular importance, but they are of significance in the case of the Soviet Union, where an important change is often preceded by a series of minor innovations. It was, however, the death of Stalin which heralded striking innovations in Soviet policy.

SO far as India was concerned, the first important and formal sign of Soviet change was manifested in August 1954, when Malenkov, in his speech to the Supreme Soviet, praised India's role in the Korean armistice.

The contrast in this speech between a severe criticism of the United States, and his friendly reference to the new states of Asia, gave a hint that the new Soviet leaders recognized the potential value to Soviet policy of a friendly approach to the national governments of Asia.

The new Soviet Government lost no time in giving a concrete shape to its policy. In the summer of 1953, an Indian art exhibition was held in Moscow at the request of the Soviet Government.[22] In October 1953, the new Soviet Ambassador to New Delhi, M. A. Menshikov, handed a cheque of 296,560 rupees to Nehru for the national relief fund,[23] and placed a wreath on the tomb of Gandhi, an

18 *India Record* (London, 28 February 1953).
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 K. P. S. Menon, *The Flying Troika* (London, 1963), p. 2.
22 K. P. S. Menon, op. cit. pp. 17, 63.
23 *New Times*, 31 October 1953, p. 32.

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important gesture which his predecessor, Novikov, had carefully avoided. In the same month, he offered to supply India with industrial equipment, farm machinery and tools at prices more favourable than those prevailing in the West. In exchange for these commodities, Menshikov, on behalf of his government, agreed to buy jute and tea, for which there was at that time a great slack in demand in the West because of the Korean armistice. On 2 December, an important trade agreement was signed with India which bound the two governments to facilitate trade between the two countries over a wide range of goods.[24] Mutual visits were also encouraged between the two countries. By the end of 1954, as many as 14 Indian delegations, from a football team to industrialists, visited Moscow at the invitation of the Soviet Government.

UNDOUBTEDLY, these events had created the necessary atmosphere for the growth of Indo-Soviet relations. All that was now needed was the development of some factors or circumstances which would push the relations between the two countries to a higher political plane. This was provided by the United States in 1954. During that year, Washington, in an effort to negate some of the inherent weaknesses apparent in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, devoted a considerable part of its efforts to the building up of military alliances. The Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty was signed on 8 September; and under active encouragement from Washington, elements of the 'Northern Tier' defence system, embracing Turkey, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq also emerged in 1954. Furthermore, significant military assistance was furnished by Washington to Pakistan.

To New Delhi, the notion of a defence alliance to protect Southeast Asia and the Middle East against a possible Chinese or Soviet attack was abhorrent on many counts. First, such an alliance contradicted India's passionately held view that military blocs generally were steps towards war rather than peace. Secondly, the projected inclusion of Pakistan threatened to introduce a system of military blocs into India's immediate neighbourhood, thus converting the Indian subcontinent into a theatre of cold war at the very time when New Delhi was making strenuous efforts to make it the centre of a 'peace area'. Thirdly, the prospect of United States military assistance to Pakistan threatened to strengthen that country not only in relation to the Soviet Union with whom she hardly had any quarrel, but also in relation to India with whom important issues were still outstanding. Therefore, despite all the assurances by the United States that military assistance to Pakistan was not and would not be directed against India, Nehru reaffirmed his wholehearted distaste for the whole project.

Inevitably, all these developments germinated important changes

[24] For complete text, see *Foreign Affairs Reports* (New Delhi, December 1959).

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in India's policy towards the outside world. First, a wave of anti-American sentiment swept the country, alienating even an important element of Indian public opinion which was sympathetic to the United States. In fact, so intense was this feeling that even the relatively moderate Nehru government was affected by it—so much so that the United Nations was informally advised to remove its officers of American nationality stationed in Kashmir, since they were no longer considered neutral in the Kashmir dispute.[25]

Secondly, India began to devote a considerable part of her diplomatic efforts to bring together all like-minded Asian countries with the object of giving definite shape to non-alignment as an international force. There does not seem to be any doubt that the United States' activities in the area threw into relief, and each other's company, those nations which for one reason or another found it more convenient to occupy the no-man's land between the Western and the communist blocs than to attach themselves to either.

Thirdly, India began to show definite signs of moving closer to Peking and Moscow, the most important indications of which were Nehru's visit to Peking in 1954 and his acceptance of the Soviet invitation to visit the Soviet Union.

MOSCOW, equally opposed to American efforts to build anti-communist alliances, naturally viewed Indian opposition as an excellent opportunity to cultivate with India and exploit the rising anti-American feeling manifesting itself in the country. Nehru's severe criticism of United States military aid to Pakistan did not go unnoticed. On the contrary, wide coverage was given to his views in the Soviet press. The Indian people, said a *Pravda* article, 'cannot but be alarmed seeing the attempts to set up an aggressive bloc right on India's borders, which will invariably lead to the building of foreign bases and airfields on the territories of India's neighbours and to the militarization of those countries with which it is attempting to maintain closer relations'.[26]

A massive offensive of friendship was thus launched; and Soviet writers, who only a few years earlier had made it a point to stress the unfortunate aspects of Indian life, now began to project a favourable image of the country. Suddenly they found that 'everything in India attracts the artist's eye'.[27] Those who in the past had written about India's slums and filthy streets now mentioned 'the fine buildings which to this day are like a hymn of man's genius'.[28] In an effort to create a proper atmosphere between the two countries, Soviet historians began to underline the great importance that was attached by Lenin to the revolutionary movement in India.[29] They also discovered

[25] Ibid. 20 March 1954.
[26] *Pravda*, 27 September 1953.
[27] *New Times*, 7 August 1954, pp. 27–29.
[28] Ibid.
[29] *Pravda*, 21 April 1954.

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that Afanasi Nikitin, a subject of the Tsar, had visited India in 1469–72. Since it was appropriate and timely to give him credit for this adventure, he was duly made a national hero. In the presence of the Indian Ambassador, a statue of Nikitin was unveiled in Kalinan in May 1955.[30] Mahatma Gandhi, who had so far been consistently condemned as reactionary in Soviet publications, was now praised for his progressive and important role in the national struggle.[31]

It was perhaps in the diplomatic field that the change in Soviet policy was most striking. No longer was India's foreign policy considered to be tied to the apron strings of the West, and no longer was Nehru considered a reactionary serving the interests of the imperialists. On the contrary, Soviet official declarations and articles in the press were now full of praise for India and her approach to world problems. Hardly an occasion was missed to underline her important role in international affairs. During Nehru's visit to the Soviet Union in June 1955, the Soviet public was mobilized to give him a reception 'for which there has been no parallel in Moscow before or since'.[32] As part of this diplomatic offensive, the Soviet Government extended complete support to India on the two foreign policy issues—Kashmir and Goa—that faced her in the middle fifties. Unlike the West, whose attitude on these issues was, to say the least, ambivalent, the Soviet Government came out openly and categorically on the side of India. This became evident during Khrushchev's and Bulganin's visit to India in 1955. For Khrushchev, the Kashmir problem had already been resolved by the people of the area, and it was only a question of time before 'Goa will free itself from foreign rule and will become an integral part of the republic of India'.[33]

But such diplomatic action, though undoubtedly effective for generating a favourable Soviet image, was apparently not sufficient to encourage Indian orientation in the direction of Moscow. For India was inhibited in her goal of attaining real and effective disengagement from the West due to her excessive dependence on that area. Practically all her aid came from the West, and almost all her trade was geared to Western markets. The Indian leaders were aware of the difficulties that such a situation created in the formulation of an independent foreign policy, but they could hardly remedy this state of affairs in view of Soviet aversion to non-aligned India. Thus, notwithstanding the Indian determination to pursue an independent policy, her options in real terms were severely circumscribed. She could hardly disengage herself from the West.

[30] K. P. S. Menon, op. cit. pp. 17, 115.
[31] N. A. Bulganin and N. S. Khrushchev, *Speeches during Sojourn in India, Burma and Afghanistan* (New Delhi, 1956).
[32] For some details, see K. P. S. Menon, op. cit. p. 106.
[33] N. A. Bulganin and N. S. Khrushchev, op. cit. p. 73.

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HOWEVER, after the death of Stalin, and with the inauguration of a moderate policy, the forging of economic links with India and other non-aligned countries became the key lever of Soviet foreign policy.

An unprecedented Soviet offensive was launched to make India less dependent on the West. It was argued that as long as she was economically tied to the West, it was not possible for her to pursue an independent line in foreign affairs.

The net result of this offensive was the considerable rise in trade turnover between the two countries. From a negligible figure of 8·1 million rupees, it increased to 719·7 million rupees in 1961, to 1,753·6 million in 1965,[34] to 2,269·5 million in 1966–67,[35] and to 4,970 million rupees at the end of 1968.[36] According to the commercial agreement for 1966–67, signed on 7 January 1966, the trade between the two countries is expected to have doubled by 1970 as compared to 1964.[37] In fact, it has been suggested by some specialists that India could 'hopefully increase her turnover of trade to more than double', as compared to 1964, 'if she can harness and develop capacity to produce various items needed in the Soviet Union'.[38]

It is evident that there was a favourable constellation of factors that contributed to this rapid rise: there was the Soviet determination to develop relations, and there was also the fact that the rapid rate of growth was accounted for by the low level from which it had started 15 years earlier. Nonetheless the rate of growth is too significant to be attributable only to the absence of any relations in 1953 or to such elements as political determination.[39]

In the case of aid, too, the Soviet contribution to Indian economic development is undoubtedly significant. By 1967, Soviet credits totalled well over 10 billion rupees and made India the recipient of by far the largest amount of Soviet foreign aid (exclusive of arms). Admittedly the total assistance emanating from Moscow is less than the aid given by Washington, but its impact on the Indian economy is undoubtedly greater. By and large, most Indians tend to agree with the view that the aid coming from Moscow was more favourable and more approximate to Indian economic thinking.

Although such a widely prevalent view may be partly due to the remarkably well-organized publicity concerning Soviet economic assistance, it is, however, principally due to the considerable advantage that accrues from such aid.

In the first place, Soviet assistance is primarily concentrated on

[34] For details, see *Yearbook of International Trade Statistics 1965* (New York, 1967), p. 361.
[35] *The Statesman's Yearbook 1968–1969* (New York, 1968), p. 381.
[36] B. R. Ghagat, 'Indo-Soviet Trade. Promising Prospects Ahead', *Commerce*, 11 April 1970.
[37] *Soviet News*, 11 January 1966, p. 23.
[38] Government of India, *India's Trade with East Europe* (New Delhi, 1966), p. 45.
[39] For details, see V. Rymalov, *La collaboration économique de l'URSS avec les pays sous-développés* (Moscow, not dated).

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heavy industry in the public sector—an area to which the Indian decision-makers have given top priority. In fact, most of the expansion of Indian heavy industry has been due to the direct or indirect assistance emanating from Moscow. Even a cursory glance at the Indian economic plans would show that Soviet assistance is concentrated on the building up of steel plants, on the exploring and refining of oil and on the development of heavy engineering and electrical equipment plants.[40]

Secondly, most of the credits given to India are long-term credits, the repayment of which begins one year after the completion of deliveries of the equipment.[41] Such an arrangement made it possible for India to incorporate Soviet assistance in her planning and establish her plans for a number of years. Thirdly, all the Soviet credits do not exceed an interest of 2·5 per cent. Fourthly, the repayment of Soviet credits is either in rupees or in goods.

The Soviet contribution to long-term Indian economic development is indeed significant, and it has played a decisive role in the forging of close ties between the two countries. This was naturally considered as an important development by most Indians, as it implied not only a general communist approbation of India's policy of non-alignment, but it also permitted her to decrease her dependence on the West, and thereby successfully attain a balance between the East and the West without being criticized by either of them that she had slidden into the other camp.

THE general communist approbation of India's foreign policy, however, did not last long; for by 1959 it became increasingly evident that communist China was veering away from a gradualist and moderate policy in internal as well as external affairs. Internally, the 'hundred flowers' movement that was launched by the Chinese leadership to generate free discussion was abruptly ended in 1958, and externally more and more emphasis was laid on the decisive shift of the international balance of power in favour of the communist countries, on the struggle against 'American imperialism', and on the 'uninterrupted revolutions' in the developing countries.

As an integral part of this belligerent line, India was made an important target of Chinese hostility. A number of Indian political parties were accused of fomenting the Tibetan revolt of March 1959, and the Indian Parliament was denounced for interfering in the internal affairs of China.[42] An unusually long editorial appeared in the *People's Daily* on 6 May in which, alternating between condescending friendliness and outspoken intransigence, Nehru was criticised for his views on Tibet.[43] For the first time (January 1959) the entire border alignment

[40] For details, see V. Rymalov, op. cit.
[41] Ibid.
[42] *Peking Review*, 31 March 1959.
[43] The editorial was entitled 'The Revolution in Tibet and Nehru Philosophy'; for complete text, see *Tibet Documents* (New Delhi, 1959).

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between India and China was questioned, and in September of the same year, after some frontier incidents, a claim was laid to about 50,000 square miles of what the Indians considered to be a part of their territory.[44] Within a year after these developments, the relations between Peking and New Delhi had become so strained that they had begun openly to accuse each other of imperialistic designs. A new situation had thus developed.

A general feeling of apprehension soon arose in India about the possible Soviet reaction to the dispute. For how could she, many argued, remain neutral in a conflict between a communist and a non-communist country? Therefore, when the Sino-Indian relations had become particularly tense as a result of the Longju incident in August 1959, it was widely assumed that Moscow would support Peking, thus recreating a common hostile front against India on the same lines as had existed during the first five years of Indian independence. However, to the surprise of many observers, the Soviet leaders adopted a line of neutrality. Through a *Tass* statement of 9 September 1959, the Soviet Government deplored the Sino-Indian dispute, and expressed the hope that it would be settled through peaceful negotiations between the two states.

Such a view was reiterated by Khrushchev personally. Speaking at a meeting of the Supreme Soviet on 31 October 1959, he regretted the incidents between states 'friendly to us' and stated that 'we would be very happy if there were no more incidents, if the existing frontier disputes were settled through friendly negotiations to the satisfaction of both parties'.[45]

Such an attitude on the part of the Soviet Government was indeed unprecedented; for never since the formation of communist states in Eastern Europe and the Far East had Moscow adopted a posture of neutrality between a communist and a non-communist state.

WHAT was it that led the Soviet leaders to adopt such an unusual attitude? Why did they adopt such a non-committal posture, when it was unobtrusively evident that any public expression of neutrality would only introduce another element of strain in the already aggravated relations with Peking?

It would appear that there were two important considerations that may have led the Soviet Government to adopt such an unusual attitude. First, by 1959 Soviet policy towards the non-aligned world had become remarkably successful. It had by that year not only succeeded in establishing economic relations and forging useful political links, but it had successfully disengaged many of them from the West—an important Soviet objective. Naturally the Soviet Government was

[44] Indian Ministry of External Affairs, *White Paper* no. 11 (New Delhi, 1959), p. 53.
[45] N. S. Khrushchev, *World Without Arms, World Without Wars*, Book 2 (Moscow, 1959), p. 399.

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reluctant to undo all these achievements—which might have been the case if they had criticized India on the Sino-Indian border dispute. Secondly, by 1959, Sino-Soviet differences had bubbled to the surface. On many important political and ideological issues a point of no return had already been reached and there were definite indications that China and Soviet Russia had decided to go their different ways. Under the circumstances, Moscow was unlikely to risk losing its already enhanced prestige among the non-aligned countries in order to appease China, who was, in any case, determined to go her own way irrespective of the stand Moscow might take on the Sino-Indian dispute. Therefore, despite the informal appeals from Peking that Moscow should refrain from any public declaration that might embarrass China, the *Tass* statement was made.[46]

Nonetheless, it is evident that the conflict between New Delhi and Peking must have been a source of great concern and embarrassment to the Soviet leaders. Clearly any further escalation of the dispute was not in their interest, for it would have further narrowed their margin for manoeuvre and would have contributed to the undermining of their policy towards the non-aligned countries. It is therefore not surprising that notwithstanding Sino-Soviet differences, Khrushchev, during his unexpected and rather sudden visit to India on 11 February 1960, extensively discussed the Sino-Indian border dispute with the Indian leaders, and finally persuaded reluctant Nehru to extend an invitation to Chou En-lai to discuss Sino-Indian differences.[47] However, in the prevailing state of public opinion in India—including Nehru's own party—it was not possible for the Prime Minister to conduct negotiations with Chou En-lai on a give-and-take basis. The Chinese proposal of surrendering the Indian claim over Aksai Chin area in exchange for the Chinese recognition of the McMahon line was rejected, leading to the further exacerbation of the Sino-Indian dispute.

With the further deterioration of Sino-Indian relations, Moscow went even further and began to criticize Peking for its attitude towards India. In an interview with the Moscow correspondent of the Indian Communist Party weekly, *New Age*, Khrushchev suggested in his flamboyant manner that China's policy was incorrect, and compared it with that of the Soviet Government which had given away some of its territory to Iran to settle the border dispute with her southern neighbour.[48] According to the Chinese sources, the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party had informed the Chinese party in a verbal notification that 'one cannot possibly seriously think that a State such as India which is militarily and economically immeasurably weaker than China would really launch a military attack on China and commit aggression against it'.[49]

[46] *Peking Review*, 8 November 1963.
[47] *Hindu*, 13 February 1960.
[48] *Link*, 15 August 1962, p. 73.
[49] Editorial Department of *People's Daily*, 'The truth about how the leaders of the CPSU have allied themselves with India against China', *People's Daily*, 2 November 1963.

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However, when the Chinese communists launched their massive attack on India on 20 October 1962, Moscow made a volte-face and squarely sided with the Chinese. In an editorial on 25 October 1962, *Pravda* denounced the McMahon line as a line imposed by the imperialists, and approved the Chinese ceasefire proposals.[50]

WHAT were the reasons for this sudden and unexpected change? Was it because the Soviet leaders, seriously embroiled in the Cuban crisis, were eager to avoid a showdown with Peking at that time? Whatever might have been the reasons for such a radical shift, one thing was certain: India was deeply disappointed. Many members of the Parliament criticized the Soviet reaction to the dispute. Even E. V. Baliga, President of the National Council of the Indo-Soviet Cultural Society, deplored the stand taken by the Soviet Government.[51]

The Indian Government, however, did not give up hope that Moscow might change its attitude once the Cuban crisis had subsided. Therefore, despite the existence of general discontent in the country, Nehru avoided criticizing Moscow, and actually went to the extent of stating that he understood the Soviet difficulties on the question.

He said:

> The Soviet Union has been, as the house knows, consistently friendly to us. It has been put in a very difficult position in this matter because they [the Soviets] have been and are allies of China, and hence the embarrassment to them as between a country with which they are friendly and a country which is their ally. We have realized that and we do not expect them to do anything which would definitely mean a breach over there. It is not for us to suggest to any country. But we have had their goodwill and good wishes all along, even very recently, and that is a consolation to us and we certainly hope to have that in the future.[52]

On 5 November, however, the Soviet Government reverted to its original neutralist line. In an editorial on the border question, *Pravda* now maintained a complete silence about the McMahon line and no longer extended complete support to the Chinese ceasefire proposal. A simple appeal was made to both sides instead, to agree to a ceasefire and to discuss the whole question without imposing any conditions.[53]

With the further aggravation of the Sino-Soviet dispute, Moscow even renounced its posture of neutrality, and began openly to criticize China for her attitude towards India. At the Italian Communist Party Congress, held in December 1962, F. Kozlov criticized the Chinese Party of what he called an ' adventuristic position ' on the Sino-Indian border conflict.[54] In a series of articles in August 1963, *Pravda* denounced Chinese aggres-

50 *Pravda*, 25 October 1962.
51 *Background* (New Delhi, 10 December 1962), p. 2.
52 Ministry of External Affairs, *Prime Minister on Chinese Aggression* (New Delhi, 1962), p. 87.
53 *Pravda*, 5 November 1962.
54 *New York Times*, 4 December 1962.

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sion against India, and lashed out at Peking's failure to seek a peaceful settlement of the border dispute.[55] On 15 February 1964, Suslov in his report to the plenary session of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party also criticized Chinese policy towards India and viewed it as having 'rendered a great service to imperialism and done great harm to the national liberation movement, the progressive forces of India and the entire front of the anti-imperialist struggle'.[56]

At the same time, Soviet aid was stepped up and a number of agreements were signed covering specific projects. The most important agreement was the Soviet accord in January 1965 to construct the Bokaro Steel Plant which the United States Government had agreed to build, but was forced to renounce later due to internal political pressure.[57]

It was, however, in the military field that the tempo of Soviet aid was really accelerated. Following the Chinese invasion, the Soviet Union sent all types of armed equipment needed for mountain warfare, agreed to establish factories to manufacture MIG-21 jet fighters, and made available ground-to-air missiles, light tanks, mobile and fixed launching installations and radar equipment which could be used on any part of the Indian frontier. By May 1964, the total military aid that emanated from Moscow—130 million dollars—was greater than the aid that was given by the United States during the same period.[58] And in September 1964, India received a new pledge of 140 million dollars under which the Russians agreed to supply 44 MIG-21s, 50 ground-to-air missiles, about 70 light tanks, six submarines and an assortment of various infantry weapons.[59] To finance this, the Russians provided a ten-year loan at 2 per cent.

IT is thus evident that within the general framework of Soviet diplomacy in Asia, India gradually acquired a significant place. In fact, one could venture to suggest that she had by 1964 gained a position of centrality. The quantum of military and economic assistance emanating from Moscow had indeed become considerable; and the political encouragement she had begun to receive to attain some of her foreign policy objectives was as striking as the absence of such assistance from the United States and Great Britain.

However, after the fall of Khrushchev in 1964, who was the real architect of excessive Soviet involvement in India, the new Soviet leaders adopted a remarkably subtle policy of extricating themselves from a position of immoderate involvement in any one country which was not under their direct control, and strove to develop relations with other Asian nations.

Perhaps the most significant development in this direction, so far

[55] *Pravda*, 10 and 13 August 1963.
[56] Ibid. 3 April 1964.
[57] O. P. Mehrotra, *From Bhilai to Bokaro* (New Delhi, 1968).
[58] *New York Times*, 13 May 1964.
[59] Ibid. 4 August 1965; see also *Link*, 20 and 27 September 1964.

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as India was concerned, was the remarkable and rather rapid improvement in Soviet-Pakistan relations. Although some contacts had already been established in the early sixties,[60] effective signs of a real normalization, however, became evident only in 1964 and 1965. In 1964, a cultural agreement was signed, visits were exchanged, economic relations were developed, a Soviet loan was given, and favourable articles were published in the Soviet press underlining the positive nature of developments in Pakistan.[61] In 1965, Ayub Khan visited the Soviet Union. This was the first time that the head of the Pakistan state was visiting Moscow. Naturally the occasion was fully used to have an extensive exchange of views which resulted in the partial removal of misunderstandings that plagued the relations between the two countries.[62] But the principal development in Soviet-Pakistan relations was the Soviet decision to adopt a position of neutrality on the issues that racked the two countries. This became apparent during the Indian President's visit in September 1964.[63] On this occasion, the joint statement produced no mention of Kashmir. During Prime Minister Shastri's visit in the spring of 1965, the Soviet leaders avoided taking a pro-Indian stand on the Kashmir and the Rann of Kutch disputes, and expressed the view that 'the Soviet people would like them to settle their border disputes and other disputes peacefully, and all prerequisites for this are there'.[64] Two days later he noted that only imperialists could benefit when 'liberated states quarrelled', while the joint communiqué omitted specific references both to Kashmir and the Kutch issues, and declared only that disputes 'must be resolved by way of peaceful talks and the use of force to settle disputes is impermissible'.[65]

By adopting such a policy, the Soviet Union succeeded in disengaging herself from the Indo-Pakistan dispute in which she had overly embroiled herself in the mid-fifties. But this disengagement could not in any way be likened to the policy she followed after the independence of the sub-continent; for at that time she did not appear to be interested in forging significant relations with either of the two governments, whereas in the mid-sixties she was eager to develop relations with both of them.

The skilful handling of a complicated and rather explosive situation stood the Soviet Government in good stead; for not too long after the adoption of such a line, it was successful in establishing friendly relations with Pakistan without generating a serious crisis in Indo-Soviet relations, without arousing the indignation of sensitive India. Undoubtedly, this was a remarkable feat of Soviet diplomacy.

[60] An aid agreement was signed with Pakistan in March 1961 and a trade agreement was concluded in August 1963.

[61] For details, see I. H. Qureshi (ed.), *Foreign Policy of Pakistan, An Analysis* (Karachi, 1964); see also Mohammed Ahsen Chaudhri, 'Pakistan's Relations with the Soviet Union', *Asian Survey* (California, September 1966), pp. 492–500.

[62] For details, see Mohammed Ayub Khan, *Friends not Masters. A Political Autobiography* (London, 1967), pp. 168–74.

[63] *Soviet News*, 21 September 1964.

[64] Ibid. 17 May 1965.

[65] Ibid. 17 May 1965, p 90

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WITH the rising interest of the Soviet leaders in the whole of the Indian sub-continent, it became increasingly evident that they were not prepared to limit their diplomatic actions to the simple task of forging links with the two rivals. For it became increasingly evident that the effective advancement of Soviet interest on the sub-continent as well as in the rest of Asia was closely linked with the amelioration of relations between India and Pakistan. Soviet diplomacy, therefore, moved forward and began to express concern over the manner in which the relations between the two countries continued to deteriorate. At first, however, the concern was limited to the simple task of making general statements stressing the urgency of finding 'a way towards the ending of bloodshed and conflict'.[66] But when the dispute finally exploded in the actual outbreak of hostilities in September 1965, Moscow initiated an important offensive to limit the conflict. Pressure was put on both sides to avoid taking any action that might escalate hostilities, and severe objections were raised to the Indian decision to open a new front in the Punjab area in order to relieve Pakistani pressure on the Kashmir front.[67] At the same time, the Soviet Union warned the Chinese, who had the clear intention of keeping the pot boiling,[68] not to exacerbate the situation 'as many states might find themselves drawn into the conflict one by one'.[69]

The Soviet leaders, however, knew that the best guarantee against any further escalation evidently was the rapid termination of the conflict. And it is on this difficult task that they set their sights; informal diplomatic contacts were established with the leaders of the two countries in order to impress upon them the vital importance of peace in the area. Appeals were promptly dispatched to the two countries urging them to 'display realism, restraint, and understanding of the grave consequences of the development of the armed conflict'[70]; and specific proposals were formally made to both Shastri and Ayub Khan to meet in the Soviet Union. Kosygin personally offered his good offices to bring a rapid end to the conflict.[71]

At first there was reluctance from both sides, but when it became increasingly evident that the conflict was beginning to take on dangerous proportions, the leaders of the two countries finally agreed to meet in Tashkent. And it was in that important city of Central Asia that an agreement was concluded on 10 January 1966.[72] Both govern-

[66] *Pravda*, 24 August 1965.
[67] Hari Ram Gupta, *Indo-Pakistan War, 1965*, vol. 2 (Delhi, 1968), p. 217.
[68] The Chinese had sent an ultimatum to India on 16 December 'to dismantle all its military works for aggression on the Chinese side'; for details, see Ministry of External Affairs, *Documents on China's Ultimatum to India* (New Delhi, 1966), p. 12.
[69] *Soviet News*, 14 September 1965, p. 113.
[70] Ibid. 8 September 1965, p. 101.
[71] Ibid. 20 September 1965, p. 125.
[72] For details, see M. S. Rajan, 'The Tashkent Declaration: Retrospect and Prospect', *International Studies*, July–October 1966, pp. 1–28.

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ments agreed to resume normal relations and undertook 'not to have recourse to force and settle their disputes through peaceful means'.[73] It is no exaggeration to state that without the active participation of Kosygin in the discussions, the agreement would not have been concluded. In fact, it is known that the talks would have broken down but for the last-minute Soviet intervention.[74]

MOSCOW had thus succeeded where the other powers had failed; and she became—because of this remarkable feat—an important factor in Indo-Pakistan relations, perhaps more than the other major powers. But if Tashkent was a major diplomatic achievement for the Soviet leaders, it was also an eye-opener for them. The problems that racked Indo-Pakistani relations were too intractable and too forlorn to be resolved by good offices or through the mediatory efforts of a foreign power. The rapidity with which the two nations had quickly set aside the Tashkent agreement, and had nullified 'the Tashkent Spirit', was a clear proof of the despairing situation that prevailed in the area.

Under the circumstances, the Soviet leaders slowly disengaged themselves from the position of seeking a real solution to the conflict, and appeared to move towards the limited task of forestalling the violent explosion of the dispute. Apparently, the risks in such a situation were too great, and Moscow did not wish to stake its prestige, power and influence to resolve what appeared to be a forlorn conflict.

The adoption of such a policy was also full of many pitfalls, and contained within itself dangerous germs negating the very objectives for which it had originally been adopted, namely the goal of continually increasing influence in the two countries. Having once decided to maintain and develop relations with the two contending nations, Moscow found itself increasingly obliged to adopt policies that vitiated the development of relations with both of them.

The Soviet decision to give military assistance to Pakistan is a case in point. Up to the middle sixties, all the efforts of the Pakistan Government to obtain military assistance from Moscow were firmly resisted by the Soviet leaders. But it soon became apparent that the continuous hedging on such an important issue was generating a difficult situation for the Soviet Government.

In the first place, it was leading to a continual manifestation of discontent in Pakistan, thereby creating a situation where the continuous growth of Soviet-Pakistan relations were being jeopardized. Obviously, the Soviet Government, after having successfully developed relations with Rawalpindi, did not wish to see them undermined.

Secondly, a continuous refusal to give arms to Pakistan permitted the leaders of that country to insist in their negotiations with the

[73] Ibid. p. 101.

[74] Tang Tsou (ed.), *China's Policies in Asia and America's Alternatives* (Chicago, 1968), p. 416.

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Russians that they must in this case cease to give military assistance to India. Obviously, the Soviet leaders did not wish to accept such a proposal as it would have seriously affected Indo-Soviet relations. It was therefore considered that the making of a symbolic arms deal with Pakistan would permit them to maintain their bridges with that country without seriously jolting their relations with India. A decision was thus taken in July 1968 to give military aid to Pakistan.[75]

WHAT were the factors that brought about this change in the Soviet attitude towards the Indian sub-continent? Why did the Soviet leaders decide to equate Pakistan with India on certain matters?

In the first place, there appeared to have developed, since 1964, a general trend in Soviet diplomacy to extricate itself from an immoderate involvement in intractable problems which are of no direct concern to Soviet interests. In the Pakistan-Afghan dispute on the Pakhtoon question, the Soviet Union ceased to side openly with Afghanistan. On the Cyprus issue, the previous Soviet position of extending unconditional support to the Cypriot Government against Turkey was slowly and subtly abandoned; and on the Indo-Pakistan dispute a position of neutrality was adopted. The pursuit of such a political line is not only a striking example of the growing sophistication in Soviet diplomatic behaviour, but is perhaps an important sign of a Soviet consensus that such a line, under the circumstances, is the only effective way to safeguard Soviet interests and, at the same time, aggrandize Soviet influence.

Secondly, by the early sixties, India had ceased to carry any great weight in international affairs. The humiliating Indian defeat in the Sino-Indian war of 1962 was a brutal exposure of her weaknesses and her inability to defend her interests and her security. It became evident that she did not have the necessary political and military strength to withstand an attack from the outside. For the Soviet Union, the timid Indian performance was probably instrumental in encouraging her to jettison her rather special relations with India.

Thirdly, Pakistan, having partially disengaged from the West, following a realization that none of her foreign policy objectives had been achieved in cooperation with the West, had begun to show increasing signs of seeking a rapprochement with China. Border differences between the two countries had been resolved by March 1963, important trade agreements had been concluded in January 1963, and a general understanding had been reached on diverse international issues including, according to some reports, some military matters.[76]

Apparently the drift of Pakistan in the direction of China must have

[75] For background information, see Mohammed Ayoob, 'Soviet arms aid to Pakistan', *Economic and Political Weekly*, 19 October 1968.

[76] The Pakistan Foreign Minister, Bhutto, in fact implied that China would come to Pakistan's assistance in the event of an attack from India. For text of the speech, see K. Sarwar Hasan (ed.), *Documents on the Foreign Relations of Pakistan: China, India:Pakistan* (Karachi, 1966), p. 377.

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been a source of great concern to the Soviet Union which was making all efforts to isolate the Middle Kingdom. And in order to forestall this development, Moscow must have felt the necessity of seeking a rapprochement with Pakistan.

But this effort to develop friendly relations with Pakistan did not of course mean that India ceased to be an important objective of Soviet diplomacy. Far from it. Though having lost her position of centrality, India was still considered important. Economic and military assistance continued to flow. In fact, while appealing for peace during the Indo-Pakistan conflict of 1965, Moscow declined to impose an embargo and publicly stated in the Security Council that Kashmir was an integral part of India.

Nonetheless, the changed Soviet attitude did not fail to create rumblings of discontent in India, generating for the first time a serious crisis in Indo-Soviet relations. The opposition in the Parliament—with the exception of the communists—vigorously condemned the Soviet decision to give arms to Pakistan. Some of the leading members of the Congress Party were also critical. The Secretary of the Congress Parliamentary Party expressed the view that the 'Soviet decision indicated that she [Soviet Union] attached more importance to friendship with Pakistan, for it was strategically placed'.[77] The attitude of the Indian press was also critical, leading some to suggest that an effort ought to be made to defreeze relations with China in order to counter Soviet action.[78]

The attitude of the Indian Government was, however, cautious. After having made a number of discreet and vain efforts to dissuade Moscow from taking such a decision, some members of the Central Government, according to some reports, manifested their irritation by leaking the news to the Indian press. It was calculated that 'a popular outburst' that would inevitably result from such a leakage would not be a bad idea and might actually persuade the Soviet leaders to abandon their original decision.[79] At about the same time, the Indian Prime Minister, Mrs Gandhi, publicly reacted by stating that 'we are not happy' about the Soviet decision, though she prudently made it clear that Indian foreign policy would not undergo any change.[80] The Defence Minister went a little further and expressed the view that the Soviet Union and the United States were making a 'wrong assessment' of Pakistan by the supply of arms to her, thus leading her to adopt a 'more intransigent attitude towards India'.[81]

The Indian prudence was dictated by a number of very practical reasons to which sufficient importance has not been given. In the first

[77] *National Herald* (New Delhi, 10 July 1968).
[78] For details, see 'Nireekshak', 'What then must we do', *Economic and Political Weekly*, 27 August 1968.
[79] From *Indian Express*, cited in ibid.
[80] *The Statesman's Weekly*, 13 July 1968.
[81] Ibid. 23 November 1968.

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place, it was simply not possible for the Indian Government to rock the boat of Indo-Soviet relations at a time when India was heavily dependent on the Soviet Union on a number of issues of foreign policy; for the dangerous consequences that would have resulted from such an action would have, in all probability, outweighed the advantages—if any—that India would have gained from such a policy. Secondly, the government of India had been repeatedly assured by Moscow that whatever arms the Soviet Union might supply to Pakistan would pose no danger to India.[82] On the contrary, argued the Soviets, with arms supplies Soviet influence over Pakistan would increase and this influence would undoubtedly be exercised against military adventures. Thirdly, most of the sophisticated military hardware that India received from the outside emanated from the Soviet Union; and most of the financial and technical assistance also came from that country.

In view of all this, what could India do and from whom could she obtain military hardware, if she defied Moscow? Military aid from the United States and Great Britain was no longer possible in view of their decision to stop all such assistance after the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965. Nor was it possible—at least at the moment—for her to normalize her relations with Pakistan and China, for the conflicts with the two countries were too aggravated to be resolved easily.

India was thus left with no options, and had apparently no choice but to continue to maintain good relations with Moscow, notwithstanding the difficulties that had begun to arise between the two countries.

HOWEVER, notwithstanding the limited options, the relations between the two countries did not radiate the same warmth and friendliness as existed in the middle fifties. They were in fact seriously affected. The Soviet statements made in private meetings were now simple reiteration of what had been publicly stated. The Soviet attitude, for example, at the Indo-Soviet bilateral talks held in Delhi in 1968 was that of an imperial power dealing with a dependency. She did not even observe the elementary diplomatic courtesies, as she brushed aside one Indian query after another, and studiously refused to offer satisfaction to the host country on any matter of direct concern to her, whether the issue was the supply of Soviet arms to Pakistan or Moscow's neutralist stand on Kashmir, or the harsh and continuous propaganda that was beamed by *Radio Peace and Progress* against some of the Congress leaders. Even on the explosive issue of border alignment between India and China, shown on Soviet maps, the attitude of the Soviet delegation was generally evasive and non-committal. But the differences between the two countries are no more confined to a few political issues only. They have spilled over to the economic domain,

[82] Kosygin made a statement to this effect in Calcutta on 10 September 1969. See *The Statesman's Weekly*, 13 September 1969.

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where an increasing number of difficulties and differences have become evident.

On the question of trade, difficulties began to arise with the development of a favourable trade balance for India. This began in 1964 and reached the figure of 210 million rupees in 1967.[83] Such a trend is expected to continue in view of the fact that, having built an important industrial base, Indian needs for capital equipment have significantly declined, and her demand for such commodities as fertilizers, industrial raw materials, non-ferrous metals, etc., are rapidly rising.[84] The Soviet Union, which had so far met most of India's demands for capital equipment, is however unable to provide the new needs. Nonetheless she appears to be insisting that India must buy from her in order to balance trade and payments between the two countries.

Difficulties also began to arise in some of the projects built by Moscow. Some of them were ill-equipped, while the others were in fields for which there did not appear to be much demand. For instance, the Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (IDPL) were dogged from the outset by faulty equipment, rising costs, designs unsuitable for Indian conditions, and delays in delivery. It was even suggested that much of the plant was in fact second-hand, having been built for China and dismantled. The Soviet project report had not included a feasibility study, estimates of demand having been assumed from Soviet experience elsewhere. Consequently, there was a heavy surplus at the plant. Indian consumption of the tetracycline group of drugs, for instance, was 10 metric tons a year and was estimated to rise to 40–50 metric tons a year by 1971–72. But the Soviet experts nonetheless insisted on a capacity of 120 tons of chlorotetracycline, which had become obsolete and was not used by Indian doctors. The IDPL consequently incurred a loss of 8·9 million rupees in 1968.[85]

Difficulties are also discernible in the further development of the oil industry. After having acquired a dominant position in the Indian oil industry, Moscow is eager not to lose this position. The Soviet attitude to the exploring for oil off the Bombay coastline in the Gulf of Cambay is a case in point.[86] Preliminary investigations in 1963 indicated that these areas held promise of being some of the largest oil reserves in the world. It is interesting that Moscow admitted that its own expertise was inadequate to explore and develop these fields. But, at the same time, it would not have other countries undertake the work, and has been pressurizing the Indian Government to go slow in the hope that it will be able to satisfy Indian technical needs within a few years.

[83] *Financial Times*, 12 June 1968.

[84] Indian imports of industrial raw materials between April and September 1968 were 40 per cent higher compared to the same period during 1967.

[85] *Economic and Political Weekly*, 5 October 1968.

[86] *Thought*, 14 September 1968; see also *Economic and Political Weekly*, 7 September 1968.

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THE factor that perhaps contributed to the rise of most serious differences in Indo-Soviet relations was Moscow's reluctance to permit a large Indian participation in the implementation of Soviet-aided projects. The Soviet Government declined to share the construction of the Bokaro steel project with Indian consultants and forced on India 350 Soviet experts when the Indian Government was convinced that Indian engineers could do the job.[87] This was described by an observer as 'an attempt to reduce us to that of contractor coolies'.[88]

The Indian proposal for an economy of 20 billion rupees in a project of 90 billion was also rejected. Moscow very clearly informed New Delhi that either it could approve the project along with the original costs of production or alternatively drop it altogether. Furthermore, there have been four delays since the project was conceived in 1964 which have put the estimated completion date of the first stage to early 1973 compared with the original schedule of late 1968. These delays have pushed up the cost of the project over and over again to a fantastic figure. The Soviet consultants had originally undertaken to complete the first stage of the project at a cost of 5 billion and 900 million rupees. It is now likely to be around 8 billion rupees.[89]

In addition to all these difficulties, the overall Soviet attitude towards India became more and more difficult. More and more examples began to arise of Soviet annoyance with India, difficulties began to surge forward regarding the composition of delegations, criticism of internal Indian policies became more rampant in the Soviet press and anti-Indian propaganda—including personal attacks on some leaders—became common on *Radio Peace and Progress.*

Soviet ideological assessment of the Indian political and economic scene also underwent an important change by the middle sixties. While the *New Times* noted India's increasing dependence on United States aid and the 'growing strength of the capitalist monopolies with the close foreign trade',[90] an article in *International Affairs* expressed the view that the control of the Indian big business was pushing her 'off the path of independence'.[91] Perhaps the most interesting analysis was by Professor R. Ulyanovsky, deputy head of the international department of the Soviet Central Committee. In an article in *Pravda* he rated India below the more recently independent countries in Africa in terms of revolutionary potential. The functioning of the state sector was considered to be far from promising in view of the fact that it was being 'gradually converted into a means of speeding up the development of privately owned industrial capitalism'. The effect of this and other 'retrograde' tendencies was, according to Ulyanovsky, to cancel out

[87] *The Statesman's Weekly*, 14 May 1966.
[88] Ibid.
[89] *Economic Times*, 4 February 1970.
[90] *New Times*, 11 August 1965.
[91] *International Affairs*, April 1967.

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such favourable Indian features as 'a progressive foreign policy' and 'friendly relations with the Soviet camp'.[92]

However, all the difficulties that have surged forward between the two countries do not seem to interfere with Soviet efforts to cultivate Indian friendship. India still remains an important factor in international affairs; for notwithstanding the considerable plummeting of her prestige after 1962, her large size and reasonable economic growth cannot be ignored—least of all by the Soviet Union who is continuously seeking a viable counter-balance to the expanding Chinese influence on the continent of Asia.

[92] *Pravda*, 3 January 1969.

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Soviet-Indonesian Relations since 1965

Robert C. Horn

THE events of the early morning hours of 1 October 1965 in Indonesia set into motion a number of processes that eventually toppled President Sukarno and crushed the seemingly strong and influential Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). The attempted coup and its aftermath greatly altered not only the domestic political situation but also Indonesia's international orientation. Sukarno's 'era of confrontation' in Indonesian foreign policy, in particular the *konfrontasi* against Malaysia, came to an end. Even more abruptly, the Sukarno-forged 'Djakarta-Peking axis' was broken. This meant to Peking the downfall of perhaps its greatest ally in the Third World, and the crushing setback to the Peking-oriented PKI, the largest Party outside the communist camp.

It was also important for relations with the Soviet Union. Moscow had been involved in Indonesia extensively in the decade preceding the coup. The visit in September 1956 of President Sukarno to the Soviet Union began what became the two main thrusts of Soviet policy: economic and military assistance. By the early 1960s the Russians had extended to the Indonesians some 367·5 million dollars in economic credits and close to 1·25 billion dollars (in world market prices) in military aid, including MIG-21s, TU-16s with air-to-surface missiles, submarines, destroyers with surface-to-air missiles, at least three SAM sites equipped with Soviet 'Guideline' missiles, and a wide variety of other aircraft, ships, vehicles and smaller arms. The Soviets also invested heavily in Indonesia in terms of diplomatic support, especially in the Outer Islands' revolt and in Indonesia's quest for West Irian. But by 1965, the Soviet position in Indonesia was a very weak one. Due primarily to Sukarno's and the PKI's increasingly warm relations with China and to Moscow's equivocation in the Malaysian campaign, the Russians had none of the influence or 'leverage' they had hoped and expected their aid, support and 'friendship' would bring them.

In terms of a Soviet response to the changing Indonesian situation, a number of policy options, each replete with opportunities and dangers, would seem to have been available to the Kremlin leaders. There was the extreme one of breaking relations with Djakarta's new regime as a response to the crushing of the PKI and the country's 'swing to the right', both internally and externally. However, Moscow's desire to defend the PKI—to the detriment of possible relations with the new Indonesian regime—could not have been very great. The Party, while independent, had been extremely pro-Chinese in terms of the

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Sino-Soviet dispute and had directed a good deal of political venom at the 'modern revisionists' of the Soviet Communist Party. In any event, the PKI had not been Moscow's primary tool or target in the pre-coup period. That had been Sukarno's role. Yet by 1965 Sukarno had pulled as far away from Moscow and as close to Peking as had the PKI. To defend either at the cost of missed opportunities with General Suharto and his 'New Order' would have made little sense in light of Moscow's past pragmatic, rather opportunistic policies.

Nor did the other extreme, that of ignoring the hunting down of communists and banning of the PKI and seeking to establish close and unqualified relations with the new regime, seem viable. To act unconcerned about the wholesale destruction of a communist party—particularly one so significant domestically and so large and therefore important internationally—would be to jeopardize the Soviet Union's claim to leadership of the international communist movement. (Such a policy would have offended two Asian parties especially important to Moscow—those of North Korea and North Vietnam.) Moreover, there was the very real possibility that what was left of the PKI, after the removal of the pro-Peking top leadership, might prove more amenable to Soviet influence. This last consideration might also have been thought applicable by the Soviets to Sukarno: if his 'dangerous' eccentricities, particularly his close alignment with Peking, were curbed, he, too, might be more like the radical nationalist the Soviets thought they knew in the 1956–62 period.

Consequently, Moscow's policies steered between these two extremes. The initial crushing of the PKI and especially the pro-Peking leadership represented no loss to Moscow and could be greeted with relative equanimity and rather *pro forma* objections. In terms of Indonesia's foreign policy, which had always been Moscow's primary concern, inasmuch as Indonesia's 'swing to the Right' meant a breaking away from communist China, this was pure gain for Moscow. However, by the same token, the obvious excesses against the PKI, the apparent attempt to extirpate not only the PKI but also communism and Marxism-Leninism from Indonesia, could not be treated calmly and with detachment by the Soviet Union for the reasons mentioned above. Furthermore, Indonesia's foreign policy swing did not conform to Moscow's hopes. Instead of coming to rest on a radical nationalist and anti-imperialist position, the swing continued towards a rapprochement and friendship with the West. In other words, exchanging a 'weakened . . . international position' due to too close a relationship with Peking only to gain an equally weak position as a result of a dependence on and strong ties with the West, particularly the United States, was not the change which Moscow desired.[1]

[1] For example, see Ivan Antonov, 'Aspects of Indonesian Foreign Policy', *New Times*, No. 52, 28 December 1966, pp. 15–17.

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The central hypothesis, then, of this brief study of Soviet-Indonesian relations in the period since 1965 is that Moscow's policies continued—as they had in the years prior to 1965—to be reactions to developments in Indonesia in the long-term attempt to gain influence or leverage there and to strike a balance between policy extremes, keeping all alternatives open.

INITIAL Soviet reaction to the widespread anti-communist campaign which raged particularly through Java, the PKI stronghold, and Bali was predictable in light of Moscow's previous relations with Djakarta and what had been an increasingly pro-Chinese communist party and its position as defender of international communism. Objections were issued but they carried little conviction and no threat of retaliation against the forces responsible. The Russians were careful not to fault the emerging regime but rather only to 'warn' it that 'right-wing' and 'reactionary' elements were behind the campaign, with the fervent support of the imperialists. An early *Pravda* editorial accused 'internal reaction'—including leaders of the anti-communist *Masjumi* and PSI parties banned by Sukarno—of seeking to exploit the tense situation in order 'to settle accounts with its political opponents'.[2] The attacks on the Indonesian 'Left', said *Pravda*, weakened the country internally, by breaking the unity of the 'national democratic forces', and internationally, by weakening 'the efforts of its people in the struggle against imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism'.

> One cannot help realize that he who attacks the communist party and other democratic organizations inflicts direct damage on the national interests of his country. It is only by preserving national unity that Indonesia can retain a worthy place in the international arena, pursue a genuine national policy, and not become a tool of alien forces.

Pravda went on to express the Soviet people's 'firm belief' that communism in Indonesia could not be eradicated and the hope that 'common sense and a sense of responsibility' would prevail so that Indonesia's domestic problems—apparently not yet considered as international in scope—would be settled democratically.

Soviet commentary subsequently carried on in a similar vein, asserting that developments in Indonesia only aided the imperialists and the internal reactionary forces. Despite continuing criticism from Moscow regarding the 'unlawful and monstrous terror' against the PKI,[3] specific denunciation of the banning of PKI in mid-March 1966[4] and later in that year the banning of the dissemination of

[2] *Pravda*, 26 October 1965. For similar analysis and commentary, see also Radio Moscow, 9 and 11 October, *Tass*, 16 October and *Pravda*, 20 October 1965.
[3] *Pravda*, 26 December 1965.
[4] See Radio Moscow, 14 March 1966, and more 'officially' and more cautiously, *Izvestia*, 14 March 1966.

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Marxist-Leninist ideology,[5] and bitter condemnation of the Indonesian military tribunals which served only as 'a political trial of the communist movement as a whole',[6] the Soviet position continued to be that the solution of the 'problem' was an internal matter for Indonesia.[7] Moscow only was willing to go, in terms of 'threats', as far as the assertion that it could not 'remain indifferent' to the situation.[8] In an interesting and revealing commentary on Soviet policy, the Indonesian army daily newspaper *Berita Yudha*, praised Moscow's self-restraint, drawing a parallel with Soviet policy towards Egypt. 'Even though the UAR has banned the Communist Party the policy of good relations between the UAR and the Soviet Union has not been disturbed.'[9]

No doubt of some comfort to the new Indonesian leaders was the fact that Moscow devoted a good deal of its commentary on Indonesia to criticism of the PKI's role in the *Gestapu* and the Party's policies which had preceded it. As part of the continuing polemic with the Chinese, the Russians castigated the PKI for the influence it allowed Peking to have on its policies and—with an 'air of satisfaction', according to Peking[10]—blamed the PKI itself for the anti-communist campaign by reminding it that 'political adventurism, putschism, and sectarianism are alien to Marxism-Leninism'.[11]

Moscow and a group of pro-Soviet PKI émigrés further took the Party to task for a number of other errors: subordinating class interest to national ones, 'class collaboration', being too dependent on the national bourgeoisie, meaning especially Sukarno (a particularly ironic and hypocritical change in light of past Soviet policies), giving precedence to the peasant question over that of the workers, the insulation of the top leadership from criticism and suggestions from the rank and file, and the cult of Aidit as the leader.[12] While attacking Aidit, the pro-Soviet Indonesian communists contended that not all could be blamed on him. The fault really lay, they asserted, in the state of increasing economic, political, and ideological subjection to the Chinese Communist Party. It was extremist Chinese influence that led the

[5] *Pravda*, 23 November 1966.

[6] *Pravda*, 5 August 1967. This article, by B. Vetin and V. Tumanov, interestingly referred to the 'paradoxical situation' which had arisen in the wake of the *coup* attempt: 'The forces which de facto deprived the president of power and disbanded the lawful government are now exterminating their political opponents, accusing them of trying to do what these forces have actually done themselves.'

[7] *Pravda*, 16 February 1966.

[8] *Pravda*, 23 November 1966.

[9] *Berita Yudha*, 16 March 1966.

[10] See *Peking Review*, 22 October 1965, p. 12.

[11] *Pravda*, 26 October 1965. See also *Izvestia*, 17 October 1965.

[12] These viewpoints were expressed by the Russians themselves (see *Pravda*, 30 July 1968) and also by the pro-Soviet PKI émigrés (see *Party Life*, New Delhi, July, August, and September 1967). The latter document has received particularly close study in Rex Mortimer, 'Indonesia: Emigré Post-Mortems on the PKI', *Australian Outlook*, December 1968, pp. 347–59, and in Branko Lazitch, 'Indonesian CP Between Moscow and Peking', *Corrispondenza Socialista* (Rome), January 1968, pp. 21–24.

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PKI down the road of deviation to the debacle of the *Gestapu* as 'Mao-Tse-tung's band . . . made the Indonesian Communist Party victim of its adventurist policy'.[13]

Important also in the eyes of the Indonesian leaders was the prescription for the future of communism in Indonesia by the pro-Soviet group of Indonesians. While calling for the utilization of all forms of struggle, this group did not refer to armed insurrection as the 'main form of struggle', as did the Peking group. They called, rather, for the formation of a 'front of national unity' and the creation of 'new political alliances as umbrellas for its rebuilding'.[14]

WHAT appeared, however, to be of greater significance in Soviet eyes than internal Indonesian developments in the immediate post-coup years (as indeed had been the case throughout the history of Soviet relations with Indonesia) was the changing direction of Indonesia's foreign policy. The over-all direction of Soviet policy seems to have been to strive to establish good relations with the new regime—and avoid attacking Sukarno personally while he was still involved in the power struggle—while seeking to obstruct Indonesia's renewed friendship with the West. To this end, while only mildly condemning the anti-communist campaign, the Soviet leadership from 1965 to 1968 repeatedly was to assert that:

> The Soviet people highly value friendship with the Indonesian people and their consistent and courageous struggle against imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism. *The Soviet people sincerely want further cooperation between the USSR and Indonesia, in political, economic, cultural and other fields.*[15]

Moscow was obviously elated with the reorientation of Indonesia's foreign policy which meant a swing away from Peking and the reversal of several Sukarno policies, including those regarding the United Nations and Malaysia. The Russians were particularly enthusiastic when reporting the mid-1966 meetings in Bangkok which helped to end Indonesia's policy of 'confrontation' against Malaysia. On the meetings, Radio Moscow commented:

> The most important point agreed upon at the meeting was that concerning political measures to normalize relations between the two countries. This is of course good news. The meeting of both countries' deputy premiers will pave the way for a reconciliation which will ease the tension and naked hostility which has rampaged for nearly three years between the two countries.[16]

[13] See Radio Moscow, in Mandarin to Southeast Asia, 6 August 1967. For the pro-Chinese position see the PKI 'self-criticism' of 1966 by Sudisman in the *Indonesian Tribune* (Tirana), No. 3, January 1967, lengthy excerpts from which appeared in *Peking Review*, 21 July 1968, pp. 13–22.

[14] Mortimer, 'Emigré Post-Mortems', p. 359.

[15] *Pravda*, 26 October 1965. Italics by the author.

[16] Radio Moscow, 2 June 1966. It is interesting to note that Soviet commentary referred to the *konfrontasi* as detrimental not only to Indonesia and to Malaysia but

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The Soviets likewise hailed the first steps toward the establishment of diplomatic relations between Indonesia and Singapore—where Moscow had already opened a trade office and a *Tass* centre.

The pleasure with which the Russians viewed these foreign policy changes derived to a good extent from the fact that the previous policies, the 'deviations', could be ascribed to the baneful influence of the Chinese. At the end of 1966, in an implicit but unmistakable attack on Peking, *New Times*, referring to Indonesia's 'anti-imperialist alliance with the socialist countries and the young Afro-Asian states', in masterful understatement asserted that:

> Much damage to the alliance was done by the forces that are out to split the socialist camp and the international communist movement. Under their influence, a few years ago the dangerous slogan was advanced of a 'Djakarta-Peking Axis'. This could deprive Indonesia of independence and initiative in foreign affairs, doom her to isolation, to separation from the socialist community, and might have resulted in a certain retreat from non-alignment. In pursuance of this policy, Indonesia withdrew from the United Nations early in 1965, where until then she had been part of the anti-imperialist front. Indonesia deactivated her links with many socialist and developing countries. All this markedly weakened her international position.[17]

Chinese 'adventurism' had also been responsible, said Moscow, for the *Gestapu*, the confrontation against Malaysia, as well as Indonesia's policy of 'self-reliance', that is rejection of aid from the West as well as from the Soviet Union. Nor did the Soviets fail to point out, especially after his final defeat in February 1967, that Sukarno, aided and abetted by Peking, had led Indonesia in these 'dangerous adventures', had opposed peaceful co-existence, and had squandered 80 per cent of the state budget on the struggle against Malaysia.[18]

At the same time, however, Moscow saw indications that Djakarta's international orientation, while moving away from close relations with Peking, was shifting past the 'centre', that is, non-alignment (as interpreted by the Russians), toward a pro-Western stance. Moscow repeatedly reminded Indonesia of the treachery that had been practised against it by the West, especially in terms of Dutch colonialism and efforts by the United States to finance revolts and support reactionaries against the Indonesian Government. On the other hand, Indonesia's friend, the Soviet Union, 'has always provided political and economic support to free Indonesia. It was with the Indonesian people when it

also to Soviet foreign policy in that it was just this tension which had kept British forces in the region in strength; see Radio Moscow, in Indonesian to Indonesia, 25 August 1966.

[17] *New Times*, No. 52, 28 December 1966, pp. 15–17.

[18] See especially *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, 19 March 1967.

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fought for independence and the return of West Irian and when Indonesia struggled to build a national economy and its armed forces '.[19]

ONE of the main areas of Soviet concern was increasing economic relations between Indonesia and the West. Warnings came from Moscow of new Western efforts at 'neocolonialism', new efforts to control and exploit the country's resources. By allowing foreign capital investment, Indonesia was jeopardizing its sovereignty and independent policy, as well as its economy, and was 'losing hold' of all the gains it had made since independence. The only way that the economic situation could be improved was through halting the granting of concessions to the imperialists, extending co-operation with the socialist countries, restoring of democracy (an end to the purge of the communists), and emphasizing the state sector of the economy and agrarian reform.

A second area of major Soviet concern was in the matter of regional alliances. Historically Moscow had been very sensitive on the question of Indonesian adherence to regional groupings and the formation of the Asian Pacific Council (ASPAC) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), not to mention the continued existence of ASA, SEATO, and ANZUS in the region. At ASPAC's third ministerial conference in Canberra in mid-1968 when it was suggested that Indonesia be invited to join and after the *Djakarta Times* (closely associated with the Indonesian Foreign Ministry) said the following day that this was worthy of consideration, Moscow was quick to remind Indonesia that ASPAC was an imperialist organization. 'Has Indonesia abandoned its policy of non-alignment, particularly of nonparticipation in imperialist military blocs?' asked Radio Moscow.[20]

The organization that seems to have worried Moscow the most, however, was ASEAN. When the organization was in its early planning stages, *Pravda* warned Indonesia that it was a 'Western-backed' organization and would mean an abandonment of Indonesia's policy of anti-imperialism.[21] Once ASEAN was formed in (August 1967) for the expressed purpose of regional economic and cultural co-operation by Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines, Moscow's attention shifted to what it considered the dangerous possibility of the conversion of the grouping into a regional defence organization. To group together in opposition to Peking was acceptable, but Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore had to be careful as the United States, through its 'stooges' Thailand and the Philippines, would undoubtedly seek to make ASEAN into an anti-communist

[19] *Pravda*, 20 October 1965. It should be noted that even at this early date the Russians made no mention of their assistance and co-operation in and especially support for the *konfrontasi* against Malaysia.
[20] Radio Moscow, 7 August 1968.
[21] *Pravda*, 9 August 1966.

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military-political alliance under American control. In this endeavour, added Moscow pointedly, the Americans have been encouraged by the anti-communist policy of Indonesia's new regime.[22]

Finally, an extremely significant aspect of what Moscow saw as increasing collusion between Indonesia and the United States revolved around the question of Djakarta's position on Vietnam. Speculation in the Indonesian press, especially in the armed forces' newspaper, *Angkatan Bersendjata*, of the need for a review of Indonesia's policy concerning the war, greatly bothered the Russians:

> It is alarming that such newspapers as *Angkatan Bersendjata* and *Merdeka*, usually reflecting the views of official circles, are questioning the principles of Indonesia's foreign policy. Whether they like to or not, by justifying the U.S. aggression in Vietnam trom positions of anticommunism *they are paving the road to imposing on Indonesia the shameful course which has turned some dependent countries in Asia into accomplices in U.S. imperialism's criminal war* against the independence and freedom of the Vietnamese people.[23]

American Vice-President Humphrey's visit in November 1967 was viewed by the Soviets as another effort by the United States to obtain support from the Indonesian Government for its policy in Vietnam. Although Moscow acknowledged that the Indonesian leaders did not voice open support for American policy, the Russians obviously continued to be worried lest Washington pressure Djakarta into a position of support regarding Vietnam and into support for giving ASEAN military teeth and a political (anti-communist) role through the means of holding out the offer of aid, and, of course, by warning of the 'danger' of communism.

In addition to verbal efforts, Moscow also sought practically, although not without a certain amount of apparent hesitation and confusion, to obtain some degree of influence in Indonesia and in its policies through techniques the Soviets had employed—unsuccessfully—in the past: economic and military assistance. The Soviet leaders seemed from the beginning to make clear that they were not prepared to put up with as much as did Khrushchev—in terms of new agreements and new deliveries with no repayment—especially in light of the Djakarta regime's anti-communist programme at home and gestures toward the West in foreign affairs. At the same time, Moscow indicated that there were opportunities for negotiating and *quid pro quo* bargaining.

A crucial question from the Soviet point of view was the repayment of Indonesia's enormous debt. The Soviet Union chose not to participate in the 'Tokyo Club' of eight of Indonesia's creditors and did not join in the subsequent rescheduling by that group of

[22] See, for example, Radio Moscow, 25 October 1967 and 4 August 1968.
[23] *Pravda*, 3 November 1967. Italics by the author.

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Djakarta's debts. In October 1966, after a number of delays,[24] Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik journeyed to Moscow for a number of purposes, the primary one being to discuss the repayment of Indonesia's debts to the Soviet Union. That not all went well in Moscow was apparent from the fact that no agreement was signed and that Malik felt compelled to call on the Soviet Government 'to quit its hesitant, wait-and-see attitude toward Indonesia'.[25] It was not until after another month of talks in Moscow led by the chairman of the Indonesian State Auditing Board, Major General Suprajogi, that the Soviets agreed to reschedule Indonesia's long- and medium-term debts (some 785 million dollars). Malik revealed at that time that 'originally the Soviet Government asked Indonesia to pay its debts immediately' and, even in the end, the Russians 'did not agree to all of Indonesia's requests . . . '.[26]

In the area of economic assistance Moscow also exhibited a hesitant and rather 'hard-line' policy. Work on most Soviet aid projects not already halted was stopped shortly after the coup. When Djakarta sought a new 10 million dollar credit from the Soviet Union in order to complete the Soviet-aided Tjilegon steel mill, the Russians turned down the request. The November 1966 accord agreed to postpone the Tjilegon project as well as the Tjilatjap superphosphate plant, and to cancel the steel factory and mechanical rice unit projects in Kalimantan. The only projects to be continued were the Ambon technological faculty and the highway in Kalimantan. There were reports of an exodus from Indonesia of a large number of Soviet technicians. Djakarta also announced that an 'effort to get commodities from the Soviet Union through rupiah financing met with failure'. The expenses of non-military specialists sent to Indonesia were to be paid 'in cash from free convertible currency'.[27] Moreover, Soviet-Indonesian co-operation in trade fell precipitously.[28]

Regarding military assistance, there were contradictory signs. Although there is no evidence to support Chinese charges of 'intensified military collusion' (e.g. *Jen-min Jih-pao*, 23 March 1967) between

[24] One of which was due to 'the busy schedule of the Soviet leaders'; Radio Djakarta, 2 September 1966. This may well have represented a Soviet attempt to apply some small degree of pressure on Djakarta at least to show that they would not jump at the chance to postpone Indonesia's repayment of its debt to the USSR.

[25] Radio Djakarta, 22 October 1966.

[26] Radio Djakarta, 24 November 1966. One particular problem was that the Soviets called for payments to begin in April 1969 while the 'Tokyo Club' deferred Djakarta's payments until 1971.

[27] See 'Report by the Presidium Minister for the Economic and Financial Affairs before the Gotong-Royong House of Representatives about the Results of the Talks with East European Countries on the Rescheduling (Postponement of Payment) of our Debts, 14th April 1967,' Djakarta: Department of Information, 1967.

[28] Soviet imports from Indonesia fell only from 32·0 to 30·8 million dollars in value while Soviet exports dropped from 54·4 to 4·8 million dollars; see United States Department of State, *Director of Intelligence and Research*, 'Communist Governments and Developing Nations: Aid and Trade in 1967', RSE–120. 14 August 1968, pp. 17, 21.

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the Soviet Union and Indonesia, Indonesian leaders did report early in 1966 that promised aid items were continuing to flow from the Soviet Union and in December 1966 the Soviets completed an electric power station and presented it to the Indonesian navy. In addition, Moscow agreed to continue to pay the cost of Indonesian armed forces trainees still in the Soviet Union. There were, however, even more signs that all was not running smoothly in the two countries' military relationship. A high-powered Indonesian navy delegation went to Moscow in August 1967 to seek new credits and returned empty-handed. Moscow refused spare parts to Indonesia except on a cash basis and even then there was considerable grumbling in Indonesia about inadequacies and delays in Soviet shipments. Confirming this, the Soviet leaders in mid-1968 offered to *resume* the supply of spare parts to Indonesia's armed forces in return for an end to the country's anti-communist policies.[29]

AS can be seen from the above, relations between Indonesia and the Soviet Union were by mid-1968 anything but close. Soviet leaders seemed to be coming to the realization that their 'middle' or 'compromise' policy of attempting to foster closer relations with Djakarta while exerting, at the same time, some influence over the domestic anti-communist drive and Indonesia's relations with the West, was very much a failure. The campaign against the PKI and communist 'remnants' had not abated and Indonesia's foreign policy seemed to be moving ever closer to alignment with the West. In the Soviet analysis, the position of Djakarta 'extremists' and of 'colonial subversion', in the form of Western economic ties and CIA involvement in Indonesian youth groups, were seen as strengthening. *Pravda* commemorated Indonesia's independence anniversary by emphasizing Indonesia's 'open door' to 'capitalist exploitation', concluding ominously that:

> despite good intentions and aspirations, in beginning its 24th year of sovereign existence, Indonesia faces the harsh reality of many serious problems. World imperialism is striving all the more constantly to drag this country into the orbit of its economic, military, political, and neocolonial interests. The fate of Indonesia's people depends upon which way it decides to go.[30]

There is considerable evidence that 1968 saw not only a continued decline in Soviet-Indonesian relations but also a qualitative change and rapid acceleration of this decline. This 'new phase' in relations between the two countries centred on the treatment of the PKI by the Indonesian regime—a topic hitherto only of secondary importance to the Russians. The most striking example of this change was the new Soviet appeals to Djakarta on behalf of PKI leaders Njono and

[29] *Antara* (Indonesian News Agency), 23 May 1968.
[30] *Pravda*, 17 August 1968.

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Sudisman (who were to be executed). In March 1966 Nikolai Podgorny, Chairman of the Soviet Presidium, had written to Sukarno asking that Njono be spared (Sudisman had not yet been arrested) and used the mildest of language. He 'sincerely hoped' that this 'highly humane step' would be taken for it 'would be received with great approval and understanding. . .'.[31] In August 1967 Soviet leaders and organizations voiced similar appeals couched in only slightly stronger language. In October 1968, however, the Soviet appeals were of a quite different nature. Messages were dispatched to President Suharto, General Nasution, Chairman of the Provisional Consultative Assembly, and Achmad Sjaichu, Indonesia's chairman of Parliament.[32] Although these messages only 'asked' for humaneness and an end to 'the terror unleashed in Indonesia in connection with the events of 30 September 1965,' they did warn that the executions would damage Indonesia's national interests and international prestige, and, pointedly, threaten 'her co-operation with the socialist countries'. A harsh statement of the CPSU Central Committee, which also was issued,[33] referred even more bitterly to Indonesia's 'reactionary circles', 'unbridled terror'—'Human history knows of no other instance of destruction on such a monstrous scale of human life in peacetime for ideological reason'—and further that these 'monstrous crimes' showed that:

> the upper hand in Indonesia is being taken by forces which seek to complicate relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, to renounce the traditional friendship between the Indonesian and Soviet peoples in order to curry favour with the imperialist powers and to earn the recognition of the darkest reaction.

The Central Committee stated that it protested 'vigorously' and that it 'demands' that the death sentences be annulled. An accompanying *New Times* article, significantly entitled 'Twilight Over Indonesia', concluded that, in spite of the fact that Indonesia had refused to side with the United States in Vietnam and had so far resisted the transformation of ASEAN into a military bloc, 'Indonesia's prospects [were] gloomy indeed'—due to the massacre of patriots, hounding of democratic organizations, continuing economic dislocation, and growing dependence on the imperialist powers. After the execution of Njono, Sudisman and others implicated in the *Gestapu* at the end of October, Moscow again denounced these 'bloody crimes' and, going further than ever before in its attack on the Djakarta regime, stated that 'the new order in Djakarta did not only ignore the "just demands", but even intensified its anti-communist campaign'. Other Soviet commentary compared the execution to 'the evil deeds of the Hitlerites'

[31] *Tass*, 5 March 1966.
[32] For the texts of these messages, see *New Times*, No. 42, 23 October 1968, pp. 2–3.
[33] Ibid. p. 2.

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and warned: 'The time will come when the executioners *and those who sanctioned the crimes* [*i.e. the Government*] will answer for their grave criminal actions'.[34]

This new stance seems to have involved Soviet hopes for the revival of a Moscow-oriented communist party in Indonesia. International needs, in terms of the world communist movement (related to the aftermath of the invasion of Czechoslovakia) combined with the failure of previous Soviet policies to push Moscow not only into a stronger defence of communism in Indonesia but also into seeking—in competition with Peking—to build a new PKI. Moscow had from the beginning laid the groundwork for a PKI resurgence by insisting that only a narrow group of PKI members took part in the *Gestapu* and that 'the broad masses of communists and members of other democratic progressive organizations had nothing to do with it'.[35] Early Soviet attempts in this direction of constructing a new PKI are attested to by the presence of PKI émigrés in Eastern Europe and by accusations by Indonesians (and Chinese) in 1966 and 1967 that Moscow was seeking to revive and control the PKI. The Soviet leaders would go, however, only as far as to publish a congratulatory message from 'underground Indonesian communists' to the CPSU on the 50th anniversary of the October Revolution, which said that Indonesian communists, operating underground, were seeking to rehabilitate the communist party on Indonesian soil.[36]

There were simultaneously numerous signs of Chinese involvement in Indonesian communism. There were reports of China giving military training to PKI refugees, sending them back subsequently to Indonesia to work with local guerrillas. Peking and the pro-Chinese PKI faction there called for protracted armed struggle against the Indonesia military regime and there was in 1967 and 1968 a series of armed clashes between government security forces and communist terrorists in Java, Sumatra, Sulawesi, and Kalimantan. An upsurge in autumn 1968 in guerrilla activities in East Java led to a large-scale army offensive which smashed the communist base and took a large number of prisoners, including members of a newly-established PKI Politburo.

Moscow reacted immediately to the new debacle by asserting that 'the Communist movement in Indonesia had suffered another disaster' and by castigating Peking for its policy of 'Maoist adventurism' which had forced the weak PKI, with no mass support, 'to engage themselves in a frivolous shooting match' with 'bitter consequences'.[37] Moreover, this defeat of the pro-Chinese communist forces seems to have been accompanied by an increase in activities of Moscow and the pro-Soviet

[34] See Radio Moscow, in Indonesian to Indonesia, 31 October, *Izvestia*, 31 October and *Pravda*, 1 November 1968.

[35] *Pravda*, 16 February 1966.

[36] *Pravda*, 9 November 1967.

[37] See *Pravda*, 14 September and Radio Moscow, in Indonesian to Indonesia, 28 September 1968.

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'Marxist-Leninist PKI'. Charges increased of Soviet subversion in Indonesia: of the large size of the Soviet embassy in Djakarta and its efforts to reconstruct the PKI, as well as Soviet 'assistance' to students who had returned to Indonesia from studying in Moscow. In May 1969, the Soviets took a significant step when Radio Moscow broadcast—to Indonesia in the Indonesian language—a new 'programme' of the 'Marxist-Leninist group of the PKI'. Denouncing the 'fascist military dictatorship' in power in Djakarta—one of the first times Moscow condoned such a charge—the programme called for a 'united national front among all patriotic forces', for democratizing the state apparatus and community life, general elections, stopping the terror, amnesty to prisoners, revoking the ban on Marxism-Leninism, solving the economic crisis, and improving the workers' conditions. Radio Moscow said: 'we wish success to our beloved comrades'.[38] Subsequent Soviet commentary, such as the one commemorating the 49th anniversary of the PKI, continued to stress that:

> In an underground struggle for the interests of the workers and peasants and for national independence, the communists of Indonesia have *the support of their colleagues in the Soviet Union* and elsewhere in the world.[39]

Soviet efforts regarding a new PKI have been significant enough to have earned strong Chinese attacks. Alluding to the split in the Indonesian communist movement between pro-Chinese and pro-Soviet elements, a statement by Peking-oriented PKI remnants asserted that the 'Indonesian communists continue to purge from their ranks the evil poison of modern revisionism [i.e. pro-Moscow elements], which daydreams of pursuing a peaceful course and suppressing armed struggle'. Moreover:

> The Soviet revisionist renegade clique has still further exposed itself as socio-imperialism and socio-fascism which collaborates with U.S. imperialism in suppressing the revolutionary struggle of peoples through the world. They also strive to deceive the Indonesian people by describing the Suharto-Nasution regime as being anti-imperialist. *Through a handful of Indonesian revisionist renegades* they have stepped up their effort to peddle the rotten goods of revisionism to the Indonesian revolutionary people's movement. *Through the so-called Marxist-Leninist group of the PKI* they intend to usurp the name of the PKI to create havoc among Indonesian revolutionary ranks and in the interests of the meeting of revisionist parties of various countries to be held in Moscow. The Marxist-Leninists and revolutionary people of Indonesia firmly oppose their intrigues and will oppose and crush their brutal efforts to sabotage and suppress the armed struggle of the Indonesian people.[40]

[38] Radio Moscow, 17 May 1969.
[39] Radio Moscow, in English to South Asia, 23 May 1969.
[40] Radio Peking, in Indonesian to Indonesia, 4 June 1969. Italics by the author.

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A document of the pro-Soviet group answered in kind, again attacking Chinese adventurism and calling for the building up mass support and the consolidation of a Marxist-Lenist (i.e. pro-Soviet) party. Nevertheless, in an effort to lag not too far behind in revolutionary ardour, the statement called on the Marxist-Leninist communists to wage a 'vigorous struggle' against the military regime and to overthrow it.[41] The Soviet position was clarified further in the message in June 1969 to the Indonesian communists from the Moscow conference of 75 communist and workers parties:

> . . . All of progressive mankind wrathfully condemns the crimes of the military dictatorship in Indonesia and its antinational policy.
>
> The communist movement in Indonesia is alive despite the police terror. In exceedingly difficult underground conditions, many Indonesian communists are conducting a struggle for the revitalization of the Communist Party of Indonesia, for the interests of the working people. They are courageously defending the country's national independence from encroachments of imperialism, which is making use of the Indonesian ruling circles' antipopular and antinational policy. . . .[42]

There were yet other indications of the declining state of relations between Moscow and Djakarta. Indonesian foreign policy was coming increasingly under fire from the Soviet leaders. Two years ago, stated Radio Moscow at the beginning of 1969, the Soviet Union thought Indonesian foreign policy would remain the same—'independent'—but this had not been the case. 'In a short time the new order in Djakarta has liquidated its democratic achievements . . .', said the broadcast, going to a point of condemnation not quite reached before. The new regime had let in foreign capital, denationalized enterprises, neglected agrarian reform, and allowed widespread inflation, poverty and corruption.[43] Another broadcast seemed to go even further:

> Now, at the helm of the government in Djakarta stand reactionary forces who are intent on restoring the old relations with the imperialist powers and their monopolies.[44]

Concern continued to be expressed about the possible military role of ASEAN and Indonesian wavering on the Vietnam question. Indonesian leaders complained of Moscow's reluctance to aid in Indonesia's economic development and decried the steadily decreasing trade between Indonesia and the Soviet Union and the East European bloc. Foreign Minister Malik admitted that Moscow was not offering new aid and there were no reports of progress. Military relations were likewise at a standstill.

The military regime in Djakarta was sensitive to these problems

[41] Radio Moscow, in Indonesian to Indonesia, 6 June 1969.
[42] *Pravda*, 15 June 1969.
[43] Radio Moscow, in Indonesian to Indonesia, 1 February 1969.
[44] Radio Moscow, in Indonesian to Indonesia, 25 March 1969.

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and to continued Soviet involvement with a new PKI. It was obvious, said Radio Djakarta, referring to a *Tass* dispatch on the PKI's struggle, that the activities of PKI remnants 'are supported and masterminded by the international communist movement'.[45] President Suharto stated pointedly in April 1969 that Indonesia would not interfere in the internal affairs of any foreign country that may subscribe to the communist indeology, and, at the same time, no country had the right to interfere in Indonesia's domestic affairs. Foreign Minister Malik in June summed up the Indonesian position and the state of relations between the two countries. While reiterating that Southeast Asian security could be maintained without the interference of 'big powers',[46] Malik went on to say that he considered the Soviet Union 'a factor' in Southeast Asia and that Indonesia wanted to have as good relations with it and with other socialist countries as with other countries. He made clear, however, that he was referring particularly to economic relations:

> We always look forward to having good economic relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries on the basis of mutual respect, equal rights, and *not to interfere with each others' internal problems.*

And even in this limited sense there were major difficulties in Soviet-Indonesian relations, for in the words of the news agency *Antara*, the Foreign Minister added that: '*This idea cannot easily materialize, since it needs mutual understanding on both sides.*'[47] Almost one year later, in May 1970, Suharto was still making clear that a 'good relationship' between Djakarta and Moscow did not exist as the Soviet Union lacked 'understanding about developments in Indonesia'.[48]

IN light of past Soviet policies in Indonesia—both prior to and since the 1965 coup—it would seem unreasonable to expect that the Russians would go wholly in the direction of supporting a new PKI at the expense of closing the door to the possibility of improved relations with the Suharto regime. Indeed, there are some isolated indications of a continuing Soviet willingness to deal with the Government in Djakarta. In March 1969 it was announced that Moscow offered to build a tyre factory in East Sumatra. The Russians have indicated an interest in taking part in the development of the tin and fishing industries and reportedly have hinted that some 25 million dollars worth of aid might be extended to help Indonesia complete

[45] Radio Djakarta, 16 June 1969.

[46] Malik has continued to emphasize the need to keep the 'big powers' out of the Southeast Asian and India Ocean area. At a time when the Soviet Union seems to be expanding significantly its naval strength in the Indian Ocean area generally, Malik has stressed the neutrality of the area and, pointedly, that there was no justification for any military bases there. See, for example, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, No. 12, 19 March 1970, p. 4.

[47] *Antara*, 7 June 1969.

[48] *New York Times*, May 24, 1970.

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the Tjilegon steel mill in West Java and the Tjilatjap superphosphate plant in Central Java.[49]

One major stumbling block to any improvement in relations into middle 1970 seems to have derived from the long-standing problem of Indonesia's repayment of its debt to the Soviet Union. Although Djakarta's non-Communist creditors largely met its requests for a longer grace period, lower interest rates, and a longer period of repayment, Moscow was unwilling to grant similar concessions. Month-long negotiations were carried out by a Soviet delegation in Indonesia in the autumn of 1969 but these failed to produce an agreement. Foreign Minister Malik made a special trip to Moscow in February 1970 again without success. All the Soviet government paper *Izvestia* could state after that visit was that 'opinions were exchanged on problems connected with the state of economic and commercial ties between the two countries'.[50] It was not until Malik spent almost a week in Moscow in late August that an accord could be reached. Perhaps indicating the coolness of relations, the Soviet press again made no mention of the Indonesian's arrival and the only acknowledgement of the whole issue was an *Izvestia* statement two days after the signing—and the day after Malik left Moscow—that an 'understanding' had been reached and 'an agreement signed on conditions for Indonesia's liquidation of credits owed to the Soviet Union'.[51] No details were given by the Soviets and the only light shed on them was in a press conference Malik held in Moscow—again not reported in the Soviet press—the day of the signing. At that time he indicated that the Russians' terms were similar to those Indonesia had with Western creditors and that the thirty-year repayment period would begin on December 31, 1970.[52]

Given the lack of any further details it may still be too early to draw any conclusions as to the effect the agreement will have on Soviet-Indonesian relations. Nevertheless, according to a press statement made by Malik on his return to Indonesia, the USSR had expressed its readiness in principle to extend economic aid to Indonesia.[53] Malik said that work would be resumed on projects discontinued after the abortive 1965 coup. The projects to be given priority were the nuclear power station at Serpong, the iron and steel project at Tjilegon and the super-phosphate project at Tjilatjap. It was later announced that a Soviet economic delegation was to visit Indonesia in the near future to discuss economic co-operation between the two countries, particularly in the processing of tin and bauxite. A Soviet survey team was also expected to visit Djakarta and to work on the abandoned projects. At the same time Malik stressed that the

[49] See, for example, William J. Coughlin in the *Los Angeles Times*, 15 March 1970.
[50] *Izvestia*, 27 February 1970.
[51] *Izvestia*, 29 August 1970.
[52] *New York Times*, 28 August 1970.
[53] Moscow Radio in Indonesian on 5 December 1970 commented that resuming aid to Indonesia would 'alleviate the workers' plight'.

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agreement 'was not linked to any political questions'.[54] Recent Soviet commentary, continuing to be sparse, does seem to confirm that the status quo has been maintained. Moscow's position has continued to be one of criticizing Indonesia for its domestic and international policy of anti-communism. Internally, such a policy of 'political genocide', said a typical *New Times* analysis in October, has destroyed Indonesian unity without which it was impossible to overcome the 'continuing economic crisis'. Inviting in the 'capitalist monopolies' only conceals and increases the country's economic ills. In foreign policy, the same article stressed, 'certain political quarters in Indonesia 'are trying to get the government to renounce the traditional policy of non-alignment and join aggressive pro-imperialist blocs in Asia, and are hampering normalization of relations with socialist countries'.[55] Especially with President Nixon's mid-1969 visit to Indonesia and that of Vice-President Agnew in early 1970, Moscow has put even greater emphasis on the danger of Indonesian support for Washington in Vietnam, of the militarization of ASEAN, and generally of Indonesia forsaking its 'traditional policy of neutrality in international affairs'.[56]

The fact that the Soviets are still issuing such 'warnings', and that they still contend that Indonesia's independence is only 'threatened', not eradicated, indicates that they feel the situation is still in flux. One would expect, then, at least in the short term, that the Soviet leaders will strive to keep their options open and avoid committing themselves wholly either to the support of a new but weak PKI or to the military regime in power. Certainly, they want more flexibility than they had in Sukarno's Indonesia in the early and middle 1960s. Future Soviet policy will depend particularly on Djakarta's foreign policy and degree of neutrality, and on the development, as well, of the 'Marxist-Leninist PKI'. Should Indonesia maintain some independence from the West and should the new PKI not gain strength very rapidly, both of which seem plausible, one might expect Soviet policies to return to those of the mid-1950s although with noticeably less optimism, when the Soviet Union began its 'Indonesian offensive'. For, unless the Soviet leadership becomes *totally* opposed to the giving of foreign aid to third world countries, Moscow may well follow through its analysis that the 'harmful' and 'dangerous' aspects of Indonesian policy are due to the country's 'economic dependence on the consortium of creditor countries in which Washington plays the leading role',[57] and seek to offer Indonesia once again an alternative source of economic aid and support, and perhaps military assistance.

[54] *Antara*, 31 August 1970.
[55] I. Antonov, 'Against Indonesia's National Interests', *New Times*, No. 40, 7 October 1970, pp. 25–26. See also *Izvestia*, 13 October 1970.
[56] See, for example, Radio Moscow, in Indonesian to Indonesia, 30 June and 23 July 1969, and I. Antonov, 'Washington's Asian Doctrine', *New Times*, No. 6, 10 February 1970, p. 12.
[57] Antonov, "Washington's Asian Doctrine', *New Times*, p. 12.

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